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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigated differences between semantic and 
autobiographical memories of the same item. 
In a review of the problem area [Part 1] it was shown that 
the semantic/episodic distinction, SED, [Tulving 1972, 1983] had 
not been unequivocally supported by research and was open to a 
number of theoretical criticisms. A revised version of SED 
focusing on content and organizational differences [as opposed 
to process differences1 between the two classes of memory was 
shown to be less vunerable to theoretical criticism, to 
accomodate past findings more fully, and to suggest ways in 
which the two 
distinguished. 
classes of memory might be 
The revised version of SED 
more markedly 
emphasised the 
autobiographical content of episodic memories and suggested ways 
in which the two classes of memory may be related. 
A series of experiments are reported (Part 2] which 
investigated the hypotheses that autobiographical and semantic 
memories of the same items differed in terms of the information 
that they represented, were differently organized, and were 
indirectly connected. A number of experimental techniques were 
employed including free descriptions, priming, property 
verification, and cued recall of images drawn from either 
8emantic ur autobiographical memories. 
lent strong support to these hypotheses. 
Page 2 
Overall the findings 
It is concluded [Part 3] that autobiographical and 
semantic memories of the same items differ in terms of the 
information which they represent and in their forms of 
organization 
version of SED 
in memory. These findings validated the revised 
which emphasised representational differences 
such as content and organization rather than process differences 
and also supported the proposal that that the two classes of 
memory were represented in a unitary memory store rather than in 
functionally separate memory stores. The implications of the 
findings for the study of autobiographical memory, semantic 
memory, categorization, and imagery are discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
OVERVIEW 
This thesis was based on the observation that a person may 
simultaneously hold an autobiographical and semantic memory of the same 
item. For example a person may have an autobiographical memory of a 
chair and a semantic memory of a typical instance of a chair [Rosch, 
1978; Mervis and Rosch, 1981]. Two central questions which the thesis 
attempted to answer were; a] how do these two types of memory differ ?, 
and b] what relations exist between the two types of memory? Part 1 
[chapters 2 to 6] considered past work and theorizing into these two 
questions. Part 2 [chapters 7 to 11] reports a series of investigations 
of hypotheses relating to the two questions. Part 3 [chapter 12] 
sUmmarizes the main findings and conclusions, discusses problems related 
to the research, and considers theoretical implications of the findings. 
Part 1 
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Chapter 2 critically evaluates Tulving's [1972; 1983] 
semantic/episodic distinction [SED] and experimental investigations of 
SED are then reviewed. It is shown that SED is not unequivocally 
supported by the evidence nor, in its current formulation, is it immune 
from theoretical criticisms. It is proposed that a revised version of 
SED which emphasises the personal content of episodic memories avoids 
some of the theoretical criticisms and suggests ways in which the two 
classes of memory may be more effectively distinguished. The term 
'autobiographical memory' is prefered to the term 'episodic memory'. 
Chapter J reviews research into autobiographical memory and it 
is shown that that autobiographical memories have been found to 
represent information about the context in which objects and events were 
experienced. Research into autobiographical memories also indicated 
that such memories may connect to script-like semantic memories [Schank, 
1975; Schank and Ableson, 1978]. It was noted that autobiographical 
memories had been found to come to mind in the form of images. 
Chapter 4 reviews research and theorizing into semantic 
memory. It is observed that a general characteristic of semantic memory 
is that semantic memories are represented in networks. Research into 
the semantic representation of scripts and categories is then reviewed 
and a general model of semantic category representation specified. It 
is shown that past work has heavily implicated general perceptual 
attributes in semantic category representation. It is also noted that 
semantic categories at the 'basic' level [Rosch, 1978] have been found 
to be highly imagible. 
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Chapter 5 considers recent research and theorizing into 
imagery and it is observed that virtually all this research has studied 
images drawn from semantic memory. Theories of imagery [e.g. Koss1yn , 
1980] have emphasised the transitory nature of images and argued that 
images are 'generated' from from underlying memories. It is shown that 
current theories of imagery postulate that image generation reflects the 
character of the underlying memories. It is proposed that imagery 
presents one way in which autobiographical and semantic memories of the 
same item may be independently accessed. 
Chapter 6 states the main aims of the research and the 
hypotheses to be investigated. The central hypothesis is that 
autobiographical and semantic memories will be found to differ most 
markedly in terms of the information that they represent. A secondary 
hypothesis is that autobiographical and semantic memories will differ in 
terms of their organization. Finally it was hypothesised that 
autobiographical memories would be found to be connected to semantic 
representations of scripts. 
Part 2 
Chapter 7 reports two experiments. Experiment 1 gathered 
typicality, or goodness-of-example, ratings of items drawn from nine 
common categories. Experiment 2 gathered two types of ratings of the 
imagibility of items drawn from different typicality levels. In the 
first set of imagery ratings 5s were asked to rate the imagibility of 
'typical instances' [TI} of objects and activities named to them. In 
the second set of imagery ratings different Ss rated the imagibi1ity of 
, 
personal instances' [PI] of the same objects and activities. TI 
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imagery ratings were found to be positively correlated with typicality 
whereas PI imagery ratings were found to be, in part, negatively 
correlated with typicality. These results tentatively indicated that 
autobiographical memories, from which PI images were judged to have been 
drawn, were not organized in memory in terms of typicality; whereas 
semantic memories, from which TI images were judged to have been drawn, 
were organized in terms of typicality. Suggesting that autobiographical 
and semantic memories were differently organized in memory. 
Chapter 8 reports experiment 3 in which two groups of Ss were 
required to generate and then describe either PI or TI images of the 
same highly typical and atypical items. These items were selected from 
experiments 1 and 2. It was hypothesised that descriptions of PI images 
would predominatly contain context specific information about the imaged 
item and that descriptions of TI images would predominatly contain 
information about the general [context free] perceptual properties of 
the imaged item. It was also hypothesised that information contained in 
descriptions of TI images of highly typical items would overlap whereas 
information contained in descriptions of TI images of atypical items 
would exhibit little overlap [Rosch and Mervis, 1975] indicating that 
the images had been drawn from semantic categories. In contrast it was 
predicted that information contained in PI images of highly typical and 
atypical items would not overlap indicating that these images had not 
been drawn from either semantic categories or memories organized in 
terms of attribute overlap. It was found that descriptions of PI images 
were dominated by experiential context specific information about the 
imaged item whereas descriptions of TI images were dominated by context 
free general perceptual information about the imaged item. These 
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findings indicated that autobiographical and semantic memories of the 
same items differed markedly in terms of the type of information that 
they contained. The predicted pattern of information overlap was 
observed for TI image descriptions indicating that these images had been 
drawn from semantic categories. The information contained in PI images 
was not found to overlap with the exception of information about the 
locations in which the imaged items had been encountered. This 
indicated that PI images were not drawn from semantic categories but 
that they either contained or connected to, semantic information about 
locations. It was concluded that autobiographical and semantic memories 
differed in terms of the information they represented and in terms of 
their organization in memory and that autobiographical memories 
contained/connected to semantic information concerning locations. 
Chapter 9 reports two experiments. A major criticism of 
experiment 3 was that the slightly different imagery instructions used 
in PI and TI may have predisoposed 5s to describe their images in 
certain ways and so the observed content difference may have related 
more to nature of the imagery description than to nature of the image. 
Experiment 4 investigated content differences between autobiographical 
and semantic memories in a way which obviated this criticism. It was 
reasoned that, as experiment 3 had found that autobiographical memories 
Contained experiential context specific information and were not 
Organized in semantic categories and that semantic memories contained 
general perceptual information and were organized in semantic 
categories, then TI image generation should be facilitated, and PI image 
generation should be inhibited, by semantic category primes. Three 
types of prime were constructed, a] picture primes that depicted typical 
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perceptual properties of the category, b] word primes that named the 
category, and c] a coloured slide that acted as a no-prime. It was 
predicted that TI image generation would be most faclitated by picture 
primes, followed by word primes, and would not be facilitated in the 
no-prime condition. It was predicted that PI image generation would be 
inhibited by both picture and word primes and that fastest PI image 
generation times would be observed in the no-prime condition. 
A further factor was that of organization. To examine this 
the typicality level of the to-be-imaged items was varied and stimuli 
were selected from highly typical [HT] , mediumly typical [MT] , and 
atypical [AT], levels. It was hypothesised that in the TI condition 
image generation times [IGTs] would be fastest to HT exemplars, slower 
to MT exemplars, and slowest to AT exemplars, whereas in the PI 
condition IGTs would be similar at all typicality levels. 
It was found that TI IGTs were faster to picture primes, 
slower to no-primes, and slowest to word primes. PI IGTs were fastest 
to no-primes, slower to picture primes and slowest to word primes. It 
is argued that for various reasons the word prime effect failed and, in 
fact, acted to inhibit image generation in both PI and TI. Effects to 
picture primes and no-primes were as predicted with the somewhat 
unexpected finding that unprimed PI images were generated marginally 
faster than picture primed TI images. The results, tentatively, 
confirmed the hypothesis that semantic memories [TIl contained typical 
perceptual information which autobiographical memories did not contain. 
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The predicted typicality effect was observed for T1 images and 
a similar [unpredicted] typicality effect was observed for PI imagers to 
picture and word primes. It was argued that semantic category primes 
induced typicality effects in PI. However an unexpected typicality 
effect was observed in the PI no-prime condition. IGTs were equally 
fast to HT and AT exemplars but siginificantly slower to MT exemplars. 
A re-examination of the stimuli suggested that mediumly typical 
exemplars named objects and activities that may have been less recently 
encountered by Ss and, so, less recently encoded. It was speculatively 
suggested that the PI IGTs may have been related to the availablity of 
autobiographical memories which were organized in terms of recency of 
encoding. It was concluded that the results, although containing 
unpredicted findings, tentatively confirmed the hypothesis that 
autobiographical and semantic memories were differently organized. 
Experiment 5 indirectly investigated the suggestion that 
recency of encoding may have deterimined no-primed PI IGTs at different 
typicality levels in experiment 4. Ratings of how recently Ss had 
encountered items drawn from HT, MT, and AT, typicality levels were 
found to be distributed in a manner very similar to that of no-prime PI 
IGTs. It was concluded that autobiographical memories were organized, 
at least in part, in terms of recency of encoding. 
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Chapter 10 reports three experiments. It was decided that 
additional normative data would have to gathered in order to investigate 
content differnces further. Experiment 6 gathered production frequency 
norms of perceptual and locational attributes given to exemplars drawn 
from three typicality levels in nine categories. It was predicted that 
perceptual attributes would overlap in a manner similar to that found by 
Rosch and Mervis [1975], HT exemplars would exhibit most overlap, MT 
exemplars would exhibit less overlap, and AT exemplars would exhibit 
little or no overlap. As experiment 3 had found that locational 
attributes exhibited some overlap it was predicted that these attributes 
would exhibit a pattern of attribute overlap similar to that of 
perceptual attribute overlap but not as marked. Both predictions were 
confirmed. 
Experiment 7 had the aim of replicating the no-prime PI and TI 
imagery condition employed in experiment 4 and of examining content 
differences more directly. It was decided to require 5s to verify 
locational and perceptual attributes of exemplars after generating a PI 
or TI image of the exemplar. It was predicted, on the basis of 
experiments 3 and 4, that TI imaging would facilitate the verification 
of perceptual attributes but not locational attributes, whereas PI 
imaging would facilitate the verification of locational attributes but 
not perceptual attributes. It was reasoned that autobiographical 
memories either contained the required information about the 
to-be-verified location or connected directly to that information but 
did not contain nor connected directly to information about typical 
perceptual attributes. Conversely it was reasoned that semantic 
memories either contained the required information about the 
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to-be-verified perceptual attribute or connected directly to that 
information but did not contain nor connected directly to information 
about locations. 
There were two independent variables, image generation time 
[IGT] and attribute verification time [AVT]. The to-be-imaged exemplars 
were the same as those employed in experiment 4. It was predicted that 
IGTs would be similar to those observed in the no-prime PI and TI 
conditions in experiment 4. It was also predicted that there would be 
no effect of typicality for AVTs. 
All the predictions were confirmed. IGTs indicated that 
semantic memories were organized in semantic categories in terms of 
typicality whereas autobiographical memories were organized in terms of 
recency of encoding. The ATVs indicated that semantic memories 
contained or connected directly to information about typical perceptual 
attributes whereas autobiographical memories did not. Autobiographical 
memories contained or connected to information about locations. It was 
concluded that autobiographical and semantic memories contained 
different information and were differently organized. 
Experiment 8 employed a similar design to experiment 7. In 
this experiment Ss were required to generate PI and TI images of the 
same exemplars as those employed in experiment 7. After image 
generation Ss were required to recall the exemplars in multi-cued recall 
test. The cues were perceptual and locational attributes. It was 
predicted that locational attributes would facilitate the recall of 
exemplars that had previously been PI imaged but would not facilitate, 
to the same extent, the recall exemplars that had previously been Tl 
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imaged. Conversely it was predicted that perceptual attributes would 
facilitate the recall of exemplars that had previously been TI imaged 
but would not facilitate, to the 8ame extent, the recall exemplars that 
had previously been PI imaged. Both predictions were confirmed lending 
further support to the hypothesised content distinction. 
Chapter 11 contains three experiments which indirectly 
examined connections between autobiographical and semantic memories. As 
experiments 3, 7, and 8, had found that autobiographical memories either 
contained or connected to semantic information about locations and that 
semantic memories either contained or connected to information about 
typical perceptual attributes it was decided to examine the structure of 
these attributes in memory. It was reasoned that information about 
locational and perceptual attribute structure would facilitate 
inferences concerning the connectivity of autobiographical and semantic 
memories. Ss were require to make similarities judgments of sets of 
perceptual attributes and exemplars [experiment 9], sets of locational 
attributes and exemplars [experiment 10], and a set comprised of 
locational and perceptual 
similarity judgments were 
attributes and exemplars. The resulting 
subject to multi-dimensional scaling [MDS]. 
It was hypothesised that perceptual attributes and exemplars would be 
found to be distributed around a perceptual prototype whereas locational 
attributes and exemplars would be found to be distributed in terms of 
script-like structures. It was further hypothesised that, when judged 
together, script-like structures [locational attributes] would be found 
to 'point' to perceptual prototypes. 
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The findings confirmed the hypotheses. It was concluded that 
autobiographical and semantic memories of the same items only indirectly 
connected to each other via script-like semantic representations. 
Part 3 
In Chapter 12 the findings are summarized, evaluated, and 
discussed. It is concluded that a semantic/autobiographical distinction 
[SAD] which emphasises representational differences between the two 
classes of memory has been found to be a more efficacious distinction 
than the earlier SED. Autobiographical memories have been found to 
represent experiential context specific information whereas semantic 
memories have been found to represent general perceptual information. 
Semantic memories have been shown to be organized in semantic categories 
whereas autobiographical memories were not. Thus autobiographical and 
semantic memories differed in terms of the information that they 
represented and in terms of their organization. Further it was found 
that semantic and autobiographical memories of the same items connected 
only indirectly. 
Problems associated with the research are discussed and a 
number of ways in which the experiments might have been improved are 
outlined. Implications of the findings for future research are then 
conSidered. It is proposed that future research might profitably 
address the question of organization in autobiographical memory. It is 
also proposed that semantic memory researchers should extended their 
investigations to semantic structures other than semantic cat£gories. 
It is argued that these investigations are prerequisite to the further 
stUdy of connections between autobiographical and semantic memories. 
Part 1 
The Problem Area 
CHAPTER 2 
DISTINGUISHING AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL AND SEMANTIC MEMORIES 
In this introductory chapter Tulvings' [1972) 
original formulation of the semantic-episodic distinction 
[hitherto refered to as SED] is considered. Experimental 
investigations of SED are then reviewed. Following this 
developmental evidence bearing on SED is discussed. 
Alternatives to SED are then considered and the semantic 
content of episodic memory is discussed. Finally Tulving's 
[1983] reformulation of SED is detailed. It is concluded 
that SED is not unequivocally supported by the evidence nor, 
in its current formulation, is it immune from theoretical 
criticisms. It is argued that a revised SED which 
emphasises the personal content of episodic memory avoids 
some of the theoretical criticisms and points the way 
towards investigations that, at the very least, hold the 
promise of empirically distinguishing the two classes of 
memory. In order to draw attention to the personal aspect 
of episodic memories the term 'episodic memory' is rejected 
and replaced by the term 'autobiographical memory', [c.f. 
J.Mandler, 1979; Brewer 1982]. 
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2.0 Episodic and Semantic Memories. 
Tulving [1972] drew a distinction between 'semantic' 
and 'episodic' memory in which semantic memory was conceived 
as " ••• a mental thesaurus, organized knowledge a person 
possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their 
meaning and referents about relations among them, and about 
rules, formulas, and algorithms, for the manipulation of 
these symbols, concepts, and relations ... " [p.386]. In 
contrast episodic memory was conceived as 
" ••• autobiographical events, describable in terms of their 
perceptible dimensions and attributes and in terms of their 
temporal-spatial relations ••• " [p.387]. Tulving went on to 
suggest that different retrieval processes might operate on 
these different memories with different modes of reference, 
i.e. autobiographical vs. cognitive. Nelson and Brown 
[1979] summarized these distinctions in the following table, 
[see over]. 
These 
dis tinguishing 
then are 
criteria 
the three most explicit 
outlined by Tulving [1972]. Other 
criteria are put foward but are less clearly stated and 
appear 
Brown] • 
to be 
The 
of less central importance [see Nelson and 
first entry in Table 2.1.1 specifies a 
'content' distinction between the two memory classes. The 
second entry suggests an 'organizational' distinction and 
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Table 2.1.1 Tulving's Distinction Between Episodic and 
Semantic Memory 
[Extract from Nelson and Brown, 1978, p.235. All entries are 
quotes from Tulving, 1972, p.385-3861 
Nature of 
stored 
information 
Autobiogra-
-phlcal vs. 
cognitive 
reference 
Conditions 
and conseq-
-uences of 
retrieval 
Episodic 
Receives stored infor-
-mation about tempora-
-lly dated episodes or 
~vents and temporal-
-spatial relations am-
-ong these events 
Always stored in terms 
of its autobiographical 
reference to the 
already existing 
contents of the 
episodic memory store 
Retrieval serves as a 
special type of input 
to episodic memory and 
thus changes the 
contents of the 
episodic store 
Semantic 
Semantic memory is the 
memory neccessary for 
usage of language 
Cognitive referents of 
input signals 
Retrieval of 
information from the 
system leaves its 
contents unchanged 
------------------------------------------------------------------
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the third entry indicates a 'processing' distinction. It is 
apparent that these distinguishing or 'diagnostic' [Tulving, 
1983] features are not clearly articulated. For instance 
the entry 'semantic memory is neccessary for the usage of 
language' suggests a linguistic content of semantic memory. 
Yet ~ost theorists assume that linguistic knowledge and 
conceptual knowledge are relatively independent [Ortony, 
1975; Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976]. The point is that 
Tulving's diagnostic features are somewhat fuzzy [c.f. 
Tulving, 1983, for comment on this] and, as will be shown 
below, this has given rise to research which has been 
equally fuzzy about which diagnostic feature was being 
studied. 
Tulving's 
In contrast what was particularly clear was 
hypothetical suggestion that the two memory 
classes were represented in functionally independent 
systems. A functional distinction is here conceived as 
being similar to the sort of distinction drawn between long 
term Rnd short term memory in which different sorts of 
processes and organization are thought to operate in the two 
different memories [see discussion of Anderson and Ross, 
1980, below, section 1.1]. Further, the two stores are 
thought of as being represented in different areas of the 
brain [see section 1.3, below, for further discussion of 
this point]. One of the purposes of this chapter is to 
demonstrate that functional independence is not a neccesary 
criteria of SED and that a modified SED which does not make 
such an assumption is best able to accomodate experimental 
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findings and theoretical criticisms. A further aim is to 
consider whether all three of the diagnostic features 
contained in Table 2.1.1 are equally central to SED. 
Tulving [1972] further complicates the specification 
of SED when he goes on to argue that " ••• The distinction 
between episodic and semantic memory systems should not be 
construed as representing the beginning of some new theory 
of memory. Rather, the point of view of the two as separate 
systems represents an orienting attitude or a pretheoretical 
Position whose major usefulness may turn out to lie in 
facilitating theory construction, without in any way 
circumscribing the nature of possible theories ••• " [p.384]. 
Nevertheless, and as already discussed, it was implicit in 
the orginal paper that Tulving intended the distinction to 
be of more than simply heuristic value. Nelson and Brown 
[1978] also note this equivocation between SED as a 
heuristic, or as a functional, memory distinction. Thus it 
is not 8uprising that, since Tulving [1972], memory 
researchers have divided on these issues, some holding to 
SED as a 'conceptual heuristic' only and/or rejecting it 
wholly in favour of a single-store view of long term memory 
[Anderson and Bower, 1973; Anderson, 1976; Anderson and 
Ross, 1980; Baddeley, 1976: Lindsay and Norman, 1977; 
McKoon and Ratcliff, 1979; McCloskey and Santee, 1981; 
Schank, 1975; Schank and Abelson, 1977]; while others have 
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elevated the dichotomy to a functional model of memory 
[e.g.Atkinson, Herrmann, and Westcourt, 1974; Kintsch, 
1975; Lockhart, Craik, and Jacoby, 1976; Tulving 1976; 
Watkins and Tulving, 1975; Shoben, Westcourt, and Smith, 
1978; Herrmann and Harwood, 1980; Tulving 1983}. 
Before considering a less equivocal formulation of 
the distinction, experimental investigations directly 
concerned with SED will be outlined. It will become evident 
that the findings are contradictory and it will be argued 
that this is related to the failure of reseachers to fully 
accese episodic memories with a high autobiographical 
content. It will be argued that at least in part this is a 
product of the lack of clarity in Tulving's [1972j 
specification of SED and his insistence that SED is a 
functional distinction. 
2.1 Direct Experimental Evidence. 
Although, suprisingly, there is a paucity of 
research directly concerned with SED the objective of 
relevant experimental investigations has been to establish 
whether or not the two types of memory are functionally 
distinct. Typically this research employs reaction time 
paradigms that seek to selectively draw upon one store or 
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the other. Shoben, Westcourt, and Smith, [1978] carried out 
two experiments employing a sentence verification task, 
assumed to be a semantic memory task, and a sentence 
recogaition task, assumed to be an episodic memory task. 
Semantic relatedness was found to effect verification 
latencies but not recognition latencies. Conversely the 
number of predicates stored with a concept was found to 
effect recognition latencies but not verification latencies. 
From these confirmatory findings Shoben et al argued that 
semantic information was represented by semantic features, 
[see chapter 4, below, for a discussion of semantic 
features], whereas episodic information was represented in a 
more " ••• surface-like format ••• " [p.31S]. It may be noted 
in passing that the phrase 'surface like format' implies 
Some type of imagery and, in the discussion of 
autobiographical memory, chapter 3, the role of imagery will 
be more fully explicated. Thus Shoben et a1 conclude that 
the two stores are functionally separate: semantic memory 
is organized in semantic networks of features upon which, 
presumably, process such as spreading activation act; 
episodic memory is not organized in networks of related 
features but in some more literal fashion such that size of 
the input affects recall. The two diagnostic features 
supported by this finding are those of organizational and 
proceSSing diferences (second and third entries in Table 
2.1.1] 
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However McCloskey and Santee [1981] strongly 
criticized Shoben et al's methodology in accessing episodic 
information, [number of predicates stored with a concept], 
pointing out that their claims are only valid if it can be 
shown that the retrieval process they assumed, drawn from 
liAM [Anderson and Bower, 1973], was correct. McCloskey and 
Santee went on to argue that Shoben et aI's findings can be 
accounted for by assuming that some aspect of the liAM 
process model is incorrect, rather than assuming the 
functional independence of episodic and semantic memory. In 
addition McCloskey and Santee reported findings lending 
support to their methodological criticism of the Shoben et 
al experiment and, more importantly, illustrating that 
concepts in episodic memory may be represented by semantic 
features. They conclude by remarking that " ••• we can see no 
obvious basis for the claim that semantic and episodic 
representations are different ••• " [p.70]. It will emerge 
that such claims and counter-claims are characteristic of 
this literature and it is not until studies of 
autobiographical memory are considered [Chapter 3] that 
substantive differences become evident. The point to be 
made here is that the encoding of a list of unrelated 
sentences most probably gave rise to a memory trace that was 
primarily dominated by a record of semantic processing 
performed at encoding. Such memories have little reference 
to the self and although 'episodic' are probably closely 
associated with, and very rapidly assimilated to, the 
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semantic system. Hence, perhaps, the failure to observe 
persistent differences using this sort of paradigm. 
Whatever the case it is particularly noteworthy that both 
these studies overlooked the first of the diagnostic 
features listed in table 2.1.1, namely the content 
difference. 
Further evidence against SEn comes from McKoon and 
Ratcliff [1979]. McKoon and Ratcliff reported a series of 
experiments employing priming between paired associates in 
lexical decision and item recognition paradigms. The paired 
associates were either novel [and therefore, presumably, 
held in an episodic store], or strongly associated 
preexperimentally and hence asssumed to activate semantic 
memory. It was found that the effects of priming were 
Similar in the two conditions suggesting that similar, if 
not identical, processes were at work in both memory 
systems. Hence the claim of functional seperation of 
semantic and episodic memories was not supported. It was 
also found that semantic information affected decisions that 
should, logically, have been based on newly learned 
[episoQic] information. McKoon and Ratcliff concluded in 
favour of the more parsimonious single-store models [see 
section 1.3 below for a discussion of single store models]. 
However it was clear that the semantic paired associates 
used by McKoon and Ratcliff were 'over' learned in 
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comparison to the novel paired associates. Thus, as 
Her~ann and Harwood [1980J noted, priming in the two 
conditions was confounded with learning. This was a 
particularly pressing criticsm as only a short learning 
period [three seconds] was employed by McKoon and Ratcliff 
and this may well have accounted for the reliance by their 
subjects on semantic information in making judgments that 
should have drawn on episodic information. Herrmann and 
Harwood employed a more rigorous learning paradigm in their 
study and were able to show that " ••• recognition was 
influenced by the organization used in episodic memorization 
but not by preexisting semantic organization ••• " [p.467]. 
Herrmann and Harwood also pointed out that the McKoon and 
Ratcliff study was the only study to contradict previous 
work on episodic priming [McLaughlin and Herrmann, 1972; 
Herrmann and McLaughlin, 1973) which had generally favoured 
a functional seperation of SED. Herrmann and Harwood 
concluded that the contents of semantic and episodic 
memories were organized differently and hence gave rise to 
different priming effects. Nonetheless this is not 
unequivocal, given that the Mckoon and Ratcliff findings 
were, at least partly, acceptable. It is clear that the 
episodic memories investigated, in both reports, must have 
had a high semantic content. Thus failure to take into 
account content differences, while emphasiSing 
organizational and process differences which had not been 
unequivocally demonstrated, lead to findings, which at best, 
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provide very tentative support for SED. 
One further study of particular importance for SED 
was reported by Anderson and Ross [1980], although the 
importance of this study resided not so much in the 
experimental findings as in the reinterpretation of SED 
which the authors offered. Anderson and Ross reported three 
experiments which tested whether learning episodic material 
interfered with the retrieval of semantic information on the 
assumption that this would not be the case if, in fact, 
there were two separate memory stores. The results from two 
of the experiments were predicted by Anderson's ACT theory 
[Anderson 1976;1983] which makes no semantic-episodic 
distinction, but were not easily predicted by the Tulving 
[1972] version of SED. However a third finding was not 
interpretable by ACT and Anderson and Ross " ••• attr ibute the 
different results to the difference between semantic and 
biographical memories ••• " [p.462]. From this they argued 
for a general distinction between types of memories in terms 
of the contents rather than functions of different memories. 
As in the earlier discussion the term functional distinction 
refers to differences in the processes and modes of 
organization thought to be specific to separable memory 
stores. Content distinctions on the other hand refer to 
" ••• differences in the types of information being 
processed ••• " • Anderson and Ross go on to comment, " ••• The 
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point of outlining this classification of distinctions is to 
propose that the semantic-episodic distinction has been 
generally accepted as a functional distiction, when it 
should have been considered as a content distinction ••• " 
[p.464]. However, as has been noted, certain workers have 
committed SED to some form of content distinction [see Table 
2.1.1, above]. What seems to have led most researchers to 
overlook content was the emphasis placed upon the functional 
separation of the two classes of memory. Thus research has 
tended to focus on process and organizational differences. 
For instance, in reviewing research from his own laboratory 
Tulving [1976] clearly favoured a functional separation of 
episodic and semantic memories into independent systems. 
[Unfortunately this paper was only available in french and a 
translation of the complete paper was not located, although 
an english abstract was. Further the reviewed research does 
not appear to have been published in separate papers nor is 
it discussed separately by Tulving [1983). Hence the 
details of these findings were not available to this 
researcher]. 
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The conclusion to be drawn from the research 
discussed so far is that functional separation of semantic 
and episodic memories into separate systems with different 
organization and different encoding and retrieval processes 
is not unequivocally supported. Acceptance of a functional 
SED remains provisional. Further to this it has been 
pointed out that, because of the emphasis on functional 
seperation, the above research has not effectively studied 
those episodic memories that would be thought to have a high 
personal or experiential content. Content differences 
between the two classes of memory have been obscured by the 
predominant semantic content of the episodic memories 
selected for investigation. Hence the important point about 
Anderson and Ross's proposal is that it directs attention 
towards the autobiographical character of episodic memories. 
Given that organizational and process differences have 
proved difficult to effectively investigate, postulating a 
content based SED may lead to the observation of more 
clearly marked differences between the two classes of 
memory. This was, after all, the finding of Anderson and 
Ross's third experiment. 
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Prior to detailing the concept of a 'content' 
distinction further, some relevant developmental research 
into SED, which emphasises episodic memories with high 
auotbiographical content, will be briefly discussed. 
2.2 Developmental Considerations. 
The purpose of touching upon developmental research 
at this point is to illustrate that research that has 
focused more on autobiographical episodic memories, than the 
experimental studies prevoiusly discussed, tends to further 
confirm the veracity of a 'content' distinction between 
episodic and semantic memories. Anglin [1977] and Nelson 
[19781 report interview studies in which it was found that 
young children [3 to 5 year-olds] placed heavy reliance on 
personal knowledge in describing 'real-world concepts'. 
Nelson [1978] comments " ••• the conceptual network of the 
young child is derived from personal experience, is 
functionally based, and is mapped onto language terms 
directly at first ••• ". Nelson goes on to argue that 
although conceptual knowledge was drawn directly from 
experience those experiences were not a central component of 
the conceptual system. Hence she favours some unspecified 
form of SED. More explicitly Nelson and Brown [1978] 
commented that " ••• Whatever terms we wish to use, we must 
recognize that the kind of knowledge that is stored in 
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long-term memory derives from the child's experience of 
events or episodes and that it is stored at least partially 
in a form that appears to reflect those episodes directly, 
that is in autobiographical memories ••• " [p.240]. Thus long 
term memory is seen by these researchers as being comprised 
of autobiographical and conceptual knowledge [see section 
2.3, below, for further discussion of this]. 
Studies of word association among young children 
[Deese, 1965; Entwhistle, 1966; Entwhistle and McNeill, 
1970; Petrey, 1977] seem to confirm a developmental 
sequence similar to that suggested by Nelson. Of concern to 
present discussion is Petrey's [1977] reinterpretation of 
syntagmatic-paradigmatic shift [see Nelson, 1977J. Briefly, 
this 'shift' involves the child developing from relying on 
syntagmatic word associations" that is associations that do 
not preserve grammatical form class [e.g. 'high-school' 
rather than 'high-low'], to associations that do preserve 
grammatical form class, i.e. paradigmatic associations. 
Petrey argues that underlying this well documented shift is 
a shift in cognitive reference from 
episodic/autobiographical memories to semantic memory [see 
second entry in Table 2.1.1 abovel. Petrey concludes that 
" ••• whereas adult's responses are grouped primarily by 
semantic memory of words' internal content, children's 
responses display mainly episodic memories of external 
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context ••• " [p.69]. 
It thus seems that SED is accepted by at least a 
number of developmental psychologists as a theoretical 
concept of some explanatory power. It should be stressed 
that the use of the term 'episodic memory' by these 
researchers refers to types of memory quite different from 
those investigated in the research discussed previously: it 
is clear that these developmental psychologists interpret 
episodic memory to refer to 'autobiographical' memories: 
hence, perhaps, the usefulness of SED in developmental 
psychology. 
2.3 Criticisms of, and 
Semantic-Episodic Distinction. 
Alternatives to, the 
The discussion has so far examined evidence which 
although inconclusive lends most support to a content based 
SED. This section considers alternatives to SED but it will 
be seen that a content based version of SED obviates many of 
the criticisms introduced below. There are three general 
areas of criticism and alternatives to SED and these will be 
discussed under the following headings: A] Single-store 
models; B] Multi-store models; and C] Schema models. 
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A] Single-store models 
Section 1.1, above, examined experimental evidence 
bearing upon SED. Some of these experiments were reported 
by single-store theorists [Anderson and Ross, 1980; McKoon 
and Ratcliff, 1979; McCloskey and Santee, 1981]. However 
single-store theorists have 
Collins and Loftus [1975]; 
generally ignored SED, e.g. 
Anderson [1976]; Rummelhart, 
Lindsay, Norman, [1975]; Lachman and Lachman [1979]; and 
others. This is, perhaps, because for many researchers the 
distinction represented merely a heuristic for 
distinguishing different classes of research rather than 
different classes of memory. Yet, as discussed previously, 
the distinction was very quickly elevated to the status of a 
theoretical concept and as such should have presented a 
challenge to single-store models of long term memory. 
Actually this challenge is more apparent than real because 
SED only represents a criticism in its functional form. 
That is, if it is claimed that episodic and semantic 
memories are stored in different brain areas and that 
different processes operate within these stores. Certainly 
this is Tulving's [1972; 1983] position but, as has been 
shown, the evidence is contradictory on the issue of 
differential processing. 
evidence [reviewed by 
There is some neurophysiological 
Tulving, 1983, chapter 3] that 
episodic and semantic memories are differentially effectd by 
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brain injury suggesting storage in separate brain areas. 
Yet Tulving [1983; p.160] states that he envisages episodic 
memories as 'feature-bundles' clearly implying some form of 
network-like memory organization as postulated by virtually 
all single store theorists [c.f. Anderson, 1983]. If the 
functional criteria are dropped from SED both semantic and 
episodic memories could be conceived as being represented in 
the same network. Further the two classes of memory within 
the network may be separated by content differences [as 
Anderson and Ross suggested], and hence different regions of 
the network may be dominated by different classes of memory. 
Organization within regions of the network would not 
neccessarily have to be similar although, of course, all the 
types of organization that the network could support would 
be realizable in all areas of the network. This sort of 
single store-model clearly accommodates a content and, 
possibly, organizationally based SED and also permits 
different memory classes to be stored in different brain 
areas. More importantly such a model invites consideration 
of how the two clsses of memory may be connected [see 
chapter 4, below]. Thus single-store models of memory and 
SED are only mutually exclusive if the 
functionally distinct memory systems is adhered 
notion of 
to. Since 
the evidence for such a separation is inconclusive a 
modified single-store SED emphasising content differences 
may be legitimately adopted as part of the revised SED being 
worked towards here. This single-store version of SED will 
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be discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 6. 
B] Multi-store models 
SED has been frequently rejected on the basis of the 
following type of argument: since SED provides no account 
of, for instance, memory for actions there must be more than 
two memory 'stores'. In reply to this Tulving [1983] argues 
that SED only applies to declarative knowledge and that 
procedural 
distinction. 
knowledge lies outside the range 
However Tulving may be understating the 
of the 
range 
of SED. People can, afterall, recall specific actions as 
well as perform skilled actions. Thus it is not at all 
clear that memory for actions lies outside the scope of SED. 
What 1s clear is that memory for actions is an under-studied 
area and little is known concerning the structure and 
representation of actions in memory. Hence distinctions 
relating to this class of memories would seem to be 
premature. With these comments in mind multi-store models 
of memory will now be briefly examined. 
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Those workers who argue that certain classes of 
memory cannot be accomodated by SED typically put foward an 
alternative proposal featuring a multi-store model of 
memory. For example Miller and Johnson-Laird [1976] pointed 
out that 'action-memory' was overlooked by SED and argued 
that skill memory did not easily fit either episodic or 
semantic memory systems as outlined by Tulving [1972]. 
Then, having 'breached' SED, they suggested a five-fold 
categorization of 
action, geographic 
problem is that 
memory 
and 
it is 
into " ••• seman tic, episodic, 
person memories, ••• " [p.1s1]. One 
far from clear how this 
classification, based as it is on the different paradigms 
used to study memory, 
nature of memory. 
seems certain that 
extends our understanding of the 
Given this mode of model building it 
different researchers would quickly 
'breach' Miller and Johnson-Laird's five-fold model and very 
quickly develop a multiplicity of memories. Indeed Tulving 
[1972] cites a volume of essays on memory [Norman, 1970] in 
which over twenty five different categories of memory are 
referenced, [it was this which orginally lead Tulving 
[1972jp.382] to propose SED]. As Tulving pointed out such a 
multiplicity, of what must be overlapping, theoretical 
concepts is indicative of a conceptually weak account of 
memory. Wittgenstein's [1953; p.232] comment that 
psychology is in a state of 'conceptual confusion' would 
seem to be vindicated by such multi-store models. In short, 
multi-store models, given that they inevitably engender a 
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multiplicity of memories, tend to obscure rather than 
clarify our understanding of memory. 
Further to this Miller and Johnson-Laird do not 
appreciate that SED, at least in some formulations, is 
partially a 'content' distinction which cross-cuts their 
memory classications. As already suggested 'action' 
memories may be wholly autobiographical or semantic. 
Similarly 'person' memories may be autobiographical or 
typical [Canter, Mischel, and Schwartz, 1982]. It is not 
clear how Miller and Johnson-Laird's multi-store model could 
accomodate this within-store difference. 
A more recent version of the multi-store approach 
has been proposed by Brewer [1982]. Brewer also argued that 
skill-memories could not be accomodated within the 
semantic-episodic distinction and went on to posit a 
tripartite model of skill, generic, and autobiographical, 
memory systems where generic memory was sud-divided into 
'domains' of which semantic memory was one, perceptual 
memory another, and presumably there would be others. Yet 
in practice this does not provide an extension of SED. In 
essence all Bewer's memory stores other than the 
autobiographical are semantic stores. Brewer's model, 
therefore, only differs from SED [a la Tulving, 1972] in 
it' 8 fuller characterization of semantic memory. It is not 
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after all a different class of model. 
A slightly different criticism was put forward by 
Collins [1975]. He challenged SED by arguing that semantic 
memories may be temporally ordered. Recall that temporal 
dating of memories was put forward by Tulving [1972; see 
Table 2.1.1 above] as one of the criteria that distinguished 
episodic memories. Having put this criticism Collins went 
on to argue for the multi-store view which, it has been 
argued, lead to untenable memory models. However Collins's 
semantic temporal ordering criticism 
interesting in the light of a later 
is particularly 
paper reported by 
Roediger and Crowder. Roediger and Crowder [1976] studied 
subjects' recall of American presidents, designated as 
semantic memories. Their reasoning was that as Ss could not 
have episodically encoded the majority of the presidents 
then that information must have been represented 
semantically. Roediger and Crowder provided some evidence 
that Ss were not recalling the presidents from an 
episodically encoded list, although they acknowledge that 
most of their Ss may at some time have been required to 
learn such a list. The main finding was that of strong 
primacy/recency effects in recall. Chronologically earlier 
and later presidents were recalled more frequently than 
presidents from the middle 
concluded that temporal 
period. Roediger and Crowder 
dating was employed in semantic 
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memory and thus could not be singled out as a criteria for 
distinguishing episodic and semantic memories. This is not 
a serious criticism for the revised SED being worked towards 
here: it was earlier argued that if semantic and episodic 
memories were represented in the same memory network then 
organizational forms intrinsic to the network 
realized in any part of the network. However the 
and Crowder finding clearly demonstrates that 
temporal information may be more characteristic of 
may be 
Roediger 
although 
episodic 
memory it can not sharply distinguish between semantic and 
episodic memories and hence Tulving's [1972] criteria must 
be modified. Of these criteria spatial information and the 
personal content of episodic memories have, so far, remained 
distinctive, in as much as they have not been challenged by 
contradictory findings. 
Multi-store models then do not present a 
theoretically viable alternative to SED. In fact it is not 
clear that they are distinguishable from SED for, it has 
been argued, any store within a multi-store model may be 
divided into episodic and semantic memories. 
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C] Schema Models 
This section discusses 'schema' models of memory. 
For this discussion the central point concering such models 
is that they postulate semantic memory representations that 
contain spatio-tempora1 information. It should be recalled 
that spatio-tempora1 information was one of the central 
distinguishing criteria of episodic memories [Tu1ving, 
1972]. Bower, Black, and Turner, [1979] have investigated 
schema-like memories and their findings indicate that these 
sorts of semantic memories do, in fact, contain 
spatio-tempora1 information. Thus spatio-tempora1 
information can not be employed to distinguish semantic and 
episodic memories. However semantic schema-like structures 
will be discussed separatetly in Chapter 4. Here the 
discussion will be predominatly concerned with the proposals 
fowarded by Schank [1975], Nelson and Brown [1978], and J. 
Mandler [1979] which directly address SED. 
One of the earliest and most direct challenges to 
SED came from Schank [1975; Schank and Abelson 1977]. 
Schank argued that all conceptual knowledge was based on 
actual experience and consequently that all memory was 
episodic. He went onto theorize that episodes were 
represented by stereotype 'scripts' [Schank, 1975; Minsky, 
1975; Schank and Abelson, 1978]. Scripts were postulated 
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to be 'large' conceptual structures that contained 
informantion about what generally happened in certain 
similar situations. Schank [1975], Schank and Abelson 
[1977], give a number of examples of scripts, probably the 
most well known example being that of the 'restaurant' 
script where 'plans' of typical action sequences specify how 
certain 'goals' [e.g. ordering the meal] are to be 
achieved. Scripts also contain information about the types 
of objects typically encountered in the situations they 
depict and information about the locations, times, and 
actors, associated with the script. 
Two points of interest for the present discussion 
arise from Schank's account of scripts. These are, 11 
Schank's claim that the conceptual system is completely 
based on experience and is, therefore wholly episodic, 2] 
that scripts contain spatio-temporal information. 
Schank's claim for the wholly experiential nature of 
the conceptual system overlooks a critically important 
distinction, namely that between knowledge from experience 
and knowledge of experience [Ortony, 1975; Anderson and 
Ross, 1980). Ortony [1975) puts the case strongly: 
" ••• philosophers have long argued that although all 
knowledge might arise from experience it is not neccessarily 
given in experience •• " [p.66]. Further to this Ortony 
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introduces a contrast between knowledge held in an 
encyclopaedia with knowledge contained in a personal diary, 
[a contrast paralleled by Anderson and Ross' content 
distinction], and argues that a 'script' is analogous to an 
entry in an encycolpaedia. Hence a content distinction can 
be maintained between semantic and personal memories, for 
example between memory of a particular restaurant that one 
has visited and memory of what generally occurs in 
restaurants [a restaurant 'script']. Schank's criticisms of 
SED are not, then, as damaging as he might have hoped. 
The second problem which Schanks' work poses for SED 
is that scripts clearly contain spatio-temporal information. 
Nelson and Brown [1978], in a useful review of various 
orientations to the semantic-episodic distinstion, touch 
upon this problem. They concluded their review by favouring 
" ... a usage that distinguishes episodic as a form of memory 
unit leading to both remembered autobiographical events 
[' the bear visited my tent'] and the formation of 
generalized event structures or scripts [what you expect to 
happen when you visit a restaurant] representing similar 
repetitive experiences or routines. We conceive of these 
generalized event structures as one component of an 
underlying conceptual memory •••• We would like to reserve 
the term semantic memory for the storing of information 
about words and concepts represented in language ••• " 
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[p.240]. However it is clear that Tulving's [1972] original 
distinction could not permit 'generalized event structures 
or scripts' as episodic memories even though these contain 
spatio-temporal information. Indeed the suggestion is 
antithetical to the concept of episodic for 'generalized 
events' are abstracted from a number of episodes. They are 
no longer 'autobiographical events' [Tulving, 1972, p.387]. 
The view taken here is that generalized events, scripts, and 
schemas, are semantic structures. As Tulving [1983; p.64] 
comments, " People are capable of learning many things about 
the world through their own personal interaction with the 
world. Some of this knowledge is stored in semantic memory 
in the form of ' scripts' •• " • J.Mandler [1979] argues a 
position very similar to this when she proposes that 
semantic memory is categorically and schematically organized 
and contrasts with purerly autobiographical memories of a 
more 'literal' nature, [this may also be likened to Shoben 
et aI's 'surface-like format' charcterization of episodic 
memories]. Thus scripts may be represented semantically, 
presumably having been derived from a number of episodic 
encodings, and so semantic memories may represent 
spatio-temporal information. Spatio-temporal information 
can not then be employed to sharply distinguish between 
autobiographical and semantic memories as Tulving [19721 
proposed and in this sense Schank's work challenges SED. 
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The criterion which at least some researchers 
accept, and which has persistently emerged in this 
discussion as best differentiating semantic and episodic 
memories, was that episodic memories contain 
autobiographical information whereas semantic memories do 
not. This, then, is the 'content' distinction. Subsequent 
discussion will elucidate 
distinction. In Chapter 
distinction will form the 
strategy. 
and develop 
6 investigating 
central aim of 
the 
the 
the 
content 
content 
research 
2.4 The Semantic Content of Episodic Memories 
Thus far the discussion has sought to make a case 
that semantic and episodic memories are primarily 
distinguishable in terms of the content of the information 
they represent. However in section 1.1 above it was 
recognized that some episodic memories may predominatly 
contain semantic information. Tulving [1983; p.64] 
characterizes this in the following example; 
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"Imagine that late one night a friend telephones 
you. When you pick up the receiver, he says, "Aardvarks eat 
ants", and then hangs up. The friend calling you on the 
telephone, at a particular time, with you in a particular 
place, and saying something to you, is an episode, probably 
a memorable one. The utterance is the semantic contents of 
the episode. You can ask many different questions about the 
episode and interpret it in a number of different ways, 
depending upon your knowledge of the world, including your 
friend; you can also ask questions about the utterance and 
interpret it in terms of your relevant semantic knowledge, 
and regardless of whether you remember the utterance as a 
part of, or independently of, the episode". 
Clearly the information that distiguishes 
telephone message and semantic knowledge of Aadvarks' eating 
habits is the experiential content of the former. A further 
point here is that episodic memories contain information 
about the context in which an event was experienced whereas 
this does not neccessarily appear to be the case for 
semantic memories, [this does not, of course, mean that 
context can not, or is not, represented semantically). This 
Bort of content difference may constrain the organization of 
the two classes of memory [see chapter 4, below]. 
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Tulving goes on to point out that " •• once we accept 
the possibility of the semantic contents of particular 
episodes, we should always keep in mind the possibility that 
questions that are assumed to be directed at the semantic 
system could be answered in terms of the information 
retrieved from the episodic system", [p.64], and, obviously, 
vice versa. The central point is that when investigating 
differences between semantic and episodic memories the two 
must be clearly distinguished, even though it is accepted 
that the two classes of memory are, in psychological terms, 
closely interrelated. To quote Tulving again " •• it is 
difficult to imagine how anyone would seriously wish to 
resist the idea that the two systems are closely 
interdependent and interact with one another virtually all 
the time", [p.65]. The earlier suggestion that the two 
classes of memory might be conceived of as being represented 
in the same memory network would seem to be supported by 
this line of argument. However it is notable that virtually 
no research has attempted to investigate how the two classes 
of memory may be connected. To establish the precise nature 
of SEn it is clearly of some importance to determine how the 
two classes of memory are interrelated. Toward the close of 
part 2 of this thesis [Chapter 11] some research is reported 
which suggests at least one way in which episodic and 
semantic memories may be connected. 
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In conclusion episodic and semantic memories are 
clearly closely interrelated. In fact episodic memories may 
contain semantic information but they are distinguishable by 
virtue of their personal reference and by containing 
information about the experiential context. Distinguishing 
the two classes of memory experimentally is crucial despite 
their evidently close interrelation. 
2.5 Conclusions: 
distinction. 
a revised semantic-episodic 
~ecently Tulving [1983] has further refined SED and 
this refined version will now be briefly outlined. [Note 
that this version of SED was published after much of the 
present introduction was already written]. 
Tulving presents an expanded and updated version of 
his 1972 paper in which, "Episodic and semantic memory are 
conceptualized as ~ systems that differ with respect to a) 
the kind of informat ion processed by them, b) 
characteristics of their operations, and c) their 
applications in real life as well as the memory 
laboratory ••• " [p.9]. It should be clear that the present 
conceptualizat ion of SED, i.e. content and organizat ional 
differences between two classes of memory represented in a 
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unitary memory network, departs irom this outline of 
Tulving's on the issue of separable memory systems and on 
b). Episodic and semantic memories are not conceived as 
separate memory systems and, hence, different 'operations' 
[it is assumed that this term, which is characterized by 
examples in Tulving 1983, denotes processes and functions of 
the two classes of memory] are not thought to be localized 
to one or the other class of memory. Rather both types of 
memory are thought of as being represented in the same 
memory network and exhibiting similar 'operations'. Within 
this network different classes of memories are more or less 
associated with each other in terms of the content of the 
information they represent. Thus only section a) of 
Tulving's revised SED is compatible with the approach taken 
in this thesis. This is summarized by Tulving in Table 
2.1.2, over. Although this thesis does not directly 
investigate c) the findings to be reported below bear, 
albeit indirectly, upon the usage of autobiographical and 
semantic memories in everyday cognition. 
The entries 'units' , 'organization' , and 
'reference', summarize the issues to be researched in this 
thesis. 'Source' and 'Veridicality' are deemed to be 
outside the scope of present interests [summarized in 
Chapter 6J. It is contended that the episodic memories 
selected for investigation should have a high experiential 
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Table 2.1.2 Summary of Differences Between Episodic and 
Semantic Memory 
[extract from Tulving, 1983, p.35, Table 1.3] 
Diagnostic Feature Episodic Semantic 
------------------------------------------------------------------
Information 
Source 
Units 
Organization 
Reference 
Veridicali ty 
Sensation 
Events; episodes 
Temporal 
Self 
Personal belief 
Comprehension 
Facts; ideas; 
concepts 
Conceptual 
Universe 
Social agreement 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
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content, [self re£erence~. They should in effect be 
autobiographical memories. Hence the term episodic will be 
dropped and substituted by the term autobiographical. The 
autobiographical units to be investigated will be 
experienced events, episodes, or scenes. Conversely the 
semantic units to be investigated will be concepts. 
Organization has been speculatively touched upon above and 
is discussed in more detail in chapters 3 and 4, following, 
where it is argued that the two classes of memory differ in 
terms of their organization in memory. 
The 
distinction 
concept 
employed 
of 
here 
an autobiographical-semantic 
emphasises representational 
differences between the two classes of memory in contrast to 
the processing differences emphasised by Tulving [1972; 
1983J. Attention is focused on the diagnostic features of 
content differences and organizational differences [in that 
order of importance] because it has been shown above [and 
will be further explicated below, chapters 3 and 41 that 
these features hold out the most promise of empirically 
distinguishing the two classes of memory. 
CHAPTER 3 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
This chapter considers some of the research into 
autobi8graphical memory. Firstly types of autobiographical 
memory and their contents are discussed [section 3.1J. A 
separate section [3.2] then examines the relationship of 
autobiographical memories and schematic semantic memory 
representations such as scripts, M.O.P's, and scenes. It is 
concluded that autobiographical memories are closely related to 
such semantic structures. Finally the specific class of 
autobiographical memories selected for study is detailed. 
3.1 Types of Autobiographical Memories 
Tulving [1983] discusses what he calls the 'recollective 
experience'. Tulving's argument is that accessing episodic 
memories involves the experience of remembering whereas, 
accessing semantic memories does not neccessarily involve such 
an experience. Related to this Esther Salaman outlines a number 
of types of recollective experience on the basis of her personal 
experience of recollecting autobiographical memories, in her 
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book 'A Collection Of Moments' [1970; see, also, Neisser, 
1982]. Salaman describes two types of memory; those memories 
that " ••• come back involuntarily, bring with them strong 
emotions, and give a sensation of living in a past moment ••• " 
[p.63] and those memory fragments that " ••• carry no strong 
emotions, do not give the feeling of living in the past, and 
never come back involuntarily ••• " [p.63]. The first type of 
memory are clearly highly emotionally charged autobiographical 
memories. The second type of memory may be a mixture of 
non-emotional autobiographical memories and semantic memories. 
Of the involuntary memories Salaman sugests a further division 
between " ••• whole memories, which always contain a disturbance 
or a shock, and fragment memories which do not ••• " [p.63]. 
There are then, three types of memory here: those that must be 
voluntarily, consciously, retreived; those that arise 
involuntarily and bring with them an experience of 'living in 
the past'; and a further group that carry no feeling of 'living 
in the past' but also arise involuntarily. Salaman's account 
suggests that the recollective experience of autobiographical 
memories mayor may not involve emotions and mayor may not be 
involuntary. The research reported in p~rt 2 is wholly 
concerned with 'fragment' memories that carry no strong emotions 
and that are voluntarily retrieved. Salaman's account also 
implicates imagery in all the forms of memory that she 
discusses. It seems clear that, at least in Salaman's case, 
autobiographical memories were to some extent analogs of 
experiences. Imagery and autobiographical menory are discussed 
further below [this chapter] and chapter 5 considers the issue 
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in d~tail. However, the concern at this point in the 
discudsion, is with studies of autobiographical memories having 
some emotional content. 
Brown and Kulik [1977] reported a questionnare study of 
what they called ' flashbulb memories' [FB], in which Ss whe re 
asked ·what were you doing when you heard the news of Kennedy's 
assination ? ' . . FB's were conceived as memories for 
" ••• c ircumstances in which one first learned of a suprising and 
consequently emotionally arousing event ••• " [p.7l]. Brown and 
Kulik suggest a possible neurophysiological basis for FBs drawn 
from Livingston's [1967] 'NOW PRINT' hypothesis. This proposed 
that a reticular discharge into both cortical hemispheres, 
triggered by a limbic system response to an event of 'biological 
meaning', caused all recent brain events to be 'printed' 
[encoded] • The important findings of the Brown and Kulik study 
were that S8 recall appeared to be categorizable in terms of 
five ubiquitous categories [Brown and Kulik refer to them as the 
'canonical' categories of recall]: 'Place', 'Ongoing Event', 
'Informant', 'Own Affect', 'Aftermath'. Notice that 'time' is 
not one of Brown and Kulik's categories of recall perhaps 
calling into question Tulvings' [1972] emphasis on the 
'temporal' nature of episodic memory although the time 
of the assassination 
instructions, hence Ss may 
fy..rther 
reiterate thiS,~ the time 
was specified in the experimental 
have considered it redundant to 
of learni~ £i ~he assination e.g. 
morning, afternoon, evening, etc, was independent of the actual 
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event. Neisser [1982], in a critical review of the Brown and 
Kulik finding, argued that their 'canonical categories of 
recall' might also be viewed as 'narrative conventions'. 
However it is likely that narrative conventions are themselves a 
product of the form of memory. Further as narrative convention 
surely includes the unfolding of events over time, and since 
Brown and Kuliks' Ss did not appear to take advantage of this 
'convention', Neisser's criticism remains questionable. A more 
likely alternative interpretation of these findings is that the 
'canonical' categories of recall reflected analogical properties 
of t~e memory trace. That is, an image of the event would have 
included information about location, actions, and actors. The 
question of how an image might have represented information 
about 'consequences for the self' requires some elaboration. 
Possibly, emotions aroused by an event of 'biological meaning' 
act as the organizing information at encoding. For instance 
events might be stored in categories of emotions such as, 
'even~s involving fear'. According to this proposal the 
category contains the emotional information and the image 
represents an analog of what actually happened. As Brown and 
Kulik did not report asking their Ss whether or not imagery 
mediated recall this interpretation remains speculative, 
although it does seem more in keeping with the notion of 
flashbulb memories than with Neisser's 'narrrative conventions'. 
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The above two studies suggested that autobiographical 
memories may be represented analogically and contain information 
about the location of, and actors involved in, a recalled event. 
Studies of non-emotional autobiographical memories lend support 
to these suggestions. Whitten and Leonard [1981] report one of 
the fullest studies of non-emotional autobiographical memories. 
[In passing Whitten and Leonard's definition of autobiographical 
memory might be noted: " ••• while the term "autobiographical 
memory" could be used as a synonym for episodic memory [Tulving, 
1972], it is more useful to define autobiographical memory as 
that set of information pertaining to extra-experimentally 
experienced events ••• ' [p.566]. Although this is not the 
definition employed here [see section 1.5, chapter 2] it does 
indicate the dissatisfaction of these researchers with the 
autobiographical content of laboratory based studies of episodic 
memory, see section 1.1, chapter 2 for further discussion of 
this issue]. Whitten and Leonard report two studies in which Ss 
were asked to recall the name of one teacher from each of the 
twelv~ preceding preuniversity years. 58 were cued forward 
[grad~s 1-12], backwards [grades 12-1], or in a random order. 
In addition, in the second experiment, 58 were also asked to 
'think aloud' as they recalled. It was found that backward 
cueing was most effective in eliciting recall suggesting that 
the recall of one item facilitated the recall of a contiguous 
item and also that the probablity of recalling an 
autobiographical memory was a function of recency, [c.f 
discupsion of Linton [1982] below] The findings of central 
importance to the present discussion arise from the protocols 
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given by the subjects which revealed a limited number of search 
strategies. Whitt~n and Leonard identified four general search 
strategies [employed within a particular grade]: 'target-subset 
selection', 'imaged-location traversal', 'cognitive landmark 
identification', and 'temporal ordering'. The most commonly 
used strategy was target-subset selection, which in this case, 
involved Ss selecting a subject grade and locating the name of 
the teacher of that subject. Similarly the actual grade name 
acted, in some cases, as a delimiting subset. The second most 
frequ€ntly employed strategy was imaged-location traversal where 
Ss reported generating an image of their school and mentally 
walking through various classrooms until they located a 
particular teacher. The cognitive landmark strategy involved S 
recalling a significant event in their past and deducing from 
that who their teacher had been at that time. The temporal 
ordering strategy simply employed searching backward or forward 
by some set unit of time e.g. term. Whitt~n and Leonard also 
noted that many of the reports involved imagery, physical 
attributes were commonly reported, and locational searches 
obviously involved imagery. Thus autobiographical memories were 
recalled that involved no specific emotional or emotionally 
arousing content and that yet partlly correspcnded to Brown and 
Kuliks' 'flashbulb memories' in that they contained information 
about locations and actors and were represented as images. An 
earlier study by Williams [1978] lead to substantively similar 
findings. Williams observed 'activity search' [paralleling the 
target-subset selection strategies outlined by Whitten and 
Leonard],'location scanning', and 'image scanning' corresponding 
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to imaged-location traversal. 
These studies then lend further weight to the 
characterization of autobiographical memories as taking an 
analcgical form and containing information concerning locations 
and actors associated with those locations. The two most common 
organizational forms observed in these studies of 
autobiographical memory were categorization [e.g. english 
teachers] and the representation of information in images. This 
charaterization appears to apply equally to emotional and 
non-e~otional autobiographical memories. 
3.2 Autobiographical And Schematic Memory [Scripts]. 
Linton [1975, 1978, 1982] studied her recall of events 
from her own life over a period of six years. Linton reports 
that " ••• Increased experience with any particular event class 
increases semantic [or general] knowledge about the event and 
its context. Increased experience with similar events, however, 
makes specific episodic knowledge increasingly confusable and 
ultimacely episodes cannot be distinguished ••• " [1982, p.79]. 
In discussing her recall of various meetings which she had 
attended Linton illustrates this effect when she writes " ••• some 
years later, after many meetings, I have lost my capacity to 
reliably pinpoint particular board meetings and I could not 
describe proceedings of most meetings except perhaps the 
Chapter 3 Page 3~8 
first, and [if it wt:ce recent] the last ••• " [p.80]. From 
Linton's report it seems that there are strong primacy/recency 
effects in autobiographical memory. This is confirmed by Rubin 
[1982], who, in an experimental study in which Ss recorded 
events from their lives and dated them, came to a similar 
conclusion; namely that retention of autobiographical memories 
was identical to the retention of words in episodic memory 
experiments, since a primacy/recency retention function was 
evident in both cases. In chapter 2 section 1.3 it was noted 
that Roediger and Crowder [1976] reported finding, 
primacy/recency effects in semantic memory indicating that this 
retention function was common to both autobiographical and 
semantic memories. However as the Roediger and Crowder finding 
appears to be the only one of its kind, it is perhaps not 
unrea&onable to conclude that primacy/recency effects are more 
chara~teristic of autobiographical than semantic memory. Such a 
suggestion would, of course, be predicted by the single-store 
model of autobiographical and semantic memories outlined in 
chape 1 and this is taken up in later chapters [4 and 6]. 
Returning to the Linton study, the central point she makes 
is that autobiographical memories gradually 'merge' into 
semantic memories. However it is not clear whether Linton means 
that such memories are actually altered, or that the similarity 
of subsequent experiences renders retrieval cues ineffective. 
Penfield [1969] from studies involving the electrical 
stimulation of areas of the cor text reports , flashback 
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responses' in which patients apparently relived previously 
irretrievable moments from their past. Loftus and Loftus [1980] 
were severly critical of this interpretation of Penfield's work 
pointing out that less than 8% of the 1,132 patients treated by 
Penfield and his associates reported such experiences, and that 
there is reason to believe that some of the reports of 
flashbacks may have been at least partially fabricated. 
Furthermore Loftus and Loftus, drawing upon the work of Loftus 
and her colleagues [1975,1979], point out that some memories 
clea:ly are modified, as Linton suggested, in favour of the 
appropriate semantic schema. Loftus and Loftus concluded that 
" ••• some memories are apparently modifiable and that, 
consequently, they are probably unrecoverable ••• " [p.419]. 
Possibly one of best studies of this effect is reported by 
Neisser [1981] in his retrospective study of 'John Dean's 
Memory'. In this study of Dean's recall of conversations he had 
with Nixon, the then president, concerning the notorious 
Watergate burglary and subsquent cover-up, Neisser was able to 
take advantage of the fact that unknown to Dean all his 
conversations with Nixon had been recorded •• Thus it was 
possible to compare Dean's trial testimony with actual 
recordings of what was said. From this comparison Neisser 
argues that " ••• The single clear memories that we recollect so 
vividly actually stand for something else; they are 'screen 
memories' a little like those Freud discussed long ago [1899]. 
Often their real basis is a set of repeated experiences, a 
sequence of related events that the single recollection merely 
typifies or represents. We are like subjects of Posner and 
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Keele [1970] who forgot the individual dot patterns of a series 
but 'remembered' the prototypical pattern they had never seen. 
Such memories might be called repisodic rather than episodic: 
what seems to be an episode actually represents a repetition ••• " 
[p.20]. The 'repisodic' concept emphasises that repeatedly 
experienced events which are similar become 'merged' into a 
semantic structure. Hence more recently experienced events 
which are in the process of 'merging' with the semantic 
structure and are more available for recall than less recently 
suggesting 
expelienced event~ ~ how recency effects may occur in 
autobiographical memory. It might also be speculated that 
events experienced for the first time remain available for 
recall because of their 'biological significance', as suggested 
by Brown and Kulik [discussing Livingston's, 1967, NOW PRINT 
hypothesis]. However it is difficult to equate this latter 
suggestion with the well documented phenomenon of childhood 
amnesia. The central point of Linton's and Neisser's research 
is that autobiographical memories are closely associated in 
memory with script-like semantic structures [e.g. board 
meetings, conversations with Nixon]. 
Nickerson and Adams [1982] report a study in which they 
came to much the same conclusion as Neisser. In this study 5s 
were asked to recall the details of a common object, an American 
penny. Memory was generally very poor and Nickerson and Adams 
argue that constant exposure to an object and the ability to 
recognize that object do not give rise to the detailed 
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representation of thaL object in memory. They concluded that 
" ••• what one is most likely to remember about the visual 
properties of objects is what one needs to remember in order to 
distinguish those objects in every day life ••• " [p.175]. Brewer 
and Treyens [1981] studied incidental memory for an office and 
its contents and reached similar conclusions to those of 
Neiss~r, and Nickerson and Adams. Brewer and Treyens concluded 
from their study that " ••• recall of. •• items must have been due 
to schema-based knowledge about offices becoming integrated with 
the actual episodic information about the experimental room ••• " 
[p.228]. It seems that the evidence and current interpretations 
of that evidence suggest that specific autobiographical memories 
unles8 other wise marked [e.g. emotionally] become integrated 
with, and modified by, existing schema. 
Situations, locations, and events, have also been 
connected to essentially semantic memory structures by Rosch 
[1978; see chapters 5 for a full account of Rosch's work]. 
Rosch reported a pilot study where Ss were asked to list events 
from the previous day, a week ago, and so on. It was found that 
" ••• the events listed were just those kinds of events for which 
Schank [1975] has provided scripts ••• " [p.44]. However Rosch 
was al~o interested in the role of objects in events and further 
data led her to suggest that " ••• t he task of using a given 
concrete noun 1n a sentence appears to be an indirect method of 
eliciting a statement about events in which objects play a 
pa r t. • ." [ p • 4 5 1 • Thus autobiographical memories of events, by 
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virtue of their close association with script-like semantic 
structures, connect to semantic categories of objects. Bower, 
Black, and Turner [1979] reached a similar conclusion in their 
study of memory for scripts. They concluded that scripts 
'pointed' towards semantic categories of objects, [this study is 
discussed in more detail in chapter 4]. 
More recently Reiser, Black, and Abelson, [1982] have 
repocted two studies employing Schank's [1982] concept of 
'Memory Organization Packets' [MOPs]. MOPs represent sequences 
of generalized scenes, each of which co~sists of actions to 
accomplish a sub-goal. For example the Restaurant MOP would 
contain the scenes 'being-seated', 'ordering', 'eating', and so 
on. Generalized scenes may be referenced by more than one MOP. 
1bus the generalized scene 'paying' contains information that is 
true of paying in general. It is the MOP that contains context 
specific information that directs or 'colors' the generalized 
scene to the specific instance e.g. paying for a meal in a 
restaurant. Reisser et. al. showed that MOPs provided the 
optimum level of specificity for recall whereas generalized 
scences proved too specific. From this it is clear that there 
are different levels of specificity in memory, corresponding to 
autobiographical memories, generalized 
categories, MOPs and so on. It has 
autobiographical memories are closely 
scenes, semantic 
been shown 
associated 
that 
with 
'generalized scenes' [scripts] and that generalized scenes are 
associated with semantic categories of objects. This suggests 
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one ,-'ay in which au:..obiographical memories may connect to 
semantic memories and it will be recalled that questions as to 
the nature of such connections were raised at the close of 
chapter 1 as being central to research concerned with an 
autobiographical/seman tic memory distinction. The final section 
in this chapter, then, considers what sort of autobiographical 
memories would most facilitate investigation of the hypothesised 
content distinction, organizational differences, and 
connections, between the two classes of memory. 
3.3 Conclusions: Autobiographical Memory for Objects 
From the above discussion it should be clear that the 
focus here is upon non-emotional autobiographical memories: 
given that so little is known about emotion generally and the 
role of emotion in memory specifically this would not seem to be 
an unreasonable bias. The previous discussion may also have 
suggested that one area of study might be that of investigating 
differences between autobiographical memory for an event and the 
corresponding semantic memory for that class of events. However 
a major problem here is that, with the exception of the work of 
Bower and his colleagues, there has been little research into 
the semantic representation of events, [see Schank, 1983, for a 
review] • Thus such a research aim was not considered feasible 
in the time available. 
.. 
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The stimuli selected for study were, then, common everyday 
objects and activities. These were selected because it was 
reascflable to assume that most people would have 
autobiographical memories of common objects and activities and 
because those memories would not generally be of a high 
emotional content. Also the semantic representation of common 
objects and activities has been well researched by psychologists 
in t'le last decade, [see chapter 5 for detailed acccount]. 
F'lrth~rmore it has been shown that autobiographical memories are 
conr:ected with scripts-like semantic memory structures that 
'point' to semantic categories of objects. Thus content 
differences, and connections, between autobiographical and 
8eman~ic memories of the same items are directly investigable. 
In addition the organization of autobiographical memories of 
categories of common everday objects and activites can be 
contrasted with their corresponding semantic representation. 
Finally some comments may be made concerning the content 
and organization of autobiographical memories of common items. 
Firstly the research reviewed above suggested that typically 
autobiographical memories will contain contextual information 
about the encoded item. Information about the location of the 
items, activities, and actors, may be contained in the 
dutobiogra[Jt1ica 1 memory. Also, as Whi tten and Leonard found 
that autobiographical memories of teachers were categorized 
[e.g. English teachers], it might be predicted that 
autobiographical memories of common items would also exhibit a 
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categorical organizatlun. The question of interest for an 
autobiographical/semantic memory distinction is whether or not 
categories of autobiographical memories of items are similar to 
semantic categories [of the same items). Lastly it is clear 
that autobiographical memories may be brought to mind in the 
form of images. One of the implications of the research 
reviewed above is that an image drawn from an autobiographical 
memory may differ from an image [of the same item] drawn from a 
semantic memory. This suggests a very direct test of content 
diffe~ences between the two classes of memory and this point is 
elaborated below [chapters 4 and 5]. 
CHAPTER 4 
SEMANTIC MEMORY AND SEMANTIC CATEGORIES 
This chapter elaborates Tulving's [1972], somewhat 
impo'!~rished, characterization of semantic memory. The first 
four sections discuss characteristics of semantic memory about 
which general agreement has emerged since 1972. The following 
three sections review research into the semantic representation 
of scripts and categories. The final section summarizes a 
number of conclusions drawn from the preceding discussion and 
raise~ two general issues which have important implications for 
the proposed investigation of content differences between 
autobiographical and semantic memories. It is concluded that 
autobiographical and semantic memories for the same common 
object are likely to differ markedly in term of the iftformation 
that they represent. It is also concluded that the two classes 
of memory may differ in terms of their characteristic 
organization. 
.. 
.. 
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4.1 Conceptual Content 
One of the most generally agreed upon characteristics of 
semantic memory is that it does not contain verbal 
representations. Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield [1979], 
obser"/ed that " ••• every major model of semantic memory assumes 
that words and concepts are stored separately ••• " [p.300: see 
also Collins and Loftus, 1975]. Semantic memory then is viewed 
as being what Miller and Johnson-Laird have called a 'conceptual 
domain' • Which accords well with Tulvings' [1972] 
characterization of semantic memory as a repository of word 
meanings but not of words. This assumption has not been 
directly investigated although evidence from word production 
st udies, aphasiology, imagery, and scanning studies has 
convinced a number of investigators that the assumption is 
warranted, [Atkinson, Herrmann, and Wescourt, 1974; Collins and 
Loftus 1975; Lachman, Shaffer, and Hennrikus, 1974; Paivio, 
1971, 1975; K08slyn, 1981] • Many other researchers also 
subscribe to word/concept representational separation either by 
way of theoretical considerations or on the basis of anecdotal 
evidence [see Lachman, Lachman, and Butterfield, 1979, for 
further discussion]. The general concensus is that words, which 
are stored in some other separate area of memory, are mapped 
onto non-linguistic semantic memories. 
i. 
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4.2 Semantic Networks 
Virtually all accounts of seman tic memory either 
explicitly state, or implicitly assume, some form of network of 
semantic entities. Some notable exceptions to this are models 
featuring formal logics such as predicate calculus [Kintsch, 
1974], componential analysis, [Fillmore, 1968, 1969], procedural 
semanLtcs, [discussed by Clark and Clark, 1977}. However it 
would be fair to say that these models of semantic memory have 
not given rise to research as extensive as that engendered by 
network models. Nor have these models been as successful as 
network models in accounting for cognition generally. [c.f. 
Anderson, 1983, for a wide ranging semantic network model that 
accounts for data from a number of diverse areas including 
memory, problem solving, learning etc.}. Also the authors of 
these models provide no criteria which would prevent their 
models being mapped onto a network structure [c.f. Hollan 
1975]. For these reasons, then, the focus here will be upon 
explic~t semantic networks models. 
Network models of semantic memory stem from the work of 
Quillian [ 1966; 1969}, who is also credited with introducing 
the term 'semantic memory' to psychology [c.f. Smith, I978}. 
Since Quillian a number of subsequent network models have been 
put fo.ward notably by Collins and Quillian [19721, Collins and 
Loftus (1975), Anderson and Bower [1973}, Anderson [1976; 
1983], Lindsay, Norman and Rumelhart [1975]: see also Hollan 
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[19751 on Meyer [197C}, Smith, Shoben, and Rips [1974]. These 
are reviewed by Smith [1978], Woods [1975], Glass and Holyoak 
[1975j. The concern at this point in the discussion is not with 
specific models but with the general charateristics of semantic 
memory which they imply. 
Discussing the concept 'semantic network' Woods [1975] 
observed that " ••• a semantic network attempts to combine in a 
single mechanism the ability not only to store factual knowledge 
but also to model the associative connextions exhibited by 
humans which make certain items of information accesssible from 
certain others ••• ". Typically, in a semantic network, meaning 
is modelled as a set of relations amongst nodes in the network. 
For example the meaning of the concept 'Robin' is determined by 
its proximity [connectivity] to the nodes 'Bird', 'Wings', 
'Redbreast', and so on. Connections between the nodes form the 
networl<'.. All theorists subscribe to the view that semantic 
memory is s truct ured and that semantic structures are 
interrelated but disagree as to the exact form of semantic 
structures and their interrelations [c.f. Smith and Medin, 
1981]. It follows that Tulving's [1972] comment that semantic 
memory represents relations amongst word meanings may be 
expandp.d to state that word meanings are represented in the form 
of intprrelated semantic structures in a network. 
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Early formulations of semantic networks conceptualized the 
network as being very similar to a computer data base in which 
processes [programs] operated on the network [data base]. 
Related to this, it will be recalled, that Tulving [1972; 1983; 
discuRsed in chapter 2] argued that different processes operated 
upon semantic and autobiographical memories. 
[1972] subscribed to a process/representation 
Thus Tulving 
distinction. 
However it is not clear that such a distinction can be 
maintained for anything but heuristic purposes [Kosslyn 1978, 
1981~. In pratice determining what effects are the product of 
mediating structures and processes respectively presents a 
currently impenetrable problem. On a more theoretical note it 
is obvious that processes must also be represented. Thus prior 
to employing a structure/process distinction some criteria must 
be formulated that separate the two. As no attempt has been 
made towards formulating such criteria the status of the 
distinction remains unclear. This argument questions in turn a 
functional separation of semantic and episodic memories for, if 
processes and structures are not [currently] separable in 
principle, it makes little sense to use these concepts in an 
attempt to distinguish different memories in practice. 
\et there is at least one way in which autobiographical 
and semantic memories differ in terms of processing. As 
previously pointed out [see section 1.3 chapter 2, a~ovel 
semantic structures may be derived from autobiographical 
encodings then it may be plausibly argued that the developmental 
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processes operating tG construct such semantic memories may be 
specific to the autobiographical memories upon which they 
opecace. 1ft short the developmental processes employed in the 
construction of the semantic system operate on autobiographical 
memori<;s only. The focus of this thesis is upon extant 
autobiographical and semantic memories in adults and so this 
developmental speculation, although interesting, is outside the 
range of present interests. 
4.3 Spreading Activation 
One of the main assumptions of network models is that 
stimuli 'activate' corresponding [and associated] pre-existing 
memory representations. Evidence from studies employing various 
forms of semantic judgments, i.e. priming semantic memory 
(Posner, 1978], sentence verification studies [Collins and 
Loftus, 1975], and categorization [Mervis and Rosch, 1981], all 
suggest that activation of a particular concept leads to 
activation of connected concepts. This suggests that within 
semantic memory activation spreads. Collins and Loftus [1975J 
provide the most complete account of this in the form of a model 
which was, essentially, an extension of Collins and Quillian 
[1972], called 'spreading activation'. Their argument was 
simply that the referent terms in a sentence activated their 
corresponding semantic representations [nodes} in memory and 
activation spreading out from these representations along 
connections in the semantic network meet and summate hence 
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activating other related areas of memory. Spreading activation 
offers some account of why a sentence such as 'A table is an 
item of furniture' is verified faster than a sentence such as 'A 
rug is an item of furniture'. The connecting path in the 
network between 'table' and 'furniture' is shorter than the path 
between 'rug' and 'furniture', [Rosch, 1975; Loftus, 1975]. 
Implicit, then, in the spreading activation model is the 
assumption of a common process. Semantic judgments are made by 
activation being channeled through groups of pre-set connections 
in th~ network and by inference processes which produce a 
response based on the state of activation of the system. 
More recent conceptualizations of network activation [e.g. 
connectionist models of cognition, Feldman and Ballard, 1982, 
Hinton and J.A. Anderson, 1981] based loosely on the 
neurophysiological model of the neuron, posit that processing is 
identical in all brain areas and cognition is a product of 
activation spreading through connections between neuronal-like 
processing units. It is also proposed that connections may be 
inhibitory and/or excitatory. Thus activation· of two 
unconnected areas might, in some way, very rapidly inhibit a 
'true' response which simultaneously may excite a 'false' 
response. This suggests a possible mechanism mediating fast 
judgments of false statements [c.f Glass and Holyoak, 1975]. 
However connectionist models are in an early stage of 
development and although they appear to offer general 
explanations of cognition [rather than just semantic memory] in 
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a way that takes into account known properties of the brain, 
their status as models of cognition remains to be determined and 
they have yet to be applied to memory generally. Their 
releva~ce to the present discussion is that they posit common 
and distributed processing of brain areas of different content 
within a single network. In such a general network regions 
differ by their characteristic content and the concomitant 
connections of nodes. Various memory classes are not 
distinguished by different processes which operate upon them but 
by difierent contents and connections. A connectionist model, 
then, posits a unitary memory network in which autobiographical 
and semantic memories would be separated by content differences. 
As both types of memory are represented in the same network 
there must, therefore, be some connections between memories of 
different content. In short this is a unitary model of memory 
which accomodates an autobiographical/semantic distinction based 
upon differences in content and connectivity [organization]. It 
thus encapsulates the main conclusion of chapter 2 that 
autobiographical and semantic memories differ in terms of the 
content of the information that each represents. 
4.4 Semantic Memory and Scripts 
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In chapter 3 some evidence was reviewed showing that 
autobiographical memories may contain some semantic information 
and may connect to semantic memories. It was proposed that 
autobiographical memories may connect to script-like semantic 
representations. This section of the discussion considers 
investigations of the semantic representation of scripts, within 
the framework of a unitary network. 
The discussion so far has focused exclusively on semantic 
representations of noun concepts and has dealt chiefly with 
nouns in isolation from all but the simplest of contexts, [i.e. 
simple declarative statements such as'A table is an item of 
furniture']. However studies of context effects have led some 
researchers to propose that the 'unit' of semantic memory is a 
proposition, or other unit larger than a concept. This approach 
represents a challenge to the methodology and models of semantic 
memory research outline above [c.f. Smith, 1978; Smith and 
Med in , 1981 1 • The challenge stems from the work of Bransford 
and his colleagues [Bransford and Johnson, 1973; Bransford and 
McCarrell , 1974; Bransford, Barclay, and Franks, 1972; 
Barclay, Bransford, Franks, HeCarell, Nitsch, 1974; Anderson 
and Ortony, 1975]. Essentially Bransford has been concerned to 
show the effect of context on memory. In one experiment Ss were 
given sentences to read such as " The man lifted the piano " or 
" The man tuned the piano " and then asked to recall the 
sentences to cues such as 'heavy object' or 'musical instrument' 
[Barclay et aI, 1974] The context appropriate cue was found to 
Chapter 4 . Page 4-10 
be most effective in eliciting recall [e.g.'heavy object' 
facilitated recall of 'The man lifted the piano' but not the 
'The ~an tuned the piano' •••• and vice versa] leading these 
researchers to argue that the meaning of a word is constructed 
from other words in the sentence rather than, simply, retrieved 
from semantic memory. Smith [1978], Smith and Medin [1981] 
attempt to obviate this criticism by suggesting that context 
allows a listener to 'concretize' the word meaning by 
comput~ng/activating specific features. They also propose that 
ambiguity largely relates to superordinate terms rather than 
category members or features although this is only partly so, 
for instance 'piano' is not a superordinate. Smith and Medin 
[1981] acknowledge the ad hoc nature of these proposals and 
conclude that " ••• we can do little more than spell out these 
alternatives and difficulties ••• " [p.96]. Yet there are two 
further responses to these findings that Smith and Medin appear 
have to overlooked. 
Firstly the context effects literature has generally 
examined recall from autobiographical memory. If 
autobiographical encodings are records of the cognitive 
enviroI~ent at the time of encoding, as Tulving [1983] proposed, 
then the autobiographical memory trace might reasonably be 
expected to predominatly contain semantic information about the 
implied context of the sentence. This information would be 
supplied at encoding by activation of relevant semantic memories 
[c.f. Dell, Mckoon, and Ratcliff, 1983]. Hence context effects 
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may ie localized to autobiographical memories. If this is the 
case it could be plausibly argued that context effects have yet 
to be demonstrated for semantic memories. 
The question remains as to how semantic memories supply 
the relevant contextual information at encoding. The second 
response emphasises the role of script-like semantic memories 
which represent information about context. In the discussion of 
scripts which follows it will be shown that a view of semantic 
memory that incorporates some notion of 'scripts' readily 
accounts for context effects. In one sense this supports 
Bransford's argument for scripts are clearly 'larger' semantic 
units than single concepts. But they are not emergent 
properties of sentences and, as will be shown, are conceived as 
'pointing' to sets of individual concepts. 
Schank's concept of scripts [Schank, 1975; Schank and 
Ableson, 1978; Schank, 1983] was outlined and discussed in 
chapter 2. A case was made that autobiographical memories were 
• 
closely connected to script-like semantic structures. The work 
of Bower and his colleagues [Bower, Black, and Turner, 1979; 
Bower and Clark-Heyers, 1980; Ross and Bower, 1981] further 
supports the notion of script-like semantic representations. In 
a series of experiments, investigating the concept of scripts 
put forward by Schank and Abelson [1977], Bower et al [lQ79] 
found evidence suggesting a hierarchical organization in memory 
for activities, in which the hierarchy was organized by 
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'scenes' • It was also found that script related intrusions 
occured in Ss recall of a text. Bower et al concluded that 
scripts were analogous to the noun category structures reported 
by previous semantic memory research and, as such, constituted a 
previollsly unexplored area of semantic memory. They went on to 
suggest that the level of detail recorded with each script was 
at a high level of generality with specific 'slots' in scripts 
being 'empty' [see Minsky, 1975] and acting as 'pointers' 
directing the memory search to relatively context-free 
inforffiation held elsewhere in semantic memory. They concluded 
with a view of scripts which proposed that " ••• many scripts will 
be clustered around the primitive action they enable. Thus the 
restaurant, bar, and kitchen scripts cluster around ingestion; 
the bus, train, airplane, and bicycle scripts cluster around 
physically moving one-self, and so on ••• " [p.217]. Presumably 
then lifting-scripts point to 'heavy objects' such as piano's 
and music-making scripts 'point' to representations of musical 
instruments. Bower et aI's work appears to have influenced 
Schank [1980] who has modified his memory model and now argues 
that scripts are constructed in a rule governed manner by 
'higher level' general structures, Memory Organization Packets 
or MOPs [see chapter 2 above]. 
Bower and Clark-Heyers [1980] extended the findings of 
Bower et al [1979] and demonstrated that high positive lures in 
a recognition experiment were incorrectly misidentified as 
having been part of the original memory set, strongly suggesting 
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that a script had mediated recognition. Further evidence led 
Bower and Clark-Heyers to contend that scripts acted as emergent 
superordinates, organizing input. Similarly Smith, Adams, and 
Schorr [1978], in an experiment examining the confusability 
inherent in learning similar facts, reached the conclusion that 
such facts were organized in terms of some script like 
structure, which also reduced retrieval failure by minimizing 
trace confusablity. 
Finally Ross and Bower [1981], in a series of experiments, 
evaluated a number of memory models of preexperimentally 
associated knowledge and concluded that a schema model most 
easily explained their findings. They proposed that a 
" ••• schema is a large conceptual Rtructure preexisting in 
memory; it interrelates a number of actors, objects, and 
properties; it gives general information about these categories 
along with the type of values which fill those variable slots; 
it can be applied to new cases by instantiating the variables in 
terms of the value of a particular objects or events in the case 
a t hand ••• II [p. 15 ] • 
It is clear from this research that some semantic memories 
take the form of of script-like structures that specify context. 
These script-like structures cluster around common actions and 
point to context free semantic representations. Within the 
network such representations are presumably superordinate to 
representations of objects and activities. As Smith [1978] 
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comments " ••• highe r order units [representations for 
situations] ••• must take as their input lower order units 
[repreoentations for words and sentences] ••• ", [p.46]. The next 
section, then, discusses the representation of 'lower order 
uni ts' 
4.5 Semantic Categories 
The title of this section is taken from a review paper by 
Mervis and Rosch [1981]. The paper presents a view of 
categorization that has arisen over the last ten years and it is 
with this view, as represented by the work of Rosch and her 
colleagues, that the discussion shall initially be concerned. 
The most extensive research into the semantic representation of 
common objects and activities has been reported by Rosch and her 
colleagues. This section will be predominatly concerned with 
this work and with the type of semantic representation which it 
implies. 
In a series of papers [Rosch 1973; 1974; 1975(a); 
1975(b); 1975(c); 1977; 1978; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch, 
Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem 1976(a); Rosch, Simpson, 
Miller, 1976(b)] Rosch has proposed a 'view' of categorization 
implicit in which is a model of the semantic representation of 
categor{es. The word 'view' is used here because Rosch 
[197S(b); 1978; Mervis and Rosch 1981] has persistently argued 
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that her work specifies neither a process nor a representational 
model of categorization. Rather, it is claimed, this work 
present3 'principles' of, and 'constraints' upon, possible 
models of categorization. Nevertheless Rosch's work does imply 
processing and representational accounts [see Rosch 1975(b) for 
instance] and it is difficult to escape the conclusion that this 
research was predicated, albeit implicitly, upon such models, 
[Smith 1978; Smith and Medin 1981]. However before turning to 
these implied models of categorization two central principles of 
categoLization, expounded by Rosch, will be outlined. 
The first principle is that of 'cognitive economy' which 
states that the task of categorical representations is to 
provide the maximum amount of information for the minimum amount 
of cognitive effort [Rosch, 1978 p.28]. The concept of 
cognitive economy was introduced to pschology by way of Collins 
and Quillian [1972; Quillian, 1966]. The concept of cognitive 
economy, then, derives from computing where concern with the 
economic storage of data was a central issue. Collins and 
Quillian [1972] argued that networks were a cognitively ~conomic 
form of data storage. It is not clear that Rosch in adopting 
the principle of cognitive economy was commited to a network 
model of semantic category representation. But it will become 
apparent, in the discussion to follow, that Rosch's account of 
semantic categories is highly compatable with the notion of 
network representation. 
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The principle of cognitive economy is not, however, 
without its critics. For instance Lachman and Lachman [1979], 
in considering 
representation, 
reformulated as 
an evolutionary approach to memory 
argued that 
the principle 
cognitive economy should be 
of 'adaptive' economy. They 
pointed out that the human memory system is high in redundancy 
and went on to propose that memory is probably subject to an 
information/survival trade off rather than an information/effort 
trade off. The most efficient representational system is not 
neccessarily the best adapted for survival. Specifically a 
network type of representation in which concepts are represented 
only once at a particular node [e.g. Collins and Quillian, 
1972; Collins and Loftus, 1975; Anderson, 1983] might be 
thought to unduely limit the networks ability to survive injury 
[and hence lower survival value]. Yet although the class of 
model implied by the Lachman's, is psychologically more 
sophisticated than the computer derived version of cognitive 
economy, it has yet to be fully developed and hence will not be 
employed here. Nonetheless the principle of cognitive economy 
and the nature of categorical representation are closely bound 
up with evolutionary considerations as the following discussion 
will indicate. 
In proposing her second principle Rosch asserts that 
" ••• the perceived world is not an unstructured total set of 
equiprobable co-occurring attributes. Rather the material 
objects of the world are perceived to possess (in Garner's, 
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1974, sense) high correlational structure ••• " [ibid, p.29]. 
According to this proposal attributes in the world occur in 
'perceptual bundles' e.g. wings and feathers. Rosch observed 
that at least two factors contributed to which attributes were 
represented: a) the functional needs of the perceiver in 
interaction with the environment, and b) the category system 
that iR already extant in a culture at a given time. Thus there 
should be an optimum level at which attribute groupings are 
maximized for economy and survival [Lachman and Lachman, 1979]. 
A majo( part of Rosch's work is concerned with specifying such a 
'basic' level of categorization. 
Two models of categorization implicit in Rosch's work are 
the 'exemplar' and the 'featural' models and in discussing these 
models the account of categorization given by Smith and Medin 
[1981; Chapters 4, 7, and 8] will be extensively drawn upon. 
At the core of the exemplar model is the assumption that a 
concept is represented by separable descriptions of some of its 
exemplars. It is argued that exemplars usually playa dominant 
role in categorization because of their accessiblity, other 
types of information such as summary descriptions of concepts, 
being less accessible. For instance the concept 'Bird' is 
defined by exemplars such as 'Robin, Sparrow, Thrush, and the 
like. One example of the use of exemplars comes from the work 
of Holyoak and Glass [1975; previously discussed in chapter 4] 
who found that when Ss judge the truth of sentences such as "All 
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birds are eagles" they employ counterexamples, e.g. 'Robin' 
rather than summary descriptions. Smith and Medin cite a large 
body of research supporting the use of exemplars in 
categorization [p.144]. Exemplars are represented either by 
descriptions such as 'feathers, wings, redbreast, etc.', or by 
subsets such as pink flamingo, Chilean flamingo. Rosch 
[1975(b); Rosch et al [1976(a)] present evidence supporting a 
versior. of the exemplar model in which 'goodness' of exemplar 
has a central role. Rosch [1975(b)] found that people regard 
certaL, exemplars as better examples of a concept than other 
exemplars. Thus subjects judge 'Robin, Sparrow, and Thrush' to 
be more typical of the concept 'Bird' than 'Ostrich, Penguin, 
and Bat'. Similarly 'Kitchen Chair' is thought to be a better 
example of the concept 'Chair' than 'Car Seat'. Additional 
evidence from Rosch [1975(a); 1975(b») and others, shows that 
more typical exemplars are categorized faster [Smith, Shoben, 
Rips, 1974; Hampton, 1979], than less typical exemplars, are 
responded to faster when making categorical judgements, are 
activated by the concept, were better recalled than less typical 
conceptA, and shared more properies in common with other 
category members. This work demonstrating the role of exemplars 
in the representation of common objects raises the question as 
to how exemplars are interrelated in memory. 
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Rosch and Mervis [1975] account for typicality effects, 
such as those listed, in terms of 'featural overlap'. In 
describing this Rosch and Mervis draw on Wiggenstein's [1953] 
notion of 'family ressemblances'. Exemplars bear a family 
ressemblance to each other if individuals share some features in 
the following manner: 'c' can be said to be related to 'A', 
although they share no common features, by virtue of the fact 
that both are related to 'B', A<--->B<--->C. Rosch and Mervis 
formalize this in the concept of 'cue-validity' [Beach, 1964; 
Reed, 1972]: " ••• Cue validity is a probabilistic concept; the 
validity of a given cue 'x' as a predictor of a given category 
'y' (the conditional probability of y/x) increases as the 
frequency with which cue 'x' is associated with category 'y' 
increases and decreases as the frequency with which cue 'x' is 
associated with categories other than 'y' increases •••• The cue 
validity of an entire category may be defined as the summation 
of the cue validities for that category of each of the 
attributes of the category. A category with high cue validity 
is, by definition, more differentiated from other categories 
• than one of lower cue validity •••• " [Rosch, 1978, p.30-31]. 
Thus categories are seen as related to each other according to 
how many properties they share with each other and how many 
properties they share with a contrast class. Robin, Sparrow, 
and Thrush, which have many features in common with each other 
and few features with other classes are categorically distinct. 
As these instances also share many features in common with the 
superordinate 'Bird' and few with other 8uperordinates they are 
'typical' of the concept 'Bird'. Other categories/concepts, 
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e.g. Penguin, Emu, Bat, have few features in common with each 
other, have few features in common with the superordinate 
'Bird', and have featural overlap with categories from other 
classes, and, so, are 'atypical' exemplars of their class. It 
may be noted in passing that Murphy [1982] has argued that, on 
logical grounds, the formal concept of cue validity is not 
applicable to categorization in this way. Nevertheless 
cue-validity does capture the central notion that items are 
typical by virtue of feature overlap and feature contrast. A 
more recent formal model by Tversky [1978] is, perhaps, not open 
to Murphy's criticisms although this model is not capable of 
accounting for the effect of contrast categories [dissimilarity] 
as it deals exclusively with similarity. 
In one of the few attempts to investigate the types of 
attributes that people actually used in categorization Rosch and 
Mervis had Ss list features of exemplars, previously judged as 
typical and atypical, and of the appropriate superordinate 
concepts. It was found that typical exemplars shared many 
features with each other and with features of the superordinate 
whereas atypical instances had few features in common with each 
other, with other [typical] members of the class, or with the 
features of the superordinate concept. In contrast they did 
have features in common with members of other classes. Rosch 
and Mervis proposed that this 'internal structure' of categories 
indicated their 'prototypical' nature The concept of a 
prototype, as used by Rosch and her colleagues, referred to the 
Chapter 4 Page 4-21 
central tendency of a category. Highly typical instances were 
said to be more prototypical of a concept in as much as they 
were closer to the centre of the category. Other researchers 
have arrived at similar conclusions. For instance Hampton 
[1976; 1979] described this internal structure as 
'polymorphous'. Polymorphous concepts are ones in which an 
exemplar belongs to a certain category if it possesses a 
sufficient number of a set of features , none of which need be 
common to all category members. McCloskey and Glucksberg [1979] 
presen~ a similar account of the 'fuzziness' of concepts in 
their property comparison model. 
The general featural model outlined by Smith and Medin 
[p.61-67] effectively summarizes the role of features in 
semantic categories. The model incorporates two central 
assumptions; firstly that the representation of a 
concept is a summary description of an entire class, and 
secondly that the representation of a concept is some sort of 
measure of central tendency of the concept's and- class's 
properties. Such properties or features are probabilistically 
determined. For example a feature of Furniture is 'made of 
wood' which although possibliy true of Chairs, Tables, 
Sideboards, is less likely to be true of Carpet, Mirror, Vase 
and is not necessarily true of any of these items. The point is 
that such non-necessary features may be true of many items in 
the clRss and hence are reasonable additions to the list of 
concept criteria. Features are weighted according to their 
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probability of occuring with items in the class and according to 
their probability of co-occuring with other features. 
Cue-validity, property comparisons, and polymorphous concepts, 
are all very similar realizations of this general featural model 
and all try to capture the probabilistic nature of 
feature/concept inclusion and central tendency. Rosch [1978] 
~he 
has called this~'horizontal' structure of categories to denote a 
reference to how exemplars are related to each other within a 
category level. Rosch also proposed a 'vertical' dimension to 
categorization in which classes of concepts were separated 
according to their level of abstraction and this aspect of 
category representation is now considered. 
Rosch and her colleagues [1976(a); 1978; Mervis and 
Rosch 1981] observe that objects can be categorized at a number 
of different levels of abstraction and, when these levels are 
linked together in a taxonomic hierarchy, a particular level is 
more cognitively salient than other levels. These workers term 
this the 'basic' level, which is the level at which the 
information value of the attribute [feature] clusters is 
maximized. [Earlier in the discusion it was suggested that 
there were certain meta-theoretical reasons for posititing a 
basic level i.e. cognitive economy, survival value]. Rosch et 
al [1976(a») studied three level hierarchies of common noun 
categories, e.g. Furniture [superordinate level), Chair [basic 
level], and Kitchen Chair [subordinate level]. The main 
findings were that " ••• the basic level is the most general level 
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at which (a) a person uses similar motor actions for interacting 
with category members, (b) category members have similar overall 
shapes, (c) a mental image can reflect an entire category ••• " 
[Mervis and Rosch, 1981; p.92]. Further while superordinates 
were found to share virtually no common attributes, basic level 
concepts shared numerous common attributes, and subordinates 
shared even more common attributes. Mervis and Rosch [1981, 
p.92-94] discuss a plethora of findings, including many reported 
by other researchers, that support the concept of a basic level. 
A terminological problem here is that researchers in this area 
frequently use the terms attribute, feature, and property, 
synonymously. This convention will be adopted during the course 
of this discussion but in section 4.6, below, the 
distinctiveness of the three terms will be established. In 
considering these issues Smith and Medin concluded that 
" ••• superordinate concepts are likely to be described by 
exemplar representations, whereas subordinate concepts are 
likely to be described by probabilistic representations ••• " 
[p.172]. For example Furniture is represented by 'Chair, Table, 
• 
Bed, Sofa, etc.', whereas 'Kitchen Table' is represented by 
features such as 'legs, wooden, top, drawer, etc.'. They 
further propose that basic level categories are represented by 
both, e.g. Table is represented by a typical example of table 
and by a list of features. This is in keeping with an 
earlier point made by Smith and Medin [p.169] that prototypes 
are realizable as instances, that is, as exemplars. In other 
words the prototype of table is realizable as an example or 
series of examples of tables. It should also be recalled that 
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Rosch [1976(a); discussed further in chapter 6) found that 
basic level concepts to be more imagible than concepts at other 
levels of abstraction. Smith and Medin concluded that 
" ••• superordinates probably have no common perceptual properties 
(as the listings from Rosch and her colleagues indicate), they 
may well have common abstract or functional properties (which 
the listings are insensitive to). Thus a superordinate's 
perceptual properties may be represented in exemplar form (that 
is, shape is given separately for each exemplar), while its 
nonperceptual properties are described in probabilistic form 
that is, as a summary representation) ••• " [ibid). 
Before bringing together the various points raised in this 
discussion a brief note must be made about 'features'. 
4.6 Perceptual Attributes 
The above discussion relied heavily on the concept of a 
'feature' • This sections examines what sorts of features 
subjects regard as being associated with common objects. 
There are few reports of the features subjects implicitly 
associate with category terms. In those studies that exist 
subjects are typically asked to list " ••• properties and 
characteristics that people generally attribute to various 
objects or things ••• " [Ashcraft, 1976, p.4; see also, Ashcraft 
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1978;1979; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Hampton 1976; 1979; Smith, 
Shoben, and Rips, 1974] • Given that subjects list similar 
properties the 
generally taken 
resulting production frequency 
as indicating underlying semantic 
norms are 
structure 
[ibid]. It is typically found that certain features 'dominate' 
a concept and/or a class [Ashcraft, 1978]. However examination 
of these norms shows that Ss rarely include in their listings, 
attributes other than perceptual properties and simple motor 
interactions although the former account for the majority of 
properties. This suggests that, if these sorts of norms do 
reflect underlying semantic structure, perceptual properties 
playa dominant role in the semantic representations. The 
research previously discussed [see also Ashcraft, 1978] provided 
extensive evidence that perceptual properties played a central 
role in categorization. More recently Murphy and Smith [1982] 
in a study employing artifical categories observed that 
distinctive perceptual features were closely involved with 
typicality effects. Murphy and Smith reported that only 
perceptusl attributes were crucial to their findings and they 
comment " ••• Rosch et al [1976(a)] claimed that objects are 
categorized faster at the basic level than at the subordinate or 
superordinate levels because basic categories are associated 
with more distinctive attributes. Our studies provide strong 
su~port for this claim as long as it is qualified to mean 
perceptual attributes ••• " [p17]. They went on to argue that 
perceptual features were closely related to those parts of 
objects which they frequently named or implied. In keeping with 
this Hemingway [1981] found that basic level exemplars had more 
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'parts' in common than exemplars from other levels but that this 
relationship did not hold for other attributes such as qualities 
and functions. As functions inevitably involve actions a 
plausible suggestion is that functions are represented in 
script-like semantic representation. In chapter 5 it was 
reported that Bower et al [Bower, Black, and Turner, 1979] found 
that scripts were organized around the primitive actions that 
they enebled. Thus in as much as functions involve actions, 
they may be represented in some script-like format as opposed to 
discrete features. Murphy and Smith concluded by proposing that 
natural categorization may have evolved to attend to primarily 
perceptual attributes [see also Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976]. 
This clearly relates to the earlier discussion of the survival 
value of a basic level of categorization. Given that items 
represen~ed at the basic level are more cognitively available it 
would seem to follow that they depict objects in the 
environment. An animal that could identify food sources and 
predators very quickly and with little cognitive effort would be 
well equiped for survival. 
features and properties involved in the 
representations of common objects are then predominantly 
perceptual features. Clearly these perceptual features describe 
the most salient characteristics of the objects with which they 
are assoc~ated. In production frequency lists idiosyncratic 
responses are rarely more evident than normative responses. For 
example possession of a green chair does not predispose a 
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subject to include 'green' as a property of chair. It follows 
that basic level exemplars with which the properties are 
associated are typical instances that predominantly contain 
perceptual information. This may be in turn responsible for 
their imagibility. 
In conclusion the terminology to be employed employed in this 
thesis for referring to aspects of objects will now be 
clarified. From now on the following convention will be adopted 
in the use of the terms property, feature, part, and attribute: 
with the exception of 'attribute' all the terms are taken to 
refer to perceptual aspects of objects. For example a property 
of an orange would be it's colour, 'orange'. A feature of an 
orange would be 'pock-marked skin'. A part of an orange would 
be 'pips'. Obviously these are only examples and there will be 
aspects of objects that do not easily fall into this 
classification. However these distinction have heuristic value 
for later in the thesis [Part 2] there will be occassions when 
different aspects of objects 
'attributes' will be taken 
will be considered. The term 
to refer to all the aspects of an 
object aGd this will be modified by terms such as 'perceptual'. 
Perceptu3l attributes are all the perceptual aspects of an 
object jncluding those that are not properties, features, or 
parts. The term attribute will be most frequently employed. 
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4.7 Conclusions: Semantic Representation Of Common 
Objects 
It is clear from section 4.5 and 4.6 that Rosch's account 
of category representation is highly campa table with a network 
model of memory, although Rosch does not herself draw this 
para11eJ.. Attributes and exemplars are differentially connected 
in str~ctured sets • 
. The following general model of the semantic representation 
of natural objects may be derived from the above discussion. 
Common objects are represented by exemplars and by attributes. 
Further they are represented in categories which have no precise 
boundaries. Categorical membership is determined by attribute 
overlap between exemplars, which determines an exemplars 
centrality to the class. Thus semantic representations of 
common objects contain attributes and examples of those objects 
structured in overlapping sets. The role of features and 
exemplars in these semantic representations varies with the 
level of specificity of the concept. Superordinates are 
represented in terms of summary descriptions of their abstract 
and/or functional properties, e.g. Furniture; is used to store 
things, sit on, sleep on, decorate, impress friends, ••• etc. 
Superordinates are also represented by their most typical [basic 
level] exemplars. Basic level concepts are prototypical of 
subordinate classes that contain [primarily] perceptual 
information. Hence basic level concepts are represented by 
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subordinate exemplars and/or descriptions [i.e. attribute lists 
or clusters]. Basic concepts are realizable as images. 
Subordi~ate concepts are instances of basic level concepts which 
are represented by their attributes. 
There are, of course, a number of questions raised by this 
general model. For instance does the model apply to 
representations with more than three levels of abstraction ? 
How can the model account for 'expert' knowledge of natural 
objects? Does the model extend to more abstract concepts ? 
[c.f. Hampton, 1981]. Can the model account for the 
combination of concepts, e.g. pet fish [c.f. Smith and Medin, 
1981, for further discussion of this]. These questions are 
beyond the scope of the present thesis. The aim here is to 
investigate differences and similarities between these semantic 
representations and parallel autobiographical representations. 
To this end the research to be reported in part 2 of this thesis 
primarily confines itself to investigating concepts at the basic 
level and, more specifically, employs the stimuli so intensively 
researched by Rosch and her colleagues. Inevitably issues that 
relate to categorization will arise and these will be discussed 
as they occur. However such issues will be subordinate to the 
central goal of the thesis which is to investigate content 
differences between semantic and autobiographical memories. 
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It! conclusion the general model of category representation 
suggests two questions of direct relevance to the hypothesised 
content distinction. The first is, are autobiographical 
encodings of objects representented in a manner similar to that 
of corresponding semantic representations i.e. by attributes, 
? It will be recalled that Tulving [1983] proposed that 
episodic: memories might be thought of as 'feature bundles'. 
Also the extensive literature on cued-recall suggests that 
episodic memories contain separable attributes. There is 
therefore the possibility that autobiographical memories may be 
represented by attributes. This leads to the second question: 
are autobiographical and semantic representations of the same 
basic level concept comprised of the same attributes ? This 
will form one of the central hypotheses of the research reported 
in part 2 of this thesis and is discussed further in chapter 7. 
CHAPTER 5 
iMAGERY AND THE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL/SEMANTIC DISTINCTION 
Tn chapters 3 and 4 it emerged that imagery was involved 
in autobiographical and semantic memories. This chapter 
discusses imagery both generally and imagery as it relates to 
the al'tobiographical/semantic memory distinction. The use of 
imagery to study content differences between autobiographical 
and semantic memories is considered. 
The first section considers the 
and me.nory. Particular attention 
KOBslyn [1980]. 
relationship 
is given to 
of imagery 
the work of 
The second section discusses the case for two types of 
image: firstly images drawn from semantic memories, and 
secondly images drawn from autobiographical memories. 
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T.he third section briefly considers imagery methodology. 
~t is concluded that imagery constitutes the most direct 
method for investigating content differences between 
autobiograpical and semantic memories. 
~.1 Imagery and Memory 
Two approaches to imagery are considered in this section; 
a] studies of the role of imagery in long-term memory and, b] 
studies of imagery in short term memory, [Holyoak, 1980; 
Richarason, 1980]. These two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive and both of these approaches emphasise the relations 
of imagery ana memory. [The imagery/proposition debate will not 
be discussed. This omission is reasonable given Anderson's 
[1978] argument that imaginal and propositional models are not 
theoretically distinguishable and given that the concern here is 
with tpe content of memories rather than with their 
repres~ntatiooal format]. 
The first approach is best typified by the work of Paivio 
[1971, 1975, 1978] which has centered on the role of imagery in 
long term memory. J.T.E. Richardson [1980] has called this the 
'elaborative' approach to imagery. It is concerned with the 
functior of imagery as an organizing parameter in long-term 
memory [c.f. Haber, 1981], as an aid to recall, and as a means 
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of representing meaning. Paivio [1971; 1975(~); 1975(b)] has 
proposed a dual-coding model of image:..-y and verbal 
representation which contains the following proposals: firstly 
two codes in which to represent experience are available, 
imagina~. and verbal, and although these codes are independent 
they are associatively related; coding [of the same item] in 
both modes leads to superior accessibility in comparison to 
single coding; secondly the imagery system permits simultaneous 
coding of multiple pieces of information whereas the verbal 
system employs sequential coding; thirdly images are 
" ••• analogue representations of perceptual information ••• " 
[1975(&), p.145], or, in other words, records of perceptions. 
Paivio supported his model with a number of experimental 
investigations [c.f. Paivio 1971; 1975(b)]. However in a 
recent review of the literature J.T.E. Richardson [1980] 
conclud~d that the dual-coding hypothesis, as presented by 
Paivio, ~as not supported by the evidence: not all meanings are 
represei.lted by images; dual coding does not necessarily 
facilitate recall; images are not records of perception. 
• Although dual-coding has not received unequivocal support by in 
subsequ~~t research, certain aspects of the elaborative approach 
are atil: generally agreed upon: some long term memories are 
represented in an analog format; some long term memories may be 
arrayed along analog dimensions [such as size, shape colour and 
the like]; and at least some, if not all items are coded both 
verbally and imaginally. Analog representations, then, play 
some role in long-term memory and may be accessed by words. It 
will be proposed, below, that appropriate verbal instructions 
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may ac~ess images of autobiographical or semantic memories. 
11. contrast to the elaborative approach to imagery the 
second approach considered here [the constructivist approach] 
has attended to the 'privileged' and 'emergent' properties of 
images. According to this view images are conceived as being 
transit0ry representations. Research and theorizing in this 
area is best typified by the work of Kosslyn and his colleagues 
[see K0sslyn, 1980 for an overview]. Kosslyn puts foward a 
theory of imagery in which visual mental images are 
conceptualized as transitory data structures that occur in an 
analog spatial medium. These 'surface' representations are 
generatEd from more abstract 'deep' representations in long-term 
memory and, once formed can be operated on in certain distinct 
ways. Thus images are said to be quasi-pictorial and are 
represented in a medium that mimics coordinate space. Images 
are generated from underlying deep structur~s that Kosslyn 
characterizes as being either 'literal' or 'propositional'; 
" ••• lit~ral information consists of encodings of how something 
looked, not what it looked like; an image can be generated 
merely by 
Proposi~ional 
activating an underlying 11 teral encoding. 
information describes an object, scene, or aspect 
thereof and can be used to juxtapose depictive representations 
in different spatial relations ••• " [p.Sl]. Kosslyn went on to 
argue th~t in retrieving information from memory a 'horse race' 
takes plL~ce between propositional fact retrieval and imaged fact 
retrievaJ.. Studies of the use of imagery in fact retrieval led 
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Kosslyn to conclude that " ••• imagery is likely to be used in 
fact retrieval if the fact is about a visible property of an 
object that a person has seen and it has not been considered 
frequently in the past ••• " [p.54]. For example in answering the 
question 'how many windows are there in the front of your house 
7' most people report generating an image and 'reading' the 
answer off that image, whereas answering the qu~stion 'do houses 
have windows 7' is usually not mediated by imaged fact 
retrieval. 
It might be argued that this distinction is parallel to 
the autobiographical/semantic memory distinction since 
autobiographical memories can be seen as literal encodings and 
semanti~ memories as propositional encodings. However this 
connectlon is not made by Kosslyn and indeed his distinction 
refers p.xclusively to semantic memory. Moreover it is possible 
to apply Kosslyn's literal/propositional distinction to 
autobiographical memories themselves. In othp.r words there may 
be both propositional and literal representatioqs of 
experiences. For example habitually going to the same place may 
of 'over-learned' propositional give ri~e to some form 
autobio~raphical memory. In contrast 'going to a number of 
similar ~laces will eventually, give rise to a semantic memory 
of that class of places [recall Linton's a:count of her own 
memory for meetings, discussed in chapter 3J. The position 
taken h~re then is that both autobiographical and semantic 
memories may be represented propositionally or literally. 
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Kosslyn further outlines various privileged properties of 
the imagery medium such as specialization for making size and 
shape comparisons, representing visible properties, and 
facilitating the manipulation of representations. The work of 
Shepard and Metzler [1971], Shepard and Cooper [1973], Metzler 
and S~e~ard [1974] into the mental rotation of visual images 
the provid~s evidence forl latter point. Shepard [1978] argued 
that one of the priviJeged properties of imagery was that in the 
process of some transformation, such as rotation, images 
maintai~ed a one to one correspondence with actual objects in 
the world so that, if the imaged object and the veridical object 
were si~ultaneously rotated [at the same speed], the two objects 
would be isomorphic to each other at all points in the 
transf0rmation. Such one to one isomorphism is not preserved by 
more abstract transformations. 
L.le elaborative and constructivist approaches taken 
together make four central points about imagery. Firstly images 
may be &ccessed by words. Secondly images are constructed from 
underlying memories. Thirdly images are rep".:-esented in some 
transitory form. Fourthly imagery facilitates ce~tain types of 
manipulation, e.g. fact retrieval, size comparisons, mental 
rotations. As the present aim is to investigate content 
differeTlcp.s between autobiographical and semantic memories the 
research in this thesis will he will be concerned with the 
second and fourth of the above points: the generation of images 
from different types of memories, and nature of the information 
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contain~d in such images [see chapter 6]. 
5.2 Two Classes of Image 
The elaborative and constructive approaches to imagery 
both efuphasise the close relationship of imagery to memory, 
although 'memory' here must be qualified to mean semantic 
memory. Commenting on this Tulving [1983] observed, lilt is not 
without interest in the present connection to observe that 
little mention has been made of episodic memory in the currently 
flourishing literature on mental imagery, even when the 
imagery-work or thinking about it has has been done by theorists 
with knc'wo interests in, and contributions to, the study of 
episodi~ memory 
1979; Kosslyn, 
Shepard, 1975, 
[e.g. 
1976; 
1978; 
Anderson, 1978; Kolhers and Smythe, 
Neisser, 1972; Paivio, 1976, 1977; 
Simon, 1972]. Almost invariably, the 
images of the contemporary theories of imagery reside in, or 
come frem, what in the episodic/semantic distinction of memories 
would be regarded as the semantic part.", [p.186]. 
In keeping with Tulving's comment is Rosch's finding that 
basic level concepts are more likely to be realized as images 
than are other classes of concepts. In experiments using a 
signal-det2ction paradigm and a priming paradigm [Rosch et aI, 
1976(a), Posch, 1975(b)] basic objects appeared to be the most 
abstract categories for which an image could be representative 
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of the class as a whole. Presumably these images of basic level 
concepts were drawn from semantic memories. Note also that both 
Rosch and Kosslyn asked their Ss to generate images of 'typical 
instances' of objects. Commenting on this, Block [1981] pointed 
out that it is often supposed that prototypical representations 
are f n'm the same class of enti ties as images: ..... If 
prototyp2S are in the same natural kind as mental images, and if 
protot~'pes are as important in thinking as now appears to be the 
case, then the issue of the nature of mental images is closely 
connected to the question of the nature of human thought ••• " 
[p4]. Also, as previously noted, basic level concepts contain 
primarily perceptual attributes [Murphy and Smith, 1982], 
suggestillg a basis for their imagability. It follows that 
images drawn from semantic memories should frequently represent 
typical perceptual attributes of a class ot objects. For 
example if an S is asked to generate an image of a typical 
'table', it may be expected that a he/she will have in mind some 
analog representation depicting common properties of tables. 
Thus se~antic memories of common objects may be imaged. 
It will be recalled that virtually every study of 
autobiographical memory reviewed in chapter 3 indicated that 
autobiographical memories were frequently imaged. Whitten and 
I 
Leonard round that imagery was, form in which Ss most frequently 
recalled their school teachers: even when Ss reported searching 
categories of school teachers the eventual re~all was in the 
form of an image. Yet it seems unlikely that an image drawn 
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from an autobiographic~l memory would contain primarily common 
properties of the imaged object. As observed in chapter 3, an 
autobi0graphical image is more likely to contain information 
about tre context in which an item has been experienced. For 
example an image of a table drawn from an autobiographical 
encoding might represent the table currently in a person's 
kitchen. Such an image would only contain zeneral perceptual 
attribuces of tables in as much as these were a part of the 
imaged object; perceptual attributes contained in 
autobio~raphical images would usually be specific to the imaged 
object rather than typical of that object. Thus the content of 
images drawn from autobiographical memories would be, 
predominatly, comprised of information specific to the 
experienced context. 
lruagery may, then, constitute a fairly direct means 
whereby differences in the content of underlying memories can be 
examined. 
5.3 Imagery Methodology 
~\ere is a methodological parallel between imagery 
research, in both the elaborative and constructivist approaches, 
and semantic memory research. Both types of research have 
employed chronometric measures [see Posner, 1978] to invesigate 
memory rlpresentations. While semantic memory researchers have 
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studied reaction times to phrases and words, imagery researchers 
have studied the times taken to generate images, to manipulate 
images, and to verify properties contained in images. Clearly 
the time taken to generate an image will reveal something about 
the und~rlying memory trace. For instance Glass and Meany 
[1978] in an experiment employing an image generation time 
paradigm found that exemplars of low typicality were of two 
types: one type, that exhibited slow image generation times, 
were categorized more slowly because it took longer to retrieve 
descriptions of the exemplars; and a second type, exhibiting 
faster ~mage generation times, were categorized more slowly 
because it took longer to compare descriptions of exemplars 
against a description of the category. The image generation 
times, then, indicated that exemplars of low typicality did not 
form a homogeneous group. Glass and Meany concluded that 
imagery was "the best measure of how much a subject knew about 
an instance" [1978; p.623]. Image generation times, then, may 
be emplvyed to study aspects of underlying memories. Similarly 
the time taken to verify properties of generated images may be 
employed to examine the content of images and, hence, to further 
infer th£ nature of the underlying memories. 
5.~ Conclusions 
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it is concluded that both autobiographical and semantic 
memories may be represented as images. Times taken to generate 
images and to verify information contained in images may 
indicete differences in both the content and the organization of 
the underlying classes of memory. 
It 1s difficult to envisage how content and organizational 
differ~aces could be directly investigated by means other than 
imagery. In chapter 2 it was shown that in p~evious research 
into autobiographical memory typically requiring S8 to learn 
unrelated sentences and/or phrases, these memories could be 
judged t? have a high semantic content. Hence, differences 
between the two classes of memory may have been obscured. 
Rather than compelling Ss to encode autobiographically the aim 
of the present research was to investigate autobiographical 
memories which had been encoded extra-experimentally. This was 
in keeping with past studies of autobiographical memory [chapter 
3] which had also investigated extra-experimentally encoded 
autobiographical memories. Similarly, in the great majority of 
studies, extra-experimentally encoded semantic memories had been 
studied. In conclusion, since imagery involves the retrieval of 
those memories from which the image is generated, it appears to 
be the most direct way of investigating both autobiographical 
and semantic memories. 
CHAPTER 6 
THE RESEARCH AIMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This chapter outlines the general and specific aims of the 
research ~o be reported in part 2 of this thesis. The first section 
specifies the general aim of the research. The second section discusses 
the stimuJ.i to be used. The following three sections detail specific 
hypotheses crawn from the discussions in earlier chapters. The sixth 
section Cvnsiders the types of methodology to be used and the 
experimental strategy. 
summarized. 
Finally the specific 
6.1 The Research Aim 
research aims are 
The central goal of this thesis is to investigate content 
differe~e5 between autobiographical and semantic memories. It is 
expected that the findings from these investigations will lead to an 
account of the representation of autobiographical and semantic memories 
and their relation to each other. Hence the central research aim is to 
present an overall account of the representation of the two classes of 
memory. It is intended that this overall account will specify well 
established differences between the two classes of memory as well as 
areas that await investigation and the type of investigations that might 
be undertaken. 
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6.2 The Stimuli 
It was, decided to investigate autobiographical memories of 
common everday objects and activities. This had the advantage of 
employing stimuli the semantic representation of which had been 
extensively investigated. In chapter 4 the semantic representation of 
'natural' categories was outlined and a general model specified. The 
natural categories studied by Rosch comprised some nine categories of 
everday objects and activites. This may seem a small sample of all 
categories, however as Rosch [1975(b)] pointed out this group of 
categorie~ comprised the nine most frequently occuring categories in 
american-english and so may be judged to be representative of categories 
of common objects and activities generally. Furthermore, as Smith and 
Medin [1981] observed, semantic memory researchers have yet to extend 
their stud!es, fully, to other types of categories and concepts. Hence 
the selection of these stimuli would seem to be in keeping with current 
semantic memory research. 
6.3 Content Differences 
The main argument drawn from chapter 2 was that 
autobiographical and semantic memories were most likely to differ in 
terms of t~e content of the information that they represent. The main 
hypothesis of this thesis is that autobiographical and semantic memorieS 
differ in terms of content. Other hypotheses concerning differences 
between autobiographical and semantic memories will be considered belo~, 
however these are secondary to the central hypothesised 
difference. 
content 
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From the discussion in previous chapters it was clear that 
content ~ifference8 between autobiographical and semantic memories had 
not, previ~u8ly, been directly investigated. Any content differences 
that had been observed were incidental to the research discussed above, 
as in the Anderson and Ross study [1981, see section 1.2, chapter 2]. 
Thus the nature of content differences remains d ~atter of speculation, 
albeit intensive speculation. From the discussion in chapter 2 and from 
the revi~ws in chapters 3 and 4 of autobiographical and semantic 
memories, it was evident that theorizing and research indicated that 
autobiographical memories contained information about the experienced 
context whereas semantic memories did not. The semantic memories of 
basic level exemplars, discussed in chapter 4, were seen to contain, 
primarily, context 
represented object. 
It is 
autobiogr4phical 
free perceptual information concerning the 
hypothesised that content differences between 
and semantic memories take the following form: 
Autobiogrpahical memories of common objects and activities contain 
information about the context in which the item was exper\enced, and 
contain ccntext bound perceptual information. For example an 
autobiogra~hical memory of 'chair' may contain information about the 
experienced context, 'in living room at home', and context bound 
perceptual information, an old green simulated leather chair which 
looks a bit worn'. Semantic memories will not contain contextual 
information but rather will contain information about typical perceptual 
attributes ~f the item. For example a semantic memory of 'chair' would 
contain inf~rmation such as 'legs, back, seat, wooden, arms,' and so on. 
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Experiment 3 in chapter 8 reports a preliminary investigation 
of the content hypothesis in which subjects described images of items 
drawn from either autobiographical or semantic memories. Experiments 5, 
7, and ~, chapters 9 and 10, report experimental manipultations of 
different aspects of content in relation to autobiographical and 
semantic memories. 
S.4 Organizational Differences 
A second, and less central, hypothesis is that sets of 
autobiographical and semantic memories differ in terms of their 
organization. This hypothesis is secondary to lhp. content hypothesis 
because organizational differences between the ~wo classes of memory 
will be only indirectly investigated. It was felt that the organization 
of autobicgraphical memories constituted a research topic in itself and, 
therefore, could not be fully and explicitly investigated given the main 
research ~im of examining content differences. Yet as, presumably, 
different contents may give rise to different typeR of organization it 
is clear that content and organization are, to some extent, related. It 
was decided, then, to examine Whether autobiographical memories were 
represented in semantic categories, similar to those discussed in 
chapter 4, rather than directly investigating autobiographical memory 
organizaticn. 
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In chapter 4 the organization of semantic memories in 
categories and the inclusion of those categories in hierarchical levels 
of abstraction was outlined. It was shown that this semantic 
organizat~on was based on some form of attribute overlap in which items 
with considereble overlap were more central to their category than items 
with less overlap. The structure of semantic meruories poses a number of 
questions relating to the structure of corresponding autobiographical 
memories. Firstly are autobiographical memories similarly organized in 
categories 7. Secondly, if autobiographical memories are categorically 
structurec, are these autobiographical categories the same as, or 
similar too, the semantic categories 7. Thirdly are autobiographical 
categories determined by attribute overlap 7. Fourthly, if 
autobiographical categories are determined by attribute overlap, are 
these the ~ame attributes which determine semantic categories ? 
In chapter 3 Whitten and Leonard's [19811 finding that 
autobiographical memories of subject's school teachers were, at least in 
part, organized categorically [e.g. english teachers, fourth grade 
teachers, etc.] was discussed. This finding clearly indicated that 
• 
autobiographical memories may be categorized. However it is not clear, 
primarily ~ecause of lack of research, whether this is also true of 
autobiogra~hical memories of common objects and activities. Although 
this is obviously an area of some interest it is also suspected that it 
is a very complex area and thus could not be investigated in any depth 
in the present thesis, i.e. as a secondary hypothesis. 
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This thesis will not directly investigate categorization of 
autobiogr3phical memories. However it is feasable to investigate 
whether autobiographical memories are organized in the same way as 
semantic ~ategories. This can be easily achieved by varying the 
typicality of the stimuli: If autobiographical memories are organized 
in categories similar to semantic categories, or 1f they simply directly 
connect to a corresponding semantic memory, then the typicality effects 
[discusseci in chapter 4, section 4.6] habitually observed for semantic 
memories sh0uld also be present for autobiographical memories. The 
typicality of stimuli are varied in all the experiments reported in part 
2 and in all experiments similarties and differences in organization 
between autobiographical and semantic memories are considered. However, 
with the exception of experiment 6, chapter 9, and experiments 9 to 11, 
chapter 1:, organizational differences are secondary to investigating 
content differences. 
TIle questions relating to the use of attributes in 
autobiographical memory organization are clo~ely related to the 
hypothesised content differences. If it is found that autobiographical 
memories do contain seperable attributes then it might be assumed that 
these may be employed in the organization of autobiographical memories. 
Although not directly investigated in the thesis, chapters 7 and 11 
provided scme data indirectly bearing on this issue. Further to this if 
it is found that autobiographical memories do not contain similar 
information to semantic memories then clearly the two cannot employ the 
~ attributes in determining organization. Chapter 8 reports findingS 
bearing upun this issue. 
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The central hypothesis concerning organizational differnces is 
simply that semantic memories are subject to typicality effects which 
will not be evident for autobiographical memorien. As other specific 
hypothese~ about organizational differences are largely dependent on the 
findings ~oncerning content differences these will be considered when, 
and if, suggested by these findings. 
6.5 Connections Between Autobiographical and Semantic Memories 
One of the consequences of the rejecticn of Tulving's [1972; 
1983] funccional distinction between semantic and episodic memories [see 
chapter ~] was the accecptence of a unitary model of memory, 
[multi-store models were also rejected, see chapter 2]. The unitary 
model of memory discussed in chapter 4 emphasised the connectivity of 
memories within a single memory network in which different classes of 
memories are distinguished by their content and concomitant connections. 
Within such a model it is clear that autobiographical and semantic 
memories [of the same item] must have some connections with each other. 
It is appropriate, then, that this thesis should have something to say 
concerning the relations of autobiographical and semantic memories. 
If autobiographical memories contain, primarily, contextual 
information, as hypothesised above, then they may connect to script-like 
semantic r~presentations, [see chapter 3]. Script-like representation 
'point' to other context free semantic representations [see section 4.5, 
chapter 41. Thus context free semantic representations may connect to 
corresponding autobiographical memories via some form of script-like 
representation. Chapter 11 examines this hypothesis. 
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6.6 The Invesigatl.ve Strategy 
The investigative strategy was that of 'converging operations' 
[Garner, 1974; Rosch, 1978]. This strategy was felt to be most 
appropri~te because of the lack of relevant past work upon which to base 
experiment.al paradigms and because this strategy had been employed, for 
similar r~asons, successfully by Rosch [1978; Mervis and Rosch, 1981]. 
The centlAI idea of coverging operations is simply that evidence 
gathered from a number of different sources [in this case different 
experimental methods] cumulatively supports one overriding 
interpretation, even though alternate interpretations may be brought to 
bear on the findings of individual experiments. In the research 
reported ~low descriptions of images, image generation times, priming 
images, cued recall, attribute verification times, similarity judgments, 
and attribllte production frequency norms, constituted the manipulations 
and dependent variables; the findings of which converged on the 
hypothesis that autobiographical and semantic memories differ in terms 
of content:: Autobiographical memories represent information about the 
experienced context whereas semantic memories represent information 
about gene~al [perceptual] attributes.It is important to note that 
although a particular finding may be interpretable in more than one way 
it will be shown that alternative interpretacions do not account for 
other specific findings nor for the overall pattern of the results. 
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6.7 Summary and 0t.her Issues 
The cent t'iil topic of the research is that of content 
differences between au~obicgraphical and semantic memories. It is 
hypothesised that autobiographical memories represent context specific 
informatiCln 
information. 
whereas semantic memories represent context free 
Secondary to this is the topic of organizational differences 
between the two classes of memory. It is hypothesised that semantic 
memories are organized in semantic categories in terms of typicality 
whereas autobiographical memories are not organized in semantic 
categories in terms of typicality. 
A third issue concerns the connections between 
and semantic memories. It is hypothesised that 
memories connect to script-like semantic 
autobiogr~phical 
autobiographical 
representations which in turn 'point' to context free semantic 
categories, Thus the cnnnectiol1 between semantic and autobiographical 
memories cf the same COW.TIlon items is via script like semantic 
representat';'ons. 
It is inevitabl2 that in the course of the research findings 
will emerge which more directly on other issues e.g. 
categorizaLion and imagery [outlined in chapters 4 and 5]. Although 
these additional iSSU8~ will be recognised at the appropriate place in 
the thesis :urth(c.r disr..:'.!',.'}! n ''''ill be defered to chapter 12. In -:hapter 
12 the implications ); the findings for categorization, imagery, and 
other issues, will be dss~ss~d dnd discussed. 
Part 2 
:'he Research 
CHAPTER 7 
TYPICALITY AND IMAGERY 
In this chapter two experiments are reported: the first 
is designed to gather normative data about the stimui to be used 
throughtout this research; the second experiment also has this 
aim, but in addition looked at the relationship of typicality to 
different classes of imagery. 
The gathering of normative data at this stage was felt to 
be or particular importance because the subjects to be used in 
this series of experiments, Open University Ildminstrative staff 
and psychology students, are somewhat different from the subject 
population usually drawn on by semantic.memory researchers, i.e. 
first and second year North American psychology undergraduates. 
Open lJniversity students take a part-time correspondence degree 
stretching on average over a six year period and frequently are 
in full employment throught out the course of their degree. 
These students tend to be older, with an average age of early 
30's ranging from early 20', to post retirement age [65+], and 
are more broadly distibuted across the full range of 
socia-economic sub groupings. For these reasons, then, the 
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accuracy of current norms such as typicality ratings [ROsch, 
1975]~ imagery ratings [Paivio, Yuille. and Madigan, 1968], and 
property norms [Ashcraft, 1976], can not simply be assumed. 
Although there is likely to be some overlap it is equally likely 
that there will be important differences between norms gathered 
from culturally distinct groups, such as North American 
undergraduates and Open University students [see Brown, 1978; 
Rosch, 1975]. 
E~periment 1 
Typicality Norms 
7.1 Introduction 
In chapter 4 it was observed that normative ratings of the 
perceived centrality of an exemplar to a category have been 
taken as reflecting underlying semantic structures. For example 
Rosch [1975(b), experiment 1] had subjects rate items according 
to how best the item fit their "idea or image of the meaning of 
the category name" [p.197]. From the resulting data Rosch was 
able to construct 'goodness-of-example' category norms depicting 
the typicality element of internal category structure. [see a1ao 
Ashcraft, 1978]. 
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The validity of these norms is es~ab1ished in subsequent 
experimental investigations. Rosch [1975(b)] reported a 
sequence of experiments in some of which Ss made similarity 
judg~ents of pairs of exemplars drawn from different typicality 
levels e.g. high, medium, and low, typicality. Judgments of 
pairs of highly typical exemplars were faster when subjects were 
prim~d with the category name than when unprimed. Further, 
judgments of pairs of highly typical exemplars were generally 
faster than judgments of pairs of exemplars previously judged to 
be less typical of the category. These findings strongly 
suppo~ted the assumption that typicality was an organizing 
facto~ in the underlying semantic representation of categories. 
In chapters 9 and 10, of this thesiS, experimental 
manipulatiOns of exemplars drawn from different typicality 
levels 4re reported. However the present concern is simply to 
rep1ic£te Rosch's 'goodness of example norms' [1975(b), 
experiment 1] on the present subject population. This is felt 
to be necessary because Brown [197&d in a replication of the 
Battig and Montague [1969] category noraa, with U.K. subjects, 
observed some important differences in the production 
frequencies of individual items. To take an extreme example, in 
response to 'a type of dance', U.s. subjects second most 
frequently produced response was 'frug' Whereas this dance did 
not appear in the U.K. pro~uction frequency responses. 
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For these reasons it is predicted that the U.K. 'goodnes 
of ~xemplar' norms will exhibit a similar typicality structure 
to tOot observed by Rosch, but that there will be notable 
differences in the perceived goodness-of-examp1e of individual 
exemplars by U.K. and u.s. subjects. 
7.2 Method 
A single group of Ss were required to rate on a 7-point 
scale their judgment of the typicality of exemplars drawn from a 
group of categories. Order of presentaion. of exemplars and 
categories was random within the constraints specified below, 
[see Materials]. The data was collapsed across Ss and internal 
reliability assessed by random split-half rank order 
correlations. These norms were also correlated with the norms 
reported by Rosch [1975(b»). 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were taken directly from Rosch [1975(b) 
experiment 1, p.197] which employed the following stimulus 
selection procedure: Rosch 
categories, categories 
selected the 
the exemplars 
most co .. only 
of which could 
used 
be 
unambiguously represented by simple pictures. She rejected 
categor~.es that had a part-whole structure [e.g. parts of the 
body, parts of buildings], categories with multiple 
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superordinates [e.g. animal is commonly used as a synonym for 
mammkl], and categories the superordinate of which cross~cut a 
number of taxonomies [e.g. food]. The ten categories 
eventually selected were: fruit, bird, vehicle, vegetable, 
sport, tool, toy, furniture, weapon, and clothing. As these 
categories are all contained in the Battig and Montague [1969) 
production frequency norms of instances given as members of 
categories, Rosch selected the exemplar lists from this source. 
Exemplars were taken from Battig and Montague if they had a 
production frequency of ten or more. Thus ten superordinate 
categories each with 50 to 60 exemplars were constructed. 
In this experiment nine of these categories were employed: 
fruit, bird, vehicle, vegetable, sport, toy, furniture, weapon, 
and clothing. [The tenth category [tool] was randomly 
el~inated to reduce the size of the total stimulus set and 
hence the time taken by Ss to complete the ratings]. 
Translations from American into English were undertaken where 
the ~xpertmenter deemed neccessary. [e.g. 'drapes' to 
'curtains'] and these were infrequent. The complete list of 
exemplars is contained in Appendix A, Table 7.1.1. 
Materials 
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An experimental booklet was constructed in which all 
members of a category were listed below the category name on a 
single sheet of paper and this was done for all nine categories. 
The nine sheets were combined into a booklet the front page of 
which ~ontained the instructions. Next to each exemplar was 
printed a numbered seven point rating scale. The distribution 
of exemplars on anyone page was randomly selected from a group 
of thirty random orderings of each category and the ordering of 
pages was selected randomly from the 91 possible page 
order~ngs. Page order and order of presentation of exemplars 
were ccmbined so that no Ss received all the stimuli in exactly 
the same order, although some Ss received the same random 
orderings of exemplars within a category, or the same ordering 
of pages, as other Ss. 
Subjects 
Subjects were Open University staff and students. The 
Open University staff Ss were all members of The Open University 
subject panel and numbered 42. The students were taking either 
second or third level courses in psychology and numbered 72. 
Mean age of all Ss was 34 [to nearest year] and the range was 
from 19 to 55. 114 Ss took part, 68 females and 46 males. 
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Procedure 
Open University ltaff took part in groups o,f 8 to 12 at 
took 
the Open University. Open University students ~, part in 
groups of 4 to 20 while attending a seven day residential 
psychology summer school, at either Warwick or Sussex 
unhrersities. SS were given the following instructions [taken 
from Rosch, 1975(b), p.198]: "This study has to do with what we 
have in mind when we use words which refer to categories. Let's 
take the word 'Red' as an example. Close your eyes and imagine 
a trua red. Now imagine an orangish red ••• imagine a purple red. 
Although we might still name the orange red or the purple red 
with the term 'Red' they are not as good p.xamples [as clear 
cases of what red refers to] as the clear "true" red. In short 
some reds are redder than others. The same is true for other 
kinds of categories. Think of dogs. You all have some notion 
of what a "real dog", a "doggy dog" is. To me a retriever or an 
alsatian are very doggy dogs while a Pekinese is a less doggy 
dog. Notice that this type of judgment.has nothing to do with 
how well you like the thing; you can like a purple red better 
than a true red but still recognize that the colour you like is 
not ~ true red. You may prefer to own a Pekinese without 
thinking that it is the breed that best represents what people 
mean by dogginess. 
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In this experiment you are asked to judge how good an 
example of a category various instances of the category are. In 
the i'est of this booklet are listed nine categories with a 
numbt"i' of examples for each category. At the top of each page 
is & category name and beneath it are a list of examples of that 
category. Next to each example are the numbers 1 to 7 and you 
are asked to ring one of these numbers to indicate your 
j udglllen t • A 1 means that you feel the member is a very good 
example of your idea of what the category is. A 7 means that 
you feel the member fits very poorly with your idea or image of 
the category [or is not a member at all]. A 4 means you feel 
the member fits moderately well. For example one of the members 
of tha category 'Fruit' is 'Apple'. If apple fits well your 
idea or image of fruit you would ring a 1; if apple fits your 
idea of fruit poorly you would ring a 7; a 4 would indicate 
moder.,.te fit. Try to use the full range of numbers on this 
7-p01nt scale so as to finely discriminate your judgments. 
Don't worry about why you feel that something is or isn't 
a good example of the category. Remember different people will 
have aifferent opinions. Try!2. mark it the way YOU ~ !E.." 
s, then completed the ratings in theIr own time. At 
completion Ss recorded their age, sex, nationality, and whether 
English was their first language or not. 
pound. 
Ss were paid one 
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7.3 Results 
Of the 114 Ss data from 12 Ss [9 males and 3 females, all 
Open University students] was rejected on the basis that either 
English was not their first language or that they were not 
resident U.K. nationals. The analysis WgS conducted on the 
ratings of the remaining 102 Ss. 
Rank orderings and mean ratings of goodness of example of 
all Instances of all categories are shown in Appendix A, Table 
7.1.1; also shown are the corresponding ranks from Rosch 
[1975(b), experiment 1]. Reliability of the ratings was 
assesaed by Spearman rank order correlations and Pearson product 
moment correlations on the following divisions of the data: A] 
between two separate split halves of Ss divided at random, B] 
between Open University staff and Open University students. 
Consistency was high, the split-half correlations were all .91 
or higher, and the correlations between Open University staff 
,and students were all .90 or higher. Table 7.1.2, over, lists 
the Spearman rank correlation coefficients. These findings 
compare favourably with Roschs' split-half correlations which 
were all 0.97 or higher and, for a geographical division of Ss, 
were 0.92 or higher. 
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Table 7.1.2 Spearman rank correlation coefficients [rho] 
between split-half and staff-vs-students 
divisions of goodness-of-example ratings. 
Split- Staff-
-half vs-Students 
Category rho rho 
Toy 0.9105 0.9016 
Sport 0.9145 0.9079 
Vehicle 0.9794 0.9547 
Weapon 0.9511 0.9442 
Clothing 0.9732 0.9014 
Furniture 0.9761 0.9700 
Fruit 0.9523 0.9615 
Bird 0.9626 0.9581 
Vegetable 0.9776 0.9752 
Table 7.1.3 Spearman rank correlation coefficients [rho] 
between U.K. and U.S. Goodness-of-Example category 
norms. [Ordered from lowest to highest correlation]. 
Category rho 
Bird 0.5558 
Vegetable 0.5958 
Toy 0.7705 
Sport 0.7282 
Furniture 0.7396 
Fruit 0.8053 
Weapon 0.9212 
Vehicle 0.9358 
Clothing 0.9373 
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Spearman rank order correlations were also calculated for 
each category norm of U.K. against U.S. rankings, see Table 
7.1.~, above. It is clear that there are striking agreements 
and disagreements between U.K. 
briefly discusssed below. 
7.4 Discussion 
and U.S. raters and this is 
The principle finding is one of close agreement between Ss 
as t~ the goodnes-of-example of a large number of exemplars 
across a group of categories. This supports Rosch's conclusions 
that " ••• (a) Subjects consider it a meaningful task to rate 
membe~s of such categories according to how well they fit the 
subject's idea or image of the meaning of the category name and 
(b) thare is high agreement between subjects concerning these 
rankings ••• " and therefore that the norms " ••• provide a reliable 
measure of internal structure ••• ", [p.198-199]. Thus, following 
Rosch's example, these norms will form an lndependent variable 
i~ the research reported below which will employ subjects drawn 
from the same population from which the norms were collected. 
The inuependent variable will be typicality which will be 
employed to investigate hypotheses concerning the organization 
of autobiographical and semantic memorle&, as outlined in 
chapter 6. 
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A second finding, peripheral to the central aims of this 
thesis but of interest nevertheless, wae that the extent of 
agreement betweeb U.K. and U.S. norms varied considerably 
acro~s categories though overall agreement was high. In a 
comparison of production frequency category norms between U.K. 
and V.S. subjects 'Brown, (1978] found similar variations. 
BroWT_ argues that these variations are partly attributable to 
the two national populations being exposed to different sets of 
referent objects. Some of these differences occur naturally as 
in the case of Birds and Vegetables, whereas others are 
cultur61ly created as in the case of Sport and Toys. The 
correlations listed in Table 7.1.2 lend some support to these 
arguments. These findings also provide some indirect support 
for one of Roschs' 'principles of categorization' [1978; 
discussed in Chapter 4]. This principle staes that perceptual 
discolltinuites, which vary from environment to environment, 
contrib~te to the structuring of groups of instances. 
it is not intended to pursue this issue here. 
However 
The important implication of the national differences for 
the current research is that norms gathered from one population 
can not be readily applied to another population. The 
predi~tion that the overall form of typicality would be the same 
but thnt different items would be rated as more of less typical 
according to nationality was confirmed. 
Experiment 2 
Imagery Norms 
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7.5 Introduction 
In this experiment data was collected from Ss about the 
rated imagability of a selection of exemplars drawn from the 
typicality norms compiled in Experiment 1. Two types of image 
were examined: [a] 'typical instance' imagery in which Ss were 
asked to rate the imagability of typical ins~ances of exemplars 
and ib] 'personal instance' imagery in which Ss were asked to 
rate the imagablity of personal instances of the same exemplars. 
Typical instance images were assumed to be drawn from underlying 
semantic memories and personal instance images were ass~ed to 
be drawn from underlying autobiographical memories, [see chapter 
3 and 4]. For the moment these assumptions will not be 
questioned further. However evidence will be presented 
[chapters 8 and 9] showing that such assumptions are warranted. 
The ~entral purpose of this experiment was to examine whether 
the two classes of memory were equally imageble. 
The first hypothesis, drawn from the general hypothesis of 
a Content distinction between autobiographical and semantic 
memori~8, was that: as personal instance images would contain 
information about actors, actions and locations, and typical 
instance images would contain information about the perceptual 
attributes of the imaged item, personal instance images should 
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be richer or more detailed than typical inRtance images. To 
assess this it was decided to ask Ss to rate the 'detail' with 
which images came to mind. It was predicted that there would be 
no cor~elation between ratings of 'detail' given to personal and 
typical instance images, indicating that the two were not 
asso~iated. 
A second hypothesis was simply that images drawn from one 
or the other class of memory would be more or less easy to bring 
to mind. It might be argued that autobiographical memories 
would be less easy to image than semantic memories because they 
contain more detail. There is some evidence that complex images 
take more time to generate and require more effort to keep in 
mind than simpler images [see Kosslyn, 1980]. However as there 
is n~ past work that has directly investigated differences in 
the availabilty of autobiographical and semantic memories it was 
only predicted that there would be differences in the rated ease 
with which images came to mind and the direction of the 
differences was not predicted. 
A third issue related to the organization of the 
underlying memories [see chapter 6]. It was reasoned that as 
semancic memories are represented in categories then a 
typicality effect should be present in the typical instance 
imagery ratings, particularly on the ratings of 'ease' with 
which an image came to mind. It was hypothesised that ratings 
of ease of imaging an item would correlate with the rated 
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typicality of that item, but only for typical instance imaging. 
As little was known about the underlying organization of 
autobiographical encodings no firm predictions could be made 
about the expected relationship of personal instance imagery and 
typic.ality. However, as discussed in chapter 6, various 
consideratio~suggested that autobiographical memories were not 
organized in terms of centrality of exem~lars to a class. 
Therefore it was expected that personal instance imagery would 
not be related to typicality. 
The three hypothese were; a] that personal instance 
images would be rated as being more detailed than typical 
instance images; b] that personal and typical instance images 
would differ in rated ease of imagability, although which type 
of imafe would be rated easier to image is not predicted; and 
c) that typical instance imagery would vary with rated 
typicality but that personal instance imager.y would be unrelated 
to typicality. 
7.6 Method 
An independent groups design was e'Jlployed. Ss were 
randomly allocated to one of two groups .. One group were 
requirt!d to rate the imagability of typical instances of 
exemplars while the other group were required to rate the 
imagability of personal instances of the same items, [see 
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Procedure, below, for instructions). In both groups two ratings 
were r~quired for each item, [a] the 'ease' with which the image 
came to mind and [b] how 'detailed' or 'elaborate' the image 
was. In all cases Ss used a 7-point rating scale where '1' 
indicated very high imagery detail or ease and '7' indicated 
very low imagery detail and ease. The presentation of stimuli, 
and the order of ease and detail ratings, were randomized. 
Subjects 
106 Ss took part all were Open University students 
attending a weeks' residential introductory psychology summer 
schoo1 at the University of Sussex. They were 70 females and 36 
males, with a mean age of 34, ranging from 23 to 51. All S8 
were English speaking resident U.K. nationals. 
Stimulus Selection 
9 exemplars were selected from each of the 9 
goodness-of-example category norms collected in experiment 1 
[see Table 7.1.1., Appendix A] on the following basis: a] in 
each set of 9 exemplars, 3 exemplars were highly typical, 3 were 
mediumly typical, and 3 were atypical. Typical exemplars had a 
ranking of 6 or higher, mediumly typical exemplars had a ranking 
fallin~ between 21 and 32, and atypical exemplars had a ranking 
of 40 or lower; b] exemplars from all levels of typicality were 
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only selected if they were unambiguous members of their 
superordinate category. So exemplars such as 'Glass' for the 
category 'Weapon', or 'Books' for the category 'Toy' were 
rejected; c] exemplars were chosen that could be represented by 
simple pictures and that were likely to have been frequently 
encountered by Ss in their everyday lives. So exemplars such as 
'Oriole' for the category 'Bird', or 'Kale' for the category 
'Vegetable', were rejected. 81 exemplars were selected and 
these are listed under their appropriate superordinate category 
in Table 7.2.1, below, (see Results]. 
Materials 
A six page experimental booklet was constructed in which 
each printed exemplar was immediately followed by two 7-point 
rating scales, one labelled 'Ease', and the other labeled 
'Detail'. The first page contained the inotructions, the next 
four pages contained the 81 stimulus words, and the final page 
contained questions about age, sex, nationality, and language. 
The distribution of exemplars on the four centre pages was 
randoYly selected from a group of twenty random orderings of the 
total .et of 81 exemplars, 'Ease' and 'Detail' scales were 
randomly alternated, and the ordering of pagel vas selected 
randomly from the 41 possible page orderings. Thus although 
so.e Ss received either the exemplars or pages in si.ilar orders 
no S. received identical an overall presentations. 
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Procedure 
Ss took part in groups of 20 and completed their ratings 
in their own time, in a large hall seated well apart. Ss were 
given the following instructions according to which group they 
were allocated, either [A] 'Personal insta~ce' imagery raters, 
or [B) 'Typical instance' imagery raters. 
[A) "This study has to do with how clearly and how easily 
certain words bring to mind images of objects and activities 
with which we are familiar. For example on hearing the word 
BICYCLE I have an image 
parked in the hallway of my 
of my own, slightly rusty, bicycle 
house. To take a more unusual 
example, in thinking about the bird TOUCAN I recall watching a 
T.V. advert that featured a Toucan. 
In ~ study you ~ asked to bring to mind images of 
actual objects and activities which you have experienced. That 
is yo\.> .!!'.!. asked ~ bring to mind, in the form ~ ~ image, a 
personal or autobiographical instance ~ the named object or 
acitvitJ[, [we shall refer to this, in the rest of these 
instructions, as a 'personal instance image'1. 
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In the above two examples there are two impOrtant 
differences between my two images: fir~tly my image of my 
bicycle came almost immediately to mind whereas the image of a 
Toucar. took some effort to bring to mind. I had to think about 
it. Thus some images come to mind more readily or with more 
ease than other images. One of the things you will be asked to 
do balow is to indicate how easily certain images come to mind. 
Secondly my image of my bicycle contained quite alot of detail 
whereas my image of the Toucan was a bit hazy and contained only 
a fe~ details. A second thing that you will be asked to do is 
to incticate how detailed certain images are once you have 
brought them to mind. 
You are, then, asked to judge with what 'ease' your image 
came to mind and how 'detailed' that image was. 
Over the page is a list of words and next to each word are 
two 7-point rating scales; an 'E' [easel-scale and a 'D' 
[detail]-scale. You are asked to ring a number on the 
appropTiate scale to indicate your judgment of how easily and 
with wnat detail, a specific word brings to mind a personal 
instance image of the named object or activity. For example: 
Chap tel' 7 
BICYCLE E 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
D 1 2 3 4 567 
tOUCAN D 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
E 1 2 3 456 7 
E-SCALE: A '1' on the E-sca1e means that a personal 
instance image came immediately to mind. A '7' means that no 
persof,al instance image came to mind. A'4' indicates that a 
personal instance image came to mind only after some thought. 
Other numbers such as '2' and '3' indicata that personal 
instance images came to mind more or less easily, '5' and '6' 
indicate that personal instance images were elicited with more 
or less difficulty. 
D-SCALE: A '1' on the D-scale means that an image of a 
detailed or an elaborate autobiographical, or personal instance, 
image came to mind. A '7' means that no personal instance image 
came t~ mind. A '4' indicates that a general or hazy personal 
instance image came to mind. Intermediate numbers such as '2' 
and '3' indicate that the personal instance image was more or 
less detailed, whereas '5' and '6' indicate that the personal 
instance image was more or less general or hazy. [Note that in 
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the word lists the E~scale does NOT always occur before the 
D-scale: Check this carefully before ringing a number] 
The numbers I have ringed in the above examples reflect my 
judgments of the the ease with which, and detail contained in, 
the personal instance images I was able to bring to mind in 
response to BICYCLE and TOUCAN. Try to make your ratings on the 
basis of the first image that comes to mind. 
It is essential that you make your judgments, on the E-
and D- scales, as fine as possible and you are asked to use the 
full range of numbers on the 7-point scales t.o achieve this. Of 
course everyone will give different ratings according to their 
experiences and preferences, so do not be concerned about 
whether your judgments are 'right': There are no right answers. 
Just msrk it the way you see it. 
Try to work as quickly as possible, 'taough not so fast 
that your answers are ill-considered. Generally you will find 
that bringing to mind personal instance images of every day 
objects and activities is extremely easy." 
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[B) "This study has to do with how clearly and how easily 
cert4in words bring to mind images of typical instances of 
objects and activities. For example on hearing the word BICYCLE 
an image of bicycle comes readily to mind. However, to take a 
more unusual example, on hearing the word TOOCAN I had to think 
a little before I could bring an image to mind. 
You are asked to form images of 'typical instances' of 
different objects and activities. This means that you should 
generate images of what .!!. typicaly meant or denoted ~ ~ 
particular word. For example g may be the case that you 
personally ..2!!!.!. tandem bicycle and hence might find .!!. easy ~ 
form ~~ image of that bicycle. However, in this study, you ~ 
asked .!!2! do this but form!!!. image E.f what most people would 
!!!!.!! £I. the !!.!!! bicycle. That.!!. ~ im~ of what ~ fits 
your idea of the object. [These will be referred to as 'typical 
instance images' throughout the rest of these instructions). 
From the above examples it is clear that some images come 
to mind more readily or with more ease than other images. One 
of the things you will be asked to do below is to indicate how 
easily certain images come to mind. A second point is that 
while oy image of 'bicycle' contained quite alot of detail my 
image of a toucan was a bit hazy and contained only a few 
details" A second thing that you will be asked to do, then, is 
to indicate how detailed certain images are once you have 
brought them to mind." 
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The remaining instructions were identical with [A] except 
that 'typical instance image' was substituted for 'personal 
instance image. 
8s were randomly allocated to one of the two groups by 
drawing either a blue or yellow token from a box. The lights in 
the hall were dimmed to encourage image generation and it was 
verbally suggested to 5s that they employ one of two techniques; 
[1] close eyes and try and see the image, [2] keep eyes open, 
fixate on a blank wall or 'the middle distance', and project the 
image. 
7.7 Results 
The mean ratings for 'ease' and 'detail' of imagability in 
the two instruction groups, 'typical instance' [TI] and 
'pers~na1 instance' [PI] are listed in Table 7.2.1 [Appendix A] 
next to the actual exemplars and their cortesponding typicality 
rating. 
Two sets of random split-half correlations were calculated 
for each set of ratings [E-TI, D-TI, E-PI, D-PI]. Spearman rank 
correlations for 'Ease' and 'Detail' ratings under TI 
instructions were all higher than .886 nnd for 'Ease' and 
'Detail' under PI instructions were all higher than .832, 
Showing close inter-subject agreement. 
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All four sets of imagery ratings and the typicality 
rati~gs were entered into a stepwise mUltiple linear regression 
where the imagery ratings were the predictor or independent 
variables and the typicality norms were the criterion or 
dependent variable. Two separate regression analyses were 
undert~ken and the predictors were entered in reverse order in 
the s~cond analysis. Table 7.2.2, over, shows the correlation 
matrix of the variables. 
The best predictor of typicality was E-TI with a multiple 
R of 0.4375 that accounted for 12.7 % of the variance of 
typicality and this was significant with F~4.1125 DF 1,79 p<O.OS 
No other variables accounted for more than 5 % of the 
typicality variance and none yielded significant F ratios. It 
thus seemed that 'ease' of imagability of typical instances was 
a weak [correlation was only 0.41] but comparatively significant 
predictor of typicality. PI imagery, on both ease and detail 
ratings, was the least predictive of typicality. PI ratings on 
both s~ales were slightly higher, see Table 7.1.1 [Appendix A], 
than TI ratings indicating that PI images were perceived as 
being slighty more difficult to bring to mind and slightly less 
detailed than TI images. However the highest correlations were 
for E-TI with D-TI and E-PI with D-PI, indicating that the two 
types of measure were closely associated. 
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Table 7.2.2 Correlation Coefficients for Imagery and 
Goodness-of-Example Ratings [Typicality]. 
Typic-
-aU,ty 
E-TI 
D-TI 
E-PI 
D-PI 
Typic-
-allty 
1.0000 
0.4127 
0.3987 
0.2697 
0.1758 
E-TI 
1.0000 
0.9024 
0.6552 
0.5209 
D-TI 
1.0000 
0.6955 
0.6158 
E-PI 
1.0000 
0.8967 
D-PI 
1.0000 
------------------------------------------------------
Table 7.2.3 Correlation Coefficients for Imagery and 
Goodness-of-Example Ratings Collapsed across 
'Ease' and 'Detail' Ratings. 
Typic-
-ality 
TI 
PI 
Typic-
-allty TI PI 
1.0000 
0.4063 1.0000 
0.2291 0.6673 1.0000 
----- ._--------------------------------------------
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These high inter-correlations between E and D within TI 
and PI had the effect of rendering the F values reported 
unstable from analysis to analysis. It was found that both 
regression coefficients and other estimates of variance [RSQ, 
mean square correlation coefficients] varied with the order in 
which variables were entered into the regression equation. This 
was d\~ to the multicollinearity of the variables and, in 
particular, 
of &~I ~d 
to the extreme collinearity of the intercorelations 
D-TI [0.9024] and E-PI and D-PI [0.8967]. 
Multicollinearity renders the regression equation unstable, 
hence regression coefficients fluctuate from sample to sample, 
and reduce the reliability of the partial regression 
coefficients [Johnston, 1972]. As E and D ratings within the 
two instructions groups were so highly correlated and because of 
the effect this had upon the regression analysis it was decided 
to re-analyse the TI and PI ratings collapsed across the E and D 
measures. Table 7.2.3, above, shows the correlation matrix for 
the collapsed analysis. 
TI and PI were entered into a multiple linear regression 
as predictors and typicality ratings were the criterion. The 
overall multiple R was 0.4132 and RSQ was 0.1707. The overall 
regression yielded a F ratio of 8.028, DF 2, 78, which was 
significant p(0.0006. Two-tailed t tests performed on the 
regression coefficients found that, for TI t-3.333, which was 
significant, p(O.OOl, and for PI t- -0.568 which was not 
significant, p(0.57. Further TI, with a multiple R of 0.4102, 
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accounted for 12 % of the variance on the dependent variable 
whereas PI, with a multiple R of 0.22915, 8ccounted for only 5.3 
% of the variance on the dependent variable. This finding 
supports the hypothesis that typical instance images are related 
to typicality whereas personal instance images are not related 
to typicality to any significant extent. 
Also note that TI and PI were comparatively closely 
correlated with each other [0.6673] indicating an association 
betwep.n the two groups. As clearly this association is not 
related to typicality, it would seem reasonable to conclude that 
the relationship is one of imagability. In other words 
autobiographical and semantic memories were equally imagable. _ 
In addition each category was analysed separately and the 
regression equations were tested for equality between groups. 
The analysis of variance of regression coefficients over groups 
yielded a F ratio of 1.922, DF 24, 54, p<O.025. Table 7.2.4 
lists the regression coefficient, 't' statistic, and p level for 
TI and PI in each category. It can be seen from table 7.2.4, 
above, that the significant difference between regression 
coefficients over categories is a product of the correlation of 
TI with typicality and the lack of correlation of PI with 
typicality. 
categories. 
However these effects were not consistent over 
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Table 7.2.4 Regression Analysis Across Categories. Including 
Regression Coefficients, T Values, and p values 
(two-tailed) • 
Category Variable Coefficient T P(2-tailed) 
Weapon TI 0.54566 1.238 0.262 
PI 0.25826 0.557 0.598 
Bird TI 2.56232 4.198 0.006 
PI -1.25296 -1.792 0.123 
Vegetable TI 3.84930 2.794 0.031 
PI -3.02379 -2.293 0.062 
Clothing TI 5.54239 1.419 0.206 
PI 0.96149 0.475 0.652 
Fruit TI 2.96818 2.829 0.030 
PI 0.01793 0.013 0.990 
Toy TI 1.96030 1.608 0.159 
PI -0.95196 -0.938 0.384 
Vehicle TI 2.24713 1.072 0.325 
PI 0.48519 0.367 0.726 
Sport TI 2.06098 0.451 0.668 
PI -2.78183 -1.141 0.298 
Furniture TI 1.03371 0.707 0.506 
PI 1.27943 1.713 0.137 
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To investigate this further, linear trends amongst groups 
[TI and PI], categories, and the grouping of imagery ratings by 
typicality level, were tested. [Note that the actual typicality 
ratings were not included in this analysis]. All the main 
effects were significant, groups F 187.34, OF I, 54, p<O.OOl, 
categ~ries F 4.85, OF 8, 54, p<O.OOI, typicality F 25.1, OF I, 
54, p<O.OOI. Of interest in this case were two higher order 
intera~tions. The groups by category interaction was at 
Significance, F 2.15, OF 8,54, p-O.05, and the groups by 
category by typicality interaction was also significant, F 
2.377, OF 8, 54, p<O.05. No other interactions were 
significant. These findings indicated that typical instance 
image instructions produced ratings similar to those of 
typicality norms whereas personal instance image instructions 
produced ratings that were partly negatively correlated with 
typicality norms, although both these effects varied with 
categories. 
• In summary: some categories produced TI imagery ratings 
wpich k ~ere more or less postively correlated with typicality; 
some categories produced PI imagery ratings which were more or 
less negatively correlated with typicality. These two effects 
were, overall, significantly different from each other. 
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7.8 Discussion 
The finding that judgments about how easily, and with what 
detail, images came to mind were highly correlated in both 
personal and typical instance imagery groups, indicated that 
these measures were closely associated. Because of the 
correlation the hypotheses that personal instance images would 
be rated as being more detailed than typical instance images and 
that one or the other class of imagery would be rated as being 
more or less easy to image could not be statistically assessed. 
The fa:t that the two rating scales within PI and TI were highly 
correlated indicated that they were ratings of the same thing, 
namely, imagability [c.f. Paivio, Yuille, and Madigan, 1968]. 
It s~ems that the detail contained in an image is one of the 
determinants of the ease with which that image can be brought to 
mind [c.f. Kosslyn, 1980, also discussed in chapter 5]. 
Nevertheless it was apparent from table 7.2.1 [Appendix A] 
that typical instance imagery ratings, of both ease and detail, 
were slightly higher than corresponding ratfngs of personal 
instance images, but these differnces were slight. Examination 
of Table 7.2.1 indicates that TI images were generally [but not 
always] rated 0.5 to 1 point higher [i.e. closer to 1] on the 
7-point scale, for both ease and detail. Furthermore the two 
scales, ease and detail, when collapsed within imagery groups, 
yielded a moderate correlation [see Table 7.2.3 above] between 
PI and TI. Personal instance and typical instance images were, 
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then, judged to be equally imagable and the hypotheses that the 
two types of imagery would be judged to be differently imagable 
were not confirmed. 
The third hypothesis that ratings of typical instance 
imagery would be correlated with rated typicality received some 
support from the small but significant correlation between the 
two [see Table 7.2.3]. The TI correlation with typicality was 
nearly twice that of the PI correlation. It thus appeared that 
TI and PI ratings were not similarly related to typicality. 
Further analysis found that the positive correlation of TI with 
typicality was significant, that PI ratings were negatively 
correlated with typicality, and that these two effects were 
significantly different from each other. Finally it was 
observed that these effects varied from category to category. 
These findings clearly showed that the rated imagability 
of typical instances of items were similar to the rated 
typicality of those items. This strongly suggests that TI 
imagery and typicality are in some way related. Possibly 
typical items are more available in memory, than 
items, and henct were 'easier' to TI image. 
receives support from the reaearch reviewed 
le88 typical 
This proposal 
in chapter 4 
(section 4.4] where it is reported that typical exemplars were 
easier to recall, image, make category judgments about, and were 
more frequently referred to in conversation. It was also clear 
from the findings that personal instance imagery ratings are not 
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positively correlated with typicality. This lends some support 
to the hypotheses that autobiographical memories are not 
organized in terms of typicality. 
However this pattern of findings was not consistent across 
categories. Although TI ratings were always positively 
correlated with typicality, they were not always significantly 
so. It seems that typicality and the imagability of typical 
instances are only partially related. A possible explanation is 
that since Ss received the stimuli in random order they may not 
have pe.rceived their categorical nature. Possibly a category 
cue, by activating the category in memory, might have rendered 
the relationship of imagability and typicality more stable [this 
is explored further in chapter 9, experiment 5]. PI ratings on 
the other hand, were not always negatively correlated with 
typicality. One explanation for this may be that if it proves 
difficult to locate the appropriate autobiographical memory from 
which to generate an image then the memory search defaults to 
the appropriate, and presumably more easily located, semantic 
memory. However had such defaulting beer. frequent then a 
typicality effect similar to that observed in TI would have been 
evident. As PI was either negatively or only very slightly 
poative1y correlated with typicality it was reasonable to assume 
that semantic memories were infrequently defaulted to in this 
condition. Certainly it was clear that PI and typicality were 
infrequently related and this suggested t~18t the underlying 
autobiographical memories were not organized in terms of 
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typic~lity. 
7.9 General Conclusions 
Experiment 1 replicated Roschs' [1975] goodness-of-example 
norms and provided typicality norms appropriate to a U.K. 
population. Experiment 2 reported imagery ratings appropriate 
to a U.K. population and found that the rated imagability of 
personal and typical instance imagery were similar. This 
suggests that the two types of imagery were equally imagible. 
Further it was found that typical instance imagery was 
related to typicality but that personal instance imagery was 
eithe~ negatively or only weakly related to typicality. This 
suggests that the underlying autobiographical and semantic 
memories, from which the images had been drawn, differed in 
terms of their organization. 
1~e normative data gathered in these two experiments was 
to be used in the selection of stimuli in subsequent 
experiments. 
CHAPTER 8 
DESCRIPTIONS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL 
AND SEMANTIC MEMORIES 
This chapter reports an experiment that directly 
inveBtigated the hypothesised content distinction between 
autobiographical and semantic memories. In chis experiment Ss 
were required to generate personal or typical instance images 
and then to give short descriptions of their imagese The main 
finding was that descriptions of personal instance images were 
dominated by information about the context in which an item had 
been experienced. Descriptions of typical instance tmages were 
dominated by information about the perceptual attributes of the 
imaged item. ThUB the content hypothesis was supported and it 
was concluded that autobiographical memories represent 
informLtion about the context in which an item was encountered 
WhereGS semantic memories represented information about the 
general perceptual attributes of an item. 
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Data was also gathered 
differences between the two 
relating 
classes of 
to organizational 
memory. This data 
indicated that autobiographical memories of common items may 
connect to semantic memories of the same items by way of 
semantic representations of information concerning the locations 
of those items. 
Experiment 3 
Autobiographical and Semantic Memory Content 
Introduction 
The central point made in part 1 of this thesis was that 
autobiographical and semantic memories were most likely to 
differ in terms of the information that they represented. 
Chapter 4 [sections 4.4, and 4.5] reviewed evidence showing that 
semantic memories of common objects contained information, 
primarily, about perceptual attributes of the represented item. 
These perceptual attributes had been found to be general or 
typical of the category of the item, e.g. attributes given to 
'chair' were 'seat, arms, back, legs, etc.,' [Rosch and Mervis, 
1975; Ashcraft, 1978]. In contrast chapter 3 proposed that 
autobiographical memories contained information, primarily, 
about the context in which an item had been experienced. The 
point was also made that 
autobiographical memories 
perceptual attributes contained in 
would be specific to the experienced 
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item, e.g. 'chair' would contain attributes such as 'green, 
worn~ stain on arm,' and the like. 
It was decided, then, to collect Ss descriptions of 
personal and typical instance images. The prediction was that 
the descriptions would differ in terms of their content; 
descriptions of personal instance images would contain 
information about the context in which the item had been 
experienced and information specific to the imaged object; 
whereas descriptions of typical instance images would contain 
information about general perceptual attributes of the imaged 
item. 
In chapter 4 it was observed that previous researchers had 
investigated the role of perceptual attributes generally. 
Murphy and Smith [19821 reported that attribute overlap amongst 
basic level concepts was in terms of perceptual attributes 
rathel' than other classes of attributes. More recently Hemenway 
[1981) found that basic level objects had more parts in common 
• 
than they had other perceptual attributes. In the present study 
it was decided to sub-divide perceptual attributes into 
features, properties, parts, and functions. The first three 
sub-groupings were discussed in chapter 4 and all are detailed 
below, [see Results]. However the inclusion of 'functions' as a 
sub-grouping of perceptual attributes may appear strange. 
Aftera!l functions and perceptual attributes have been singled 
out by past researchers as separate attribute groupings [see for 
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exam~le Nelson, 1974]. Yet 'functions' are generally comprised 
of what Rosch et a1 [1976(a)] called simple motor interactions. 
For example a function of 'chair' is that it can be 'sat on', a 
function of 'jacket' is that it can be 'worn'. As functions may 
largely be represented by simple motor interactions which might 
be th~ught of as being perceptual in nature it was decided to 
include functions as a sub-grouping of perceptual attributes. 
However it was not expected that functions would be freqently 
named by Ss in descriptions of their images. The image itself 
should not typically depict functions although the image might 
in some way ~ymbolize functions of the item. 
A similar fourfold sub-division of contextual attributes 
was suggested by the discussion of context in chapter 3 and by 
the discussion of the semantic representation of scripts in 
chaptel' 4. It was decided to divide contextual attributes into 
inform~tion about the experienced context [location], time, 
actors and activities [other than functions] and context 
specific pe~ceptual information. These are detailed below [see 
Results]. This divison of contextual attributes was, in 
essence, a condensed version of Brown and Kulik's 'canonical' 
categories of recall [see chapter 3]. 
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The divisions of perceptual and contextu~l attributes were 
not intended to be exhaustive of possible divisions that could 
be ma1e of these attribute classes. Rather the aim was simply 
to provide some way of assessing the dominant attribute types 
named in Ss descriptions of their images. The reason that this 
was deemed neccessary was that in later experiments it was 
intended to manipulate the content of autobiographical and 
semantic memories. These divisions also facilitated the 
refinement of the content hypothesis. It was predicted that 
more perceptual parts would be named in Ss descriptions of 
typical instance images than other types of perceptual 
attributes [Hemenway, 1981]. Tulving's [1972, 1983] claim that 
episodic memories contain spatio-temporal information suggested A 
that ~nformation about times and locations would dominate 
contextual attributes contained in Ss personal instance image 
descript.ions. 
In addition to investigating the content hypothesis the 
-
experiment aimed to examine attribute overlap between the image 
descriptions. This was to be achieved by employing groups of 
highly typical and atypical exemplars. It was shown in chapter 
4 that semantic representations of highly typical basic level 
exemplars had many [perceptual] attributes in common with each 
other and had little overlap with exemplars from other classes. 
Atypical exemplars had few attributes in common with each other 
and overlapped considerably with exemplars from other classes. 
Similarly highly typical but not atypical exemplars contained 
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[perceptual] attributes that were common to the category 
superordinate. Rosch and Mervis [1975] had Ss list attributes 
of highly typical and atypical exemplars and made a count of the 
number of attributes common to the five most typical exemplars 
and tc the five least exemplars. Table 8.1.1, over page, shows 
Rosch and Mervis' findings. In contrast, category 
superordinates were found to have virtually no attribute overlap 
with each other. The question then was, would descriptions of 
personaI instance imagery contain attributes that overlapped 
with each other in a manner similar to that found by Rosch and 
Mervis for semantic representations 1. 
A finding which bears on this question is that of Tversky 
and Hemenway [1982] who reported evidence that categories of 
environ2ental scenes containing information about locations were 
structured hierarchically in terms of attribute overlap in a 
manner similar to that observed by Rosch and Mervis. As 
attribute overlap is often taken as indicating semantic 
structure [Ashcraft, 1978; Rosch, 1975; Smith and Medin, 1981] 
it might reasonably be argued that information about locations 
is semantically represented. Thus autobiographical memories in 
as much as they contain information about locations may exhibt a 
form of attribute overlap similar to that of semantic memories. 
This suggests at least two plausible possibilities concerning 
attribute overlap between autobiographical memories: al 
locational information may comprise the semantic content of 
autobiographical memories [see chapter 2]; b) locational 
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Table 8.1.1 Number of Attributes in Common to Five 
Most and Five Least Prototypical Members 
of Six Categories. 
Cate~o;:,y Most Typical Leas t Typical 
Members Members 
Furniture 13 2 
Vehicle 36 2 
Fruit 16 0 
Weapon 9 0 
Vegetable 3 0 
Clothing 21 0 
[from Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Table 2, p582] 
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in autobiographical memories may be 
connect to semantic representations [of 
locations). A corollary of a) is that autobiographical memories 
because they contain semantic information are not fully distinct 
from semantic memories and are organized in a similar manner. 
In contrast a corollary of b) is that autobiographical memories 
are separate from semantic memories but connect to them by way 
of information about locations and therefore are not neccesarily 
organized in a way similar to that of semantic memories but may 
be accessed by way of semantic memories. Although these two 
possibilities will not be directly investigated in the present 
experiment findings indirectly bearing on them will be reported. 
Subsequent experiments will more directly investigate 
organizational differences between the two classes of memory 
[c.f. chapters 9 and 10). [Also, as will be recalled, it was 
stated in the research aims specified in chapter 6 that 
investigating connections between the two classes of memory was 
considered to be of secondary importance to investigating 
content and organizational differences. Thus it is not until in 
chapte~ 11 that experiments directly bearing upon this issue are 
reported). 
Finally it is not expected that in the present experiment, 
other types of contextual attribute, e.g. context specific 
perceptual attributes, information about actors and actions, and 
temporal information, will exhibit such overlap. 
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The central hypothesis was that autobiographical memories 
would be found to predominantly contain contextual information 
whereas semantic memories would be found to predominantly 
conta!n perceptual information. A secondary hypotheais was that 
semantic memories would be found to exhibit a type of perceptual 
attribute overlap very similar to that observed by Rosch and 
Mervis [1975). Related to this it was more tentatively 
predicted that autobiographical memories would be found to 
exhibit Some contextual attribute overlap, similar to the 
predicted perceptual attribute overlap, but only for locational 
attributes. This would suggest that information concerning 
locations either comprises p,art of the semantic content of 
autobiographical memories or connects directly to semantic 
repreB-.ntations of locations. 
Itethod 
A between groups design was employed where Ss were 
randomly aSSigned to one of two groups, PI and TI. The PI group 
were rEquired to generate personal instance images and the TI 
group were required to generate typical instance images. The 
stimuli were either highly typical [HT] or highly atypical [HA] 
of the three noun categories Furniture, Fruit, and Clothing. 
Immediately after generating an image Ss wrote a short 
description of their image. The dependent variable was the 
frequen~y with which attributes in the descriptions could be 
classified as contextual or perceptual. 
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Subjects 
Subjects were 24 members of the Open University's 
administrative staff. There were 16 females and 8 males. 
Average age was 26. None of the Ss had ever taken part in a 
psychology experiment before. All were native English speakers. 
Stimulus Selection 
5 exemplars were selected from the 8 most typical 
exemplars and a further 5 from the 15 most atypical exemplars of 
the categories Furniture, Fruit, and Clothing. These exemplars 
were t.aken from the goodness-of-example norms reported in 
experimant 1 [Chapter 3, see Appendix Al. A complete list of 
the s~imulU8 set items is contained in Table 8.1.1 in Appendix 
B. The three superordinate categories had been randomly 
selected from the group, Bird, Sport, Vegetable, Toy, Vehicle, 
Weapon. The superordinates were also included in the stimulus 
set. Thus 33 items were employed. 
The stimulua selection criteria were identical to those 
employed in experiment 3. Some attempt was made to control for 
imagability of the stimuli in the following manner: PI and TI 
imagery ratings reported in experiment 2 [chapter I, see Table 
7.2.1. Appendix Bl were consulted and exemplars were selected if 
they had similar PI and TI ratings. From the resulting set 
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exemplars were selected that, within a category and within a 
typicality level, yielded mean rating values similar to the mean 
ratings from typicality levels within the corresponding two 
categories. Sets of atypical exemplars ~ere slightly less 
imagable than highly typical exemplars. However this procedure 
could not be applied to all the stimuli because imagability 
ratings had only been collect for 3 exemplars at each typicality 
level. Stimuli the imagability of which were not know were 
selected because it was felt that they would be easy to image in 
both TI and PI. 
Materials 
. All the basic level category exemplars were printed on 
individual pages in a booklet in 24 different ~andom orderings 
of pages. Each page was half A4 size and the exemplar was 
printed at the top of the page. A further identical booklet was 
construc~ed containing the three superordinates. For the 
superorjinates there were four identical page orderings of the 
31 Possible orderings. 
Apparatus 
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Ss were provided with a pen and wer~ timed with a 
stopwatch. 
Procedure 
Ss took part in groups of four in a large room. They were 
seated well apart and the light in the room was dimmed. Ss 
could easily see to write. Ss were then randomly allocated to 
one of the two experimental groups, PI [personal instance 
imagers] or TI [typical instance imagers]. According to their 
group Ss were given one of two sets of instructions. 
PI: "This is a very simple experiment designed to collect 
information about the content of images that we can bring to 
mind of familiar everyday objects. On each page of the booklet 
in front of you is printed a word naming a familiar every day 
object. Your task is to bring to mind an image of that object 
as you have personally experienced the object. For instance if 
one of the objects was Bicycle you would bring to mind, say, an 
image of your own Bicycle or that of a friend. Having got the 
image clear in your mind's eye write a brief description of the 
image in the space below the word in the booklet. Brief notes 
will suffice. Here is an example of a description of Potatoes, 
that some one gave in a previous experiment: "I have an image 
of some potatoes [SIbs] in a plastic bag on the vegetable shelf 
at Wait.r\)se". You will be allowed 45 seconds in which to bring 
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to mind your image and write a brief description. The 
experimenter will then say "Rest" and there will be a 15 second 
pause. He will then say "Start" and you must turn to the next 
word and repeat the whole procedure. There are 45 words in all. 
If you can not bring an image to mind then score a line through 
that page and go on to the next word when the experimenter next 
says "Start". 
TI· "This is a very simple experiment designed to collect 
information about the content of images that we can bring to 
mind of familiar everyday objects. On each page of the booklet 
in front of you is printed a word naming a familiar every day 
object. Your task is to bring to mind an image of a typical 
instance of that object, that is an image which best fits your 
idea of the object. For instance if one of the objects was 
Bicycle you would bring to mind an image of a typical instance 
of a bicycle, say, drop handle bars, two wheels, seat, brakes, 
basket, etc. Having got the image clear in your mind's eye 
write a brief description of the image in the space below the 
word in the booklet. Brief notes will suffice. Here is an 
example oi a description of a typical instance of Potatoes, that 
Some Orle gave in a previous experiment: "I have an image of 
Some potatoes they are round and lumpy and are whiteish with 
SOme very dark spots on them" You will be allowed 45 seconds in 
which to bring to mind your image and write a brief description. 
The eXJ)t>rimenter will then say "Rest" and there will be a 15 
second PSU8e. He will then say "Start" and you must turn to the 
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next word and repeat the whole procedure. There are 45 words in 
all. If you can not bring an image to mind then score a line 
through that page and go on to the next word when the 
experimenter next says "Start". 
[Note that the descriptions of 'potatoes', employed in 
both Bets of instructions, were taken literally from 
descriptions given by Ss in a pilot study] 
This part of the experiment took 50 minutes. Ss then 
reread their instructions and were verbally instructed that "the 
items which you are asked to image this time are slightly more 
abstract than the previous items, nevertheless you will find 
them easy to image". Ss then completed the booklet containing 
the three superordinates. The whole experiment lasted about 1 
hour and Ss were paid one pound fifty pence. 
Results 
The results are in four sections containing: 1] the 
system of scoring the descriptions; 2] the analysis of 
descriptions given to basic level exemplars; 3] the analysis of 
descriptions given to superordinates; 4] overlap of the two 
sets of descriptions. 
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1] Scoring The Descriptions 
The following attribute classification system was adopted 
[see Introduction, above, for discussion] : The contents of 
each description were entered in one or more of ten attribu~es 
classes; Locations, Times, Perceptual Idiosyncracies, 
Actors/I~tions, Perceptual Properties, Perceptual Features, 
Parts, Functions, Exemplars, Other. The attribute classes 
Locations, Times, Perceptual Idiosyncracies and Actors/Actions, 
represented contextual attributes whereas the attribute classes 
Perceptual Properties, Perceptual Features, and Functions, 
represented perceptual attributes. The two additional classes, 
Exemplars and Other, were included to represent Ss who simply 
provided a name as a description [e.g. "I have an image of a 
Chair"] and Ss who included information other than contextual or 
perceptual [e.g. "I have an image of a very expensive chair"]. 
Thus a description such as " green chair in the front room at 
home" had two entries in Locations [front room, home] and one 
entry in Perceptual Idiosychracies [green]. Note that" Chair" 
is not counted in the Exemplar class because in this instance 
the exemplar is deemed to be part of the description of a 
perceptual idiosyncracy. In contrast a description such as 
"ha d ' r , wooden, legs, back, armrests' has one entry in Perceptual 
Property [hard], one entry in Perceptual Feature [wooden], and 
three entries in Perceptual Part [legs, back, armrest]. 
Appendix B contains examples of actual descriptions and their 
classification, [see also Results, below]. In cases where no 
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clear classification was possible the attribute was counted in 
the class Other. 
2] Basic Level Descriptions 
The data were scored in accordance with the classification 
procedure previously outlined. To determine whether the data 
could be collapsed across categories and typicality levels the 
following within groups analysis was undertaken: 
Within PI and TI 3 chi square analyses were performed on 
the total number of attributes contained in the descriptions 
regardless of attribute classification. A 12 by 2 Subjects by 
Typicality chi square, a 12 by 3 Subjects by Category chi 
square, and a 10 by 3 Typicality by Category chi square, were 
carried out. None of the six chi squares produced any 
significant chi values in either PI or TI. 
It was concluded that the number of attributes given in 
the descriptions within groups was, approximately, the same at 
all levels of typicality and in all categories. Accordingly the 
data was pooled, within groups and across typicality levels and 
categories. 
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To determine the degree of concordance between Ss 
regarding the classification of the attributes in their 
descriptions the following analysis was undertaken: 
The total number of attributes reported by a subject in 
anyone description were summed within the classification under 
which they had been entered. 51's [PI] distribution of 
attribute9 is shown, below, in Table 8.1.2. 
Within groups each S's classified attributes were entered 
in the Kendall coefficient of concordance [Siegel, 1956; 
p229-238] " In PI a W of .7706 was found that yielded a Chi of 
67.8128, DF-l1 , which was highly significant, p( 0.001, 
indicating a high level of concordance in the classification of 
Ss descriptions within PI. In TI a W of .86 was found that 
yielded a Chi of 75.68 which was highly significant p( 0.001., 
indicating a high level of concordance in the classification of 
Ss descriptions within TI. Finally PI was compared with TI and 
a W of ,0029 was found which was not significant and indicated 
iittle or no concordance between the classification of Ss 
descriptions between PI and TI. Given the close agreement 
Within groups as to the classfication of descriptions it was 
decided to collapse together the relevant categories for each 
group. For PI L, T, PI, and A, were summed to form one category 
Contextual. For TI PP, PF, PPA, and F, were summed to form one 
category Perceptual. Table 8.1.3, over, shows the total 
classified attributes before they were collapsed. 
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[Note that as the category EX [exemplar] was little used 
in both groups it was decided to collapse 0 and EX together.) 
A 2 by 3, Groups by Classification, Chi square was 
performed and this is shown in Table 8.1.4 below. 
significant Chi value was obtained, Chi= 2164.38, 
A highly 
DF=2, p< 
0.000, showing that overall PI descriptions contained contextual 
attributes whereas TI descriptions contained perceptual 
attributes. Note that all between group cell totals in Table 
8.1.4 differ significantly from each other. 
In PI Ss had an overall mean 106.5 attributes ranging from 
82 to 111 with a standard deviation of 10.644. In PI a mean of 
3.SS attributes were contained in each description of an item 
with a range of 2 to 7 and a standard deviation of 1.14. For TI 
Ss named more atributes, mean=138 with a range of 110 to 160 and 
S.D. of 16.26. In TI a mean of 4.6 attributes were contained 
in each description of an item with a range of 2 to 8 and S.D. 
of 1.18. 
Lastly a simple count was made of the attributes common to 
the five most typical items of a category [see Rosch and Mervis, 
1975; p582] and to the five least typical items. An attribute 
was counted if it was named to four, or more, of the five 
exemplars. Table 8.1.5 shows the number of attributes. 
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Table 8.1.2 Example of Classification Of Attributes Taken 
From Subject 1 [PI1. 
<---CATEGORIES---> 
L T PI A PP PF PPA F EX 0 
TOTAL 
ATTRIBUTF.S S1 48 8 30 7 0 0 0 1 0 11 
[L-locati~ns, T-time, PI-perceptual idiosycracies, 
PP-perceptual property, PF-perceptual feature, 
PPA-perceptual part, F-function, EX-exemplar, O=other] 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.1.3 Classified Attribute Totals For PI and TI Exemplars. 
L 
CONTEXTUAL 
ATTRIBUTES 
T PI A PP 
PERCEPTUAL 
ATTRIBUTES 
PF PPA 
I 
I 
F/ EX o 
--------------------------------------------------------------PI 610 123 271 125 8 12 42 21 4 62 
--------------------------------------------------------------TI 8 6 2 20 47 860 628 74 2 9 
--------------------------------------------------------------
[L-locations, T-time, PI-perceptual idiosycraci~s, PP-perceptual 
property, PF-perceptual feature, PPA-perceptual part, F-function, 
EX-exem~lar, O-other] 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.1.4 Classified Attributes Totals Given in Descriptions 
of Personal and Typical Instance Images To Basic Level 
Exemplars. 
---------l--~~~~~~~~-I-::~:~:~~~-/---~~~~----l 
I PI 1129 83 66 
--------- ------------ ------------
TI I 36 I 1609 I 11 I 
---------1-----------1----------1-----------1 
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Table 8.1.5 Number of Attributes, Contained in Descriptions of 
Personal and Typical Instance Images, Common to 
Five Highly Typical and Five Atypical Members of 3 
Categories. 
Part 1] Personal Instance Imagers 
Category Highly Typical Members 
Furniture 11 
Fruit 9 
Clothing 16 
Part 2] Typical Instance Imagers 
Category Highly Typical Members 
Furniture 14 
Fruit 11 
Clothi.ng 13 
Atypical Members 
2 
3 
3 
Atypical Members 
o 
2 
o 
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The following count revealed that: Of the total of 32 
overlapping attributes for PI 27 were locations, 3 were 
actors/actions, and 2 were times. All the overlapping 
attributes to atypical exemplars were locations: Of the total 
of 40 overlapping attributes for TI 23 were perceptual features 
and properties, and 17 were perceptual parts. 
3] Superordinate Descriptions 
Exactly the same analysis was carried out on the 
superordinate descriptions to determine whether attribute totals 
could be summed across Ss, typicality, and categories. No 
significant Chi squares were observed and it was concluded that 
Ss, within an instruction group included the same number of 
attributes in their descriptions regardless of category and 
tYPicality level. Attribute totals were collapsed across Ss, 
categories, typicality levels. 
Ss classified descriptions were analysed using Kendall's 
coefficient of concordance. PI produced a W of .8134 that 
yeilded d Chi of 87.73 which, with DF=ll , was highly 
significant , p( 0.001, indicating a high level of concordance 
between S3 classified descriptions. TI produced a W of .701 
Which yeUded a Chi of 75.7 which, whith DF=ll, was highly 
Significant, p( 0.001, indicating a high level of concordance 
between S i hi TI s classified descriptions w tn. When compared 
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with each other a W of .0041 was obtained which was not 
significant indicating little or no concordance between the 
classifiLation of PI and TI descriptions. Within groups the 
classification were collapsed into Contextual and Perceptual as 
had previously been done for the basic level descriptions. Note 
that 0 and EX were not collapsed together in this instance 
because extensive use was made of EX in both groups [see below]. 
Table 8.1.6, below, shows the classified attribute totals. 
The two groups classified descriptions were analysed in a 
2 by 4 Chi square which is depicted in Table 8.1.7 below. 
The difference in classification of description between 
the two groups was highly significant with Chi=512.71, DF=3, p< 
0.000, indicating that PI descriptions contained contextual 
information whereas TI descriptions contained perceptual 
information. In the PI group Ss descriptions contained, on 
average per item, 9.11 attributes ranging from 6 to 14 per 
superordinate with a S.D. of 1.89. Ss descriptions in the PI 
group contained, on average, 27.33 attributes per S over all 
superordinates, ranging from 20 to 34, with an S.D. of 4.25. 
In the TI group Ss descriptions contained, on average, 8.69 
attributes ranging from 6 to 14 per superordinate with a S.D. 
of 2.27. Ss descriptions in the TI group contained, on average, 
26.08 attributes per S overall superordinates, ranging from 16 
to 36, with an S.D. of 4.99. This indicated that the number of 
attributes contained in a description, either by subjects or by 
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Table 8.1.6 Classified Attribute Totals For PI and TI Given to 
Superordinates. 
r 'ONTEXTUAL ATTRIBUTES L T PI A PP PERCEPTUAL ATTRIBUTES PF PPA F EX o 
--------------------------------------------------------------
PI 96 17 27 14 3 9 2 3 106 Sl 
--------------------------------------------------------------
TI 0 o o o 11 141 108 6 47 o 
--------------------------------------------------------------
[L-locations, T=time, PImperceptual idiosycracies, PP=perceptual 
properLy, PF=perceptual feature, PPA=perceptual part, 
F-function, EX-exemplar, O-other) 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Table 8.1.7 Classified Attributes Totals Given in Descriptions 
of Personal and Typical Instance Images To 
Superordinate Categories. 
CONTEXTUAL 
---------
PI lS4 17 106 Sl 
---------
I 0 I 266 I 47 I 0 I 
---------1------------1------------1------------1------------I 
TI 
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Table 8.1.8 Number of Attributes Common to Deecriptions of 
Personal and Typical Instance Images of Five 
Highly Typical and Five Atypical Category Members 
and their Superordinates for 3 Categories. 
Part 1] Personal Instance Imagers 
Category Highly Typical Members Atypical Members 
Furniture 5 2 
Fruit 4 2 
Clothing 4 1 
Part 2] Typical Instance Imagers 
Category Highly Typical Members Atypical Members 
Furniture 11 o 
Fruit 8 o 
Clothin6 9 o 
Chapter 8 Page 8-25 
items, were virtually identical for both PI and TI. There were 
was no feature overlap between superordinate. 
4J Overlap Between Superordinates and their Basic Level 
Exemplars. 
A simple count was conducted to examine the attributes 
that the five highly typical exemplars and the five atypical 
exemplars had in common with their superordinate in the 
different imagery groups. Only the attributes which had already 
been found to be common to the exemplars were inr.luded in this 
Count. Table 8.1.8, above, depicts the number of common 
attributes. For PI the 18 common attributes were all locations. 
For the Tr group the 28 common attributes were 18 perceptual 
features and 10 perceptual parts. 
Discussion 
The hypothesis that descriptions of typical instance 
images would be dominated by perceptual information whereas 
descriptions of personal instance images would be dominated by 
contextual information was strongly supported. In the following 
discuSSion the findings are considered in two separate 
groupings; a1 findings relating to descriptions of exemplars; 
and b] findings relating to descriptions of superordinates. In 
a third section implications of both sets of findings are 
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jointly discussed. However before turning to this discussion a 
general criticism relating to the experiment as a whole will be 
briefly considered. 
It may be recalled that Neisser [1982] criticised the 
Brown and Kulik experiment on the grounds that their findings 
may have been the product of narrative conventions rather than 
'canonical categories' of recall [chapter 
Neisser's criticism was dismissed in chapter 3 
3]. 
the 
Although 
possibility 
still re~ains that, in the present experiment, Ss descriptions 
may have been partly or wholly determined by the type of 
descriptio~s which Ss thought were expected of them. For 
instanceche examples contained in the instructions may have led 
some, or all, the Ss to recount descriptions of a like content 
even though these were not accurate descriptions of their 
images. Yet, as will become evident below, the nature of Ss 
descriptions strongly indicated that they were describing images 
drawn froM autobiographical or semantic memories. Moreover in 
chapters 9 and 10 experimental evidence that does not rely on 
Ss' descriptions of images is reported which further confirms 
that it is the images, and not their descriptions, which differ. 
A a more complete refutation of this criticism will then, be 
deferred linci1 these later chapters. 
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Descriptions of Images of Exemplars 
Descriptions of typical instance images predominantly 
contained information about the perceptual features, parts, and 
properties, of objects, in that order [see Table 8.1.3, above]. 
This finding concurs with the results of Murphy and Smith [1981] 
and H~menway [1981], who found that attribute lists given to 
basic level exemplars were predominatly comprised of perceptual 
attributes. Hemenway [1981] further reported that perceptual 
parts were particularly frequently emitted in response to such 
exemplars. However, it can be seen from Table 8.1.3, that 
perceptual parts were second to perceptual features in terms of 
production frequency. This discrepancy may have been 
specifically related to the experimental manipulation in which 
the attributes were collected from descriptions of images. It 
would seem natural that fewer parts would be recorded in this 
case because, in many instances, such attributes would not be 
directly contained in the image itself. For example 'pips' were 
not mentioned [in TI] in any of the descriptions of Apple 
presumably because the actual images which Ss described did not 
depict Apple seeds. This also, albeit indirectly, indicates 
that 3s were describing actual images rather than, say, simply 
listi~g attributes or constructing a description of what they 
thought was expected. 
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Overall the general 
strongly indicated that 
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charater of TI image descriptions 
Ss had imaged isolated objects [i.e. 
not set in any context] which were typical of a class of objects 
and which contained primarily perceptual attributes. 
By way of contrast PI imagery descriptions were dominated 
by contextual attributes about locations, perceptual 
idiosyncr~cies, actors/actions, and times [in that order]. 
Perceptual idiosyncracies suggested that Ss were describing an 
actual personal image and were concerned to separate out that 
image from other possible images. Personal instance imagery 
also gave rise to descriptions that contained mere information 
which was only classifiable as 'Other' than did typical instance 
imagery. Attributes entered in the class 'Other' tended to be 
non-perceptual, non-contextual, and distinctive. Take, for 
example the following description of a personal image of a radio 
"melted white clock-radio on top of grill in kitchen, an 
accident" • The term 'accident' would seem not to be literally 
contained in the image but to be a label for that image. It may 
be recalled that Whitten and Leonard [1981; see Chapter 3 
section 3.2] in their study of the protocols of Ss recalling 
teachers found that a common recall strategy was to bring to 
mind a distinctive episode from a temporally close period to one 
in which the S had been taught in a particular grade and/or a 
particular subject and then to search from this memory location. 
Perceptually idiosyncratic and other distinctive information in 
the presen~ experiment may then, similarly act to maintain the 
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distinctiveness of the memory trace and thus facilitate 
retrieval [c.f experiment 8, chapter 10, and also chapter 12]. 
Overall the general character of PI image descriptions 
strongly indicated that Ss had imaged objects which they had 
experienced in the contexts in which they had been encountered. 
These image descriptions suggested that Ss had brought to mind a 
, , 
scene or episode in which the target item had been prominant 
[as in tha clock example above]. 
Thus, as predicted, the two types of imegery contained 
different information supporting the hypothesis that the 
underlying autobiographical and semantic memories from which the 
images had been generated, represented different types of 
information. 
Attribute overlap in the descriptions of TI imagers was 
similar to the type of attribute overlap previously described in 
the litetature [Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Ashcraft, 1976; 
Hemenway, 1981]. Perceptual features and properties accounted 
for 57.5% of the total of overlapping attributes in part 2 of 
Table 5.1.4 and perceptual parts accounted for 42.5% of this 
total. These findings were as predicted and lent further 
Support to the general model of categorization outlined at the 
close of chapter 4. 
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In ~ontrast PI attribute overlap was comprised almost 
exclusively of locational attribute overlap; 83.5% of all the 
attribute overlap in section 1 of table 8.1.5 is accounted for 
by commonality of locations and this rises to a 100% for 
atypical items. It would thus seem that the locative 
information contained in autobiographical memories is, as 
predicted, organized in a manner similar to that prevoiusly 
found for perceptual attributes in semantic categories. However 
locational attributes comprise less than 35% of all the 
attributes named in PI image descriptions and so it is not the 
case that the majority of the information contained in 
autobiographical memories overlaps in the same way as 
information in semantic memories. This tentatively suggests 
that autobiographical memories are not organized in semantic 
categorie~ and that locational attributes may be more closely 
associated with semantic memory than other attributes types 
contained in autobiographical memories. These points will be 
returned to in the final section of this discussion. 
It was also noted, in the process of analysis, that many 
of the PI descriptions were descriptions of objects in S's 
everydayenvironment(s). However 'times' were only infrequently 
mentioned in Ss PI descriptions. One of the reason for this may 
have been that time was an emergent property of the image. In 
other words the time associated with the image was specified 
indirectly in the image e.g. by the image depicting an 
experienced object during daylight hours, at a meal time 
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[breakfast]. Nevertheless it could more simply be the case that 
autobiographical memories of common ojects and activities do not 
Contain explicit information about the time an item was 
encountered. To examine this a count was made of all 
descriptions which the experimenter, felt, indicated that the 
item had been encountered recently. This was done whether or 
not a specific time was mentioned in the description. For 
instance it was assumed that if a description was of an object 
in an S's home or work environment then that object could have 
been en('~untered recently. Clearly such a count was only 
Possible for PI descriptions. The result was that 82% of the 
descriptions given in PI were descriptions of items that would 
have been encountered recently and frequently by Ss and this 
recency effect was equally distributed between typical [39.5%] 
and atypical [42.5%] exemplars. This, admittedly post hoc, 
analysis lends some tentative support to the contention that 
'time' is implicit in 
memories. Further 
images generated from autobiographical 
this finding supports the discussion of the 
recency of autobiographical memories contained in chapter 3 [see 
especially the discussion of Linton's research, where it was 
observed that autobiographical memories had been found to be 
subject to strong receny effects]. 
Descriptions of Images of Superordinates 
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Des~riptions of superordinates produced a pattern of 
findings slmllnr to that observed for exemplars. PI 
superordinate descriptions contained predominantly contextual 
attributeR whereas TI superordinate descriptions contained 
predominatly perceptual attributes. The classification of 
contextual and perceptual attributes followed a pattern very 
similar to the one found for exemplars. Perceptual attributes 
were dominated by perceptual features and parts whereas 
contextual attributes were dominated chiefly by locations and, 
to a l~sser extent, perceptual idiosyncracies. Also PI 
superordinate descriptions contained unclassified information 
similar to that discussed in connection with exemplars. Thus 
the attribute content of superordinate descriptions was very 
similar to the attribute content of descriptions of exemplars. 
However before going on to discuss attribute overlap 
between exemplars and superordinates it should be noted that it 
was found that both TI and PI descriptions contained exemplars, 
which had not been the case at the basic level. Indeed 
exemplars were the mORt frequently classed items in PI 
superordinate descriptions. Thus the character of PI images of 
superordinates generally took the form of a group of objects in 
a common location. Consider for example the following 
description of a PI image of Furniture, "In the living room, 
there's a dinning table and chairs, a three piece suite, a T.V., 
a wall unit with display cabinet". In contrast a parallel TI 
description contained no mention of context and exemplars were 
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only occassionaly mentioned, e.g. "Wooden objects with flat 
surfaces, hard edges, angular, legs, various shades of brown, 
largish, table, couch". The images generated in TI of 
superordinates would seem to contain some typical group of 
objects that depict perceptual information common to the central 
members of the class. In contrast the images generated in PI 
depicted a~tua1 experiences of groups of objects in common 
locations. 
[Note also that in the Pi group a post hoc assessment, 
identical to that carried out for exemplars, found that 92% of 
PI imagee were judged to have been drawn from recent 
experiences, e.g. visting shops, home, and work]. 
A count was made of the overlap of com~on exemplar 
attributes with superordinate attributes, see Table 8.1.8, 
above. In the case of perceptual attributes the overlap pattern 
was as predicted with typical exemplars exhibiting considerable 
overlap with their superordinates and atypical exemplars showing 
no overlap, [64.3% of the overlapping attributes were perceptual 
features and 35.7% were perceptual parts]. 
Howe'ver in the case of contextual attributes only locative 
attributes overlapped with the superordinate attributes. 
Overlap between typical exemplars and the superordinate was low. 
There was some [even lower] overlap between locational 
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attribute& given to atypical exemplars and superordinate 
locational attributes, see Table 8.1.8., above. This 
comparatively reduced overlap between locational attributes 
given to typical exemplars and their superordinates [in PI 
descritions] has a simple explanation: PI descriptions of 
superordinates tended to include superordinate locations, e.g. 
Clothing, "In shop window in city centre" , whereas PI 
descriptions of exemplars tended to contain basic level 
locations [Tversky and Hemenway, 1983], e.g. Shirt, "On a 
hanger, on a rack, with lots of other shirts, in John Kents', [a 
local clothing shop]". Thus exact attribute overlap was reduced 
in the PI condition despite the fact that locations named as 
parts of ~escriptions of images of superordinates usually 
subsumed 'he locations named in descriptions of images of 
exemplars. Note that in TI descriptions there was no clear 
difference in the level of generallity of perceptual attributes 
named in descriptons of images of either superordinates or 
exemplars. It is clear then that only locative attributes 
overlap in a manner similar to that of perceptual attributes. 
The pattern of overlapping between superordinate and exemplars 
is not as marked for locative attributes as for perceptual 
attributes and this is similar to the finding of locational 
attribute overlap amongst exemplars. 
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If it is accepted that attribute overlap indicates 
semantic representation then it might be argued that locational 
attributes are represented semantically. However the locational 
attributes given by Ss in their PI descriptions were highly 
Context specific which is not what would be expected of semantic 
representations. One plausible explanation for this is as 
fOllows: information about locations is represented in both 
autobiographical and semantic memories; in autobiographical 
memories locational information is specific to the represented 
scene, tn semantic memories Iocational information is of a more 
general nature. Locational information in autobiographical 
memories may then act as a link to semantic representations of 
lOcations. One reason why locational attributes rather than 
other attributes may act as a link between the two memory 
classes is that locations even when context specific are less 
idiosyncratic than other types of attribute. For example the 
attribute 'pink' in the descritpion 'pink plastic table standing 
in a shop window' is more idiosyncratic of 'table' than is 'shop 
window'. Thus because information about locations contained in 
autobiographical memories is less idiosyncratic than other type 
of information then autobiographical loeational information 
Connects more directly to corresponding semantic locational 
information. These suggestions are returned to in later 
chapters Lparticularly in chapter 10] where subsequent findings 
bearing on them are reported. 
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This line of argument also suggests why locational 
attributes contained in autobiographical memories exhibited a 
type of attribute overalp previously found to be closely 
associated with semantic memories: S's memory search may have 
commenced by accessing semantic information about where [in what 
location] an item was most likely to have been encountered and 
activation apreading from this point would, presumably, have 
connected fairly directly to an appropriate autobiographical 
memory. Thus autobiographical memories may have been accessed 
by way of semantic information about locations. Semantic 
representation of locations because they are organized in terms 
of overlap would have channeled the search to autobiographical 
memories WhlCh exhibited similar locational attribute overlap. 
For instance a subject asked to generate a PI image of a 'Table' 
might activate semantic information about common locations for 
tables such as 'Kitchen', 'Dinning room', 'Office', the memory 
search sprp.dding out from these semantic representation would 
activate closely connected autobiographical memories. 
Given that locations may be represented semantically the 
question then arises as to what form this representation takes. 
As locational attributes were not named in TI image descriptions 
it seems reasonable to suggest that semantic representations of 
locations are separate from semantic categories. Yet the 
findings from the present experiment indicate that locations may 
overlap with each other suggesting that information about 
locations may be clustered together in some way. The findings 
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of Bower and his colleagues [reviewed in chapter 4) found that 
information about locations may be represented in scripts. Thus 
a plausible but speculative proposal is that locations are 
clustered around or represented in, script-like semantic 
memories. A corollary of this line of reasoning is that 
autobiographical memories do not connect directly to their 
corresponding semantic memories. It was observed previously 
[chapter 4] that script-like semantic memories have been found 
to point to semantic categories, thus autobiographical and 
semantic ~emories of the same item may connect only indirectly 
to each other by way of script-like semantic representations: 
these issues are considered in more depth in chapters 10 and 11. 
Also a further suggestion implicit in the above discussion, that 
autobiographical memories may act as instantiations of scripts 
much as exemplars act as instaniations of categories, is 
considered in detail in chapter 12. 
Conclusions 
The c~ntral finding of experiment 3 was that semantic 
memories contained information about the perceptual properties, 
features, and parts of objects. In contrast autobiographical 
memories contained information about context and in particular 
information about locations, perceptual idiosyncracies, times, 
and actors/actions, associated with actual experiences. Thus 
the hypothe~ised content distinction was confirmed. It is 
concluded that semantic and autobiographical memories represent 
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different classes of inforfuation. 
A subsiduary finding was that perceptual attribute overlap 
exhibited a pattern similar to that previously found: typical 
exemplars shared attributes with each other and with the 
superordinate whereas atypical exemplars had few attributes in 
common with each other or with their superordinate. A similar 
but not so marked pattern of attribute overlap was observed for 
locative attributes, but not for any other contextual 
attributes. It was argued that information about locations was 
represented in both autobiographical and semantic memories and 
that locational information semantically represented may in some 
instances be employed to access autobi.ographical memories .It 
was concluded that autobiographical memories of common items may 
be connected to and accessed by way of, semantic 
represententations of locations. It was speculatively proposed 
that locational information in semantic memory may be 
represented in a script-like format which mediates connections 
between semantic categories and corresponding autobiographical 
memories. 
Finally a post-hoc analysis indicated that many of the PI 
images were of items that might be reasonably judged to have 
been recently encountered by SSe This lent some to support to 
previously observed recency effects in autobiographical memory 
[this issue is returned to in experiment 6, chapter 9]. 
,CHAPTER 9 
CONTENT AND ORGANIZATIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL AND SEMANTIC MEMORIES 
This chapter reports two experiments. The first 
experiment further investigated the content differences between 
autobiographical and semantic memories found in experiment 3. 
Semantic primes were found to facilitate the generation of 
typical instance images and to inhibit the generation of 
personal instance images. It was conclu1ed that semantic 
memories were comprised of perceptual information typical of an 
item and that corresponding autobiographical memories did not 
conta~.n such typical perceptual information. Data from 
the findings of 
memories contained 
post-~xperimental interviews supported 
experiment 3 that autobiographical 
information about the context in which an item had been 
experienced whereas semantic memories coatained information 
about the perceptual attributes of items. This experiment also 
examined organizational differences between autobiographical and 
semantic memories. It was found that autobiographical memories 
were ~ot subject to the same typicality effects as semantic 
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memories. It was concluded that autobiographical and semantiC 
memor'ies were organized differently in memory. Further evidence 
indilectly suggested that autobiographical memories were subject 
to rEcency effects. 
The second experiment investigated the recency aspect of 
autobiographical memories. The findings supported the 
suggeation of the previous experiment that autobiographical 
memori~s were subject to recency effects. It was concluded that 
one of the ways in which autobiographical memories may be 
organized is in terms of how recently items had been encoded. 
Experiment 4 
Priming Autobiographical and Semantic Memories 
9.1 Introduction 
, The main finding of experiment 3 was that autobiographical 
memor!es contained contextual information whereas semantiC 
memor1~s contained context free perceptual information. One 
probl~m with experiment 
have been, at least in 
3 was that the image descriptions may 
part, a product of 'narrative' 
conventions [Neisser, 1982]. This critici~m proposes that Ss 
report3 of autobiographical memories are structured in terms of 
implicit conventions that delineate how and what should be 
reported. In other words an autobiographical memory may contain 
information other than contextual information but this, by 
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convention is not reported. Presumably the same argument could 
be extended to Ss reports of semantic memories. Various aspects 
of the data discussed in experiment 3 questioned this 
alternative explanation, e.g perceptual idiosyncracies were 
localIzed to autobiographical memories, parts of objects which 
would not have been directly included in an image were not named 
in descriptions of the images. Further, it could be argued that 
narr~cive conventions were themselves a product of the nature of 
the underlying memory trace. Nevertheless it was decided to 
refute this alternative explanation fully by more directly 
invesCigating content differences between autobiographical and 
semanti~ memories. 
On the basis of experiment 3 it was reasoned that, as 
semantic memories had been found to contain context free 
perce~tual attributes, then presenting such information to Ss 
should facilitate access to semantic memories. Further as 
autobi~graphical memories had been found to contain contextually 
bound information then presenting context free perceptual 
information should inhibit access to such memories, [because 
context free perceptual information, at least initially, 
activates semantic memories, see chapter 4 and below]. If these 
predictions were supported, in the present experiment then 
content differences could be quite clearly identified with the 
content of the underlying memory trace. Narrative conventions 
[which, it can 
representations 
be argued, are 
themselves] could 
unrelated 
not account 
to memory 
for such 
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differential access. 
It was decided, then, to undertake a priming experiment in 
which personal and typical instance imagery would be primed. 
The use of a priming technique in this context seemed 
parti.~ularly appropriate, for the rationale of priming is that a 
prime can only facilitate a response if it makes possible the 
activation of a memory representation that contains at least 
some vf the information required to make that response [Rosch, 
1975; Posner, 1978; Morton, 1969; Collins and Loftus, 1975). 
Diffarent types of prime, therefore, may differentiallY 
faciUtate [or inhibit] access to autobiographical and semantic 
memor1es thus affecting the time taken to generate an image 
drawn from that memory, [and thus, indicate part of the content 
of th~ memory]. Frequently, in semantic priming experiments, 
the category name, which is presented before the target, acts as 
the prime and the intervening period is known as the 
prime/stimulus interval, [Carr, McCauley, Sperber, Parmelee, 
1982; Lorch, 1982, Irwin, and Lupker, 1983]. Posner [1978] haS 
determined that, in semantic priming experiments, the optimum 
prime/stimulus interval was 2 seconds. Typically, in a semantic 
priming experiment, S is required to make some judgment about 
the target such that a decrease in the time taken to make the 
judgment, compared to time taken to make an unprimed judgement, 
constitutes evidence that priming has taken place. In the 
present study making a judgment was replaced by generating an 
image. The dependent variable was the speed with which the 
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image was generated, [see Glass and Meany, 1981; discussed in 
chapter 5]. 
In the past, two types of prime have been predominantly 
used in semantic priming experiments, namely picture and word 
primes. The main findings have been that pictures afford faster 
access to semantic information than do words, whereas words 
affor~ faster access to acoustic-phonetic information than do 
pictures, [but see discussion of Irwin and Lupker, 1983, below, 
in 'Discussion']. Two of the central iir.dings of Rosch 
[197:(b)] were that the more typical an instance the greater the 
facilitating effect of a superordinate category prime and that 
category judgments were maintained at shorter prime-stimulus 
intervals for picture targets than for word targets. Two 
general types of argument have been proposed to account for this 
finding. The first is typified by Rosch [1975(b), 1978] who 
argued that words and pictures accessed a common semantic store 
but th~t pictures gained direct access while words underwent 
additional processing. Clearly if it is assumed that semantic 
memory is a 
descriptions, a 
expec ted, [ see 
repository of 
picture 'order 
chapter 4] • The 
attributes, instances and 
of access' effect is to be 
second type of argument, 
associated with the sort of model proposed by Paivio [1971, 
1975; see chapter 5], is that words access a verbal store 
containing name information and pictures access an imaginal 
store containing, predominantly, semantic 
approaches assume that words have only 
information. Both 
indirect access to 
Chapter 9 Page 9':'6 
sem&ntic information and that pictures have direct access. 
However it is not clear whether there is a similar 
picture/word advantage for autobiographical memories. This is 
beca~se no research has directly addressed this topic. Priming 
effects have been observed in episodic memory [Herrmann and 
Harwood, 1980; McKoon and Ratcliff, 1979; see chapter 2] 
although these were concerned with the organization of 
information contained in the episodic trace. The main finding 
was that priming effects were evident in episodiC 
[autobiographical] memories but only for primes specific to the 
memory trace. 
For these reasons, then, it seemed likely that primes 
depicting [context free] perceptual attributes would facilitate 
the generation of typical instance images and inhibit [in 
comparison to a no-prime condition] the generation of personal 
instance images. It was decided to employ both word and picture 
primes and, of course, a no-prime condition. Picture primes 
were employed because this was the best way to present sets of 
perceptual attributes. Word primes were employed on the 
assumption that word meanings [semantic memories] would be 
activated before associated 
preser.,tation of the word name. 
autobiographical memories on 
It was decid~d that the picture 
primes would depict a set of attributes and exemplars typical of 
a category and that word primes would name the category. It was 
hoped in this way to facilitate the investigation of 
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organizational differences between the two ciasses of memory 
[disc~ssed below]. 
It was predicted that typical instance [TI] image 
generation would be fastest to picture primes, slower to word 
prim~s [as past work had found], and slowest in the no-prime 
condit.ion: picture primes should directly activate the semantic 
category [Rosch, 1975(b)) facilitating TI image generation; 
word primes should activate the semantic category less than 
picture primes and so facilitate TI image generation less than 
picture primes; the no-prime condition should cause no prior 
activation and, hence, should 
generation. 
not facilitate TI image 
It was predicted that personal instance [PI) images would 
be inhibited by both types of primes in comparison to the 
no-prime control condition. It was reasoned that personal 
instance image generation would be inhibited by picture and word 
primes activating the 'wrong' [semantic] areas of memory and 
therefore inducing the memory search to commence at some 
locati~n in memory further from the sought after memory trace 
than the starting point in an unprimed search. Thus PI image 
generation times to picture and word primes would be raised in 
comparison to no-prime PI image generation times. However, as 
experim~nt 3 had found that personal instance images contained 
some pe~ceptual information, albeit idiosyncratic, then it was 
predicted that pictures primes would inhibit the generation of 
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personal instance images less than would word primes. It ~as 
predicted then, that PI image generation would be slowest to 
word primes, somewhat faster to picture primes, and fastest in 
the no-prime condition. 
Beacuse of lack prior research, it was not clear hO~ 
unprimed personal instance image generatio~ times would compare 
with unprimed typical instance image generation times. For 
instance would unprimed personal instance image generation timeS 
be fa3ter, slower, same as, image generation times to unprimed 
typic31 instance images 1. It may be recalled that, in chapter 
5, it was argued that as autobiographical memories are 'rich' 
memory representations they give rise to complex images and 
hence take longer to generate than more simple images drawn fro~ 
seman~ic memories [Kosslyn, 1980]. A counter proposal to thiS 
was t~at as semantic memories are composed of sets of attributeS 
then images generated from semantic memories take some time to 
realiz~ because each attribute has be to 'read' into the image 
[Kosslyn, 1980; see chapter 5], whereas autobiographical 
memories are like Kosslyn's 'literal' representations which are 
'read' complete and directly into the imagery medium and, hence, 
take ooly a brief time to generate. It was hoped that the 
findings from the no-prime conditions would shed some light on 
these issues. If unprimed typical instance images were 
generated faster than unprimed personal instance images then 
this might be related to the 'complexity' of the images. If, on 
the other hand, unprimed personal instance image generation ~aS 
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faster than unprimed typical instance image generation then this 
would lend some support to the hypothesis that autobiographical 
memories were like 'literal' representations. This latter 
outcome would indicate that autobiographical memories are not 
organized in terms of attribute overlap as s?ecified in the 
general model of categorization outlined at the close of chapter 
4. CIGnrly these are issues that bear as directly on models of 
imagery as on models of memory and as such are somewhat outside 
the scope of the present thesis. Nevertheless findings which 
relate to both imagery and the nature of the underlying memories 
trace will be considered below. 
It was also evident that the organization of 
autobiographical and semantic memories could be directly 
investigated using the priming technique [see discussion of 
Rosch [1975(b)] in chapter 4]. If primes were constructed that 
depict~d perceptual attributes central to, or typical of, the 
category from which the to-be-imaged item was drawn, then it 
would be predicted that these primes would facilitate the 
generation of images 
than atypical members: 
imagers. Furthermore 
of typical members of the category more 
but this should only be the case for TI 
if the prime was the category name a 
similar pattern of speed of image generation would be observed. 
It was decided, then, to employ stimuli from three typicality 
levels, highly typical, mediumly typical, and atypical. It was 
predicred that, TI image generation would be fastest to highly 
typical exemplars, slower to mediumly typical exemplars, and 
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slow£st to atypical exemplars: this semantic typicality effect 
would be most evident to picture primes, somewhat less evident 
to word primes, and, possibly, not evident at all in the 
no-prime condition. However it was not cle&r what typicality 
effects, if any, would occur to PI images. As experiment 2 had 
found that ratings of the imagibility of PI images were 
genrally, but with some exceptions, negatively correlated with 
typic~lity it was predicted that PI image generation times would 
not, in the main, show the semantic typicality effect. Yet this 
prediction applied only to the no-prime PI condition. It was 
unclear what effects, if any, the picture and word primes would 
have upon typicality in PI. No predictions were made concerning 
prime~ and typicality in PI. 
The general predictions of the experime~t were; a] that 
primes would differentially facilitate typical instance image 
generation and differentially inhibit personal instance image 
generation, [thus the content hypothesis would be supported and 
the 'narrative conventions' 
underlying memories would 
criticism defused, for the 
be directly activated]; b] 
organizational differences between the two memories would differ 
in their interaction with typicality [further questioning the 
'narrative conventions' criticism). These predictions are 
detail~d, in terms of the experimental design, in the method 
sectio~, below. 
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9.2 Method 
A mixed design was employed. Ss took part in one of six 
groupe. There were two instruction groups [IG]: personal [PI] 
and typical [TI], instance imagers, and nested within each of 
these instruction groups were three priming conditions [PC]; 
word [WI, picture [PI, and no-prime [N]. Thus the experimental 
groupings were W-TI, P-TI, N-TI, W-PI, P-PI, and N-PI. Ss were 
requ~red to generate images of 54 items [I] drawn from 9 
categ0ries [C], two from each of 3 levels of typicality [T], 
highly typical [HT), mediumly typical [MTl, and atypical [AT]. 
Thus the design was a 2 by 3 between Sa by 9 by 3 by 2 within 
Ss, illustrated in Table 9.1.1, over. 
It was decided to treat both Ss [S) and Is as random 
factorB· [Clark, 1973]. The experimental model was: between 
group f£ctors IG [two levels], PC [three levels] crossed with 
IG; Within group factors, C [nine levels), T (three levels], I 
[two levels), with C and T nested within I: 
'IG,PC,S(IGPC),C,T,I(CT)'. The dependent variable was image. 
generation time [IGT) measured from the end of the target· word 
presentation to response. A two second prime-stimulus interval 
was e~ployed, [see 
randomly allocated 
ordering of stimuli. 
Rosch, 1975; Posner, 
to groups and each S 
Ss also undertook a 
1978] • Ss were 
recieved a random 
post-experimental 
interview in which they were required to descr5.be a selection of 
their images. 
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~:able 9.1.1 Experimental Design used in Experiment 4 
Between Subjects Factors 
Imagery Instructions IG- PI TI 
Primes P • P W N P W N 
Category 1 
T 
~t1th1n Y HT Il 
Subjects p 12 
Factors I 
C MT Il 
A 12 
L 
I AT Il 
T 12 
Y 
Category 2 etc. 
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One further consideration related to the finding by Eddy 
and ~lass [1981] that reading interfered with the comprehension 
of high imagery sentences, suggesting that a visual task, such 
as re~ding a target item, might interfere with image generation. 
It w~s decided, therefore, to present the primes visually and 
the to-be-imaged targets aurally. 
Experimental Hypotheses 
The following hypotheses were investigated: 
, A] Content Differences 
1) Primes overall would facilitate TI IGTs more than PI 
IGTs. 
2) TI IGTs would be fastest to P, slower to W, and slowest 
in the N. 
3) PI IGTs would be fastest in N, slower P, and slowest in 
W. 
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4) Hence no main effect of Primes was predicted and a main 
effect of IG was dependent on TI image generation being the same 
as, or faster than, PI image generation. 
The main prediction was that of a significant Primes by IG 
interaction. 
Bl Organizational Differences 
1) A T by IG interaction was predicted. TI would sho~ 
stronb typicality effects, PI would show no, or negative T 
effects. 
2) An IG by Primes by T interaction was predicted. P and 
W prim~~ would induce strong T effects in TI but not in PI. 
No other main effects or interactions of theoretical 
significance were predicted. 
Subjects 
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60 Ss took part, all Open University staff members. There 
were 28 males and thirty two females with an age range of 20 to 
35 ye~rs and a mean age of 30 [to nearest year). All Ss were 
english speaking U.K. nationals. There were 10 Ss to each 
experimental group. Ss were paid one pound. 
Stimulus Selection 
The target stimuli were selected fro~ the stimulus set 
employed in experiment 2 and were comprise~ of two items drawn 
from HT, MT, and AT, levels of typicality from each of the nine 
categories, Weapon, Fruit, Sport, Furniture, Vegetable, Vehicle, 
Toy, Clothing, Bird, [see appendix C for a full list of 
stimuli]. There were 54 target items. From the remaining 
exemplars nine items were selected, one from each category, to 
act as practice stimuli. The superordinate category names 
constituted the prime stimuli. 
Exemplars from different categories were approximately 
balan~ed in terms of their ranked typicality and TI and PI 
imagibility, in the following way: each category was divided 
into three areas BT, MT, and AT. HT exempl&rs had a ranking of 
6 or htgher, MT exemplars had a ranking falling between 21 and 
32, and AT exemplars had a ranking of 40 or lower, on typicality 
rating~ only. Exemplars were selected from these three groups 
tiat}~d similar imagery ratings. TI and PI imagery ratings for 
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exemplars selected from RT, MT, and AT, across all categories 
were ~ll less than 3.0, indicating that these exemplars had been 
rated as highly imagable. Within typicality levels and across 
categories exemplars varied equally in their rated PI and T1 
imagibility. Overall PI ratings were slightly higher than T1 
ratin~s. 
Stimulus Construction 
1] Target Stimuli 
All the target stimuli were tape recorded, [a female voice 
was used], and digitized on a PDP 11 computer. The digitized 
words were edited to eliminate lengthy pauses within words and 
to generally raise the clarity of the words. The shortest word 
was 0.43 seconds and the longest was 0.92 seconds with a mean of 
0.64 s9conds. 
2] Prime Stimuli 
Black and white negatives of the word primes were 
constucted and mounted, individually, on Kodak Carousel slide 
binders. A red coloured slide was constructed to act as the 
no-prime stimulus. The picture primes were constructed in the 
follow~ng manner. Twenty six superordinate category nameS 
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[list~o in appendix C], including the nine category primes, were 
select3d from the Battig and Montague [1969] category norms on 
the oasis that each category was named by a single word and 
could be easily represented pictorially. Fou~ or five highly 
typical exemplars were selected from each category [target items 
alreaJy selected were not included in this selection procedure] 
and si~ple line drawings were made of every item. For each 
categol~y a composite picture depicting four or five line 
drawiugs of highly typical exemplars was constructed [see 
example in Appendix C]. Black and white slides were made of the 
pictures representing the nine prime categories and these were 
mounted on Kodak Carousel slide binders [24mm by 36mm]. 
Apparatus 
A three-field group of Kodak Carousel SAV 2000 projection 
tachistoscopes were used. Each tachistoscope was fitted with 
Projar lenses, focal length 250mm, that produced a 0.23 wide 
projection at a distance of two meters. A response box 
containing two response keys set 100mm apart was employed. All 
the apparatus was controlled from a PDP 11/34 computer, running 
RSX 11M, which also measured and recorded Ss responses. The 
softwara for this experiment was written by Dr M. Levoi of the 
Open University Psychology Unit. 
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Procedure 
Ss took part in the experiment indiv1dually and, upon 
arrival at the laboratory, were assigned a number that randomlY 
allocated them to one of the six experimental conditions. S8 
were seated in a small room in front of and below a bank of 
projection tachistoscopes. Immediately in front of S was a 
tabl£ upon which was the response box and in front of the table 
was a projection screen. The distance between the 
tachistoscopes and screen was two meters. Ss were positioned SO 
as to directly face the visual display which was 1.5m in front 
of th~~ at a height of 1.5m. S then read the following 
instru~tions, according to which image instruction group they 
had be~n assigned, TI or PI: 
':11 "This study is concerned with the mental images we can 
bring to mind of every day objects and activities, such as itemS 
of furn!.ture, articles of clothing, sporting activities, and the 
like. You will hear a word naming a common object or activity 
and YOU ARE ASKED TO FORM A VIVID MENTAL IMAGE OF A TYPICAL 
INSTANCE OF THE NAMED OBJECT OR ACTIVITY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. 
This me~ns that you should try to form an image that most people 
would agree is a typical example of the named item. For example 
if the named object were BICYCLE you would be required to form 
an im~ge of a typical instance of bicycle even though yoU 
personally may own a tandem and therefore might find it easy to 
bring to mind an image of a tandem. To reiterate: YOU ARE 
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ASKED TO FORM A VIVID MENTAL IMAGE OF A TYPICAL INSTANCE OF A 
NAMED OBJECT OR ACTIVITY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. 
rhe experimenter will now demonstrate to you the procedure 
you are asked to follow. You will have a ch~nce to reread these 
instructions later and also you will have a chance to undertake 
some practice trials." 
PI] "This study is concerned with the mental images we can 
bring to mind of every day objects and activities, such as items 
of furniture, articles of clothing, sporting activities, and the 
like. You will hear a word naming a commou object or activity 
and YOV ARE ASKED TO FORM A VIVID MENTAL IMAGE OF A PERSONAL 
INSTANCE OF THE NAMED OBJECT OR ACTIVITY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. 
This m~ans that you should try to form an image of an actual 
object or activity with which you are personally familiar rather 
than a typical or general image the object. For example if the 
named object were BICYCLE you would be required to form an image 
of a personal instance of a bicycle and thus you might bring to 
mind an image of, say, a tandem bicycle that you personally own, 
or,if !'ou do not own a bicycle, you would form an image of a 
bicycle that you have actually seen somewhere. To reiterate: 
YOU ARE ASKED TO FORM A VIVID MENTA~ IMAGH OF A PERSONAL 
INSTANCE OF A NAMED OBJECT OR ACTIVITY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. 
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The experimenter will now demonstrate "to you the procedure 
you ate asked to follow. You will have a chance to reread these 
instrHctions later and also you will have a chance to undertake 
some ?lactice trials." 
The following procedure was then verbally outlined to Ss: 
"The words naming the objects and activities which yOU 
must image will be verbally presented 
headphones which you will wear throughout 
to you over a set of 
the experiment. On 
the table in front of you is a 'response box' that contains tWO 
response buttons. You are asked to keep your left thumb on the 
left hand response button and your right thumb on the right hand 
respor-se button. Indicate that you have formed your image bY 
pressing BOTH buttons simultaneously. 
In addition to the words you will hear presented over the 
headphones will be information that will be presented visuallY 
on the screen in front of you and you must closely attend to 
this L'lformation before you form your image ••• " 
Ss then received one of the following procedures depending 
upon their prime group, W,P,N,: 
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W] " ••• Initially the screen will display a small cross 
known 8S a 'fixation' field and, as you might expect, you must 
visually fixate upon this cross. After a short delay the cross 
will be taken off-screen and relaced by a wor.d. [At this point 
Ss were shown a list of the twenty six category names that had 
been s~lected and asked to read through them. Ss were then told 
that th~ words in the experiment would be something like these 
sorts of words]. You must be sure to read and understand this 
word. After a short interval the word will be taken off-screen 
and only a blank screen will remain. Two sec~nds after this you 
will hear a word over the headphones and it is whatever is named 
by th~s word that you must image. So the word going off-screen 
warns you that you are about to hear a word over the headphones. 
In the interval, between the word going off-screen and a word 
being named to you over the headphones, repeat silently to your 
self the word that you saw on the screen. The word that you see 
on the screen will generally help you to for~ an image. Note 
that each word may be repeated a number of times. This whole 
cycle ~.s started by you each time that you press both response 
button~ to indicate that you have formed an image ••• " 
P] " ••• Initially the screen will display a small cross 
known as a 'fixation' field and, as you might expect, you must 
visually fixate upon this cross. After a short delay the the 
cross will be taken off-screen and relaced by 'a picture. [At 
this point Ss were shown the twenty six pictures that had been 
prepared and asked to 'name the category' that picture 
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represeuted. All Ss correctly named all the pictures. Ss were 
then told that the pictures in the experiment would look like 
some of these pictures]. You must be sure to get a good long 
look at the picture. After a short interval the picture will be 
taken off-screen and only a blank screen will remain. TWo 
second£ after this you will hear a word over the headphones and 
it is whatever is named by this word that you must image. So 
the picture going off-screen warns you that you are about to 
hear A word over the headphones. In the interval, between the 
picture going off-screen and a word being named to you over the 
headphones, try to hold in your mind's eye an image of the 
picturp. you have just seen. The picture that you see on the 
screen will generally help you to form an image. Note that each 
picture may be repeated a number of times. This whole cycle is 
started by you each time that you press both response buttons to 
indicate that you have formed an image ••• " 
N] " ••• Initially the screen will display a small cross 
known as a 'fixation' field and, as you might expect, you must 
visually fixate upon this cross. After a short delay the the 
cross will be taken off-screen and relaced by a coloured slide. 
You must name to your self the colour of the slide. After 8 
short interval the coloured slide will be taken off-screen and 
only a blank screen will remain. Two seconds after this you 
will hear a word over the headphones and it is whatever is named 
by this word that you must image. So the coloured slide going 
off-screen acts as a warning that you are about to hear a word 
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over the headphones. Note that each coloured slide may be 
repeated a number of times. This whole cycle is started by you 
each time that you press both response buttons to indicate that 
you have formed an image ••• " 
~aving understood these instructions Ss then reread their 
imagery instructions and undertook the nine practice trials. 
During both the practice trials and the experimental runs 
exterI".sl lighting in the laboratory was extinguished, the only 
light came from the tachistoscopic disvlays, and the 
experimenter retired to a separate room. S's responses were 
monitored on a VDU. The majority of Ss did not realize that 
they wer~ being timed. It was suggested to Ss immediately prior 
to the test runs that they adopt one of two imagery strategies; 
al projecting the image onto the illuminated blank 
tachistoscopic display, b) closing their eyes. In the second 
case it was stressed that the S must reopen their eyes AS they 
register.ed a response and keep them open until they heard the 
next it~m to be imaged. All Ss were aware that they would be 
asked about aspects of the experiment after completion of the 
experiQental trials. This part of the experiment took, on 
average, 25 minutes. 
Chapter 9 Page 9':'24 
Immediately after the experimental run Ss were askE!d to 
describe three of the images they had formed. Items were 
rando~ly selected for description, however if an S could not 
recall a particular item he/she was invited LO recall the image 
of any item that came to mind. Ss were also asked about the 
diffic'ollty of the experiment and their understanding of its 
purpos~. This part of the experiment lasted about 10 minutes. 
An extensive pilot study, with a slightly different 
design, assessed this procedure. Although results from that 
study do not feature in this report it should be noted that a 
further 44 Open University members of staff who acted as Ss alsO 
named, without error, the pictures depicting the superordinate 
ca tegol'ies • 
9.3 Results 
A ~ixed model analysis of variance was performed which 
employed the model 'IG,PC,S(IGPC),C,T,I(CT)', [IG-imagery 
instruction groups, PC-priming conditions, S-subjects, 
C-categories, T-typicality, I-items]. Factors not 
parenth"!ses are crossed with all other factors and factors 
in 
in 
parentheses are nested within the immediately 
unenc10sp.d, factor. The data were log transformed 
preceding, 
and all 
on the transformed data. Quasi F calcu1a t;ions were performed 
ratios were calculated for all main effects and interactions and 
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these are denoted by F'. All other F values are denoted by F. 
The results are reported in four sections: the first section 
reports findings bearing on the content hypothesis; the second 
section reports findings bearing on the hypotheses relating to 
organizational differences; the third section reports findings 
from the post-experimental interview; 
final, section reports other findings. 
~] Content Differences 
and the fourth, and 
Imagery Instructions: no significant main effect for 
groups, IG, was found. Although TI imagers [2225 msecs] had 
IGTs 167 msecs faster than PI imagers [2392 msecs]. It will 
become evident below that this overall similarity in IGTs was 
related to an unpredicted effect of word primes in the TI 
condition. 
Primes: an unpredicted significant main effect for 
primes, PC, was observed, F'(2,55) 6.16 p(O.OI and two 
orthogo~al planned comparisons found that IGTs to W [word 
primes] were significantly slower than the average of IGTs to P 
and N [?lcture primes and no-primes], F(I,1458) 6.63 p(O.OI, but 
that P Rnd N did not significantly differ, F(I,1458) 0.005. The 
mean IGTs, in msecs., for each condition were, W 2728, P 2108, N 
2090. This finding is in contrast to the prediction that there 
would b~ no overall effect of primes. It is evident that word 
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primes produced unexpectedly slow IGTs. 
Imagery Instructions ~ Primes Interaction: a significant 
IG by PC interaction was found, F'(2,56) 3.64 p(0.05. Figure 
9.1.1 presents a graph of this interaction. Orthogonal planned 
compari~ons found that: a) within TI IGTs to P were faster than 
IGTs tn N by 518 msecs., and this was just outside significance, 
F(1,14l8) 3.036 p(.08. Whereas IGTs within PI were faster to N 
than P by 553 msecs., which was significant F(l, 1428) 5.55 
p(0.02J. The hypothesis that the no-prime condition would give 
rise to fastest IGTs in PI was supported. However the 
hypoth~sis that perceptual primes would most facilitate TI image 
generatIon received only tentative support. b) between imagery 
instruction groups, P primes in TI gave rise to significantly 
faster IGTs than P primes in PI, F(1,1428) 4.78 ,(0.05, and the 
differ~nce was 543 msecs. N gave rise to faster IGTs in PI 
than TI this was just outside significance, F(1,1428) 3.73 
p<0.06, and the difference was 528 msecs. W gave rise to 
faster lGTs in TI than PI but this was outside significance, 
F(1,1428) 2.803, p(0.10, the difference was 488 msecs. These 
findings supported the hypotheses that picture primes would 
signicsntly facilitate TI image generation in comparison to PI 
image g~neration and that the no-prime conditon would facilitate 
PI image generation. However the finding that no-primed image 
generatfon was as fast as picture primed TI image generation was 
suprising and the finding that word primes inhibited TI image 
generation was the reverse of the earlier prediction. 
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Despite some unpredicted effects, the overall pattern 6f 
these fIndings tentatively supported the hypothesis that typical 
instan~e images predominantly contain perceptual information 
wherea~ personal instance images do not. The differences 
between means were very large for this type of experiment, e.g 
of the order of half a second. Typically image generation 
experiments find mean differences of the order of 150 to 250 
msecs' t [Glass and Meany, 1978; Kosslyn, 1980]. That these 
large aean differences were not always significant indicated 
that there was a large amount of variability in the data and 
this is discussed below. 
31 Organizational Differences 
Typicality: 
typicality [T] 
a highly significant main effect of 
was found, F(2,41) 19.76 p(O.OOOI. Two 
orthogonal planned comparisons found that the average of IGTs to 
mediumly typical [MT] and atypical [AT] items were significantly 
slower than IGTs to highly typical [HT] items, F(I,1458) 13.14 
p<O.OOI, but that lGTs to MT and AT were not significantly 
differe~t. The mean IGTs, in msecs, were, HT 2069, MT 2389, AT 
2467. Overall highly typical items were the easiest to form 
images of and there appeared to be little difference between 
medium and atypical items. It will be seen below that thiS 
effect !s best interpreted in the light of the finding of a 
three-wbY intercaction between typicality, primes, and lG. 
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Typicality Ei Groups Interaction: no significant 
interaction of T with IG was found, although this effect was in 
the predicted direction, F(2,86) 2.20 p<'lO. Thus the 
hypoth~sis that PI would either be unaffected by, or negatively 
j &\ 
effect by typicality was not supported. Collapsed over primes-
I 
both TI and PI exhibited similar effects of typicality. 
1Y.pica1ity ~ Primes Interaction: Twas found to 
signif1cantly interact with PC, F(4,225) 5.63 p<O.Ol and this is 
graphed in Figure 9.1.2. The Newman-Keuls method applied to 
these ~eans found that IGTs in W were significantly slower than 
IGTs in P and N at all levels of T. This finding shows the 
unpredicted inhibition of image generation by wo~d primes, which 
has alr~ady been mentioned. 
T.\e apparent implication of the unpredicted findings is 
that autobiographical memories are subject to typicality 
effects. However a further finding casts doubt upon this 
interprr.tation. 
The Groups ~ Primes ~ Typicality Interaction: all the 
above effects combined in a significant three way interaction of 
IG by PC by T, F'(4,156) 6.19 p<O.Ol. Figures 9.1.3 and 9.1.4 
plot the the mean IGTs involved in this interaction. 
Newman-KP.uls analysis applied to these means revealed three 
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Table 9.1.2 Grouping of Conditions in Imagery Instruction 
by Primes by Typicality Interaction found by 
the Neuman-Keuls Method, and Ordered from Fastest 
to Slowest Mean Image Generation Times. 
[see Figures 9.1.3 and 9.1.4] 
------------------------------------------------------------------
FASTEST 
GROUP 
PRIME 
TYPICALITY 
SLOWEST 
PI TI PI TI TI TI PI PI TI TI PI TI PI PI TI TI PI PI 
N P N P N P P N W N P N P W W W W W 
HT HT AT MT HT AT HT MT HT MT MT AT AT HT MT AT MT AT 
Groups of means underlined by a common line do not 
differ from each other but do differ significantly 
from other groups of means. 
[PI- Personal Instance Imagers TI- Typical 
Instance Imagers pa Picture Prime W- Word Prime 
N- No-prime HT- Highly Typical MT- Mediumly 
Typical AT- Atypical] 
------------------------------------------------------------------
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groupings of means: the fastest IGTs which 
.. 
are not 
-
significantly different from each other are PI-N-HT, TI-P-HT, 
and PI-'N-ATj the slowest IGTs which are ~ significantly 
d1fferen~ from each other are PI-W-AT, PI-W-MT, and TI-W-AT; 
the rem4ining means are not significantly different from each 
other. These three groupings are depicted in Table 9.1.2, 
above, ordered from fastest to slowest. 
These groupings of means show that although word primes 
inhibited both types of imagery they inhibited PI imagery at MT 
and AT levels to an extreme degree. This effect of word primes 
is discussed below where it is argued that the word prime 
manipulation failed in its intended effect. 
It is also clear that the pattern of responding was 
different, in terms of typicality, for TI when primed by P in 
compar:f.son to PI unprimed. The important finding is that in 
PI-N there was no significant difference between IGTs at HT and 
AT typicality levels showing that, when unprimed, the speed of 
generatidg personal instance images failed to increase with 
typ1caHty (as predicted). 
TI-P did exhibit the predicted typicality effect and TI-N 
also exhibited the predicted typicality effect. 
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In summary these findings supported the hypothesis that 
typicality is a major feature of the organization of semantic 
memory: however the findings only provide liMited support for 
the hypothesis that typicality does not feature in the 
organization of autobiographical memory. This was evident only 
in the P! no-prime condition. 
In additon failure to support some of the predictions and 
the emergence of unpredicted findings place constraints on the 
inferences which can be drawn from the results. These issues 
are discussed below. 
C] Post-Experimental Interviews 
Immediately after the experiment Ss were asked to recall 
and d~scribe three of their images. Employing the same 
classifLr.ation procedure as that used in experiment 3, it was 
found that descriptions of personal instance images were 
dominated by contextual information whereas typical instance 
images were dominated by perceptual information. It was 
concluded that Ss imagery in this experiment was similar to Ss 
imagery in experiment 3 and that personal and typical instance 
images had, in fact, been generated. 
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experienced any 
they had in some 
instance been unable to bring an image to mind. Overall SS 
claimed to have found image generation easy. However most Ss, 
in both TI and PI, mentioned difficulty in generating images of 
weapons. No 5 claimed to have failed to generate an image. 
, DJ Other Findings 
TI.ree other effects were found to be siginificant. 
Categories: firstly a significant category [CJ effect was 
found, F'(8,41) 5.75 p(0.01. Newman-Keu1s analysis performed 
upon the mean IGTs for each category found that mean IGT to the 
category Weapon differed significantly from all other means and 
that the categories Bird, Sport, and Vehicle, differed 
signif~cantly from the category Fruit, which had the fastest 
mean IGT. Such a category effect had been expe=ted on the basis 
of experiment 2 although the direction of such an effect had not 
been predicted. 
Categories ~ Imagery Instructions Groups Interaction: 
secondly, a significant C by IG interaction was observed, 
F'(8,260) 4.32 p(0.01. A Newman-Keuls analysis f~und that the 
mean IGr to the category Weapon in PI differed significantly 
from all other means and that the mean IGTs for the categories 
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Table 9.1.3 Groupings of Categories Within Imagery Instruction 
Groups found by the Newman-Keuls Method. 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Fastest Slowest 
IG PI TI TI TI PI TI TI PI PI TI PI TI PI PI TI TI PI PI 
Category FU FU VG FT FT TY CL CL VG BI BI VH TY SP SP WP VH WP 
Categories underlined by a common line do not differ 
significantly from each other but do differ significanly 
from other groups of categories. 
IG- Imagery Instruction group 
PI- Personal Instance Imagers TI- Typical Instance Imagers 
FU- Furniture VG- Vegetables FT- Fruit CL- Clothing TY- TOY 
BI- Bird VB- Vehicle SP- Sport WP- Weapon 
---------------------------------------------------------------
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Weapon in PI, 
significantly 
Weapon in TI, and Vehicle in PI, differed 
from the fastest mean IGT which was to the 
category Furniture in PI. These groupings for the C by IG 
interaction are listed in Table 9.1.3. 
As expected then, some categories overall were easier to 
image than other categories. In additon, within PI and TI the 
ordering of categories were, in terms of speed of IGt, 
different. These findings were largely due to exceedingly long 
IGTs, which occured in in both PI and TI, when Ss generated 
images of exemplars from the category Weapon. 
Subjects: thirdly a significant subjects [S] effect waS 
found, F'(54,1458) 45.0 p<O.OOO, indicating fairly high 
variability in Ss ability to generated images generallY· 
However as this did not interact with any other factor it was 
concluded that fast and slow imagers were equally distributed 
between the experimental groupings. No other significant 
effects were observed. 
9.4 Discussion 
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A number of unpredicted effects and the failure to support 
some predictions must clearly be taken into account in assessing 
the status of the present findings. Hence the two general 
hypoth~ses, a1 that the different contents of autobiographical 
and seruantic memories would be differentially activated by 
differ~nt primes, and b] that the different organization of 
autobiographical and semantic memories would be reflected in the 
difercnt effects of typicality upon the two classes of memory, 
did not receive unconditional support. 
Ho~ever examination of the findings suggested that the 
unpredicted effects were localized to two factors; a] the 
effect of word primes in II and, b] an unexpected effect of 
picture and word primes in Pl. The effect of word primes is 
discussed first then the principle findings are considered. The 
effect of picture and word primes is considered in the context 
of the finding of a triple interaction of imagery instructions 
by primes by typicality. 
A highly significant unpredicted 
inhibited image generation in 
IGIs to word pri.es in TI were 
primes 
above]. 
finding was that word 
TI [see Figure 9.1.1, 
slower than IGTs to 
no-primes and picture primes, respectively. IGTs to word primes 
in TI were over 600 msecs slower than lGTs to picture primes and 
over 140 msecs slower than IGTs to no-primes. A plausible 
explanatlon of this finding may be made in terms of the 
methodology for the experiment. In the word priming condition 
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[in both TI and PI], Ss were required to repeat the category 
name silently during the two second prime/stimulus interval. 
Assuming that Ss actually did this, it may have been the case 
that w~rd primes received only shallow processing. In a recent 
semantic priming experiment Irwin and Lupker [1983] also found 
no difference between word primes and no-primes. These 
researchers further found that naming [i.e. repeating the 
categor~ name during the prime/stimulus interval] was carried 
out at a shallow level of processing [Craik and Lockhart, 1972]. 
The word primes in the present experiment may, then, have been 
held in an acoustic/phonetic store until the presentation of the 
to-be-imaged target. If so the words would not have acted as 
primes and an extra processing burden may have been 
inadvertently placed upon Ss who may have attempted to make a 
connectioa between prime and target virtually simultaneously. 
Some Bupport fur this interpretation emerged in the 
post-experimental interview where Ss, in both TI and PI, 
spontaneously, complained of 'not being able to see the 
connection' between the word primes and to-ba-imaged targets. 
This theu would account for the unpredicted finding that IGTs to 
word primes in TI were slower than IGTs to no-primes, [it had 
been ptedicted that picture primes would produce the fastest 
IGTs in TI]. 
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However this explanation also extends 
word primes in PI. Aftera11 Ss in 
spontaneously complained that they could 
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to IGTs given to 
this conditon also 
see little relation 
betwee~ word primes and targets. Yet this complicates the 
explanation: for IGTs to word primes in PI were over 450 msecs 
slower than IGTs to word primes in TI and this difference was 
just outside significance. This suggests that word primes 
inhibited PI imagery more than TI imagery and therefore must 
have ~layed more than a 'shallow' role in accessing the 
underlying memories. A plausible explanation for these findings 
is as follows: in both TI and PI word primes were held at a 
shallow level of processing until presentation of the target. 
At target presentation the rehearsed prime was tr.en employed to 
locate the appropriate information in memory. As the word prime 
was the category name this facilitated TI image generation more 
than PI image generation because the underlying semantic 
memories from which the TI images were drawn were organized 
around a category prototype accessed by the category name 
whereas the underlying autobiographical memories were organized 
differently. Thus, it is proposed that, word primes acted not 
as primes but more as cues in a memory search. Hence the 
lengthy IGTs within and between both imagery groups. It will be 
argued below that these very slow IGTs to word primes acted to 
obscure and distort some of the predicted typicality effects. 
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lIt should be noted that there is an alternative 
explanation of the word prime findings: it may be argued that 
words generally increased image generation times because they 
had to be recoded from an acoustic code to some code which 
directly accessed memory. Note that this explanation emaphsises 
coding issues and sets aside the issue of organization. In 
other w~rds it is argued that regardless of organization in 
memory words always access memory indirectly. Clearly this is 
similar to the proposals of Rosch [1975(b)] aud Paivio [1975] 
discussed in the introduction, although their arguments that 
words gained indirect access were specific to semantic memory 
rather than applying to memory generally. In order to account 
for the differences between PI and TI word priming, this type of 
argument would have to make the additional ass~ption that words 
accessed semantic memories faster than autobiographical 
memories. Unfortunately there is no evidence bearing on this 
latter assumption and hence the prior explanation, emphasising 
categorical organization in semantic memory is to be prefered. 
The view taken here is that given that the two classes of memory 
are equated on other factors then words will access semantic and 
autobiographical memories equally quickly. This position is 
also co~patible with the unitary model of memory discussed in 
chapter 41 
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The prediction that there would be no overall effect of 
primes was not supported. Word primes gave rise to 
signifir.antly slower IGTs. However overall there was no 
significent difference between picture primes and no-primes 
supportillg the prediction for these two groups only. 
The prediction of a primes by group interaction was 
strongly confirmed [see Figure 9.1.1, above]. However, for the 
reasons outlined above, the effect of word primes in this 
interact~on may be regarded as of little significance. The main 
finding of interest is the cross over of IGTs to picture primes 
and no-primes in TI and PI. These findings lend fairly strong 
support to the hypothesis that semantic memories were comprised 
of perceptual attributes whereas autobiographical memories were 
not. Tllat is, when there is a compatibility between the content 
of the ,rime and the content of the memory the prime is helpful. 
In contrast, when the content of the prime conflicts with the 
type of information held in the memory, the prime is positively 
unhelpful. One difference which was expected, although its 
direction was not predicted, was that no-prime PI IGTs were 
significantly faster than no-prime TI IGTs but virtually the 
same ss picture primed TI IGTs. This showed that 
autobiog~aphical memories, in the absence of priming, were more 
quickly imaged than semantic memories. This suggests that 
autobiogaphical memories may ressemble Kosslyn's 'literal' 
encodings activation of which gives rise directly to an image. 
In contrast semantic memories were generated fastest when when 
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primed with perceptual attributes suggesting that the underlying 
memorie~ were comprised, at least in part, of perceptual 
attributes. Overall then, the latter findings support the 
content hypothesis and also confirm the finding of experiment 3 
that semantic memories contained general perceptual attributes 
whereas autobiographical memories did not. This clearly argues 
against the 'narrative convention' interpretation of the resultS 
of experiment 3: if it were the case that Ss PI images in 
experiment 3 contained context free perceptual attributes which 
were not included in their descriptions, then picture primes 
in the present 
generatioa, which 
experiment 
they did 
should 
not. 
conventions' criticism is rejected. 
have facilitated PI image 
Thus the 'narrative 
An-unpredicted overall effect of typicality was found. 
Highly typical exemplars were imaged faster than mediumly 
typical and atypical exemplars for both TI and PI groups. This 
finding is interpreted below when the three way interaction of 
imagery instructions by primes by typicality is considered. 
An unpredicted interaction of primes by typicality waS 
observed, [see Figure 9.1.2, above}. This was accounted for by 
the slow IGTs present in the word 
picture and no-primes, at 
indistir.guishable. 
prime conditions. IGTs 
all typicality levels, 
to 
were 
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Tha predicted typicality by imagery 
interaction was not observed. Both PI 
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instruction groups 
and TI gave rise to 
similar typicality effects. This is discussed in the context of 
the 3-way interaction. 
Finally the predicted 3-way interaction of imagery 
instructions by primes by typicality was observed although the 
precis~ pattern was not entirely as predicted [see Figures 9.1.3 
and 9.1.4, above). Two effects were clear from this 
interaction; firstly typicality has similar effects in all 
conditio~s with the exception of PI no-prime. These effects of 
typicality had been predicted for TI [although in order picture 
prime, word prime, no-prime, rather than the observed picture 
prime, no-prime, word prime), but had not been predicted for PI. 
For PI it had been predicted that either typicality effects 
would not be present or that they would be anomolous. A 
plausibl6 explanation, suggested by the data, for effects of 
typicality on PI images primed with pictures was as follows: 
the picture prime activated the semantic category and the memory 
search tor an appropriate autobiographical memory commenced at 
this point. Highly typical semantic representations were more 
activated than mediumly typical and atypical semantic 
representations, in that order. Because atypical exemplars took 
longer tc image in the PI picture prime condition it seems 
likely that the memory search commenced by locating semantic 
memories before autobiographical memories. Hence the 
differences in IGTs at different typicality levels in this 
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condition were due to the initial time spent locating semantiC 
memories. This suggests that once the semantic category had 
been activated subsequent memory searches auto~atically started 
from semantic memories. A similar account would apply to the PI 
word prime typicality effect with the proviso [see above] that 
the se~antic category was activated almost simultaneously to the 
target being registered. It is proposed then that primes that 
activate semantic categories compelled a search of semantiC 
memory prior to a search of autobiographical memory: hence 
typicality effects in the prime conditions in PI and also the 
longer time takenl~enerate images when primed compared to when 
not primed in this group. Thus the PI primed typicality effects 
cannot ~e taken as indicating that autobiographical memories 
were organized in terms of typicality. This line of reasoning 
is further supported by findings in the PI no-prime condition. 
IGrs in the PI no-prime condition were significantly 
faster than IGTs in the PI picture primed condition. If it had 
been tha case that typicality was an organizational factor in 
autobiographical memory, as in semantic memory [and also as the 
PI pictur.e prime IGTs may have suggested] then the effects of 
typicali,y should have corresponded exactly with those observed 
for sema~t.ic memory. However in the PI no-prime condition it 
was fouLd that IGTs to highly typical and atypical exemplars 
were not significantly different from each other and that both 
were s:l.gnificantly different from leTs to mediumly typical 
exemplars which were considerably slower. Though this is the 
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only condition in which the semantic typicality effect is not 
evident, the finding is striking: why should personal instance 
images of mediumly typical exemplars take longer to generate 1. 
One possible explanation related to the experimenter's 
observation that the objects and activities comprising the 
medium typical exemplars were generally less frequently 
encountered than exemplars from other typicality levels. This 
suggest~d, given that the more frequently an item is encountered 
the mor~ probable it is that the item has been recently encoded, 
that m~diumly typical exemplars may have been less recently 
encoded than other items. Thus, if autobiographical memories 
were organized, at least partly, in terms of recency of 
encodln~, as chapters 3 and 8 suggested, then because mediumly 
typical exemplars were less likely to have been recently encoded 
these ~utobiographical memories may have been less available in 
memory~ thus memory searches for the appropriate 
autobi~graphical memory of a medlumly typical exemplar took 
longer. Of course it might be countered that atypical exemplars 
are even less frequently encountered. Yet examination of the 
stimuli used in this experiment [see Appendix C] did not support 
this suggestion. 
conjecture. 
Experiment 5, following, investigates this 
The findings from the interaction of imagery instructions 
by primes by typicality lend some support to the hypothesis that 
autobiographical and semantic 
differently. Semantic memories 
memories were organized 
were found to be organized in 
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terms of typicality whereas there was no strong evidence that 
unprimed autobiographical memories were similarly organized. 
The findings tentatively suggested that autobiographical 
memories were, at least in part, organized in terms of recencY 
of encoding and this issue is taken up in the following 
experiment • 
. Data from the post-experimental interviewed indicated that 
Ss had generally found image generation easy. However exemplars 
from the category weapon were singled out by Ss as being 
difficult to image. This was supported by the finding of 8 
signifi~ant category effect in IGTs to weapons which were 
significantly slower than IGTs to all other categories. A 
categories by groups interaction also found that weapons in both 
PI and TI produced significantly slower IGTs. Possibly the 
emotional 
and/or Ss 
therefore 
connotations of such exemplars inhibited imagery 
simply had little experience of such items and 
poorly established semantic and autobiographical 
memories from which to generate images. Whatever the case it 
was decided that the category Weapon would not be included in 
future studies. Yet as the category effect did not interact 
with any variables other than groups it was concluded that thiS 
effect had not unduely effected the experimental manipulations. 
The category differences between the groups were taken as 
further indicating that Ss had indeed drawn upon different typeS 
of memory to generate their images. 
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9.5 Conclusions 
The pattern of findings, although containing some 
unpredicted and contradictory effects, provided some support for 
the proposal that autobiographical and semantic memories 
differec in terms of the information that they represent. 
Perceptual primes facilitated typical instance image generation 
and inhibited personal instance image generation. These 
findings argued against the 'narrative conventions' criticism of 
experiment 3 and that criticism was rejected. 
Forther the pattern of findings relating to typicality, 
although also containing unpredicted and contradictory effects, 
lent some support to the hypothesis that autobiographical and 
semantic memories were differently organized. Semantic memories 
were found to be organized in terms of typicality whereas there 
was no clear cut evidence that autobiographical memories were 
similarly organized. The data tentatively suggested that 
autobiographical memories might be organized by recency of 
encoding. 
Overall, the data were taken as supporting the hypotheses 
that autobiographical and semantic memories differed in terms of 
content and organization. 
Experiment 5 
Frequency of Experience Norms 
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9.6 Introduction 
The purpose of this experiment was to investigate whether 
exemplars from different typicality levels had been, 
systematically, more or less frequently experiel1ced: it was 
assumed that items which had been more frequently experienced 
were more likely to have been recently encoded and this 
assumption is discussed further below. It was hypothesised that 
the rated recency of experience of exemplars would be similarly 
Pol 
distributed to the~no-prime image generation times observed in 
experiment 4, above. The proposal that autobiographical 
memories were organized, at least in part, by recency would, 
then, receive additional, if indirect, support. However as the 
organization of autobiographical memories was only of secondary 
interest in this thesis it was felt sufficient to indicate 
rather than critically evaluate what formes) such organization 
might take. This was also in keeping with the general research 
aim to provide an overall perspective on the distinctiveness, 
and connectedness, of auotbiographica1 and semantic memories, 
[8ee chaptt!r 6]. 
One of the findings of experiment 4 was that unprimed 
personal instance image generation times [IGTs] exhibited a bo~ 
shaped ty~icality distribution: IGTs to highly typical and 
atypical exemplars were not significantly different from each 
other but both were significantly different from IGTs to 
mediumly typical exemplars. This was suprising given the 
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unbiquitos finding that typicality enhances mental processes 
[c.f. Mervis and Rosch, 1981]. Examination of the stimuli 
suggested that mediumly typical exemplars naming common objects 
about which much would have been known but which were less 
likely tc have been encountered recently by Ss, e.g. Hairband, 
Skates, Bow, Sailing, and so on. Related to this a post hoc 
analysis in experiment 3 had indicated that the majority of Ss 
personal instance images were images of objects and activities 
that had recently been experienced. It seemed probable, then, 
that recency of experience and the ability to generate personal 
instance Images were related. 
Evidence reviewed in chapter 3 strongly implicated recency 
as a factor in the retrieval of autobiographical memories. For 
example one of the most persistent findings in the study of 
autobiogra~hical memory has been that more memories were 
recalled from more recent periods of a person's llfe, 
[Warrington and Silberstein, 1970; Warrington and Sanders, 
1971; Corvitz and Schiffman, 1974; Baddeley and Hitch, 1976; 
Holland, 1976; Franklin and Holding 1977; Robinson, 1976; 
Rubin, 1982; see aslo Whitten and Leonard, 1981; Bahrick and 
Karis, 1982]. Whitten and Leonard [1981] reported that backward 
searches of autobiographical memory from most recent memories to 
temporally more distant memories was the strategey most 
frequently employed by their Ss, indicating that recent 
autobiographical encodings were prominent in the organization of 
the memory search. This evidence suggests that recent 
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autobiographical encodings were more 'available' in memory than 
le88 recent autobiographical encodings. This would provide one 
plausible explanation of the finding that IGTs to unprimed 
personal images of mediumly typical exemplars were comparitively 
slow: the search for the appropriate memory would have taken 
longer. 
Nevertheless investigations of autobiographical memory 
have not extensively 
autobiographical memory. 
studied the role of recency in 
Generally findings bearing on recency 
effects have been secondary to the research, as in the Whitten 
and Leonard study. Further there is an important though 
unacknowlp'Qged problem relating to the concept of recency as 
applied to autobiographical memory: in laboratory memory 
studies recency is usually specifically defined by the position 
of a target in a list but in everday memory recency of encoding 
is confounded with frequency of experience. In any given time 
span, items that have been most frequently encountered are, by 
definition, more likely to have been recently encoded. It is 
unclear ~lether the availability of a memory is a product of the 
frequency with which the memorized item has been encountered 
[and, therefore, encoded) or with the recency of the encoding. 
For instance a frequently encoded event such as going to the 
cinema, may not have been recently encoded yet may still be more 
available in memory than a less frequently but recently encoded 
event. Clearly this is a problem which must primarily be 
answered by research and, as such, lies outside th~ scope of the 
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research ~ims of the present thesis. What seems clear from this 
discussion is that frequency of experience may determine recency 
of encoding. 
It was decided to require Ss to rate how frequently they 
had encountered various objects, of differing typicality, in the 
immediately preceding month. It was assumed that objects rated 
as being :requently encountered were also more likely to have 
been recently encoded. It was predicted that mediumly typical 
exemplars would be found to be less frequently encountered than 
either highly typical or atypical exemplars. With the provisio 
mentioned above it could be argued that mediumly typical 
eXemplars were less recently encoded and therefore less 
available in memory. This would shed light on the IGTs to 
u~primed mediumly typical exemplars. 
9.7 Method 
A sl~gle group of Sa were required to rate, on a 7-point 
scale, hoWl frequently they had encountered objects that were 
highly typical, mediumly typical, and atypical, of 5 semantic 
categories. 
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Stim~lus Selection 
A short pilot study indicated that a list of 75 exemplars 
occupied £s for an optimum amount of time. 
The category Weapon was eliminated from the selection set 
because ~f the very slow IGTs given in response to exemplars 
from this category in experiment 4, which indicated the 
unavailabilty of both autobiographical and semantic memories of 
these exemplars. From the remaining set of 8 categories the 
following five were randomly selected: Vegetable, Clothing, 
Fruit, Furniture, Vehicle. Within each category 5 exemplars 
were sel~cted from each of the three levels of typicality, 
highly typical, mediumly typical, atypical, as specified in 
experiment 4. Within typicality levels exemplars were matched 
for PI and TI imagability, items varying by no more than 1 in 
their ratings. The lowest imagery rating overall exemplars was 
3.5 indicating that the selected exemplars were all easily 
imagible. At all typicality levels exemplars were eliminated 
from the selection set if it was intuitively felt that the 
object would have been extremely rarely or never encountered, 
e.g. 'collard' from the catgory Vegetable. Such alterations 
were rare. Five exemplars were then randomly selected from each 
category at each typicality level. Thus 15 exemplars from each 
of five categories were compiled into a stimulus list of 75 
items, [see Table 9.2.1 in Results, below, for a complete 
stimulus list). 
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Subjects 
40 Ss all full time members of the Open University 
adiminist~ative staff took part. There were 24 females and 16 
males. Average age was 27 ranging from 19 to 37. 12 of these 
S8 had previously taken part in Experiment 3 some 10 months 
earlier. All were native English speakers and local residents. 
Materials 
Sti~uli were printed in a four page booklet. Each 
exemplar uas printed next to a list of 1 to 7 numbers. There 
Were two pages each containing 30 exemplars and a final page 
containing 15 exemplars. A different random ordering of stimuli 
Was generated for each S. The front page of the booklet 
Contained che instructions to subjects. 
Procedure 
Ss to~k part in two groups of twenty each on successive 
days. Upon arrival at the laboratory Ss were seated in a large 
room well apart from each other. In front of Ss on a desk was 
the experimental booklet, face down, and a pen. When all Ss 
were seated E verbally instructed them to turn over and read the 
instructions and then to commence the experimental task. Ss who 
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had queries were asked to raise their hand and E dealt with 
their questions individually. Finally 8s were told to work at 
their own pace and if they completed the booklet before others 
to sit quietly and wait until E indicated that the experiment 
was completed. Ss then read the following instructions: "This 
is a very simple experiment designed to find out how often we 
encounter 'larious objects in our everyday lives. Over the page 
are a lidt of words and next to each word is a seven point 
rating scate. You are asked to indicate how frequently you have 
encounter~d each of the objects by ringing one of the numbers on 
the seven point scale. Specifically you are asked to indicate 
how frequently you have encountered particular objects in the 
last four veeks. Note that the object may have been directly 
encountere~ and/or you may have seen a picture of it in a 
magazine, ~ook, or on television. However verbal descriptions 
of, conversations about, or reading 
qualify as encounters with the actual 
the object name do not 
object and should be 
discounted in this experiment. You are not, of course, expected 
to remembe~ every time you encountered an object in the last 
four weeks, just use the rating scale to give as accurate 
impression as you can. 
Ringing a '1' on the seven point scale means that you have 
encountered the object very frequently indeed, say almost 
everyday Ringing a '7' means that you have not encountered the 
object at all in the past month. Ringing a '4' means that you 
have occasionally encountered the object. Use the intermediate 
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numbers, 'l' and '3', to indicate that you have encountered 
certain objects slightly more frequently than others and use the 
numbers '5' and '6' to indicate that you have encountered some 
objects slightly less frequently than others. IT IS ESSENTIAL 
THAT YOU MAKE YOUR JUDGEMENTS AS FINE AS YOU CAN SO USE THE FULL 
RANGE OF TliE RATING SCALE ". 
Ss took about 8 minutes to complete the ratings and were 
paid 50 pence. 
9.8 P.esults 
Table 9.2.1 below shows the mean rating for each exemplar 
in each category and the standard deviation of that rating. 
Figure 9.2.1 plots the overall mean rating for each typicallity 
level in each category and Table 9.2.2 tabulates the 
corresponding standard deviations of the overall mean ratings 
for each typicality level in each category. Figure 9.2.2 plots 
the overall mean for each typicality level across categories. 
and Table 9.2.3 tabulates the standard deviations for each 
typicality level across categories. Internal reliabity of the 
ratings was essessed by two split-half correlations, one between 
a divison of Ss on the basis group ordering, and second by a 
random divi9ion of Ss. The respective Spearman rank correlation 
coefficients were rho- 0.736 and rho- 0.814 both of which were 
highly significant, p(O.Ol, indicating close agreement between 
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Table 9.2.1 Ratings of Frequency of Encountering 
Exemplars of Varying Typicality. 
Category Mean S.D 
-----------------------------------------
Vegetable 
-----------------------------------------
Potato 
Cauliflower 
Carrot 
Brussel Sprouts 
Peas 
Corn 
Artichokes 
Watercress 
Asparagus 
Radishes 
2.15 
4.60 
3.70 
4.90 
4.10 
6.00 
6.65 
5.95 
6.15 
5.75 
1.42 
1.42 
1.49 
1.61 
1.94 
1.74 
0.98 
1.07 
1.34 
1.74 
Highly 
Typical 
Mediumly 
Typical 
-----------------------------------------
Peanuts 
Rice 
Ruhbarb 
Pickle 
Baked Beans 
Category 
Clothing 
3.45 
2.95 
5.95 
4.20 
3.40 
Mean 
1.46 
1.71 
1.18 
1.60 
1.76 
S.D 
Atypical 
-----------------------------------------
Jacket 1.70 1.12 
Shirt 1.50 1.20 Highly 
Sweater 1.45 1.18 Typical 
Skirt 1.85 1.26 
Suit 4.10 1.19 
-----------------------------------------
Cape 6.25 1.40 
Nylons 3.20 2.46 l1ediumly 
Pyjamas 5.45 2.21 Typical 
Parka 6.35 1.30 
Tie 4.70 2.25 
-----------------------------------------
Handkerchief 3.25 2.31 
Watch 1.65 1.49 Atypical 
Ring 1.45 1.14 
Earrings 2.65 2.30 
Purse/Wallet 1.60 1.26 
-----------------------------------------
/Continued 
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Table 9.2.1 /Continued. 
-----------------------------------------
Category Mean S.D 
Fruit 
Apple 2.20 1.50 
Orange 3.00 1.70 Highly 
Strawberry 6.55 0.85 Typical 
Peach 6.10 1.37 
Pear 5.10 1.40 
-----------------------------------------
Nectarine 6.90 0.44 
Cranberry 6.95 0.22 Mediumly 
Avacado 6.00 1.71 Typical 
Prunes 6.90 0.44 
Pommegranate 6.95 0.22 
-----------------------------------------
Tomato 2.60 1.14 
Coconut 6.05 1.14 Atypical 
Olive 5.95 1.19 
Pumpkin 6.80 0.41 
Mango 6.40 0.88 
-----------------------------------------
Category Mean S.D 
Furniture 
Table 1.05 0.22 
Chair 1.00 Highly 
Bed 1.05 0.22 Typical 
Couch 2.35 2.05 
Desk 1.05 0.22 
-----------------------------------------
Ottoman 6.80 0.41 
Piano 6.20 1.15 Mediumly 
Closet 3.30 2.20 Typical 
Lamp 3.20 3.08 
Magazine Rack 5.00 2.12 
-----------------------------------------
Radio 
Telephone 
Ashtray 
Pillow 
Cushion 
1.00 
1.00 
3.00 
1.15 
1.95 
1.98 
0.44 
1.23 
Atypical 
-----------------------------------------
/Continued. 
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Table 9.2.1 /Continued. 
Category Mean S.D 
Vehicle 
-----------------------------------------
Car 1.35 0.81 
Bus 3.40 2.25 Highly 
Van 4.65 2.08 Typical 
Taxi 4.55 1.90 
Bik.e 3.75 2.35 
-----------------------------------------
Wagon 6.30 1.68 
Cable Car 6.90 0.44 Mediumly 
Ship 6.30 0.98 Typical 
Cart 6.50 0.88 
Tank. 6.55 1.14 
Feet 1.20 0.62 
Horse 4.10 1.61 Atypical 
Wheelbarrow 5.60 1.60 
Skateboard 6.40 0.94 
Skates 6.25 0.78 
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Table 9.2.2 Standard Deviations of Frequency 
of Experience Ratings, Collapsed 
Within Typicality Levels, For Nine 
Categories. 
Category Highly 
Typical 
Mediumly 
Typical 
Atypical 
-------~--------------------~-----------------
Vegetable 1.07 0.34 0.60 
Clothing 1.11 1.29 0.52 
Fruit 2.02 0.41 1.68 
Furniture 0.58 1.64 0.87 
Vehicle 1.33 0.24 2.16 
Table 9.2.3 Standard Deviations of Frequency 
of Experience Ratings, Collapsed 
Across Typicality Levels and Categories. 
Highly 
Typical 
Mediumly 
Typical 
Atypical 
----------------------------------------------
All Categories 1.55 0.81 1.79 
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Ss ratinga of the frequency with which they had encountered 
common ev~rday objects over a four week period. 
It is clear from Figures 9.2.1 and 9.2.2 that mediumly 
typical exemplars were rated as having been less frequently 
encountered during the preceding month than either highly 
typical or atypical exemplars. 
9.9 Discussion 
The prediction that mediumly typical items would be found 
to be less frequently encountered than either typical or 
atypical exemplars was confirmed [Figures 9.2.1 and 9.2.2]. 
This bow-shaped distribution of frequency ratings is clearly 
similar to that observed for IGTs to unprimed personal instance 
images in experiment 4 [see Figure 9.1.4, above]. The proposal 
that unprimed personal instance leTs were a product of the 
availability of autobiographical memories is lent indirect 
support by this finding: autobiographical memories of mediumly 
typical exemplars were less available in memory because they 
were less frequently, and hence less recently, encoded. 
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How~ver the standard deviations, listed in Tables 9.2.1, 
9.2.2, and 9.2.3, showed that there was fairly high variability 
in the ratings. For example at most typicality levels, in all 
categories, there was, at least, one item which was rated either 
much higher or lower than the other exemplars at that typicality 
level. Hence the relatively high standard deviations at 
typicality levels. Also Figure 9.2.1 shows that different 
categories of objects were generally encountered more or less 
frequently. For instance items of Furniture and Clothing were 
encountere~, generally, more frequently than items of Fruit, 
Vehicle, £nd Vegetable. The hi~h split-half correlations 
indicated that this pattern of viabili tywas common to all Ss. 
The sources of the variance appeared to have their roots in 
common factors such as seasonal variations, e.g. the experiment 
was conducted in winter when Fruits such as Strawberry, Peach, 
and Pear, had been generally unavailable for sometime. 
Similarly u!lcontrolled for group differences in the subject 
sample may ~ave led to item variability within typicality levels 
e.g. smokers are more likely to encounter ashtrays than 
non-smokerA. The Ss 
hence the ~igh rating 
sampled were 
of 'ashtray'. 
predominantly non-smokers 
Clearly frequency of 
experiencin& an object, and hence recency of encoding, is itself 
determined by many other factors. Thus it could not be, [nor is 
itl, maintained that recency of encoding, and hence availability 
of autobiographical memories, is only determined by frequency of 
experiences. 
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Further it is not claimed that recency is the sole 
determinant of the avai1ab1ity of autobiographical memories. As 
discussed in chapter 3 emotions associated with the memory, the 
perceived consequences of the encoded event [Brown and Kulik], 
and many other factors, are evidently involved in the 
availability of autobiographical memories. 
Further, recency may determine more than autobiographical 
memory availability. For example it has been argued that 
autobiograptica1 memories become assimilated to semantic 
memories and in the process lose their distinctivenes and so, 
gradually, become irretrievable [see Chapter 3]. Thus there may 
be a grarled hierarchy of content differences such that less 
recently experienced exemplars exhibit content more similar to 
that of semantic memories than recently encoded autobiographical 
memories. H~wever until there is some account of how recent a 
'recent' m~mory must be before it is assimilated and becomes 
irretrievable, or, additionally, until, there is some account as 
to whether or not latest encodings are preserved in lieu of 
subsequent encodings, then the function of recency in 
autobiographical memory generally remains unclear. 
The claim made here is simply that recency plays some role 
in determing the availability of autobiographical memories. The 
high split-half correlations and the fact that every category 
exhibited the predicted bow-shaped distribution of ratings 
clearly showed that, in general, mediumly typical exemplars were 
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less freq,.ently encountered than typical or atypical exemplars. 
This provides some support for the proposal that the time taken 
to generate images drawn from autobiographical memories is a 
function of the availability of those memories. 
Autobiogra~hical memories of typical and atypical exemplars were 
more avail~ble because those objects were more frequently and 
recently encountered than mediumly typical exemplars. 
9.10 General Conclusions 
Experiment 4 provided some support for the hypotheses, a] 
that autobiographical and semantic memories represent different 
classes of information, and b] that autobiographical and 
semantic memories were differently organized. It was concluded 
that semantic memories contained general perceptual information 
that was no~ present in autobiographical memories. 
Experiment 4 also found that that semantic memories were 
represented in categories organized in terms of typicality. 
Additional evidence tentatively suggested that autobiographical 
memories mig~t be organized at least in part in terms of recency 
of encoding and experiment 5 supported this suggestion. It was 
concluded that semantic memories were organized in semantic 
categories whereas auobiographical memories were not organized 
1n such categories but were, partially, organized In terms of 
recency. 
CHAPTER 10 
VERIFYING ATTRIBUTES OF AND RECALLING 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL AND SEMANTIC MEMORIES 
This chapter reports 3 experiments. Experiment 6 
investigated the collection of locational and perceptual 
attrihute norms. Stimuli employed in experiments 7 and 8 were 
tak~~ from these norms. Experiment 7 replicated the no-prime 
condition from experiment 4 and investigated Ss abilities to 
verify different types of information from autobiographical and 
semantic memories. It was found that perceptual information was 
verified fastest when mediated by semantic memories and that 
locational information was verified more quickly when mediated 
by autobiographical memories. Experiment 8 investigated the 
cued recall of exemplars that had previously been imaged from 
semantic or autobiographical memories. It was found that 
perceptual cues 
previously been 
facilitated recall of exemplars that had 
imaged from semantic memories whereas locative 
cues facilitated recall of exemplars that had previously been 
imaged from autobiographical memories. These findings strongly 
supported the content hypothesis. 
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Experiment 6 
Perceptual and Locative Attribute No~s for Nine CategorieS 
10.1 Introduction 
The main finding of experiments 3 and 4 was that of a 
marked content difference between autobiographical and semantiC 
memories. To investigate this content difference further it was 
decided that additional stimuli would have to be gathered, 
particularly for autobiographical memory content. However the 
idiosyncratic nature of autobiographical memories indicated that 
comparisons between subjects would be particularly difficult. 
One solution to this problem was suggested by the findings 
relating to the locational content of autobiographical memories. 
In experiment 3 it was observed that locational attributes 
contained in descriptions of PI images exhibited attribute 
overlap similar to that observed for perceptual attributes and 
similar to that reported by Rosch and Mervis [1975]. Locational 
attribute overlap, although not as marked as perceptual 
attribute overlap, suggested that locations were semantically 
represented and in experiment 3 it was argued that that semantiC 
representations of locations are separate from autobiographical 
memories, [in the unitary memory network, see chapter 4] 
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However, as autobiographical memories have been found to 
predominantly contain information 
likely that autobiographical 
corresponding semantic memories 
about locations, it seemed 
memories may connect to 
by way of semantic 
representations of locations. Thus autobiographical memories 
may be accessed via semantic memories containing information 
about locations. Further as locations were rarely if ever named 
either in TI descriptions 
collections of attributes 
in experiment 3 or in previous 
[Rosch and Mervis, 1975; Ashcraft, 
1978; Hemenway, 1981], it seemed likely that the semantic 
representation of locations was separate from the representation 
of semantic categories and their perceptual attributes. It was 
reasoned then, that locational and perceptual attributes would 
differentially access autobiographical and semantic memories. 
Two experiments investigating ~e relationship of 
locational and perceptual attributes to autobiographical and 
semantic memories respectively, are reported later in this 
chapter. The aims of the present experiment were firstly to 
gather normative information about locative and perceptual 
attributes to be used in the later experiments and, secondly to 
compa~e the structure of the norms and, hence, to further 
investigate the semantic representation of locations. 
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A common measure of semantic dominance or relatedness is 
the production frequency of attributes, [Glass, Holyoak, and 
O'Dell, 1974; Holyoak, Glass, and Mah, 1976; Nelson and 
Kosslyn, 1975; Rips, 1975; Ashcraft, 1976; 1978; Hampton, 
1979], the higher the production frequency the more semantically 
related the attribute to the exemplar. Such production 
frequency norms typically show a pattern of centrality where a 
small number of attributes are closely associated with an 
exemplar while other attributes are rated as having decreasingly 
less association. As already noted Rosch and Mervis [1975] also 
found a characteristic pattern of feature overlap between 
superordinates and exemplars and amongst exemplars. With these 
observations in mind it was decided to gather production 
frequency norms of 10cationa1 and perceptual attributes and 
compare their patterns of overlap. The aim was to investigate 
whether 10cationa1 attribute norms were similar in structure to 
perceptual attribute norms. If so, this would support the 
hypothesis that locational attributes were semantically 
represent.ad. As experiment 3 found that autobiographical 
memories predominantly contained information about locations, 
the finding that locations were also semantically represented 
would imply that one of the ways in which autobiographical 
memories connect to semantic memories is by way of semantic 
representations of locations. 
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It was decided, then, to collect ?40duction frequency 
norms of locational and perceptual attributes given in response 
to exemplars from a number of categories at different levels of 
typicality and given to the category name themselves. It was 
predicted that although there would be some variation in the 
absolute number of attributes listed to specific items this 
would not contribute to significant differences in the number of 
attributes listed at three typicality levels, typical, mediumly 
typical, and atypical, nor would there be significantly more 
attrib'ltes listed to different categories. It was also 
predicted [after Rosch and Mervis, 1975] that typical exemplars 
would have more attributes in common than mediumly typical or 
atypical exemplars [in that order]. Similarly it was predicted 
that typical exemplars would have more attributes in common with 
the superordinate than either medium1y typical or atypical 
exemplars [in that order]. Lastly it was predicted that 
attributes listed for superordinates would show minimal overlap. 
These predictions applied to both perceptual and locational 
attributes. 
10.2 Method 
Two independent groups of Ss were require to list either 
the preceptual attributes or the locations of a set of common 
itema. Sa were randomly allocated to groups and stimuli were 
pre8ent~d in a random order. 
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Stimulus Selection 
The same stimulus set as that employed in experiment 4 
[chapter 9] was used here. Two exemplars from each of three 
typicality levels, typical, mediumly typical, atypical, in each 
of nine categories were employed. Including the category 
superordinates there were 63 stimulus items. 
Subjects 
80 Ss took part. There were 67 females and 13 males with 
a mean age of 30.5 years ranging from 24 to 55. All Ss were 
Open University psychology undergraduates taking a second level 
introductory pschology course at a one week residential summer 
school held at Sussex University. All were native English 
speakers. 
Materials 
80 different random orderings of the stimuli were 
constructed and each ordering was printed in a 22 page booklet. 
Each pagu of the booklet contained three stimulus items 
separated by a space of about ten lines in which S was to write 
the attributes. The first page of the booklet contained 
instructions. 
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Procedure 
Ss took part in two groups of 25, one group of 19, and one 
group of 11, over a two week period. Ss completed the listings 
in a large lecture theatre seated well apart. Upon arrival Ss 
were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental groups and 
admjnisterd the appropriate experimental booklet, face down, and 
given a pen. When all the Ss were seated E instructed them to 
turn over and read the instructions. Ss then read the following 
instructions according to their experimental group: 
A] Perceptual Attribute Lists 
"This is a very simple experiment designed to find out 
what perceptual attributes people think of in response to some 
common everday objects. 
parts and features of 
Perceptual attributes are generally the 
objects. For eJCample some of the 
perceptual attributes of Dog are 'tail, legs, furry, barks, 
runs, collar' and so on. In general, then, a perceptual feature 
is some sort of property of an object e.g. Furry, whereas 
perceptual parts are discernable bits of objects e.g. legs. 
OVer the page are a list of 63 common objects, activities, and 
concepts, and you are asked to list as many perceptual 
attributes for each item as you can think of in a set time. 
Don't bother to try and separate the attributes you think of 
into groups like features and parts just write them down in any 
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order. This is not any sort of creativity measure so refrain 
from listing unusual attributes at the expense of omitting more 
common ones. Although, of course, you should try to name as 
many attributes as you can. Also note that different 
individuals will mention different attributes so there are no 
'right' or 'wrong' answers. Just complete it the way you see 
it. 
When you have read these instructions raise your 'hand and 
wait for the experimeter's signal before turnir~ the page and 
starting the experiment." 
B] Location Lists "This is a very simple experiment 
designed to find out what locations people think common everday 
objfi!cts may be found in. For example a Dog might be found in 
"home, a kennel, a park, on a leash, in a cartoon, on a street, 
in front of the fire, by a lamp post" and so on. Over the page 
are a list of 63 common objects, activities, and concepts, and 
you are a~ked to list as many locations for each item as you can 
think cf in a set time. This is not any sort of creativity 
measure so refrain from listing unusal locations at the expense 
of omitting more common ones. Although, of course, you should 
try to name as many locations as you can. Also note that 
different individuals will mention di~erent locations so there 
are no 'ri~ht' or 'wrong' answers. Just complete it the way you 
see it. 
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When you have read these instructions raise your hand and 
wait for the experimeter's signal before turning the page and 
starting the experiment." 
E then asked if there were any questions and these were 
answered individually so as not to be audible to other Ss. E 
then explained that Ss would be allowed 40 seconds per item and 
that every time E said next "Next item" Ss must immediately move 
onto the next word. The experiment commenced when E said "Next 
word". E timed Ss with a stop watch. The whole experiment 
lasted about 1 hour. Ss were paid one pound. 
10.3 Results 
The perceptual attribute and locative attribute norms are 
contained in Appendix D. The norms for each category are 
distributed over 3 pages, the first page contains the the norm 
for the category superordinate, the second and third pages 
contain the norms for the exemplars ordered from most typical to 
least typical. The category norms are grouped in the order 
Weapon, Bird, Vegetable, Clothes, Fruit, Toy, Vehicle, Sport, 
Furni ture. Each page contains the following information on 
succe8sive lines: the word responded to; the rated typicality 
of the word, Typj the mean number of responses per subject, Xj 
internal reliability correlations for the frequency of response 
measure, r" , followed by the actual attribute responses listed 
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in order of decreasing production frequency; each response is 
accompanied by the absolute frequency measure A, e.xpressed as a 
percentage. Responses generated by only one subject are not 
presented. 
Random split-half correlations were performed for each 
norm and it can be seen that in both perceptual and locative 
attribute norms the Pearson correlations were high, averaging 
r-.668, S.D.-O.IS, r-.674, S.D.-0.14, respectively. Lower 
correlations occured when a high proportion of attributes were 
emitted by only two or three Ss. Given the relatively small 
number of Ss that took part in each group [n-40] a higher 
production frequency criteria would have had the effect of 
dramatically raising the correlations at the expense of 
eliminating a large number of responses.For example raising the 
production frequency criteria to 4 [i.e. 4 subjects must name 
that attribute for it to be included in the split-half 
correlat{on] dramatically raises the locative attribute 
correlation for Pyjamas from 0.38 to 0.69. Ashcraft [1976] 
reported a similar effect in his property norms. Overall the 
split-half correlations showed close inter-subect agreement 
concerning attributes with higher production frequencies. 
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Frequency A is a measure of how many Sa gave a particular 
attribute as a response. For example 62.5% of Ss named 'webbed 
feet' as a perceptual attribute of Duck i.e. 25 of the 40 
subjects. As mentioned earlier this sort of production 
frequ~ncy measure is often taken as a measure of semantic 
relatedness, [e.g. Ashcraft, 1976; Glass, Holyoak, and O'Dell, 
1974; Rosch and Mervis, 1975]. 
The mean, X, records the absolute mean number of responses 
per subject, including attributes named only once. 
Approximately 25% to 40% of attributes were named only once. 
Two 9 by 4 chi squares, categories by superordinate, 
typical~ mediumly typical, and atypical, levels were performed 
for each group. The means of the absolute frequencies of 
properties were entered in each cell. No significant chi 
squares were observed indicating that similar numbers of 
attributes were listed at superordinate, typical, mediumly 
typical, and atypical, levels in all categories within both 
groups. The means were then collapsed across categories and 
entered in a 2 by 4 chi square, groups by superordinate, 
typical, mediumly typical, atypical, levels. No significant chi 
squares were found indicating that, although slightly more 
locative attributes were named than perceptual attributes, 
similar numbers of attributes were named in both groups at all 
stimulus levels. 
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Table 10.1.1 Locative Attribute Overlap of Pairs 
of Exemplars At Three Typicality 
,Levels For Nine Categories, [in 
percentages] • 
Category Typical Mediumly Atypical 
Typical 
Exemplars Exemplars Exemplars 
----------------------------------------------
Weapon 23.8 6.2 5.5 
Bird 63.2 9.1 31.5 
Vegetable 59.2 25.9 20.6 
Clothes 57.7 25.0 13.0 
Fruit 56.5 39.1 33.3 
Toy 63.6 15.7 0 
Vehicle 33.3 4.1 17.3 
Sport 21.1 5.8 0 
Furniture 31.8 20.8 39.8 
----------------------------------------------
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Table 10.1.2 Peceptual Attribute Overlap of Pairs 
of Exemplars At Three Typicality Levels 
For Nine Categoriee, [in percentages]. 
Category Typical Mediumly 
Typical 
Exemplars 
Atypical 
Exemplars Exemplars 
~eapon 44.4 25.5 20.0 
Bird 62.5 21.7 28.5 
Vegetable 50.0 25.0 28.5 
Clothes 36.8 12.5 5.2 
Fruit 45.5 25.0 11.1 
Toy 28.5 5.3 0 
Vehicle 32.1 19.2 50.0 
Sport 25.9 5.2 0 
Furniture 24.5 35.0 9.5 
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Table 10.1.3 Locational Attribute Overlap of Pairs 
,of Exemplars At Three Typicality Levels 
For Nine Categories With Their 
Superordinates, [in percentages]. 
Category Typical Mediumly Atypical 
Typical 
Exemplars Exemplars Exemplars 
----------------------------------------------
Weapon 40.9 6.8 27.2 
Bird 40.5 30.9 14.2 
Vegetable 69.0 40.5 23.8 
Clothing 60.5 36.8 13.2 
Fruit 59.1 43.2 29.5 
Toy 47.5 17.5 15.0 
Vehicle 50.0 5.5 5.5 
Sport 23.5 16.6 13.8 
Furniture 41.1 20.5 29.4 
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Table 10.1.4 Perceptual Attribute Overlap of Pairs 
of Exemplars At Three Typicality Levels 
For Nine Categories With Their 
Superordinates, [in percentages]. 
Category Typical 
Exemplars 
Weapon 38.2 
Bird 55.2 
Vegetable 41.6 
Clothing 35.0 
Fruit 50.0 
Toy 22.5 
Vehicle 47.7 
Sport 35.4 
Furniture 31.2 
Mediumly 
Typical 
Exemplars 
5.8 
28.9 
22.9 
21.4 
23.8 
7.5 
18.8 
0 
14.5 
Atypical 
Exemplars 
2.9 
26.3 
l2.5 
2.3 
16.6 
2.5 
0 
0 
12.5 
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Table 10.1.5 Locational Attribute Overlap Between 
Superordinates [in percentages]. 
W B Vg C Fr T Vh S Fu 
[W] Weapon 
[B] Bird 5.0 
[Vgl V~getable 0 5.0 
[C] Clothing 0 a 2.7 
[Fr] Fruit a 9.5 14.2 2.3 
[T] Toy a 5.2 5.2 11.4 5.2 
[Vh] Vehicle a 0 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 
[S] 3port 0 5.8 2.9 0 0 2.9 a 
[F] Furniture a 0 6.2 6.2 6.2 6.2 a 0 
Table 10.1.6 Perceptual Attribute Overlap Between 
Superordinates [in percentages]. 
W B Vg C Fr T Vh S Fu 
[W] Weapon 
[B) ~ird 0 
[Vgj Vegetable a a 
[C] Clothing a 2.5 2.5 
[Fr] Fruit 2.1 2.1 15.2 2.1 
[T] Toy 2.6 2.6 a 2.6 2.6 
[Vh] Vehicle 2.3 a a 0 a 0 
[S] Sport 0 0 a 2.1 0 0 0 
[Fu] Furniture 4.2 2.1 2.1 6.3 4.1 10.5 a 2.1 
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To examine attribute overlap counts were made of the 
number of attributes in common between exemplars at each of the 
three typicality levels in each of the nine categories. Also a 
count was made of the number of attributes shared by exemplars, 
at each each typicality level, and the superordinate. This was 
done for both perceptual and locative attributes. Tables 10.1.1 
and 10.1.2 show the count of exemplar attribute overlap, 
expressed in percentages, for perceptual and locative attributes 
respectively. [All counts of attribute overlap are expressed in 
percetages as each norm contained slightly more or less 
attributes]. Tables 10.1.3 and 10.1.4 show the count of 
superordinate 
followed by 
percentages. 
and exemplar attribute 
perceptual attributes, 
overlap, for locative 
also expressed in 
Finally a count was made of attribute overlap between 
Buperordinates. Tables 10.1.5 and 10.1.6 represent the 
superordinate attribute overlap count, in percentages, for 
perceptual and locational attributes respectively. 
10.4 Discussion 
The results supported the prediction that locational 
attributes would exhibit a pattern of attribute overlap similar 
to that of perceptual attributes and that both patterns of 
overlap would be similar to that found by past work [Rosch and 
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Mervis, 1975]. Overall typical exemplars had many attributes in 
common vhereas mediumly typical and atypical exemplars had 
conside~ably less attributes in common, see Tables 10.1.1 and 
10.1.2, and this was the case for both locational and perceptual 
attributes. However it can be seen from Table 10.1.1 that this 
pattern was reversed for perceptual features given to exemplars 
from the category Vehicle and atypical exemplars showed more 
common attributes. This is probably a function of the low 
number of exemplars sampled [two] at each typicality level. In 
experiment 4 five exemplars were studied at highly typical and 
atypical levels and in no instance did attribute overlap at the 
atypical level exceed attribute overlap at the typical level 
although that experiment required descriptions 
objects rather than the listing of attributes. 
did require the listing of attributes Rosch and 
of images of 
In a study that 
Mervis [1975], 
who sampled five exemplars at these typicality levels, found 
that typical exemplar attribute overlap far exceeded atypical 
exemplar attribute overlap. Thus it is likely that the pattern 
of attribute overlap observed for perceptual attributes in the 
category Vehicle is the exception rather than the rule. A 
similar unpredicted pattern of attribute overlap was evident for 
locationa! attributes given to exemplars from the category 
Furniture, Table 10.1.2. and it is suggested that this also is 
an exception. If more exemplars had been sampled then attribute 
overlap at the typical level would have inceased whereas as 
attribute overlap at the atypcial level would have, 
proportionally, decreased. 
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In additon to exemplar attribute overlap a count was made 
of exemplar-superordinate attribute overlap. Tables 10.1.3 and 
10.1.4, and these clearly show that typical exemplars have more 
attributes in common with the superordinate than mediumly 
typical or atypical exemplars. This was the case for all 
categories and for both perceptual and locational attributes. 
Also a count was made of attributes common to 
superordinates. Tables 10.1.5 and iO.1.6 •• Attribute overlap 
was n~gliglible for both percepual and locative attributes at 
this level. This then supports Rosch and Mervis's [1975] 
finding that superordinates had few common attributes. 
The split-half correlations jndicated close agreement 
between subjects. There were no extreme differences in the 
naming of perceptual and locational attributes. Similarly no 
significant differences were found in the production frequencies 
of either type of attribute at differing typicality levels and 
in differing categories. Thus production frequency per se was 
not a determining factor in attribute overlap. 
Taken together the two measures of attribute overlap, 
exemplnr-exemplar and exemplar-superordinate. clearly indicated 
that typical exemplars shared more perceptual and locational 
attributes with each other and with the superordinate than 
exemplars of lower typicality. Mediumly typical and atypical 
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exemp~ars shared some, but comparatively few) perceptual and 
locati~nal attributes with each other and with the 
supero~dinate. These findings relate equally co loeational and 
perceptual attributes. Subjects then clearly treat locations in 
much the same way as perceptual attributes strongly sugg~sting 
that the latter attributes may be represented semantically. 
However these findings do not establish the specific 
organization of the underlying representations but rather, 
sugg~st its general nature. In chapter 4 it Nas observed t~dt 
perceptual attributes had been found to be organized within 
semantic categories, although this had been established not only 
by st~dying production frequency norms but also by other 
experiments such as property verification experiments [Ashcraft, 
1976; Hampton 1979], and multidimensional scaling studies 
[Smith, Shoben, Rips, 1974]. In the light uf past work and 
given the present findings it is reasonable to conclude that 
perceptual attributes are organized in overlaping sets as stated 
in th~ general model of categorization outlined at the close of 
chapter 4. In the case of locational attributes, While they 
ressem~le perceptual attributes in thelr production frequency, 
no firm conclusions as· to to their representation can be drawn 
without further research. The research on script-like semantic 
repres~ntations, reviewed in chapter 4, found that locations may 
be clustered in memory around certain common actions. Thus the 
overlap between Iocational attributes may reflect the 
commonniity of actions undertaken in locations rather than the 
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structure of semantic categories of objects. Examination of the 
locational attribute norms indicated that locations common to 
exemplars, particularly at the highly typical level, denoted 
locations in which similar activities were undertaken e.g. 
eating, buying, and cooking, for Vegetables. It is concluded 
that although perceptual and locational attributes exhibited 
similar patterns of overlap, suggesting 
seman~ically represented, the 
pattern of overlap for the two 
different. These issues are 
underlying 
classes of 
taken up 
that both were 
parameters of this 
attributes may be 
in chapter 11 which 
contains three multi-dimensional scalling studies of locational 
and perceptual attributes. 
The important point to emerge from this study was that, as 
autobiographical memories had been found to predominantly 
contain information about locations [experiment 3}, it seems 
likely that autobiographical memories are connected to semantic 
structures in which locational attributes playa dominant role. 
Thus autobiographical memories of common items may be more 
directly associated with the semantic system via semantic 
structures representing locations rather than via their 
corresponding categorical semantic representations. 
Experiment 7 
Verifying Attributes of Autobiographical and Semantic Memories 
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10.S Introduction 
An obvious follow up to experiment 4 would have been a 
priming experiment employing contextual rather than perceptual 
primes. The predictions of such an experiment would be a the 
mirror image of those in experiment 4: contextual primes should 
facilitate the generation of personal instance images and 
inhibit the generation of typical instance images. However, for 
various reasons, this was not deemed feasible: firstly it was 
difficult to assess what sort of material, which did ~ include 
the actual item, might have acted as a contextual prime; 
secondly, as autobiographical memories may not be organized 
categorically, each item would have required an individual prime 
thus logistically complicating the expe~iment and rendering it 
less comparable with experiment 4; thirdly the actual display 
depicting a context would have constituted a visually more 
complex stimulus than the picture primes used in experiment 4, 
introducin6 yet another new variable. For these reasons then it 
was decided not to undertake a contextual priming experiment. 
However one way to experimentally investigate the contents 
of the two clases of memory, was to have Ss verify different 
classes of attributes that were more or less associated with 
different classes of memory. It is predicted that the 
verification of contextual attributes would be facilitated by 
the activation of autobiographical memories and inhibited by the 
activation of semantic memories whereas the verification of 
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perceptual attributes would be facilitated by the activation of 
semantic memories and inhibited by the activation of 
autobiographical memories. 
To investigate this hypothesis it was decided to have 5s 
generate personal and typical images of objects and subsequently 
to verify attributes of the objects [as opposed to attributes of 
the image of the objects). It was reasoned that if S were 
required to answer questions about what was generally true of 
the object [rather than of his/her image of the object) then the 
time taken to verify a statement would be a measure of the 
information contained in the image and/or associated information 
activated in memory during the course of image generation. Thus 
the image would act as a prime to verification. For instance: 
S generates a personal instance image of 'Potatoes' and 
subsequent ally has to verify the statement "are sold in a 
greengrocers'''. This statement may be directly verified from 
the image if, for example, S has imaged potatoes on display in a 
greengrocers' shop. In addition the statement may be verified 
by S searching semantic memory. If semantic representations of 
locations were more closely connected to autobiographical 
memorieo than to semantic memories then in both cases the 
statement should be verified faster when a personal instance 
image has been generated than when a typical instance image as 
been ge~erated. This line of reasoning suggested a number of 
hypotheses but before considering these in detail some related 
issues must be briefly discussed. 
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Kosslyn [1980; Chapter 9] reported that when answering 
true/false questions about objects Ss used both imagery and 
propositional representations. Koss1yn argued that processes 
operating on these two types of representation run in 
competition and whichever process 'finishes first' supplies the 
information used in making a judgment. However information 
which was highly overlearned was found to be more likely to be 
processed propositiona11y. Information that was less well 
learned was more likely to receive imaginal processing. Thus in 
Kosslyn's experiments Ss reported generating more images to 
harder-t~-eva1uate than easier-to-eva1uate questions, e.g. "a 
dog has ears" was more likely to lead to an image of a dog than 
"a dog has four legs". To avoid Ss employing propositional 
processing when verifying locationa1 and perceptual attributes 
in this experiment it was decided to employ attributes which 
were frequently but not the most frequently given in the 
attribute norms reported in experiment 6. The reasoning was 
that slightly less frequently named attributes would be less 
likely to be overlearned and therefore less likely to give rise 
to proposiUona1 processing. 
One further issue relates to the nature of verification 
tasks. In property or category verification tasks it is often 
assumed that the verification time is a function of variables 
such as cognitive proximity, similarity, between the stimulus 
and target, !Meyer 1974; Collins and Quillian, 1972; Collins 
and Loftus, 1975; see Chapter 4]. However this is only the 
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case for 'true' responses. Glass, Holyoak, and O'Dell [1974] 
found that false responses were mediated by heuristics, [chapter 
4] and thus did not reflect the underlying structure of semantic 
memory as directly as true responses. Because the present 
experiment was chiefly concerned with the differential 
association of classes of attributes with classes of memory only 
true responses were analysed. Heuristics although of intrinsic 
interest were beyond the scope of the present study. 
Lastly, as Ss were to generate an image and then verify an 
attri~ute of that image, two measures were taken, image 
generation time [IGT] and attribute verification time [AVT]. 
The IGT measure was a replication of the no-prime condition in 
experiment 4. 
the following hypotheses were investigated: 
I] Image Generation Times [IGTs] 
IGTs would be fastest for personal instance imagers and 
would show a 'V' shaped typicality distribution where IGTs to 
highly typical and atypical exemplars would be fastest and IGTs 
to mediumly typical items would be slowest. Typical instance 
imagers would generally show slower IGTs than personal instance 
imagers with fastest IGTs being given to typical items followed 
by medilunly typical items and slowest IGTs being given to 
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atypical items. Thus an interaction of imagery instruction and 
typicality, similar to that observed in the no-prime condition 
in experiment 4, was predicted. 
2] Attribute Verification Times [AVTs] 
The personal instance imagers would exhibit faster AVTs to 
locational than perceptual attributeas whereas typical instance 
imagers would show faster AVTs to perceptual rather than 
locational attributes. Also it was predicted that there would 
be no over~ll differences between attributes or between groups. 
Thus an interaction of attribute type and imagery instruction 
was predicted. Lastly it was predicted that there would be no 
effect of typicality on the AVT variable, {once activated 
retrieval of associated information should be equally fast at 
all typicality levels]. 
10.6 Method 
The two dependent variables, image generation time IGT and 
attribute verification time AVT [both measured in milliseconds], 
received different treatments and were analysed separately. 
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Image Generation Times A 2 between by 6 by 3 by 2 within 
Ss repeated measures design was employed. 
factor was imagery instruction, IG. Ss 
personal or typical instance images, PI, TI. 
The between groups 
generated either 
The within groups 
fact~rs were categories, C, of which there were six, Vegetable, 
Bird, Fruit, Sport, Furniture, and Clothing; Typicality levels, 
T, of which there were three, typical, mediumly typical, and 
atypical; and .two exemplars, E, from each typicality level. 
Thus Ss imaged a complete set of 36 exemplars. This design was 
repeated four times on separate occasions each three or four 
days apart. Ss were randomly allocated to groups and the order 
of presentation of exemplars was determined by the AVT design, 
below. 
~ttribute Vertification Times A 2 between by 2 by 2 by 6 
by 3 by 2 within Ss design was employed. The between groups 
factor was IG. The first within groups factor was the attribute 
statement, true or false. The second within groups factor was 
attribute type, AT, which were either locational or perceptual 
attributes. The remaining within groups factors were C, T, and 
E. Ss, then, verified four attributes for each exemplar in four 
sets of 36, one on each occasion. The four sets were: 36 true 
perceptual attribute statements; 36 false perceptual attribute 
statements; 36 true locational attribute statements; and 36 
false locational attribute statements. The order of 
presentation of attribute statements were counterbalanced as 
follows: 
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The six categories were randomly divided into two 
which were, Al Furniture, Fruit, and Clothing, B] 
Vegetable, Sport. In two of the presentations of 
groups 
Bird, 
the 36 
exemplars group A] were paired with true attribute statements 
and Group B] with false attributes statements. In the remaining 
presentations this order was reversed. Within the false and 
true groupings the categories were split into pairings with 
locational attribute statements or perceptual attribute 
statements: To achieve this ordering categories were randomly 
divided within typicality levels. For example the categories 
Furniture, Fruit, and Clothing, each represented by 6 exemplars, 
2 at each of the 3 levels of typicality, were divided into two 
sub-groupings of 3 exemplars, with one exemplar at each of the 
three typicality levels. One sub-grouping was paired with true 
locational attribute statements and one with true perceptual 
attribute statements. The categories Bird, Vegetable, and 
Sport, were divided in the same way with the exception that they 
were paired with fasle attribute statements. Reversing the 
true/false pairings and the locational/perceptual pairings 
produced the four sets of 36 
categories, typicality levels, 
locational/perceptual attributes. 
exemplars 
true/false 
each balanced for 
statements, and 
Within the set of 36 exemplars attribute statements were 
randomly presented. Each S was randomly allocated one of the 10 
possible [41] orderings of the 4 sets of 36 stimuli. 
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Subjects 
24 Ss, 16 females and 8 males, aged between 19 and 42 
years with a mean age of 27 [to nearest year), took part. Ss 
were members of the Open University academic and administrative 
staff. All were native English speakers. 
Stimulus Selection 
A] Exemplars: six categories were randomly selected from 
the group Furniture, Fruit, Clothing, Vegetable, Sport, Bird, 
Vehicle, Toy: the latter two categories were eliminated. [Note 
that tile category Weapon had previously been dropped from the 
stimulus set because of extreemly slow lGTs observered in 
Experiment 4 to exemplars drawn from this category]. The 
exemplars were those employed in experiment 4. There were 36 
exemplars in all, 2 from each of the 3 typicality levels in each 
of the six categories, [see appendix B] 
B] Attribute Statements: the true attribute statements 
were selected from the attribute norms reported in experiment 6 
[see appendix D]. Attributes were selected if it was felt that 
they would be unlikely to be overlearned. As there was no 
normative data on the topic of overlerning this aspect of the 
stimulus selection was neccessarily intuitive. Selected 
attributes tended to be from the top five most frequently named 
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attribute~ to a 
frequently named. 
words. e.6. 
given exemplar but were not usually the most 
All attributes were prefaced by three or four 
"kept in a wardrobe" [Jacket] • Attribute 
statements were either 4 or 5 syllables in length. False 
attribute statements were identical with the exception that the 
false attribute was generated by the experimenter. The criteria 
for a fasle attribute was that it should complete a plausible 
but false statement, e.g. "is worn on shins" [Jacket). The 
central criteria for both true and false statements was that 
they named attributes which were generally, 
absolutely, true or false. A complete list 
statements is contained in Appendix D. 
rather than 
of attribute 
C] Practice Items: 12 exemplars and 6 false and 6 true 
attribute statements were selected and constructed from the 
categories Toy and Bird; two exemplars from each typicality 
level. 
Stimulus Construction 
A] Exemplars: the digitized exemplars that had been 
employed in experiment 4 were used. 
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B] Attribute Statements: an identical digitization 
procedure to that employed in experiment 6 for exemplars was 
applied to attribute statements. The digitized statements were 
edited to homogenize length and enhance clarity. The shortest 
statement was 77.3 seconds and the longest was 82.1. 
Apparatus 
A response box containing two response keys set 100mm 
apart and labeled True [right hand key] and False [left hand 
key] was used. A set of stereo headphones and stereo amplifier 
were employed. All the apparatus was controlled from a PDP 11 
computer running RSX 11M, which also measured and recorded S8 
responses. The software for this experiment was written by Dr. 
M Levoi of the Open University Psychology Unit. 
Procedure All Ss took part individually and upon arrival 
at the laboratory were randomly allocated to one of the two 
imagery instructions groups and one of the presentation orders. 
It was explained to Ss that they would be required to attend for 
a further 3 sessions each 3 or 4 days apart. 2 Ss could not 
commit themselves to this aspect of the experiment and a further 
2 Ss were recruited. Ss were seated in a small room. The room 
contained a table upon which were the headphones, response box, 
and printed instructions. It was explained to Ss that the 
experimental procedure would be demonstrated for them after they 
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had read the instructions and that they would have plenty of 
opportunity to practice the procedure before undertaking the 
experiment proper. Ss then read the following instructions 
according to their imagery group: 
!l Personal Instance Imagers: 
"This study is concerned with the mental images we can 
bring to mind of everyday objects and activities, such as items 
of furniture, articles of clothing, sporting activities, and the 
like. You will hear a word naming a common object or activity 
and YOU ARE ASKED TO FORM A VIVID MENTAL IMAGE OF A PERSONAL 
INSTANCE OF THE NAMED OBJECT OR ACTIVITY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. 
This means that you should try to form an image of an actual 
object or activity with which you are personally familiar. For 
example if the named object were BICYCLE you would form an image 
of a personal instance of a bicycle and so might bring to mind 
an image of, say, a tandem bicycle that you personally own. 
With something less common such as ASHTRAY you might bring to 
mind an image of an ashtray recently seen in a pub or shop. 
To reiterate: YOU ARE ASKED TO FORM A VIVD MENTAL IMAGE 
OF A PERSONAL INSTANCE OF A NAMED OBJECT OR ACTIVITY AS QUICKLY 
AS POSSIBLE. You will be asked to indicate when you have done 
this by pressing a button. 
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Aa soon as you indicate that you have formed the personal 
instance image an aspect of that object or activity will be 
named to you. For example, if you had formed an image of a 
BICYCLE you might have named to you the phrase "HAS HANDLEBARS". 
Your task is to indicate, by pressing yet another button, 
whethex this is generally true or false of the object. Note 
that this may not be true of your image but may be true of the 
object. YOU MUST JUDGE WHETHER THE PHRASE IS TRUE OF THE 
OBJECT. Note also that you must judge not whether the phrase is 
absolutely true but whether it is generally true. As it is 
generally the case that bicycles have handlebars you would 
answer true. If the phrase had been "IS MADE OF COTTON" you 
would, of course have answered false. 
In summary: YOU ARE ASKED TO GENERATE AN IMAGE OF A 
PERSONAL INSTANCE OF AN OBJECT AS QUICKLY AND CLEARLY AS YOU 
CAN. AS SOON AS YOU HAVE DONE THIS SOME ASPECT OF THAT OBJECT 
WILL BE NAMED TO YOU. YOU MUST VERIFY WHETHER THIS ASPECT IS . 
GENERALLY TRUE OR GENERALLY FALSE OF THE OBJECT, ALSO AS QUICKLY 
AS YO\] CAN •• 
lOu will find that the task is, in fact, very easy and 
that your images will generally contain the information that you 
need to make your judgment." 
Chapter 10 
"This study is concerned with the mental images we can 
bring to mind of everyday objects and activities, such as items 
of furniture, articles of clothing, sporting activities, and the 
like. You will hear a word naming a common object or activity 
and YOU ARE ASKED TO FORM A VIVID MENTAL IMAGE OF A TYPICAL 
INSTANCE OF THE NAMED OBJECT OR ACTIVITY AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. 
This means that you should try to form an image that typifies 
that object or activity. For example if the named object were 
BICYCLE you would form an image of a typical instance of a 
bicycle despite the fact that you personally own or like tandem 
bicycles and thus might find if easy to form an image of a 
tandem. With something less common such as ASHTRAY you would 
bring to mind an image Of a typical instance of an ashtray 
rather than, say, an image of an esoteric and very ornate 
ashtray that you recently saw in a china shop. 
To reiterate: YOU ARE ASKED TO FORM A VIVD MENTAL IMAGE 
OF A TYPICAL INSTANCE OF A NAMED OBJECT OR ACTIVITY AS QUICKLY 
AS POSSIBLE. You will be asked to indicate when you have done 
this by pressing a button. 
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As soon as you indicate that you have formed the typical 
inst~nce image an aspect of that object or activity will be 
named to you. For example, if you had formed an image of a 
BICYCLE you might have named to you the phrase "HAS HANDLEBARS". 
Your task is to indicate, by pressing yet another button, 
whether this is generally true or false of the object. Note 
that this may not be true of your image but may be true of the 
object. YOU MUST JUDGE WHETHER THE PHRASE IS TRUE OF THE 
OBJECT. Note also that you must judge not whether the phrase is 
absolutely true but whether it is generally true. As it is 
generally the case 
answer true. If 
that bicycles have handlebars you would 
the phrase had been illS MADE OF COTTON" you 
would, of co~rse have answered false. 
In summary: YOU ARE ASKED TO GENERATE AN IMAGE OF A 
TYPICAL INSTANCE OF AN OBJECT AS QUICKLY AND CLEARLY AS YOU CAN. 
AS SOON AS YOU HAVE DONE THIS SOME ASPECT OF THAT OBJECT WILL BE 
NAMED TO YOU. YOU MUST VERIFY WHETHER THIS ASPECT IS GENERALLY 
TRUE O~ GENERALLY FALSE OF THE OBJECT, ALSO AS QUICKLY AS YOU 
CAN. 
You will find that the task is, in fact, very easy and 
that your images will generally contain the information that you 
need to make your judgment." 
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The following procedure was then verbally explained and 
demonstrated to all Ss: "You will be seated in this room with 
the lighting slightly dimmed. You will be wearing the 
headphones and on the table in front of you will be the response 
box. You should place your right thumb on the right hand 
response key and your left thumb on the left hand response key. 
[N.B. By coincidence all Ss were right handed so it was not 
neccessary to adapt the procedure to left handers]. You will 
hear a 'beep' over the headphones which indicates that you are 
about to hear a word naming an object that you must image. As 
soon as you have formed the image press both buttons on the 
response box simultaneously. As soon as you do this you will 
hear a phrase naming some aspect of the object: PRESS THE RIGHT 
HAND KEY TO INDICATE THAT YOU THINK THE PHRASE IS GENERALLY TRUE 
OF THE OBJECT OR PRESS THE LEFT HAND KEY TO INDICATE THAT YOU 
THINK THE PHRASE IS FALSE. There will then be a 5 second rest 
period before the whole cycle starts again with a different word 
and different phrase. There will be 36 words in all and the 
experiment will take about 5 minutes." 
58 then undertook 12 practice trials. Ss were encouraged 
to close their eyes, or to 'project' on to a wall, to enhance 
their imaging. Having completed the practice and understood the 
experiment Ss then undertook the experimental trials. 
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After completing the first experimental run Ss were booked 
to return on three separate occassions 3 days apart. In fact 
this was not convient for all Ss and some completed their trial 
4 and/or 3 days apart. Ss were told that subsequent trials 
would be similar but were led to believe that the stimuli would 
be slightly different on each occassion. Upon commencing each 
trial all Ss reread their imagery instructions and followed the 
above procedure. Ss were paid 50 pence each time they completed 
an experimental run. 
10.7 Results 
1] Image Generation Times [IGTs] 
The data were log transformed. A repeated measures 
analysis of variance, where IG was the between groups factor and 
C, T, and I, were within groups factors, was undertaken over the 
four ~imes [TM] Ss had completed the experiment. There was no 
significant overall TM effect nor were any significant TM 
interactions observed. It was also noted that I did not reach 
significance on any of the four trials. The data, then, were 
collapsed across TH. A further analysis of variance was 
undertaken on the collapsed data to establish whether the data 
could be further collapsed across I. No Significant effect of I 
was observed nor was I part of any significant interactions. 
Thus the data were further collapsed across I and this had the 
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effect of up-grading T to the fastest changing within groups 
variable~ As typicaliy is a fixed effect [Rosch, 1975(b)] this 
obviated the need to calculate quasi-F ratios. 
A 2 between [IG] by 6 [C] by 3 [T] within groups analysis 
of variance was performed on the collapsed data. A highly 
significant effect of IG was found, F-6.5, D.F. 1,23, p(0.0173: 
lGTs were fastest in the personal instance imagery [PI] 
instruction group, 1367.37ms, and slower in the the typical 
instance imagery group [TI], 1727.ms. Thus the hypothesis that 
PI would show faster IGTs than TI was confirmed. A highly 
significant effect of T was observed, F-I0.99, D.F. 2,32, 
p<O.OOI. and IGTs at typical, mediumly typical, and atypical, 
levels were, 1478.3ms, 1611.01ms, and 1552.387, respectively. A 
highly significant interaction of T with I was also found, 
F-6.4523, D.F. 2,34, p(O.017, and this is depicted in Figure 
10.2.1, [over page]. This finding replicates the results of the 
no-prime condition in experiment 4 and strongly confirms the 
hypothesis that PI imaging gives rise to IGTs that do not show 
the predicted typicality effect whereas TI imaging does show the 
predicted typicality effect. Lastly a significant C effect was 
observed, F-2.36, D.F. 5,115, p(O.041. The mean IGTs for each 
category, in ascending order, were: Furniture 1481.82ms, 
Vegetable 1491.08ms, Clothing 1550.69ms, Fruit 1553.36ms, Bird 
1589.63ms~ Sport 1616.40ms. However this C effect did not 
interact with other variables and simply indicated that some 
categories contained exemplars that were more easy to image than 
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exemplars from other categories regardless of typicality level 
and type of imagery. 
2] Attribute Verification Times [ATVs] 
Only ATVs to true attribute statements were analysed. The 
data were log transformed. A repeated measures analysis of 
variance, where IG was the between groups factor and AT· 
[attribute type], C, T, and I, were within groups factors, was 
undertaken over the four times [TM] Ss had completed the 
experiment. [Note that as false attribute statements had ~een 
eliminated there were only 18 ATV per TM]. There was no 
significant overall TM effect nor were any significant TM 
interactions observed. It was also noted that neither T nor I 
reached significance on any of the four trials. The data, then, 
were collapsed across TM. A further analysis was performed to 
determine whether the data could also be collapsed across T and 
I. As no significant effects were found in this second analysis 
the data were collapsed across T and I. 
A 2 between [IG] 
analysis of variance 
significant effects of 
by 2 [AT] by 6 [C] within, groups 
was performed on the collapsed data. No 
IG or AT were found. However a 
significant cross-over interaction of IG by AT was observed, 
F-5.98, D.F. 1,20, p(0.024, and this is illustrated in Figure 
10.2.2 [over page]. Thus the predicted interaction was 
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Table 10.2.1 Attribute Verification Times to 
Locational and Percetual Attributes 
In Different Categories. 
B S C Fu Fr V 
L 2100 2095 2019 2008 2144 2135 
P 2196 2191 2178 2038 2141 2100 
[L-Locational Attributes, P-Perceptual Attributes 
B-bird, S-sport, C-clothing, Fu=furniture, 
Fr-fruit, Vwvehicle] 
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confirmed and the hypothesis that locational attributes would be 
verified faster than perceptual attributes in PI, and that this 
effect would be reversed in TI, was supported. No significant 
effect of C was observed. However an interaction of C by AT 
fell just outside significance, F-2.16, D.F. 5,100, p<0.08 
and this is tabulated in Table 10.2.1 [below]. The near 
significance of this interaction suggested that certain 
categories may be more or less dominated by locational or 
perceptual attributes. 
10.8 Discussion 
The prediction that image generation times [IGTs1 would be 
significantly faster for personal instance imagers [PI] in 
comparison to typical instance imagers [TI] was confirmed. The 
prediction that TI imagers would exhibit increasing IGTs with 
decreasing typicality but that PI imagers would show fastest 
IGTs to typical and atypical exemplars and slower IGTs to 
mediumly typical exemplars, was supported. These two findings 
replicate the findings from the no-prime condition in experiment 
4. 
The finding that PI IGTs were faster than TI IGTs further 
supported the argument fowarded in experiment 4 that 
autobio~raphical memories were literal encodings [Kosslyn, 1980] 
which were directly realizable as images, whereas semantic 
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memories were imaged by a process of construction in which 
attributes of the imaged object were 'read' individually into 
the image. Thus in the abscence of prior activation [e.g. a 
prime) typical instance images took longer to generate than 
personal instance images. [Implications of this proposal are 
considered in more detail in chapter 12). 
The IG by T interaction further supported the hypothesis 
that autobiographical and semantic 
organiz~d. 
that S8 
In TI IGT was a function 
memories were differently 
of typicality indicating 
searched semantic categories from typical to least 
typical members in order to retrieve the data required to 
generate the image, [this also indicates that Ss were in fact 
generating images drawn from semantic memory]: whereas access 
to autobiographical memories was faster but only for exemplars 
which had been frequently and recently encountered. Mediumly 
typical exemplars which, see experiments 3, and 4, may have been 
less frequently and less recently encountered, and therefore 
were less available, gave rise to slower IGTs. Taken together 
these two fingings lend further support to the hypothesis that 
semantic memories are organized in semantic categories and that 
autobiographical memories are organized, at least partly, in 
terms of recency. 
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The hypothesis that autobiographical memories would 
facilitate judgments about locational, but not perceptual, 
attrlbutes and that semantic memories would facilitate judgments 
about perceptual, but not locational, attributes was confirmed. 
Figure 10.2.2 depicts the interaction of attribute type and 
imagery instruction: semantic memories either contained, or 
made more available, information about the perceptual attributes 
of objects; autobiographical memories either contained, or made 
more available information about the locations in which objects 
may be found. Also, as attribute types did not differ 
significantly overall, it was concluded that both types of 
attribute were equally verifiable, given the appropriate memory. 
However it was not clear from this finding whether it was the 
different content of the two classes of memory or the memories 
to which the two classes of memory were differentially connected 
that differentially facilitated the verification of the two 
types of attribute. The findings of fast TI IGTs to picture 
primes in experiment 4 indicated that semantic memories content 
[perceptual attributes) facilitated verification of perceptual 
attributes in the present experiment. Similarly the finding in 
experiment 3 that descriptions of PI images predominantly 
contained information about locations suggested that this 
information would have acted to facilitate the verification of 
locations in the PI condition in the present experiment. Yet it 
seems unlikely that, in every case, PI and TI images would have 
depicted locational and perceptual attributes which matched 
exactly with the to-be-verified attribute. It may have been 
that in a number of cases an exact match did occur but, as the 
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selected attributes were not the most frequently named in the 
attribute production frequency norms collected in experiment 6, 
it is unlikely that exact matches occured in the majority of 
cases. It is, therefore, tentatively proposed that these 
findings were partly attributable to content differences between 
the two classes of memory and partly attributable to the 
preferential connections between the two classes of memory. 
Semantic memories are seen as connecting most directly to 
semantic categories and autobiographical memories as connecting 
most directly to representations of locations, which are 
presumably semantic. 
It lias concluded that the findings lent further support to 
the hypotheses that autobiographical and semantic memories 
differ in terms of content and organization. It was also, but 
more tentatively, concluded that these findings lent some 
support to the proposal that autobiographical memories may be 
connected to semantic representations of locations. 
Experiment 8 
Recalling Autobiographical and Semantic Memories 
10.9 Introduction 
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Experiments 3, 4, and 7, found content differences between 
autobiographical and semantic memories. These experiments were 
concerned with investigating the nature of the hypothesised 
content differences. In contrast the present experiment was 
concerned with investigating the effect of the previously 
observed content differences upon Sa recall of autobiographical 
and semantic memories. This was part of the general research 
strategy [see chapter 6] which 
autobiographical and semantic memories 
was 
through 
to 
a 
investgate 
process of 
convergent operations. The hypothesis, drawn from experiment 7, 
was that perceptual attributes would be more effective cues to 
the recall of previously imaged semantic memories than locative 
attributes and that locative attributes would be more effective 
cues to previously imaged autobiographical memories than 
perceptual attributes. 
It was decided to employ the image generation paradigm 
previously used. Ss would be required to generate either 
personal [PI] or typical instance [TIl images of exemplars of 
varying typicality. Subsequently SS would be cued with 
locational and perceptual attributes in a multi-cue recall test. 
It was also decided to employ cues which named two attributes of 
the exsmplar. For instance Bicycle would be cued with 
'handlebars/wheels' [perceptual] and 'shed/road' [locational]. 
The two attribute cue was employed to ensure that all cues were 
unique. It would have been both time consuming and difficult, 
if not impossible, to have constructed a set of single attribute 
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cues. 
However it was apparent that this experimental design only 
assessed recall of episodic memories. Since both PI and TI 
images are stored as episodic traces of the encoding phase of 
the experiment, it is the recall of episodic memories which the 
cues facilitate, or fail to facilitate. Yet this is not a fatal 
design flaw for, it is reasoned, as episodic memories are 
'records of the cognitive environment' [Tulving, 1983] then they 
differentially contain some record of the areas of memory 
activaterl during encoding. On the basis of the findings from 
the previous experiments it was evident that TI episodic traces 
would be dominated by semantic categories and, to some lesser 
extent, by other semantic structures to which such categories 
connect. PI episodic traces would primarily contain 
autobiographical memories and, also to a lesser extent, some 
record ~f connected semantic structures 
encoding. 
activated during 
The experiment does not then, directly examine the two 
classes of memory but rather examines their episodic 'recoding' 
[Tulving, 1983]. Thus any differences in recall only highlight 
differences between autobiographical and semantic memories in so 
far as the recodings preserve the nature of the underlying 
memories. The significance of this problem is offset by the 
fact that experiments 4, 7, and to a lesser extent experiment 3, 
more directly investigated the underlying memories: the 
Chapter 10 Page 10~49 
hypotheses to be introduced below are drawn from these earlier 
expe=iments and so should be sensitive to the major differences 
between the two types of episodic encoding. 
A further issue related to typicality. In experiments 4 
and 7 it was found that the retrievability of II images varied 
with the typicality of the imaged item. Less typical exemplars 
took more time to retrieve, presumably, because semantic memory 
was searched by categories and the categories were searched from 
most to least typical members. Similarly Rosch [1975] reported 
that, in suprise free recall, highly typical exemplars were more 
frequently recalled than either medium1y typical or atypical 
exemplars. In the Rosch experiment Ss recalled exemplars about 
which they had previously made a series of semantic judgments 
indicating that they most probably were drawing on an episodic 
trace containing semantic representations of exemplars. It is 
predicted that TI imaged highly typical exemplars will be more 
frequently recalled than mediumly typical and atypical exemplars 
in that order: however this effect will be facilitated 
significantly more by perceptual than by locational cues. It 
was further considered that locational cues may act to misdirect 
the memory search at recall thus eliminating the predicted 
typicality effect in this condition. 
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It was predicted that the semantic typicality effect 
considered above would not be present in the PI condition. The 
findings from experiments 4 and 7 showed that autobiographical 
memoriee were not organized in terms of typicality. However it 
was not clear, from the previous findings, whether PI images of 
exemplars would be more of less frequently recalled at highly 
typical, mediumly typical, and atypical, levels. This issue, 
then, was left open. On the basis of the findings in experiment 
7 it was also predicted that PI imaging would lead to greater 
recall when cued by locative cues than perceptual cues. 
The following hypotheses were investigated: 
1] Imagery Instructions and Cue Type 
It was predicted that locational cues would facilitate the 
recall of exemplars drawn from autobiographical memories in 
comparson to perceptual cues. Conversely it was predicted that 
perceptual cues would facilitate the recall of exemplars drawn 
from semantic memories in comparsion to locational cues. Thus 
an interaction of cue type and imagery instruction was 
predicted. It was predicted that there would be no overall 
differences in cue type independently of imagery instruction or 
in imagery instruction independently of cue type. 
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2] Typicality 
It was also predicted that there would be an interaction 
of typicality and imagery instruction group where typical 
instance imagers would recall highly typical items most 
frequently and mediumly typical and atypical items less 
frequenty. It was not clear what sort of typicality pattern 
personal instance imagers would show in their recall although it 
was predicted that this would be different from typical instance 
imager~. Thus an interaction of imagery instructions and 
typicality was predicted. 
3] Finally it was predicted that these effects would 
combine in a three way interaction of imagery instruction group 
by cue type by typicality, indicating the interactive effect of 
different memory class, different content, and, different 
underlying organization of 
memories. 
10.10 Method 
autobiographical and semantic 
1be following design was employed: a 2 between by 2 by 2 
by 8 by 3 within; where the between groups factor was imagery 
instructions [IG], personal [PI] or typical [TI) instance 
imagery; the first within groups factor was whether the cued 
exemplar had been part of the encoding set or not [TST]. This 
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factor was included to check for guessing; The second within 
groups factor was cue type [CT], locational [L] or perceptual 
[P] cues; The third within groups factor was categories [C] of 
which there were 8, Clothing, Fruit, Toy, Bird, Vehicle, 
Vegetable, Sport, Furniture; the fourth within groups factor 
was typicality [T] of which there were 3 levels, highly typical 
[RT] , mediumly typical [MT], and atypical [AT]. Thus in anyone 
group Ss generated 24 images and saw 96 cues at recall, 48 of 
which were comprised of 24 Land 24 P cues of the imaged 
exemplars, and 48 of which were 24 Land 24 P cues of exemplars 
which they had not seen or imaged at encoding. 
The whole of this design acted as a repeated measure for 
two completely different groups [G] of SSe The two groups of Ss 
imaged different exemplars at encoding. The first group imaged 
the exemplars that the second group were cued with but did not 
image and the second group imaged the exemplars the first group 
were cued with but did not image. The exemplars were the same 
as those used in experiment 7, two from each level of 
typicality. Thus two complementary sets of 24 exemplars [each 
of the 8 categories being represented by 3 exemplars from RT, 
MT, and AT, typicality levels] were constructed in a manner 
similar to that employed in experiment 7. The purpose of the 
repeated measures factor was to asses whether items might be 
collapsed within typicality levels and so eliminate the need to 
calculate quasi F ratios. 
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The independent variables were G, IG, TST, CT, C, T. The 
dependent variable was amount recalled. Ss were randomly 
allocated to groups G and IG. There were 19 Ss in each of the 
four groups. Pr%<sentation of stimuli was random. 
received a different random ordering of cues at recall. 
Subjects 
Each S 
76 Ss took part. Their ages ranged from 24 to 56 years 
with a mean of 32 years, [to nearest year]. All Ss were third 
lev~l Open University students attending a weeks' residential 
psychology summer school at Sussex University. Ss were sampled 
over 2 weeks. All Sa were english speaking nationals. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli for encoding were the same as those used in 
experiment 
omitted. 
experiment 
4 with the exception that the category Weapon was 
Two groups of 24 items were constructed as in 
7. In additon to this 12 filler items, highly 
imagable exemplars were selected from categories other than 
those used in the experiment. 6 fillers were located at the 
begining of the stimulus list and 6 at the end. Thus there were 
36 encoding stimuli, 24 experimental and 12 filler. 
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The cues were drawn from the list of perceptual and 
locational norms reported in experiment 6 [see appendix D]. The 
two attributes were drawn from the top six attributes listed to 
that exemplar. The only restrictions being that the eventual 
cue [attribute pair] should be distinctive and unique and that 
across cues repetition of individual attributes should be kept 
to the barp-st minimum. 96 cues were constructed, 48 Land 48 P. 
Black and white slides were made of all stimuli and these 
were mounted on Kodak carousel slide binders [24mm by 36mm] 
Apparatus 
A Kodak carousel SAV 2000 adapted 
tachistoscopic displays was e~ployed. 
for projection 
Timing of slide 
presentation was controlled by a Forth's Instruments pulse 
generator [single pulse]. Ss were provided with a booklet on 
each separate page of which was printed a cue. 
Procedure 
Ss took part in groups of six and seven. Ss were seated 
in a large lecture theatre and read the following instructions, 
depending on allocation to IG: 
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A] Personal Instance Imagers: the instructions were the 
same as those issued in the first part of experiment 7. 
B] Typical Instance Imagers: the instructions were the 
same as those issued in the first part of experiment 7. 
Ss were then verbally told that the word naming each item 
that they had to image would be flashed up on the screen at the 
front of the lecture hall for 5 seconds. Ss were also told that 
there would be a two second pause in between words and that 
there would be 36 words in all. Any questions Ss had were 
answered at this point. Each group of 6 or 7 Ss received a, 
predet&rmined, different random order of presentation of 
stimuli. The lights in the lecture hall were then dimmed and 
the first part of the experiment commenced. E retreated to the 
back of the hall. 
The encoding stage completed Ss were then issued with the 
booklets containing the cues and given the following verbal 
instructions: 
" On each page of the booklet 
designed to aid you in recalling 
given to you is a cue 
the image you formed of 
particular items. The cue names two aspects of an item. For 
example if the imageed item had been Bicycle then cues such as 
'handlebars/wheels' and 'shed/road' would be used. You will 
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find that some of the cues are very powerful aids to recall 
while others are less effective and yet others provide no help 
at all. The distribution of very helpful, less helpful, and 
poor cues is about equal. Note that all the items you imaged 
are cued more than once. Read each cue carefully and if it 
reminds you of an image you formed then write down the name of 
the ima.ged item in the space below. If the cue does not help 
you remember then score a line through that page. If in doubt 
then guess but try to keep your guessing to a minimum. You have 
5 minutes to complete this part of the experiment. .. 
Having completed this phase of the experiment Ss were then 
asked to briefly answer the following questions: 
"Did you find it difficult to generate images ?" 
"Briefly indicate what your images were like, e.g. highly 
detailed, fuzzy, black and white, coloured, etc." 
"Briefly indicate the area from which your images were 
drawn e.g. Home, Work, Leisure, Books, Films, T.V., etc." 
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Having completed the third phase of the experiment Ss were 
paid one pound. The whole experiment took. about. 25 minutes. 
10.11 Results 
To assess for guessing the amount falsely recalled to cues 
for unencoded items was totalled. In both groups this amount 
was less than 4%. Thus it was judged that guessing effected 
only a small number of reponses and this variable was dropped 
from the subsequent analyses of variance. 
A 2 by 2 between by 2 by 8 by 3 within groups factors 
repeated measures analysis of variance was undertaken. G was 
the first between groups factor and constituted the repeated 
measures variable. IG was the second between groups factor. 
The within groups factors, from fastest to slowest moving, were: 
cue type [CT] either L or P; categories [C]i typicality [T], 
[Note that in this analysis n-19]. No significant effects of G 
were observed and the data were pooled across groups. [It was 
also noted that C did not contribute any significant effects. 
However some small but non-significant differences between 
categories were present and it was decided not to collapse over 
this variable]. 
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An identical analysis 6f variance was undertaken with the 
exception that the repeated measures factor G was ommitted. 
[Note that in this analysis n-38]. 
1] Imagery Instructions and Cue Type 
A highly significant interaction of IG by CT was observed, 
F-113.74 p D.F. 1,74, p<O.OOOO, and this is illustrated in 
Figure 10.3.1, over page. Note that neither IG or CT 
individually reached significance. Thus the hypothesis that 
recall would be a function of type of imagery and type of cue 
was strongly supported. 
2] Typicality and Imagery Instructions 
A highly significant effect of T was observed, F-34.02, 
D.F. 2,148, p<O.OOOO. Highly typical exemplars were recalled 
more frequently than all other exemplars [HT 57.4%, MT 41.7%, AT 
46.5%]. However a highly significant interaction of IG and T 
was, also, observed, F-19.9, D.F. 2,148, p(O.OOOO, and this is 
illustrated in Figure 10.3.2. Therefore the finding that highly 
typical exemplars were recalled most accurately overall is 
qualified by the subsequent finding that atypical items were 
recalled as accurately as highly typical items in PI. Thus 
recall at different typicality levels was found to be a function 
of imagery instructions. 
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3] Typicality and Cue Type 
A highly significant interaction of CT by T was observed, 
F-49.12, D.F. 2,148, p<O.OOOO, and this is illustrated in 
Figure 10.3.3. This latter finding indicated that perceptual 
attributes cues facilitated the recall of typical exemplars 
whereas locative attributes cues facilitated the recall of 
atypical exemplars. 
4] Imagery Instructions, Cue Type, and Typicality. 
A highly significant triple interaction of IG by CT by T 
was observed, F-19.5, D.F. 2,148, p<O.OOOO, and this is 
illustrated in Figure 10.3.4. This finding showed that cues 
inappropriate to type of imagery [L to TI, and P to PI], 
abolished typicality effects and generally reduced recall in 
both &roups: whereas cues appropriate to type of imagery [L to 
PI, and P to TI] promoted predicted typicality effects in PI and 
TI. In PI mediumly typical exemplars were least well recalled. 
These findings support the hypotheses that 
autobiographical and semantic memories differ in terms of both 
content and organization. 
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Fig 10, .3 
100 Cue-Type by Typicality Interaction 
~ 80 
C; 
(.) 
Q) 
... 
~ 
;; 60 (.) 
Q) 
... 
a () 
8, 40 
co 
c 
8 
... 
Q) 
0.. 
LOCATIONAL 
CUES 
--- --.. ___ PERCEPTUAL 
CUES 
o"'-----'---------------~ highly 
typical 
mediumly 
typical 
atypical 
Chapter 10 Page 10-63 
Fig 10, .4 
Imagery Instructions by Cue-Type by Typicality Interaction 
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No other effects were significant. 
[Results from of the post~experimental questions indicated 
that few Ss had problems in generating images and all claimed to 
have formed all images. About 5% of Ss claimed that their 
images were highly unstable and only remained clear for a very 
short time]. 
10.12 Discussion 
The first main finding illustrated in Figure 10.3.1 
clearly confirmed the prediction that autobiographical memories 
would be best cued by locational attributes whereas semantic 
memories would be best cued by perceptual attributes: location 
cues facilitated PI recall more than TI recall whereas 
perceptual cues facilitated TI recall more than PI recall. This 
then, confirmed that the two classes of memory differed in terms 
of content. However a problem also noted in experiment 7 is 
that it i8 unclear whether it was the information contained in 
the image which facilitated cueing or other information 
activated during the course of image generation but not directly 
depicted in the image. The discussion of this issue in 
experiment 7 also applies here: PI images activated 
autobiographical memories and closely connected semantic 
memories of locations, TI images activated semantic categories 
and other closely related semantic structures [e.g. script-like 
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semantic representations], and it was this information that was 
contained in the respective episodic traces. [Note that recall 
in the inappropriate cue conditions was about 45%, in both TI 
and PI, suggesting that recall of the imaged items was either 
equally inhibited by inapproprpiate cues in both TI and PI or 
that the cues were ignored and baseline recall in both groups 
was similar]. 
The second main finding illustrated in Figure 10.3.2 lends 
strong support to the prediction that TI imagers would recall 
more highly typical items than either mediumly typical or 
atypical items. The prediction that PI imagers would exhibit a 
different typicality effect was also confirmed. Figure 10.3.2 
clearly shows that PI imagers recalled fewer mediumly typical 
exemplars than highly typical or atypical exemplars. This 
pattern replicates that found in experiments 4 and 7 and further 
supports the hypothesis that the two different classes of memory 
are organized differently. 
The third major finding, illustrated in Figure 10.3.3, was 
that cue type, independently of imagery instruction, promoted 
cross-over typicality effects: locational attribute cues 
enhanced recall to atypical, mediumly typical, and highly 
typical, exemplars [from highest to lowest in that order] 
whereas perceptual attribute cues enhanced recall to highly 
typical, mediumly typical, and atypical, exemplars [from highest 
to lowest in that order]. Regardless of imagery instruction, 
Chapter 10 Page 10~66 
then. locational cues abolished the usual effect of typicality 
and perceptual cues enhanced the typicality effect. However 
this finding was more easily understood in the light of the 
finding of a three way interaction of imagery instructions by 
cue type by typicality. 
The fourth and most central finding, illustrated in Figure 
10.3.4, was that of a highly significant triple interaction of 
imagery instruction, cue type, and typicality. It is clear from 
Figure 10.3.4 
eliminated the 
that inappropriate cue type reduced recall and 
typicality effects induced by imagery 
instructions and by Land P cues, e.g. PI-P, and TI-L. However 
there was a slightly steeper slope for PI-P [than TI-L], from 
highly typical to mediumly typical to atypical, suggesting that 
perceptual attributes acted to reinstate the typicality effect 
despite PI imagery instructions. This suggested that at 
retreival the memory search employing perceptual attribute cues 
commenced at a memory location subject to typicality effects, 
e.g. it the semantic category. Conversely there was only a 2% 
increase in recall from mediumly typical and atypical exemplars 
to highly typical exemplars in TI-L suggesting that the memory 
search in this instance commenced at a memory site not subject 
to strong typicality effects, e.g. semantic representation of 
locations. 
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In contrast, appropriate cues acted to increase recall and 
induced the predicted typicality effects. TI-P produced a very 
powerful typicality effect where over 37% more exemplars where 
recalled at highly typical than mediumly typical and atypical 
levels. Suggesting that semantic categories had mediated 
encoding. Conversely in PI-L more atypical exemplars were 
recalled than at highly, or mediumly, typical levels, indicating 
that semantic categories had not mediated encoding. 
Although this latter finding supported the prediction of 
no semautic typicality effect in the PI group the finding that 
most exemplars were recalled to locational cues by PI imagers at 
the atypical level was somewhat suprising. One plausible 
explanation for this effect emerged from a reconsideration of 
attribute overlap observed in experiments 3 and 6: in 
experiment 3 it was found that descriptions of PI images of 
atypical exemplars exhibited only minimal locational attribute 
overlap with more typical exemplars and that increasing 
typicality was accompanied by increasing location attribute 
overlap. It may then have been the case that locational 
attributes used in this experiment to cue atypical exemplars 
were more distinctive than other locational cues. Hence the 
superior recall of these exemplars. Note that other researchers 
[Jacoby and Craik, 1979; Eyaenck, 1979; Klein and Saltz, 1976; 
Norman and Bobrow, 1977; Wickelgreen, 1977] proposed that the 
distinctiveness of a memory trace may make that trace more 
retrievable, although distinctiveness per se was not considered 
Chapter 10 
the sole determinant of retrieval. Eysenck [1979] argued that 
distinctiveness may be thought of as an extension of the 
encoding specificity principle [Tu1ving and Thomas, 1973] which 
emphasises that recognition memory is determined by the extent 
to which " the test-trial encoding contains information that is 
unique to the study-trial encoding ", [p.111]. In the present 
case it is proposed that atypical locational cues were more 
specific to the PI imaging of atypical exemplars than medium and 
highly typical cues were to the PI imaging of medium and highly 
typical exemplars. Examination of the locative attribute norms 
[Appendix D] suggested that the locations named to atypical 
exemplars were usually more distinctive than locations named to 
exemplars at other typicality levels; occassionally however, 
highly distinctive locations were named to medium and highly 
typical exemplars. It was tentatively concluded that cues to PI 
images of atypical exemplars may, by virtue of their 
distinctiveness, have acted to raise recall 
exemplars in this condition. 
of atypical 
This effect would have been specific to PI imaging because 
TI images would have contained little or no locative 
information. Yet it might be argued that perceptual cues to 
atypical exemplars were also distinctive and therefore should 
have raised recall of TI imaged atypical exemplars. However 
previous research argues against this. In reviewing her own 
research Rosch [1978; see chapter 4] has pointed out that one 
of the reasons some exemplars were judged atypical of a category 
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was that those exemplars contained information that overlapped 
with exemplars from other classes. Hence perceptual attributes 
of atypical exemplars were not as distinctive as locational 
attributes of the same exemplars because they were common to a 
number of exemplars from different classes, [although past 
research has not established whether atypical locational 
attributes overlap across categories examination of locational 
norms in Appendix D indicated that locationsal attributes of 
atypical exemplars did not overlap with exemplars from other 
classes). 
Obviously this is a speculative interpretation of the PI 
atypical locational cued finding and, in addition, is somewhat 
tangential to the findings bearing directly upon the content 
hypothesis. The main finding was that locational cues 
facilitated the recall of autobiographical memories of exemplars 
whereas perceptual cues facilitated the recall of semantic 
memories of exemplars. Thus the content hypothesis was 
supported. 
previously 
It 
imaged 
was concluded that episodic encodings of 
autobiographical memories contained 
information about locations and this locative information was 
either contained directly in specific autobiographical memories 
or in connected semantic representations of locations. Episodic 
encodings of imaged semantic memories predominantly contained 
perceptual information. A strong semantic typicality effect for 
perceptual cued TI imagers indicated that these Ss had accessed 
semantic categories at encoding. The failure to observe a 
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similar semantic typicality effect in PI imager's recalls 
indicated that the8e 58 had not accessed a semantic category at 
encoding and, therefore, that autobiographical memories were not 
organized in semantic categories. 
10.13 General Conclusions 
The case a content distinction between 
autobiographical 
for 
and semantic memories has been strongly 
confirmed. Experiment 7 found that different classes of 
attributes were judged more or less quickly depending upon the 
class of memory that had been activated. 
that different classes of attributes 
Experiment 8 found 
facilitated recall of 
exemplars depending upon the type of memory activated at 
encoding. It was concluded that autobiographical memories 
predominatly contain information about the locations of objects 
whereas semantic memories do not. Semantic memories contain 
information about the perceptual properties typicaly associated 
with an object whereas autobiographical memories do not. It was 
further concluded that autobiographical memories may connect 
more directly to semantic representations of locations than to 
other semantic memories. 
Chapter 10 Page 10-71 
The hypothesis that autobiographical and semantic memories 
were differently organized was also confirmed. Experiment 7 
replicated the finding of experiment 4: a] that unprimed images 
of semantic memories were generated more slowly than unprimed 
images of autobiographical memories, and; b] that images of 
semantic memories were generated more quickly to higly typical 
than mediumly typical and atypical exemplars whereas images of 
autobiographical memories were generated more quickly to highly 
typical and atypical exemplars than to mediumly typical 
exemplars. It was concluded that autobiographical memories were 
generally more accessible than semantic memories. It was also 
concluded that semantic memories were organized in semantic 
categories whereas as autobiographical memories were not 
organized in similar categories and were, at least in part, 
organized in terms of recency of encoding. 
generally supported these conclusions. 
Experiment 8 
CHAPTER 11 
SEMANTIC STRUCTURES AND AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORIES 
7he three preceding chapters have been primarily concerned 
with investigating the content distinction between 
autobiographical and semantic memories of the same items. Also, 
but secondary to content, organizational differences have been 
observed between the two classes of memory. The conclusion 
reached at the close of the last chapter was that, although 
autobiographical and semantic memories differed in content and 
organization, one of the ways in which autobiographical memories 
connected to the semantic system was via semantic 
representations of information about locations. This chapter is 
concerned with semantic representations of loeational and 
perceptual attributes and with connections between the two 
classea of attribute. 
It was not intended to provide a definitive or complete 
account of the representation and interconnection of locational 
and perceptual attributes for, clearly, this would require 
extensive research: rather, the aim was to investigate these 
two clanses of attribute in the light of the findings of 
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experiments 3, 7, and 8, which had indicated that 
autoblographical memories connected to semantic memories of 
locations. As noted in experiments 4 and 6 it is not clear 
whether the semantic representation of locations was in the form 
of scripts or categories. Although this question is only 
indirectly investigated in this chapter it wtll be come clear 
that the findings strongly imply script-like semantic 
representation of locational information. It was also hoped 
that data bearing upon the interconnections of locational and 
perceptual attributes would shed some light on the pattern of 
primed image generation times observed in experiment 4 and the 
attribute verification times observed in experiment 7 and this 
is discussed further, below. 
':hree experiments featuring similarity judgments were 
conducted. The investigations were of sets of perceptual 
attributes [experiment 9], sets of locational attributes 
[experiment 10], and sets of both types of attributes 
[experiment 11]. The similarity judgments were analysed by use 
of a multi-dimensional scaling [MDS] algorithm [see Schiffman, 
Reynolds, and Young, 1981, for a non-mathematical introduction]. 
The rationale of this type of experime~tal paradigm is that 
similarity judgments reflect the underlying structure of memory 
[see for example Smith, Shoben, and Rips, 1974] and MDS maps 
structu~e contained in the similarity judgments. 
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The findings indicated that semantic representations of 
locations were clustered together in terms of the common 
activities which they enabled [Bower, Black, and Turner, 1979], 
whereas perceptual attributes were distributed amongst a number 
of dimensions and exhibited a clustering suggesting a perceptual 
'core' or prototype. When both locatioual and preceptual 
attib'ltes where ranked with each other the resulting 
configurations were interpreted as depicting dimensional spaces 
which contained concentrations of attributes that compiled into; 
a] 'scenes' 
activites, 
[script-like 
b] descriptions 
structures] clustered around common 
of objec ts clustered around a 
[perceptual] prototype, and c] descriptions of objects in 
scene£. It was concluded that locational attributes were 
organized in script-like or scene-like semantic representations 
whereas perceptual attributes were organized around prototypical 
semant~.c representations. It was also concluded that 
script-like semantic representations connected to prototypical 
representations. These conclusions are discussed in detail at 
the close of the chapter. 
Experiment 9 
Similarity Judgments of Perceptual Attributes 
1:.1 Introduction 
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In experiments 
attributes contained 
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4,7, and 8, perceptual and locational 
in semantic and autobiographical memories 
were manipulated in order to explore differences between the two 
classes of memory. During the course of these experiments it 
became clear that the two classes of memor.y were connected. 
Experi~ent 3 found that the actual objects represented in 
autob~ographical memories were idiosyncratic rather than typical 
and so the perceptual content of autobiographical memories 
tended not to be identical to the perceptual content of semantic 
memories [of the same item(s)]. However it was undoubtedly the 
case that objects encoded in autobiographical memories contained 
some perceptual information that would be classed as semantic 
indicating that perceptual semantic information may act as as 
link between the two memory classes. Yet the extent of this 
overlap was not discernable from the earlier experiments [see 
Experiment 3]. Rather the particular connection observed in 
experiments 7 and 8 was that of an autobiographical-semantic 
link via semantic representations of locations. Hence although 
it is likely that there are many qualitatively different 
connections between semantic and autobiographical memories it is 
the connection via locations that will be examined in this set 
of experiments. 
In this first experiment Ss were asked to reference rank a 
set of perceptual attributes and exemplars drawn from a 
partic~lar category according to how well they [reference and 
attribute or exemplar] 'went together'. The rankings were then 
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subject to multidimensional scaling. 
A few comments concerning the rationale and problems of 
multidimensional scaling are worth mentioning here. Firstly 
multi.iimensional scaling is ' ••• simply a mathematical tool that 
enables us to represent similarities of objects spatially as in 
a map ••• ' [Schiffman, Reynolds, and Young, 1981, p.3]. Secondly 
multidimensional scaling is most useful when the underlying 
dimensions and relations are not well known or well articulated. 
Thus multidimensional scaling might be thought of as a 
sophiuticated tool employed in the process of 
classif.ication. 
systematic 
Nevertheless there are certain problems associated with 
multidimensional scaling and although these will not be gone 
into in any great detail here the reader should be aware that 
some aspects of scaling are questionable. Tversky [1977] has 
queried the appropriateness of meteric modelling of 
psychological judgments of similarity/dissimilarity arguing that 
such d~ta may violate axioms of meteric sp~ce and that the 
resulti~g dimensions may, consequently, be artifactual products 
of the model rather than 'psychologically real' dimensions. 
Howeve~ Krumhansl [1978] has replied to Tversky's criticisms 
arguing that violations of the axioms of meteric space may be 
less extensive and damaging than Tversky suggests. Krumhansal 
proposed a modified model based on distance-density 
considerations that obviated Tversky's criticisms. 
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The debate then about the appropriateness of meteric 
modelling remains open and it is by no means clear whether other 
forms of modelling are more or less appropriate [see Krumhansll. 
Smith and Medin [1981] have argued that such modelling is useful 
and provides insights into the underlying organization of 
sti~ulus sets not otherwise available. The technique provides a 
convenient [and generally accepted] method of modelling complex 
similarity data and allows comparisons between data sets that 
would not be possible using other methods [e.g. cluster 
analysis, factor analysis, see Schifman, Reynolds, and Young]. 
One further point made by Smith and Medin of significane 
for the present research is that: although different theorists 
in the past have argued that clu~ of attributes are 
fundamentally different from attributes arrayed on dimensions it 
now seems that this a spurious distinction for any set of nested 
attributes can be conceived of as being arrayed on a dimension 
or as being organized in discrete sets of associated attributes. 
The choice is in the eye of the modeller. Thus in the present 
experiment and in latter experiments in this chapter, dervived 
config'.1rations will sometimes be discussed in terms of 
dimensions and sometimes in terms of clusters of attributes that 
'sit' in the dimensional space. No strong theoretical 
distinction is drawn between clusters and dim~nsions. 
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underlying structure of perceptual 
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was to examine the 
attributes. In this 
experiment exemplars of varying typicality were ranked along 
with some of their associated perceptual attributes. It was 
predicted that typical exemplars and attributes common to these 
exemplars would be clustered together in the scaling solution, 
indicating a perceptual prototype. Less typical exemplars and 
attributes would lie outside the prototypical clustering in less 
densely populated regions of the multidimensional space. It was 
also predicted that the configuration would fit in a space with 
a limited number of dimensions that would be easily 
interpretable. However the specificity of these dimensions 
could fiOt be predicted in advance. It was unclear whether Ss 
would employ relatively specific and discrete dimensions such as 
size, shape, colour, and the like or more bipolar distinctions 
such as parts -vs- properties, functions -vs- attributes, etc. 
However, as the latter type of distinction emerged in experiment 
3 in the classification of Ss descriptions of their images, it 
seemed probable that bipolar dimensions would be more frequently 
employad. 
11.2 Method 
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It was decided that a small group of Ss would be required 
to reference rank three sets of exemplars and attributes drawn 
from three categories. As the reference ranking task may become 
very laborious for Ss it was decided to keep the ranking sets as 
small as possible and to allow S 'rest' periods every fifteen 
minutes. The reference ranking task operated as follows: one 
ranking consisted of an item being randomly selected from the 
stimulus set to act as the reference. All other items in the 
stimulus set were then ranked in order of decreasing similarity 
to the referent. The resultant rank order formed one row of the 
~l.ritymatrix. 
in the stimulus 
This procedure was repeated for all items 
set. The data then was non-metric and 
simi1aLity was 'row-conditional' [Coombes, 1964]. As more than 
one S took 
differences 
asymmetric. 
part it was 
in rankings. 
The data was 
also possible to examine individual 
Note that the matrices were 
scaled using 
Takane, and Lewyckyj, 1978; Young 
non-m~tric individual differences model. 
and 
the Alscal-4 [Young 
Lewyckyj, 1981] 
Also note that Ss were asked to rank the stimuli according 
to ho~ well they were judged to 'go together' or how closely 
they W3re 'related' rather than according to how similar they 
were. 
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Stimuli 
From the group of nine categories used in experiment 1 the 
following three were randomly selected: Furniture, Clothing, 
Fruit. From each category pairs of exemplars from each of the 
three typicality levels, typical, mediumly typical, and 
atypil.!:11, 
previously 
perceptual 
were selected. These were 
employed in experiment 4. 
attributes were selected 
the same as those 
For each exemplar two 
from the perceptual 
attdb:.lte norms reported in experiment 4. The criteria for 
attri;,ute selection were, A) that the attributes were from the 
four most frequently named attributes to the exemplar, B) that 
the attributes were, as far as possible, words and phrases with 
a sir..gle meaning, and C] that, where possible, the attributes 
were net themselves exemplars. Thus each stimulus set was 
comprised of 6 exemplars and 12 attributes. In addition to this 
the category superordinate was included in the stimulus set. 
Finally if the experimenter felt that the s.timulus set did not 
fully represent attributes very frequently associated with the 
superordinate other attributes from the attribute norms for 
superordinates were also selected. [A pilot study had found 
that Ss objected if they felt that the stimulus set 
under-represented what they considered to be salient attributes 
of the category]. The eventual stimulus sets ·were: Furniture 
22 ite~~, Clothing 19 items, and Fruit 23 items. The actual 
stimuli are named in the scaling solutions reported below 
[Figurel, 11. 1.1, 11 .1.2, 11 • 1.3, and Tables 11 • 1.1 t 11 • 1 .2, 
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11.1.3]. A practice stimulus set drawn from the category 
Vegetable was similarly constructed. 
Each S recieved one of 31 different orders of 
presentation of the categories. The order of selection of 
standards was also random [see below, Procedure] 
Materials 
All the stimuli were hand printed on 2 by 4 white cards. 
A scor~ sheet was constructed in which to enter the rankings. 
~ubjects 
6 Ss, three male and three female, all Open University 
employees [non-academic], took part. tge Average was 31 years, 
ranging from 28 to 35. All Ss were native English speakers. 
Procedure 
Sa took part, individuallY, in three separate one hour 
sessions over a ten day period. For all Ss there was at least 
one da:,'s' interval between sessions otherwise the interval 
between sessions was variable. Within sessions Sa carried out 
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the experimental task for three periods of fifteen minutes 
seated in quiet room. There were short rest periods every 
fifteen minutes and each session commenced with S reading the 
following instructions: 
"This experiment is designed to gather information about 
how closely we think certain things are related to each other. 
For example the colour 'green' would be judged as being very 
closely related to 'pea' whereas the colour 'black' would be 
judged as being only d~tant1y related but more related than, 
say, the colour 'pink'. In this experiment you will be given 
sets ~f items that are more or less related and asked to judge 
how well certain items go together. 
There are three sets of items in all and you are asked to 
work. through each set separately. Each set is comprised of a 
For example Vegetables. 
[Vegetable] plus some 
common category of everday objects. 
The set contains the category name 
examples of the category [e.g. Potato, Pea, Carrot, etc.]. 
Also tncluded in the set are some properties which other people 
have judged to be associated with the category and its members 
[e.g. hard, green, pOinted, etc.]. Some of these items are 
very closely related to each other and some are only distantly, 
if at ~11, related to each other. 
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You are asked to make your judgments in the following way: 
pick any item to act as a reference or standard and put thiS 
item at the top of the table in front of you [all the items are 
printed separately on cards]. Then turn over all the other 
cards and pick out the item that you think is most related to 
the standard. Place this card immediately below the standard. 
Then select from the remaining items the item which you judge is 
next related to the standard and place this card immediately 
below the last card. Do this for all the items in the set. You 
will ~nd up with a long list of items the top one of which is 
judged as being most closely related to the standard and the 
botto~ one of which is seen as being least related to the 
standard. When you have done this turn over all the cards and 
you will see that each one has a number on the back. Write down 
on the score sheet that will be provided firstly the number of 
the st~ndard card and then the numbers on all the other cards in 
the order in which you have arranged them [from most to least 
related]. Now put all the cards together and shuffle them 
[vigorously I]. Place the shuffled pack face down and turn over 
the top card, if this item has not already ~cted as a standard 
then use it as the standard for that go, if it has acted as a 
standar.d then turn over the next card and keep going until you 
reach ~n item that has not acted as a standard. Having selected 
another standard then turn over all the cards and arrange them 
from most to least related. Record the ordering as above. You 
can always check which items have or ha,'e not been used as 
standards by consulting your score sheet. Repeat this procedure 
until a~l the items in the set have acted as standards. 
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In each set there are about 20 items. You will be allowed 
three sessions of fifteen minutes in w~ich to make your 
judgments. You are asked to rest in between sessions. You will 
find that three sessions of fifteen minutes provides more than 
enough time to judge all the items in a set. 
The experimenter will demonstrate this procedure and you 
will be allowed a couple of practice runs during which any 
queries you have will be answered. 
The experiment, then, is straightfoward simply judge each 
item according to how well it goes with or is related to the 
standard. There are no right or wrong answers just judge the 
items the way you see it." 
~s were then 'given 
through the procedure. 
a practice set and E guided them 
E also explained that S would have to 
attend on two subsequent days and arrangements were made for 
this. 
Having understood the procedure Ss were allowed three 
fiftenn minute sessions with a minutes rest in between each 
session. All Ss completed their rankings within this time. 
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On each subsequent occassion exactly the same procedure 
was followed with the exception that the practice trial ~as 
omitt~d. 
After each one hour session Ss were paid two pounds. 
11.3 Results 
Alscal produces a number of measures b0th of the goodness 
of fir. of the model and of the weighting Ss give to different 
aspects of the model. Hence before reporting these findings a 
brief comment will be made on which aspects of the Alscal output 
are most germane to the present study. 
Firstly the measure of fit recomended by Young [Young and 
Lewyckyj, 1980, Alscal-4 'User's Guide'] is that of squared 
correlation [RSQ]. RSQ is a measure of the proportion of 
variance acounted for by the model and, as such, is a simple and 
direct measure of how well the model fitE the data. Other 
measures such as STRESS and SSTRESS have less straightfoward 
interpretations and in many cases are not as good indicators as 
RSQ [see Schiffman, 
only RSQ values will 
Reynolds, and Young, 1981, p.17S]. Thus 
be reported in discussing the model. 
Secondl! there are no commonly accepted analytical statistics 
used iu evaluating the significance of RSQ values. It is 
generally true of multidimensional scaling algorithms that the 
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central criterion of assessment is interpretability. 
most interpretable solution with the hiqhest RSQ 
reported here. Generally RSQ values of .65 or more 
Thus 
will 
will 
the 
be 
be 
accepted. Given that the stimuli used were a [small] 
representative sample of a much larger set a model which 
accounts for 65%, or more, of the variance in the data would 
seem to provide an acceptable fit. Thirdly because the 
correspondence of the model to the data automatically increases 
with each dimension added, caution will be exercised in 
introducing additional dimensions. Particularly if these 
incre~se RSQ only by small amounts. For example adding a 
dimension in the present stimulus sets will generally increase 
RSQ by 5% hence higher dimensional solutions will have to 
increase RSQ by 10%, or more, to meaningfully extend the model. 
In other words the models selected below will err on the side of 
dimensionality. Fourthly the discussion below will 
primarily focus on the overall model rather than individual 
differences between 
different Ss will 
SSe This 
emphasise 
is because it is expected that 
different dimensions in their 
rankings but not to any extreme extent. However extreme or 
exclusive use of dimensions by Ss will be discussed if this 
occurs. 
The results then divide into two sections; firstly 
relating to nature of the selected solution and secondly 
relating to Ss weighting of the dimensions in the model. 
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1] The Model 
Three dimensional solutions were selected for all three 
stimulus sets, Furniture, Clothing, and Fruit. 
reported individually. 
Furniture 
These are 
Figure 11.1.1 depicts the three dimens.i..onal solution. RSQ 
was 0.71 indicating that the three dimensional solution 
accounted for over 70% of the variance in the data. Higher 
dimen~ional solutions added little in the way of dimensions that 
were more interpretable and only slightly raised RSQ: for the 
four dimensional solution RSQ was 0.76 and for the five 
dimensional solution RSQ was 
11.1.1~ depicts a dimension 
0.79. Dimension 1, in Figure 
of 'furnitureness' [typicality] 
where small, glass, plastic and meta1ic, [less typical] objectS 
lie on one pole of the dimension and wooden, angular, large, 
[more typical] objects lie on the opposing pole. Dimension 2 
depicts a dimension of comfort-vs-appearance where hard and 
shiny objects oppose soft and comfotable ones. Dimension 3 
depicts an attribute dimension on which attributes are polarised 
betwee~ functional attributes and perceptual attributes. 
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Clothing 
Figure 11.1.2 depicts the three dimensional solution. RSQ 
was 0.72 indicating that the three dimensional solution 
accounted for over 70% of the variance in the data. Once again 
higher dimensional solutions added little to the model and RSQs 
for 4 and 5 dimensional solutions respectively were 0.78 and 
0.82. Dimension 1, in Figure 11.1.2, is a perceptual attribute 
dimension polarized between perceptual properties [e.g. 
mate:dal, soft, woollen, etc.] and perceptual parts [e.g. 
pockets, sleeves, buttons, etc.]. Dimension 2 is polarized 
between attributes associated with wearing clothes [soft, warm, 
comfortable] and attributes associated with looking at clothes 
[colourful, fashionable] and with examples of clothing. However 
dimension 2 was not easily interpretable primarily because of 
the outliers 'legs, nylons' and 'hairband, purse'. Had more 
attributes and exemplars been employed possibly this dimension 
would have emerged more clearly. Dimension 3 juxtaposes 
functional aspects of clothing with fashionable aspects. 
Fruit 
Figure 11.1.3 shows the three dimensional solution. RSQ 
was 0.67 indicating that the three dimensional solution 
accounted for over 65% of the variance in the data. Higher 
models dimensional solutions added little to the 
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interpretability. RSQs for 4 and 5 dimensional solutions were 
0.73 and 0.77 respectively. Dimension 1, in Figure 11.1.3, is a 
dimension of 'fruitness' [typicality]. Dimension 2 is an 
attribute dimension ranging from perceptual parts to perceptual 
properties. Dimension is a dimension of 'edibleness' ranging 
from attributes closely associated with eating fruit to 
attri~utes and parts relating to inedible aspects of fruit. 
For all three categories solutions of less than three 
dimensions produced very mediocre RSQ values of 0.53 and less. 
Overall it is clear that similar dimensions and 
configurations of dimensions underlie the three sets of 
similnrity rankings and these are tabulated in Table 11.1.1, 
over, [this table is discussed in more detail below]. 
NP 
2] Individual Differencei Alscal provides two measures of 
the weighting Ss give to the dimensions. The first measure is 
called the 'subject weights' and this gives the calculated 
weight for each subject on each dimension [in RSQs]. Ss varied 
little in the weighting they gave to different dimensions and, 
consequently, the averages of the subject weights were 
calculated and these are reported in Table 11.1.2, below. 
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Table 11.1.1 The Three Dimensions Found for the Categories 
Furniture, Clothing, and Fruit: Perceptual 
Attributes [D-Oimension). 
------~--------------------------------------------------------~. 
Furniture Clothing Fruit 
----------------------------------------------------------------~ 
D1 , Furnitureness' Attributes 'Fruitness' 
[Typicality) [parts-vs-properties) [Typicality) 
D2 Comfort-vs Wearing-vs Attributes 
-appearance -Appearance [parts-vs-properties ) 
D3 Attributes Functional-vs Edibleness 
[Functional-vs -Fashionable 
-PHceptual) 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Table 11.1.2 Averaged Subject Weights: Perceptual Attributes 
----------------------------------------------------------------' 
Category Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3 
----------------------------------------------------------------' 
Furniture 0.5003 0.4840 0.4052 
Clothing 0.5092 0.4820 0.4517 
Fruit 0.4814 0.4204 0.4048 
---------------------------------------------~~-----------------' 
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It can be seen from Table 11.1.2 that although Ss, 
overe.ll, weighted some dimensions above others, these 
differences are not of any great magnitude. 
The second measure of Ss dimensional preferances is called 
the 'relative subject weight indices' and is a measure of how Ss 
differ from a typical S in the relative importance they attach 
to a dimension. These indices vary between + 1 and - 1, extreme 
values in either direction indicating an S's heavy weighting of 
that dimension. Although there were some differences on this 
measure, generally Ss weightings, for all three categories, 
varied between +0.5 and -0.5. No extreme weightings were 
obser,'ed. 
Both these measures of individual differences indicated 
that although Ss exhibited dimensional preferences these were 
not extreme and Ss did not employ particular dimensions to the 
exclusion of others. 
11.4 Discussion 
The main finding was 
describable in terms of 
that the reference rankings were 
3 dimensional models for all three 
categories, Furniture, Clothing, and 
perfered to use bipolar types of 
Fruit. Also Ss clearly 
dimensions rather than 
continuous dimensions such as size, shape, colour, etc., but 
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note that these latter dimensions can be [faintly] detected 
within within the bipolar dimensions. 
A dimension common to all the categories was that of 
'attributes'. Ss made a distinction between perceptual parts of 
objects and perceptual properties. For example, in the category 
Clothing, buttons, sleeves, legs, were distinguished fro~ 
properties such as colourful, warm, and soft. This finding 
supports the classification system employed in Experiment 3 
[chapter 8] where a similar distinction was drawn between 
perceptual parts and properties. A dimension shared by the 
categories Furniture and Fruit was that of typicality. In Table 
11.1.1 this is refered to as 'furniturenes' and 'fruitness'. 
The purpose of using these headings was to indicate that the 
dimension was not one of simple typicality [as in 
'goodness-of-exemplar' measures, although certainly this was a 
component] but rather encompassed relations between exemplars, 
attributes, and superordinate suggesting a perceptual core 
[prototype] to the dimension. Although such a dimension doeS 
not emerge in the category Clothing it can be seen from Figure 
11.1.2 that the stimuli cluster in a similar prototypical 
fashion. The remaining dimensions clearly· ressemble each other 
[from category to category] although they are somewhat specific 
to their respective categories [e.g Usefullness and Edibleness]. 
Generally the dimensions divided into those depicting divisionS 
of perceptual attributes, functional aspects of the stimuluS 
set, and typicality. Embedded within these dimensions other 
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divis~ons such as size, shape, hard~soft, etc., may be discerned 
[see Figures 11.1.1, 11.1.2, 11.1.3]. 
This low dimensionality suggeste: that perceptual 
attributes, and the objects and categories they refer too, are 
fairly sharply classified in memory and these classes combine to 
form memory structures such as prototypes. Of course a major 
proble~ for this sort of interpretation is that it maybe the 
reference ranking task that forces the S to employ discrete 
dimt:llsions and thus the derived soluti')us reflect task 
stratp.gies more than memory structures. However one argument 
againFJi; this is that Ss used similar dimensions in similar ways 
[see section 2 of Results abovel. If the dimensions were 
chiefl~ products of problem solving strategies more variation 
might have been expected. As much of the work reviewed in Part 
1 of ~his thesis has established that Ss employ protypical 
repreeentations and make distinctions between classes of 
attributes, it seems reasonable to conclude that the dimensions 
observed in this experiment reflect underlying memory structures 
more t~an task strategies. Also the observed dimensions are 
similar to the classification system employed in experiment 3 
[particularly the part-property dimension) further implicating 
the role of such dimensions in memory. 
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These findings, although of intrinsic interest, take on a 
more pertinent meaning when compared with dimensional solutionS 
derived from reference ranking locational attributes. The next 
section, then, reports such a study. 
Experiment 10 
Similarity Judgments of Locational Attributes 
11.5 Introduction 
In experiment 3 [chapter 8] it was found that Ss 
descriptions of personal instance images were dominated bY 
info~tion about the locations 
experienced. Experiments 7 
in 
and 
which objects 
8 found that 
had been 
normative 
information about locations aided recall of personal instance 
imaged objects and that locations were verified more quicklY 
than perceptual information when Ss generated personal instance 
images. Thus information about locations appears to play an 
important role in autobiographical memories. Further it seems 
likely that locative information has some form of semantiC 
reprerentation. Experiment 6 [chapter 10] found that locations 
were listed in a normative fashion similar to perceptual 
attrib~tes and, as Ashcraft [1978] has observed, such norms are 
taken ~s reflecting semantic structure. In addition Tversky and 
Hemenway [1983] have reported that locations have a 'basiC 
level' [Rosch, 1978] and are structured hierarchically, lending 
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further support to the proposed semantic representation of 
locations. At the close of the last chapter it was argut:d that 
information about locations may comprise the dominant semantic 
content of autobiographical memories and, hence, provide 
integration between semantic and autobiographical memories. 
The question then arises as to whether or not semantic 
representations of locations are similar in structure to other 
semantic representations, as Tversky and Hemenway suggested. 
The present experiment examines the proposal that the semantic 
repres~ntation of information about locations is similar in 
struct:ure to that of perceptual information. 
However it was not clear that reference rankings of 
locations would produce simple, low d~mensional, readily 
interp~etable solutions similar to those reported in experiment 
9 [abc.Ne] • It is in fact difficult to envisage what sort of 
dimensions would underlie locations. Tversky and Hemenway 
[1983j report only one major [superordinate] dimension 'inside 
-vs- outside'. Whereas, following Bower, Black, and Turner, 
[1979] who argued that scripts were grouped around the primitive 
actions they enabled, it might be predicted that locations are 
similarly grouped around certain actions. Thus locations may be 
highly dimensionalized in terms of groups of actions. [Note 
that in the introduction to experiment 9 it was argued that the 
concept of nested groups or clusters of attributes is not 
imcompatible with the concept of a dimenFion: clusters may 
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imply underlying dimensions, dimensions may imply 
attributes]. Examination of the descriptions 
clusters of 
of personal 
instaace images collected in Experiment 3 suggested that 
although these images did not themselves contain information 
about actions, the locations of the imaged objects were 
locations in which certain actions were characteristicallY 
performed. For example a personal instance image of the table 
in one's kitchen implies the act of eating. 
then that locations would be structured 
activities for which they are the setting. 
It seemed probable 
in terms of the 
This experiment is procedurally 
experinent 9. Ss referenced ranked 
locatinns, objects, and superordinate. 
ide~tical to that of 
sets of items naming 
It was predicted that 
locations would group together in terms of common actions. The 
level of specificity of the dimensions is not predicted although 
it is expected that these will be more specific than simplY 
'inside -vs- outside'. Finally it was not expected that the 
dimensions would be namable by single words but rather that theY 
would be bipolar [similar in compostion to the dimensions 
observed in experiment 9] opposing certain activities and groupS 
of activities against one and other. 
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11.6 Method 
The method was identical to that employed in experiment 9, 
above. 
Stimuli 
The stimuli were identical to those employed in experiment 
9 with the exception that perceptual attributes were replaced by 
locative attributes. Note that occasionally more or less 
attri~utes were replaced. The number of items in the three 
stimulus sets were: Furniture 21, Clothing 20, Fruit 23. The 
actual stimuli are named in the scaling solutions reported 
below, Figures, 11.2.1 [Furniture], 11.2.2 [Clothing], 11.2.3 
[Fruit]. 
Y~terials 
These were identical to those used in e~periment 9. 
Subjects 
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6 Ss took part, three male and three female all open 
University employees [non-academic]. Average age was 36 years 
ranging from 26 to 39. All Ss were native English speakers. 
Procedure 
This was identical to experiment 9, with the following 
exception: in the instructions mention of perceptual attributeS 
was substituted by mention of locations and the perceptual 
at tributes associated with the test ca.tegory Vegetable were 
substituted by locations. 
11.7 Results 
The data was analysed using Alscal-4 and the same criteria 
in interpreting the output was employed. 3 dimensional 
solutions were selected for all three stimulus sets. 
1] The Model 
Furniture 
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Figure 11.2.1 depicts the three dimensional solution. RSQ 
was 0.76 indicating that the model accounted for 76% of the 
variance in the data. RSQ for 4 and 5 dimensional solutions 
were~ respectively, 0.79 and 0.82, indicating that higher 
dimensional solutions added little to the models' explanatory 
power. Dimension 1 polarises private -vs- public locations for 
furniture. Dimension 2 polarises work -vs- pleasure locations. 
Dimension 3 polarises domestic -vs- commercial locations. It is 
clear that dimensions are not fully distinct, for instance the 
'pleasure' pole of dimension 2 overlaps with the 'domestic' pole 
of dimension 3. This is discussed further below. Note also 
that these three dimensions effectively combined to split the 
configuration into two large clusters. However a two 
dimensional solution yielded an RSQ of only 0.617 which was less 
'than the criteria of 0.65. 
Clothing 
Figure 11.2.2 depicts the three dimensional solution. RSQ 
was 0.76 indicating that the model accounted for 76% 0 the 
variance. 4 and 5 dimensional solutions gave RSQs of 0.80 and 
0.83 respectively. Dimension 1 depicts cleaning -vs- storing 
locations. Dimension 2 depicts shopping and wearing -vs-
storin~. Dimension 3, which is not very distinct, depicts 
location of clothing in transit 'travelling' -vs- locations of 
clothing in storage. These dimensions clearly overlap with one 
and other and essentially consist of storage locations, and 
public 
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Table 11.2.1 The Three Dimensions Found for the Categories 
Furniture, Clothing, and Fruit: Locational 
Attributes [D-Dimension] 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Furniture Clothing Fruit 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Dl Private/Public 
D2 Work/Pleasure 
D3 Domestic/Commercial 
Cleaning/Storage 
Shopping+Wearing/ 
Storing 
Storage [Staticl 
Travelling 1 
Natural/Artificial 
Eating/Buying 
Containers 
Table 11.2.2 Averaged Subject Weights: Locational Attributes 
-------~----------------------------------------------~----------Category Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
Furniture 
Clothing 
Fruit 
0.5053 
0.5864 
0.5525 
0.5029 0.4954 
0.4609 0.4525 
0.4663 0.4135 
-----------------------------------------------------------------
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aspects thereof, versus all other locatlons. This is discussed 
further below. 
Fruit 
Figure 11.2.3 depicts the three dimensional solution. RSQ 
was 0.74 indicating that the model accounted for 74% of the 
variance. RSQ values for 4 and 5 dimensional solutions were 
0.78 and 0.82 respectively. Dimension 1 juxtaposes natural -vs-
artificial locations of fruit. Dimension 2 depicts eating -VS-
buying locations for fruit. Dimension 3, not very distinctly, 
juxtaposes types of containers and associated fruits, e.g· 
tins, ~ies,[more typical]-vs-jar, bush, [less typical]. Once 
again it is clear that these dimensions overlap although not as 
extensively as those for Furniture and Clothing. 
For all three categories two dimensional solutions 
produced RSQs of 0.55 or less [with the exception of Furniture, 
see above). 
Overall it is clear that the dimensions for all three 
categories were not completely distinct and that considerable 
overlap was also present. It is also evident the each of the 
solutions contain discrete clusters of items and this is more 
mark.ed in comparison to the solutions for perceptual attributes. 
Table 11.2.1, below, tabulates the dimensions found for each 
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category. 
2] Individual Differences 
S8 varied little in the weighting they gave to different 
dlmensjons. Table 11.2.2, below, presents the averaged subject 
weightings, [averaged across subjects]. 
It can be seen from Table 11.2.2 that Ss overall weighted 
some dimensions more than others and this was particularly so 
for the categories Clothing and Fruit. Generally it appears 
that less distinct dimensions were of less importance in Ss 
ratings. Thus dimension 3 for Clothing and Fruit, although 
clearly used, was of less importance than dimension 1 and this 
was tha case for all Ss. This is discussed further below. 
Finally the relative Subject weight indices were examined. 
As these varied between + 0.49 and - 0.35 it was concluded S8 
use of the dimensions relative to a hypothetical 'typical' S 
were reasonably similar. 
Both these measures of individual differences indicated 
that 58 agreed upon the saliency of different dimensions and 
that some dimensions appeared to be more salient than others. 
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11.8 Discussion 
The main finding was that all three sets of stimuli, 
Furni tl\re, Clothing, and Fruit, wert~ best modelled by three 
dimensional solutions. However these sDlutions were structual1Y 
differently from those observed in experiment 9. Most notablY 
it was evident that the poles of the dimensions overlapped with 
each other. 
In the Furniture set all three dimensions overlapped to 
some degree. Thus the private/puhlic, work/pleasure and 
domestic/ commercial dimensions contain(~d similar clus ters of 
stimuli but emphasised different aspect~; of those clusters. For 
instance the 'public' pole of dimension 1 contained the itemS 
'department store, factory, warehouse, and office' which were 
a1'80 cc)ntained [although more predominatly] in the 'work' pole 
of dimension 2 and [less dominantly] in the 'commerce' pole of 
dimension 3. The reader can see from Figure 11.2.1 that other 
clusters are more or less emphasised on di:fering dimensions. 
Similarly for the Clothing stimulus set various aspects of a 
cluster of items representing the !; torage of Clothes are 
emphasised differentially to yield the three dimensions. This 
overlap LS also evident in the Fruit stimulus set where 
dimenSion 1, natural/artificial, overlaps with dimension 2, 
eating/buying, which in turn overlaps with [the not very 
distinct] dimension 3, containers. This overlap, then, suggests 
that locations are clustered around certain distinct and 
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characteristic activities associated with the stimulus set. 
Thus Furniture can be 'worked on', 'lounged on', 'sold and 
bought'. Clothing can be 'cleaned', 'stored', 'bought', and 
'worn' • Fruit can be 'picked', 'bought', 'eaten', and 'stored' 
[dimension 3]. Locations in which these activities are 
perfo~ed clustered together to yield the dimensions described 
above. 
However similar activities can be undertaken in identical 
locations: for example at a restaurant food is both purchased 
and eaten, at home a table might be eaten off or worked on, and 
clothes are worn in locations where they can be bought and/or 
stored. Hence it would seem reasonable to suggest that 
locations take on more detailed meaning according to the actions 
which are undertaken in them. Yet generally locations were 
clustered together according to the similarity of acivities with 
which they were typically associated or, in Bower et al's 
terminology, according to 'the actions which they enabled' • 
These Dorts of representations, then, would seem to be best 
described by the concept of a 'script' [see chapter 3 and 4, 
Schank, 1975; Schank and Ableson, 1978; Bower, Black and 
Turner, 1979]. Note that this ~nly partly questions the 
two central proposals of Tversky and Hemenway [1983) which were 
that there was a basic-level of representation of locations and 
that locations were represented in hierarchies like semantic 
categories. The present 
regards the proposal of a 
findings are relatively neutral as 
basic-level although this may be 
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becau3c all the locational stimuli were at a basic level. 
Examination of the locational norms gathered in experiment 6 
[appendix d] indicated that the more frequently named locations 
were at a similar level of specificity. However the proposal 
suggests that the superordinate organizing structure for 
locations is script-like rather than a summary descritpion of a 
class [see the general model of categorization outlined in 
chapter 4]. There may then be a basic level of locational 
representation but locations are not organized in way similar to 
that of semantic categories. Thus autobiographical memories, in 
as much as they predominantly contain information about 
locations [and context generally], connect to the semantiC 
system via such scripts or scene-like semantic memory 
representations. 
It was also clear that Figures 11.2.1, 11.2.2, and 11.2.3, 
contai4ed clusters of items organized categorically. In other 
words actual exemplars and their superordinate were clustered 
togeth~r, although these did not contribute towards the 
dimenslonality of the solutions. This suggests that the script 
representation 'points' [Bower et a11 towards the semantic 
category. Thus autobiographical memories may connect to 
semantic categories via script-like clusters of locations that 
connect to semantic representations of objects typically found 
in those locations. Such an account suggests why the perceptual 
attributes took longer to verify than locations when Ss 
generated personal instance images [experiement 7]: activation 
Chapter 11 Page 11-41 
had to spread further from its souce in autobiographical memory 
to activate information about 
info~ation about locations. The 
account. for the perceptual 
perceptual attributes 
reverse explanation 
attribute verification 
than 
would 
time 
advantaged observed when Ss generated typical instance images. 
It was also found that, at least for Clothing and Fruit, 
certain dimensions were generally [across subjects] weighted 
more heavily than others. This shows, unsuprisingly, that 
certain locations [and hence actions] are more characteristic of 
sets of stimuli than other, equally plausible, locations. 
Finally certain differences are apparent between the 
solutious found in this experiment and those observed in 
experimant 9. Firstly locations tend to occur in discrete tight 
clusters whereas perceptual attributes tend to be more evenly 
distributed in the dimensional space. TIlis suggests that 
perceptual attributes may be inherently more dimensionalizable 
than locations. Secondly although that objects in the 
locational solutions showed some evidence of clustering 
suggestive of a semantic category this was not nearly as marked 
as the clustering of perceptual attributes and 
Perceptual attributes were markedly organized in terms 
centraU.ty of objects and attributes to 
objects. 
of the 
the set 
[prototypicality]. Locations were organized around activities 
associated with them. Because many different activites may be 
undertaken at the same location there was considerable overlap 
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betweeL the observed dimensions. 
different dimensions emphasised 
clusters of locations whereas 
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In the locational stimulus set 
different aspects of similar 
in the perceptual stimulus set 
different dimensions were comprised of different clusters. 
The question then arises as to what relationship existS 
between perceptual attribute organization and locational 
organization. In the following, and final, experiment 
perceptual attributes and locations were juintly investigated 
and Ss made similarity judgments of sets containing both classeS 
of attribute. 
Experiment 11 
Similarity Judgments Of Perceptual and Locational AttributeS 
11.9 Introduction 
In the preceding experiments, 9 and 10, 3 dimensional 
models of the reference rankings of sets of stimuli containing 
either ~erceptual attributes or locations were observed. In 
this experiment Ss were required to reference rank sets of 
stimuli containing both perceptual and locational attributes. 
However it was not expected to observe an additive effect of 
dimensionality, i.e. six dimensional solutions. It seemed more 
likely that models of these rankings would contain higher order, 
more abstract, dimensions. In particular it was predicted that 
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perceptual attributes would cluster prototypically whereas 
locations would cluster in terms of commom actions. The 
configurations of interest would be the dimensional relations of 
these clusters. In other words dimensions that included both 
perceptual 
interest. 
attributes and locations would be of primary 
It was predicted that one of the ways Ss would rank the 
stimuli would be by reference to scripts or scenes and the 
objects that such scripts contain. However it was also 
predicted that Sa would draw a sharp distinction, whenever 
possible, between perceptual attributes and locations. Thus it 
was expected 
in the models: 
that at least three major dimensions would emerge 
1] dimensions of scenes containing descriptions 
of objects; 2] a categorical distinction between classes of 
attributes {perceptual attributes-vs-locations] and; 3] 
dimensions of typicality. 
~1.10 Method 
The method was identical to that employed in experiment 9. 
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Stimuli 
l~e stimuli were identical to those employed in 
experi~ents 9 and 10, with the following alterations: as a 
pilot test had indicated that ranking three stimulus sets each 
containing 30 plus items required Ss to att~nd the laboratory 
more times than they were prepared to, one stimulus set was 
randomly eliminated [Fruit]. The remaining two stimulus sets, 
Furniture and Clothing, were comprised of the stimuli from 
experi~ents 9 and 10, i.e. perceptual attributes and locations. 
Furniture contained 36 items and Clothing contained 32 items. 
The actual stimuli are displayed in Figures 11.3.1 and 11.3.2, 
below. 
Subjects 
5 Ss took part, three females and two males. Average age 
was 33 ranging from 29 to 37. All were english speaking open 
University employees [non-academic]. 
Materials 
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Were the same as those used in experiments 9 and 10. 
P';:'ocedure 
The procedure was identical to that employed in 
experim~nts 9 and 10 with the following alterations: 1] Ss 
21 The attended the laboratory for four 
examples in the instructions 
one 
were 
hour sessions; 
approriately altered to 
include both perceptual attributes and locations: 3] The 
practic.e stimulus set [Vegetable] included both perceptual 
attributes and locations. 
11.11 Results 
Tne data was analysed using Alscal-4 and the output was 
judged by the same criteria as that employed in experiments 9 
and 10. 
1] The Model: three dimensional solutions were accepted 
for both stimulus sets. Higher dimensional solutions did not 
greatly increase RSQ values. But note that higher dimensional 
solutions did include nameble dimensions similar to those 
observed in experiemnts 9 and 10. In the higher dimensional 
solutions the data was partioned into perceptual attributes and 
locations and additional dimensions were drawn from these 
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domains 0 Therefore as these additional dimensions were 
substan~ively the same as the dimensions oberserved in 
experiemnts 9 and 10 and as they did not greatly elevate RSQ 
values, they are not further reported here. The three 
dimensional solutions contained dimensions not observed in 
experiments 9 and 10 and these dimensions accounted for most of 
the variance in the data. 
Furniture 
Figure 11.3.1 depicts 
Furniture. RSQ was 0.71 
the 3 dimensional solution for 
indicating that the 3 dimensional 
solution accounted for 71% of the variance. RSQ values for 4 
and 5 dimensional solutions were 0.75 and 0.79 respectively. 
Dimensi~n 1 juxtaposes furniture locxations [primarily 
commercial] with perceptual attributes. Dimension 2 depicts a 
dimension of scenes ranging from domestic and private to public 
and ple~surable. Dimension 3 juxtaposes functional aspects of 
furniture with perceptual attributes [pri~arily 
properties, e.g. large, small, hard, etc.]. 
perceptual 
Ncte the clustering of perceptual attributes and objects 
with locations, e.g. 'Ashrtay, Pub, Glass, Resraurant'. Note 
also that the superordinate 'Furniture' clusters most closely 
with 'Kitchen, Living room, and House' rather than with groups 
of perceptual attributes. These findings are discussed further 
IOca11 
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FIg11 3.1 
3 Dimensional Solution for Reference Ranklngs of 
Perceptual and Locative Stimuli for the category Furniture 
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Fig11 3.2 
3 Dimensional Solution for Reference Rankings of 
perceptual and Locative Stimuli for the category Clothing 
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Table 11.3.1 The Three Dimensions Found for the Categories 
Furniture, and Clothing: Perceptual and Locational 
Attributes [D-Dimension]. 
D1 
D2 
D3 
Furniture 
Locations/Perceptual 
Attributes 
Domestic/Social 
Scenes 
Functions/Perceptual 
Properties 
Clothing 
Locations/Perceptual 
Attributes 
Domestic Locations/ 
Perceptual Attributes 
Fashion/Cleaning 
Table 11.3.2 Averaged Subject Weights: Perceptual and Locational 
Attributes. 
Category Dimension 1 Dimension 2 Dimension 3 
Furniture 0.5614 0.4448 0.3768 
Clothing 0.5278 0.4649 0.4490 
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below. 
~lothing 
Figure 11.3.2 depicts the 3 dimensional solution. RSQ was 
0.73 indicating that the model accounted for 73% of the 
variance. RSQ values for 4 and 5 dimensional solutions were 
0.78 and 0.82 respectively. 
not as distinct as those 
The dimensions here were generally 
described above for Furniture. 
Dimension 1 juxtaposed perceptual attributes with locations. 
Dimension 2 polarised into Domestic locations and perceptual 
attributes. Dimension 3 juxtaposed fashion [wearing, buying] 
with cl~aning [washing, drying]. 
Note the clustering of perceptual attributes, objects, and 
locations, e.g. 'Legs, Nylons, Bedroom, Home'. Note also that 
the sup~rordinate 'Clothing' is located toward the center of the 
configuration indicating that it was not heavily weighted on any 
of the 3 dimensions. Nevertheless surrounding the superordinate 
are items associated with the semantic category 'Clothing'. 
This is discussed further below. 
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Overall lower dimension solutions produced no higher RSQ 
than 0.57. Table 11.3.1, below, tabulates the dimensions. 
2] Individual Differences 
Sa varied little in order of the weighting they attached 
to the dimensions and Table 11.3.2 presents the averaged 
subjects weights 
It can be seen from Table 11.3.2 that th~ dimensions were 
weighted in the order 1,2,3. 
The relative subject weights showed little variance and 
varied between + 0.29 and - 0.34. 
These individual differences measures showed that Ss were 
generally agreed both as to the dimensional structure and to the 
weighting of dimensions within that structure. 
11.12 Discussion 
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The main finding was that the two predicted dimensions, 
locations/perceptual attributes and a 'scene' dimension, were 
observed in both stimulus sets. The lo'cation/perceptual 
attribute dimension was the dominant dimension in both Furniture 
and Clothing indicating that Ss distinguished different classes 
of information when making their similarity judgments. Of more 
intersest was dimension two, in both stimulus sets, where 
distinctions were drawn between domestic locations and other 
locatior.s, in furntiture, and between domestic locations and 
perceptual attributes in Clothing. Within this dimension 
objects were clustered with locations and associated perceptual 
attributes suggesting similarity judgments may have drawn on 
some form of script or Bcene-like encoding. Note that 
perceptual attributes were not clustered with locations only, 
that is they always accompanied an object, suggesting that the 
actual exemplars were a key component of script/scene 
representations. 
Dimension 3 in the Clothing set implies an underlying 
structure of actions such as 'buying and wearing' [Fashion] -vs-
'washing and drying' [Cleaning]. One pole on dimension 3 in the 
Furniture set depicts activities such as buying and selling 
[auction}, eating off, working on, and sitting on, whereas the 
other pole depicts objects and their associated attributes. 
Thus the second and third dimensions juxtaposed settings in 
which objects were found and descriptions of those objects. 
Dimension one indicated that these two types of clusters maybe 
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relatively independent. 
Within the dimensions it was clear that objects, 
locations, and associated attributes clustered together in ways 
which implied a setting. This was not true of all the stimuli, 
for example in Furniture 'metal and wood' were associated 
regardless of either objects or locations with which they might 
have been associated. It is not, then, proposed that scripts 
[Locations] and categories [Perceptual Attributes] were, 
exclusively, the organizing memory structures underlying these 
findings. Rather it is suggested that scripts and categories 
clearly played a part in Ss similarity judgments and interacted 
with ea~h other. The interaction took the form of locations 
containing objects and perceptual attributes as in the example 
'Telephone, Restaurant, Pub, Glass, Ashtray', [see Figure 
11.3.1, above]. Other clusters contained only single classes of 
information, e.g. 'Soft, Rug, Comfortable, Bed' and 'Furniture 
Shop, Removal Van, Factory, Workplace, Department Store, 
Warehouse, Office'. 
In summary then there were three main types of clusters 
observed within the dimensions: 1] Clusters depicting scenes 
containing objects and some associated perceptual attributes of 
the object; 2] Clusters containing groups of locations 
depicting common activities [e.g. working]; 3] Clusters 
containing objects and associated 
Autobiographical memories in as much 
percp.ptual attributes. 
as they predominantly 
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contain information about locations would be conected/associated 
with the memory structures giving rise to cluster types 1 and 2. 
Semantic memories predominatly containing perceptual information 
would connect to cluster types 2 and 3. Thus autobiographical 
and semantic memories of the same object may be connected to 
each other via script or scene-like semantic memory 
representations. 
One other notable feature of Figures 11.3.1 and 11.3.2 is 
the slightly different types of clustering attached to each 
superordinate. Furniture is clustered with a group of largely 
domestic locations whereas Clothing, at the centre of the 
configuration, is most closely associated with items of clothing 
and associated perceptual attributes. This suggests that 
certain categories may have prototypes that are slightly biased 
towards a particular class of information. This would seem to 
make sen~e if it was accepted that people were primarily 
concerned with the perceptual aspects of clothing and, in 
contrast, with the locations of items of furniture. 
Overall Conclusions 
The main findings were that: 
Chapter 11 Page 11':'55 
1] Perceptual attributes and locations were represented 
relatively independently. 
2] Perceptual attributes were structured prototypically 
and separated out into perceptual dimensions. 
3] Locations were clustered around common activities and 
only partially separated out into dimension of scenes. The 
locativa dimensions overlapped with each other. 
4] Locational and perceptual 
clustered together suggesting script 
attributes partially 
or scene-like memory 
structures which 'pointed' to semantic categories of objects and 
to common activities. 
The general model of the relations of semantic structures 
and autobiographical memories suggested by these findings is 
that: semantic representaions of a script/scene-like nature 
'point' to semantic categories 
associated perceptual attributes. 
of sets of objects and their 
It seems most probable that 
this confiection is via the objects that are typically associated 
with the script/scene, [afterall none of the above clusters 
contained perceptual attributes and locations]. 
Autobiographical memories connect to the semantic system via 
script/scene-like representations. The connections here is most 
probably through information about locations. Thus semantic and 
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autobiographical representations of the same items connect only 
indirectly to each other. 
This type of model offers some account of the differences 
in image generation times observed in experiment 4 and the 
property verification times observed in experiment 
discussed above. 
7 as 
The status and implications of these findings along with 
the findings from earlier experiments are discussed in more 
detail in the final and concluding chapter. 
Part 3 
Conclusions 
CHAPTER 12 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS 
. This chapter summarizes the main findings and a number of 
conclusions are drawn. Problems and shortcomings of the 
research are then discussed. Finally the implications of the 
findings for studies of autobiographical anc semantic memory and 
for studies of categorization and imagery are considered. 
12.1 Content Differences: Summary and Conclusions 
The central aim of this thesis was to investigate content 
differences between autobiographical and semantic memories. It 
was hypothesised that autobiographical memories contained 
conte~t specific information about objects and activities that 
had been experienced; whereas semantic memories of the same 
objects and activities contained context free information. 
Experiment 3 found that descriptions of images drawn from 
autobiographical memories contained idiosyncratic perceptual 
information about the imaged object and information about the 
context in which the object had been experienced. In particular 
it was found that autobiographical memories contained 
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information about the location in which an object had been 
encountered. In contrast descriptions of images drawn from 
semantic memories predominatly contained general perceptual 
information about the imaged object; contextual information, 
and particularly information about the location of objects, were 
not evident in these descriptions. Thus the hypothesis that 
autobiographical memories represented context specifiC 
information and semantic memories represented context free 
information was supported. Further to this, experiment 4 found 
that generating 
facilitated by 
images drawn from semantic memories waS 
a prime depicting general perceptual propertieS 
of the category of which the imaged object was a member whereaS 
generating images drawn from autobiographical memories were 
inhi~ited by such primes. Experiment 7 found that information 
about the typical locations of objects was verified faster fro~ 
imagee of autobiographical memories than frem images of semantiC 
memories and that information about the typical perceptual 
attributes of objects was verified faster from images of 
semantic memories than from images of autobiographical memories. 
These findings supported the results of experiment 3 and showed 
further., that content differences mediated Ss reponses in taskS 
that d~d not require descriptions of images. In short all these 
exper~ments demonstrated that the two types of memory 
represented different types of information. Moreover experiment 
8 found that locational cues facilitated recall of previously 
imaged autobiographical memories more than recall of previously 
imaged semantic memories, whereas perceptual cues facilitated 
recall of the latter compared to the former. This demonstrated 
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that content differences between autobiographical and semantic 
memories can effect the process of recall. 
It is concluded that autobiographical memories represent 
experiential context specific information and that semantic 
memories [of the same items] represent context free, mainly 
perceptual information, in the form of typical attributes. 
12.2 Organizational Differences: Su~ary and Conclusions 
In chapter 6 it was stated that organizational differences 
between autobiographical and semantic memories would not be 
directly investigated. Rather it was decided to indirectly 
investigate such differences between the two classes of memory 
by varying the rated typicality [experiment 11 of the stimuli. 
It was hypothesised that semantic memories would be organized in 
categories in terms of the typicality of the category members 
whereas autobiographical memories would not, although the nature 
of the organization of autobiographical memories was not 
predicted. Experiment 2 found that the rated imagability of 
autobiographical memories was partly negatively correlated with 
typicality, whereas the rated imagability uf semantic memories 
was partly positively correlated with typicality. Experiment 2, 
then, provided tentative support for the organizational 
hypoth~sis. Experiment 3 found that there was an overlap within 
typicality levels in the perceptual attributes contained in 
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descriptions of semantic memories. This pattern was very 
similar to that observed by Rosch and Mervis [1975], further 
confirming that semantic memories were organized in terms of 
typical! ty. However, from the contextual attribute classes 
found for descriptions of autobiographical memories, onlY 
locational attributes were observed to 
indicative of semantic typicality effects. 
overlap in a 
This suggested 
'NaY 
that 
autobiographical memories of common items generally consisted of 
information that did not overlap in a manner similar to semantiC 
memo~ies and therefore that autobiographical memories were not 
organized in terms of semantic typicality. The locational 
attr.ibute overlap was taken as indicating that autobiographical 
memories may connect to semantic representations of locations. 
It was reasoned that the locational information contained in 
autobiographical memories although context specific provided a 
link to context free semantic representations of locations and 
this is discussed further in the next section. Experiment 4 
found that image generation times [IGTs] for images of semantiC 
memories were subject to strong semantic typicality effects-
IGTs to unprimed images of autobiographical memories did not 
exhibit similar semantic typicality effects. These [no-prime] 
findings were replicated in experiment 7. The pattern of lGts 
to autobiographical memories suggested that autobiographical 
memories were organized, at least in part, in terms of recencY 
of encoding. Experiment 5 found that ratings of the recencY 
with which objects had been encountered were distributed in a 
manner very similar to that previously observed for 
autobiographical lGTs lending some support to the inference that 
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autobiographical memories were organized in terms of recency of 
encoding. 
It is concluded that the representation of semantic 
memories of common objects and activities are organized in 
categories in terms of typicality and attribute overlap [as in 
the general model of categorization specified in chapter 4]. 
Autobiographical memories of the same objects and activities, 
were not organized in similar categories nor were they organized 
in terms of typicality and attribute overlap, except in the case 
of locational information. It is concluded that 
autobiographical memories may be organized, at least in part, in 
terms of recency of encoding. However autobiographical memories 
do appear to contain semantic information about locations and/or 
connect directly to semantic representations of locations. 
12.3 Connections Between Autobiographical and Semantic 
Memori~s: Summary and Conclusions 
In part 1 of this thesis Tulving's [1972; 1983] 
functional separation of episodic and 
rejected and a unitary model of memory 
connectivity of memories in a single 
Consequently it was decided that part of 
albeit briefly, address the question 
semantic memories was 
which emphasised the 
network was adopted. 
the research should, 
of connections between 
autobiographical and semantic memories. It was reasoned that, 
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as autobiographical memories had been found to contain 
info~tion about locations that partly exhibited semantiC 
structure [experiment 3] and that autobiographical memories 
facilitated judgments about locations drawn from norms that had 
a s2mantic structure [experiment 6], then autobiographical 
memories may contain and lor connect ·to semantic memories of 
locations. However these two possibilities were not directlY 
investigated, rather Experiments 9, 10, and 11, examined the 
structure of the semantic representation of perceptual and 
locational attributes and inferred the connections from the 
obse~ved structures. 
Experiments 9 and 10 found that perceptual attributes were 
organized primarily in terms of prototypes whereas locational 
attri?utes were organized in terms of groups of locations in 
which similar actions would typically be performed [scripts]. 
Strongly suggesting that both classes of attributes are 
separltely represented in semantic memory. Experiment 11 found 
that perceptual and locational attributes together were 
organized in both the previously mentioned ways and, in 
addition, in terms of 'scenes' which partially specified 
objectee In as much as autobiographical memories contain 
locatiQnal information they may, then, connect to scene-, or 
script-, like semantic representations. These representations 
connect to other, context free, semantic memories which are 
containad in semantic categories organized in terms of 
typicality and centred around a [perceptual] prototype. 
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A problem here is that it is not clear 
information should provide a direct 
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why locational 
link between 
autobiographical and semantic memories when autobiographical 
memories contain other classes of information that could, 
pot~ntially, have provided links to semantic memories. One 
explanation is that autobiographical memories act as 
inst&ntiations of scripts [see 12.6 below for further discussion 
of this point] and their predominant overlap with scripts is in 
the form of information about locations. Related to this it 
might plausibly be argued that locative information is generally 
less idiosyncratic than other types of information i.e. 
perceptual attributes. It will be recalled that experiment 3 
found that the second most dominant class of information 
contained in de8critpions of autobiographical memories was that 
of idiosyncratic perceptual attributes which, because of their 
highly individual nature, exhibited very little overlap. 
Locative information contained in autobiographical memories 
although context specific may then, be less idiosyncaratic that 
other classes of context specific information and hence overlap 
more extensively with corresponding context free semantic 
information. Thus it was concluded that locative information is 
represented in both classes of memory but in autobiographical 
memory is context specific and in semantic memory is context 
free. 
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The central point of chapter 11 is then, that 
corresponding autobiographical and semantic memories are 
indirectly connected to each other by way of script like 
semantic representations of locations. 
12.4 The Semantic/Episodic Distinction [SED] Reconsidered. 
, The revised version of SED that research reported in thiS 
thesis has converged on contains the following four points: a] 
episodic memories are best conceived of as autobiographical 
memories; b] autobiographical and semantic memories represent 
different types of information; c] autobiographical and 
semar&tic memories are differently organized; and d] that 
autob1.ographical and semantic memories are interconnected and, 
hence, may be represented in a unitary memory network. thiS 
versio.l of SED [hereafter refered to as SAD, 
semantic/autobiographical distinction] contains as its central 
tenet that semantic and autobiographical memories differ 
primarily in terms of representation rather than in terms of 
process. Representational differences such as what information 
is represented by a class of memories and bow that information 
is organized constitute the main diagnostic features of SAD. 
[Note the use of the term 'representation' here, is somewhat 
different from the use of this term by other researchers [e.g· 
Anderson, 1978; Kosslyn, 1980]: these researchers have 
generally used the term 'representation' to refer to the 'code' 
in which information is represented. However this thesis haS 
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little to contribute towards issues relating to coding. Rather 
it is simply proposed that content and organizational factors 
are more related to representational issues than to processing 
issues [c.f. Rosch, 
representation] and it 
1978, for discussion of organization and 
is in this sense that content and 
organization are classed with representational issues]. Process 
differences are not excluded from SAD but it is argued that as 
past work [see chapter 2] has failed to unequivocally establish 
process differences then the diagnostic status of process 
differences for SAD has yet to be established. It may, of 
course, be the case that future research will determine that 
different processes operate upon different types of 
representations in which case process differences might be 
incorrorated into SAD. 
The chief advantage of SAD over SED is that processing 
issues which have proved intractable to investigation are made 
less central to the distinction and representational 
differences, which in this thesis have been found to be more 
effic£cious, become central to the distinction. This leads to a 
number of smaller advantages of SAD over SED which are also 
important. 
memory can 
differences. 
Firstly clear differences between the two classes of 
be established e.g. content and organizational 
Secondly well established representational 
differences may act to stimulate research into process 
differences. Thirdly, as SAD emphasises connections between the 
two classes of memory, research into the connectivity of classes 
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of memory may also be stimulated. [It was noted in chapter 2 
that SED's emphasis on 'functional independence' had acted to 
discourage studies of interconnections between the two classes 
of memory). 
In summary SAD by emphasising representational differences 
and de-emphasising process differences suggests ways in which 
autobiographical and semantic memories may be clearlY 
differentiated and ways in which the two classes of memory may 
be connected. 
However at the centre of SAD is the controversial 
assumption that representations and proc~sses can be clearlY 
distinguished. As mentioned previously [chapter 5] Anderson 
[1978] has argued that imagery based accounts of cognition can 
not b~ theoretically distinguished from other, non-imagery, 
accounts e.g. propositional accounts. Anderson extended this 
argument to the representational/process distinction [RPD] 
pointing out that any effect may be accounted for with equal 
facility by either process or representational models. Within 
the literature there seem to be two more or less explict 
reponses to RPD: a] the first response is simply that RPD is a 
non-issue which, at best, merely indicates terminological 
preferences [c.f. Collins and Loftus, 1975; Hollan, 1975; 
Smith, 1978; for slightly indirect discussions of RPD). Yet as 
RPD haR been 80 rarely discussed this position tends to be 
implicit in the approach taken by researchers to specifiC 
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issu~s. For example Tulving's account ~f ecphoric synergy 
[1983] throughly conflates representational and process issues 
in a way that suggests that Tulving draws no sharp 
dis tins tinction between the two; b] the second reponse perhaps 
best articulated by Kosslyn [1978] acknowledges that RPD may at 
some future point constitute a theoretically significant 
distinction but in its current formulation is at best 
pre-theoretical. Nonetheless Kosslyn [1978] argues that RPD may 
be a useful distinction for stimulating research by providing a 
way of conceptualizing, or of discussing, possible differences 
between various types of cognition. 
The concept of SAD, as outlined above, takes this second 
approach to RPD: representational and process distinctions 
constitute a way of thinking about differences between 
autobiographical and semantic memories which may 'drive' 
research. Certainly the research reported in this thesis has 
been able to establish differences between autobiographical and 
semantfc memories by distinguishing representational and process 
approaches to the two classes of memory and investigating 
hypotheses more closely associated with representational 
diffe~ences than with process differences. 
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12.5 Methodological Problems 
Although the findings supported the content and 
organizational hypotheses and provided some support for the 
hypothesised connection between the two classes of memory, there 
were a number of problems related to the research generally. 
Firstly there was no independent way in which to verify that Ss 
had generated images. However, in experiment 3, Ss descriptions 
of imaaes included and omitted information in a way that 
strongly implied that images had been generated e.g. attributeS 
of objects which would not have been explicitly depicted in the 
image were not included in Ss descriptions. This problem of 
verfying imagery is not specific to the present research and 
extends to all studies employing imagery. Although Ss in the 
present research may not have generated images the effectS 
observed consistently indicated that the memories mediating the 
responses differed in the predicted manner. Thus whether Ss did 
or did not generate images the autobiographical and semantiC 
memories they employed in making their responses exhibited 
characteristically different content and organization. 
ielated to this it was difficult to envisage ho~ 
autobiographical and semantic memories of the same items could 
have been accessed by any common process other than imagery. In 
the past semantic memories have typicaly been accessed by 
requiring Ss to make semantic judgments whereas autobiographical 
memoriey have been accessed by simply asking Ss to recall 
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personal memories. These techniques were clearly inappropriate 
given that the aim of this thesis was to study autobiographical 
and semantic memories of the same item, [this was one of the 
main points of chapter 2]. For this reasons it was considered 
that imagery, although theoretically and methodologically 
problematic, constituted the most efficacious way in which to 
investigate the experimental hypotheses. 
A further problem related to imagery was that of 
individual differences in image abilities. Subjects effects 
were observed in experiment 4 indicating that different S8 
generated images more or less quickly. As this effect did not 
interact with any other effects, it was concluded that image 
ablities had not obscured or confounded the experimental 
manipulations. However it was clear that a few Ss whose image 
generation times were considerably slower than all other SS 
acted to raise mean image generation times overall. To minimize 
the effect of slow imagers upon the experim~ntal manipulations 
image g~neration times in all experiments were log transformed 
but although this reduced the effect of such 'outliers' it was 
recognized that a more direct pre-experimental measure of Ss 
image abilities may have been employed to eliminate this source 
of variance. Clearly it would have been preferable had there 
been some way of assessing Ss image abilities, but as Richardson 
[1980] has pointed out, none of the current imagery 
questionnaires and 
imagery abilities. 
tests have been found to reliably assess Ss 
In addition none of these tests have 
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attempted to assess Ss abilities to generate images drawn from 
different memory classes. Hence, sho~t of developing such a 
• 
test, there was no way in which to control for individual 
differences in imagery abilities. 
A potentially more serious, problem related to thE! 
possibility that Ss may have been unable to generate a specific 
typical or personal instance image and may; consequently, have 
generated an image from an inappropriate memory, e.g. drawn on 
a semantic memory when generating personaY instance images 
-, 
and/or vice versa. In the studies reported above' it was assumed 
that l.f such a use of inappropriate memories had been frequent 
then the predicted experimental effects would have been 
obscured. As the predicted experi~ental effects were observed 
it was concluded that use of inappropriate meuiories had not been 
frequent. Furthermore the selection of highly imagable personal 
and typical instance stimuli at least controlled for imagabi1ity 
of the two classes of memory. One way in which the nature of 
Ss' images might have been more precisely determined would have 
been to require Ss to describe their images immediately after 
they had completed [each trial of] the e~perirnent. However this 
would 'nave produced very lengthy experimental runs with 
concomitant problems of subject fatigue. In any case this 
measure would only have facilitated checks on the data and it 
was difficult to envisage ways in which ~s may have been more 
effectively induced to generate the required image other than by 
means of varying the experimental instructionp. 
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It might be argued that the stimuli could have been 
manipulated in order to compel Ss to draw more directly on 
autobiographical and semantic memories. For example Ss could 
have been asked to generate images of scenes which they were 
known to have experienced and been asked to generate 
corresponding typical instance images of the same scenes. In 
chapters 3 and 4 it was argued that as little was known about 
the eemantic representation of scenes the use of such stimuli 
would have greatly complicated the research which would have had 
to establish the nature of semantic representation of scenes as 
well as the nature of autobiographical representation of scenes. 
Further much of the research would have been concerned with 
collecting data about events which Ss had experienced. The 
stimuli used in the above research obviated many of these 
problems simply because it could be reasonably assumed that all 
Ss would have encoded both semantic and autobiographical 
memories of common everday items. For these reasons it was 
concluded that the stimuli, although possibly not as effective 
in acc~ssing autobiographical memories as other stimuli, were 
best suited to the research aims. Manipulating stimuli to 
optimize access to different types of memories is, however, 
considar further in section 12.6 below. 
One final point related to the use of between Ss designs. 
All the experiments [except experiment 5] employed between Ss 
design~. The reason for this was, that in a pilot study to 
experiment 4 employing a within Ss deSign, it was found that Ss 
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became confused as to the nature of the images they were 
requ~red to generate. Ss complained that they found it 
difficult to generate the required image and had to suppress 
inappropriate images. One reason for this may have been that 
the two classes of memory, when activated in the same time 
period, competed for image generation. Tnus it was concluded 
that w~thin Ss designs obscured the experimental effect and 
~ 
hence the adoption of between Ss designs. Yet within Ss designs 
might have been effectively used had Ss performed the 
experimental tasks some days or weeks apart by which time 5s 
might have forgotten the first imagery instructions. However it 
was unclear how effective this procedure would have been and the 
time taken to perform the experiments would have been 
prohibitive. The main disadvantage of the between Ss design was 
that there was no way in which to verify that Ss were in fact 
generating images in both conditions. Conc~ivably it could have 
been the case that Ss systematically generated images in one 
condition but not in another. For the present purposes this is 
not such a challenging criticism as long as it can be assumed 
that Ss drew on autobiographical memories in one condition and 
semantj,c memories in the other condition and the findings 
strongly indicate that this was what Ss did. Further the 
evidence from experiment 3 strongly suggested that Ss had 
generat~d images and informal post-experimental interviews after 
each experiment also indicated that Ss in both conditions had 
generated images. Although the criticism that some or all 55 
may have sytematica1ly failed to generate images cannot be 
completely ruled out, for the reasons specified above this is 
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considered both unlikely and not neccessarily fatal for the 
interpretation of the findings. 
12.6 Autobiographical Memory: Implications and Future 
Research 
The central finding was that autobiographical memories 
represented experiential context specific information comprised 
of inflrmation about locations, idiosyncratic perceptual 
information, and information about time, actors, and actions. 
Evidence was also found indicating that autobiographical 
memories connected more directly to script-like semantic 
representations than to semantic categories. As already noted 
these findings suggest that autobiographical memories may act as 
instantlations of scripts much as exemplars act as 
instantiations of semantic categories. If future research were 
to estRblish that this were the case then it could be maintained 
that scripts are involved in the encoding of autobiographical 
memories. If autobiographical memories are encodings of the 
cognitive environment, as Tulving [1983] proposes, then 
presumably scripts may act as an organizing parameter at input. 
Hence it would not be suprising to observe that autobiographical 
memories connect more directly to scripts than to other semantic 
structres. Yet although this this may be the case for 
autobiographical memories of objects for reasons to be outlined 
below, it is not proposed that all autobiographical memories 
function as instantiations of scripts. 
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It was also found that autobiographical memories contained 
information that could not be classified as contextual such as 
evaluative judgments of the imaged object e.g. 'a not very nice 
shirt' [experiment 3]. The stimuli employed in the above 
studies had been selected because it was judged that they were 
less likely to predisopose Ss to bring to mind autobiographical 
memories with a highly emotional content and more likely to 
disp08~ Ss to bring to mind recently encoded autobiographical 
memories. However it may have been the case that 
autobiographical memories of items 
objects were dominated by other 
other than common everday 
combinations of, contextual 
types of, 
information. 
or 
For 
different 
instance 
autobiographical memories of events may be dominated more by 
information about actors, actions, times, and the consequences 
of the event for the person [Brown and Kulik, 1977], rather than 
by information about locations and perceptual idiosyncracies. 
Similarly less recent autobiographical memories, perhaps encoded 
during childhood, may have remained distinct in memory because 
of their emotional rather than contextual content. There may 
then, be other classes of autobiographical memories 
distinguishable by the information they contain, which have not 
been investigated in this thesis. It remains to be established 
whether autobiographical memories of, for instance, a highly 
emotional nature function as instantiations of script-like 
semantic memories. 
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Questions relating to the content of different types of 
autobiographical memory are closely bound up with issues 
concerning the organization of autobiographical memories and 
these issues are considered next. Although the research 
reported above did not directly investigate the organization of 
autobiographical memory it was found tha: autobiographical 
memorie8 were not organized in categories in terms of typicality 
in a manner similar to that of semantic memories. Rather it 
appeared that autobiographical memories were organized in terms 
of recency of encoding. Yet this may have been specific to the 
type of stimuli used namely, common everyday objects, which 
because they had been relatively recently encountered were 
represented in terms of recency of encoding. Other 
autobiographical memories of these stimuli may have been present 
but not employed possibly because in the context of the research 
speed of image generation was heavily emphasised and so Ss drew 
on the most available autobiographical memory. Less recently 
encoded autobiographical memories may not, then, be subject to 
similar recency effects. Whitten and Leonard [1981] found that 
Sa employed categories of autobiographical memories, [e.g. 
english teachers], in recalling long established memories of 
their school teachers. As previously touched upon, experiment 3 
found :hat descriptions of autobiographical memories contained 
more information classified as 'other' than did descriptions of 
semantic memories. This 'other' information was largely 
comprieed of evalulative attributes such as 'an expensive 
shirt't 'an evil looking blackbird', 'a delicious apple', and so 
on. P~ssibly, then, some of the autobiographical memories upon 
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which Ss drew to generate their images were taken from 
categories of autobiographical memories such as 'delicious 
things', 'expensive things', and 'ugly things'. If so, it may 
be thet autobiographical memories are organized in categories 
which are dissimilar to semantic categories. As virtually 
nothing is known concerning autobiographical memory 
categorization it is difficult to assess what effect this may 
have had on the research reported in this thesis. In the light 
of the evidence that 5s had employed recently encoded 
autobiographical memories [experiments 4 and 5] it was 
tentatively concluded that autobiographical memory 
categorization was only peripherally involved in memory access. 
However if some autobiographical memories are organized in 
'evaluative' categories it is difficult to imagine how such 
categories stand in relation to script-like semantic structures. 
One pldusible argument is that only non-categorized recent 
autobiographical memories act as instantiations of scripts: 
over time autobiographical memories are either recoded [c.f. 
Tu1ving, 1983] into autobiographical memory categories or simply 
'written over' by newer encodings. Thus the connection between 
autobi~graphical and semantic memories [indirectly] observed in 
this tr.esis may relate only to recently encoded autobiographical 
memories of common objects. 
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Greenwald [1981] has proposed that autobiographical 
memories may be organized in terms of their centrality to the 
self-system. One of the criticisms of past work, noted in 
chapter 2, into the semantic/episodic distinction was that the 
episodic memories which had been the focus of previous studies 
t 
had a high semantic content and hence differences between 
semantic and episodic memories had been obscu~ed. In the light 
of Greenwald's proposal it might be argued that these [semantic] 
episodic memories were low in autobiographical content because 
of th~ir lack of significance for, and hence centrality to, the 
self-system. The suggestion is that autobiographical memories 
which are central to the self-system may be More distinct from 
semantic memories than those which are leso central to the 
self-sy~tem. One shortcoming of the present research was that 
no attempt was made to independently assess whether the 
autobiographical memories drawn upon were all equally 
autobiographical. One possible way of controlling/assessing 
this variable would have been to have 5s rate the personal 
'content' and/or 'significance' of their images. However the 
development and validation of such a rating procedure would have 
constituted a separate thesis. Hence the criticism remains that 
the autobiographical memories drawn upon in the research 
reported in this thesis may have been low in semantic content 
[hence the predicted effects] but less central to the 
self-system than other autobiographical memories. If so some of 
the observed effects, and in particular the recency effect, may 
have been specific to the type of autobiographical memories 
selected for study. A corollary of this line of argument is 
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that most autobiographical memories are organized in relation to 
the self-system rather than in relation to semantic memories 
[e.g. scripts]. Future research then might profitably 
investigate autobiographical memory organiza~ion and content by 
examing autobiographical memories of varying centrality to the 
self-svstem. 
The foregoing discussion has raised two issues of central 
importance for future research. The first issue is that there 
may be sub-groups of autobiographical memories that are 
distinguishable by the content of the information that they 
represent. The techniques of image description, priming 
imagery, and image mediated property verification employed in 
this ~hesis could be extended to explore the content of these 
different types of autobiographical memories. The second issue, 
which ie closely related to the first, is that of the nature of 
autobiosraphical memory organization. One of the important 
outcomes of the research reported in this thesis is that it has 
drawn attention to the largely unstudied area of 
autobiographical memory organization. In conclusion it is 
proposed that more research into autobiographical memory content 
will suggest ways in which autobiographical memories are 
organized. 
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12.7 Semantic Memory: Implications ana Future Research 
One of the main points for the study of semantic memory 
arising from the research reported in this thesis concerns the 
semantic representation of scripts and scenes. The findings of 
experiment 11 indicated that semantic representation of 
locations were clustered around common actions [scripts] and/or 
cluste~ed in a way suggesting a scene, raising the questions of 
how scripts and scenes are related and, of how, if at all, 
semantic representations of scripts and scenes differ. 
Accordi~g to Schank [1983] scripts are characterised as 
subsum1mg scenes. However detailed investigation of these 
hypothetical semantic structures has yet to be undertaken and 
Schank's proposals remain provisional. Moreover experiment 11 
provided no direct evidence for Schank's proposal. One 
plausible suggestion concerning differences between the two 
semantic structures is that scripts represent procedural 
knowledge about typical action sequences [e.g. eating at a 
restaurant] whereas scenes represent typical declarative 
knowledge about locations [e.g. what a restaurant looks like]. 
Experiment 11 tentatively suggested that future research might 
profitably concentrate on differences between these two classes 
of semantic memory. 
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Concerning procedural knowledge it might be speculated 
that the semantic representation of actions is context free as 
Bower et aI's work suggested [see chapter 4]. If this were 
found to be the case then it might be furth~r hypothesised that 
SAD applies to procedural as well as declarative knowledge [c.f. 
discussion of multistore models in chapter 2]. Autobiographical 
memories of actions may contain context specific information 
[e.g. eating at a particular restaurant] whereas semantic 
memories may contain context free information [e.g. about what 
typically happens 
against Tulving 
when eating at a 
[1983] who 
restaurant]. This goes 
argues that the 
procedural/declarative distinction is orthogonal to SED and that 
SED only applies to declarative knowledge. Again future 
research might address the question of whether SAD cross cuts 
the pr~cedura1/declarative distinction. 
In conGlusion the research reported in this thesis 
supports the claim that there are different classes of semantic 
memorie~ and suggests that future semantic memory research might 
focus on these somewhat neglected semantic structures. 
12.8 Categorization: Implications and Future Reseach 
Chapter 12 Page 12~25 
Chapter 4 showed that previous research had been 
exclusively concerned with the semantic representation of 
categor~e8 and that the role of autobiographical memories in 
semantic categorization had been, largely, ignored. The present 
re8ear~h found that autobiographical memories were not subject 
to typicality effects similar to those observed for semantic 
memories and that autobiographical memories did not appear to 
access corresponding semantic memories although they may have 
indirectly connected to them. This implied that 
autobiographical memories were not closely involved in semantic 
categorization. 
Yet autobiographical memories have been implicated in the 
develorment of semantic categories and semantic memory generally 
[c.f. Nelson, 1978]. Developmental psychologists [Petrey 1977; 
Nelson 1978; 1979; 1974; see chapter 2] subscribe to the view 
that se~ntic memories 
memories. In the 
are 
light 
abstracted 
of the 
from autobiographical 
present finding that 
autobiographical memories connect most dir~ctly to semantic 
structures other than semantic categories it seems that semantic 
memories must develop from autobiographical memories via 
semantic representations of scene- or script- like semantic 
structures which pre-date the development of semantic 
categories. Support for this conjecture comes from Nelson 
[1978] who reported finding that children developed 
representations of scenes before representations of categories. 
Thus autobiographical memories may be implicated in the 
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development and acquisition of semantic memories. However once 
the two types of memory have been establised 
they are only indirectly connected and, 
accessed independently. 
it appears that 
therefore, may be 
12.9 Imagery: Implications and Future Research 
A strong test of the generality of current imagery 
theorizing [i.e. that images are transitory data structures 
generated in an imagery medium that has 'priviliged' properties] 
would be to investigate whether the imagery effects observed for 
semantic memories generalize to autobiographical memories. In 
chapter 5 the point was made that previous research into imagery 
had focused, almost exclusively, on images drawn from semantic 
memories [see Tulv1ng, 1983, quoted in chapter 5]. It may be 
the cuse that the 'priviliged' properties of the imagery 
'medium' apply only to images drawn from semantic memories. For 
example a common finding has been that more complex images take 
longer ~o generate than less complex images [c.f. Kosslyn, 
1980]. The explanation given for this effect by Kosslyn is that 
complex images have more 'parts' which must be 'read' into the 
imagery medium and hence take longer to generate. However one 
of the findings of experiments 4 and 7 was that images drawn 
from autobiographical memories were generated more quickly than 
images orawn from semantic memories. Yet it might be argued on 
the basis of the findings of experiment 3 that autobiographical 
memoriec gave rise to more complex images than their semantic 
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counterparts, questioning Kosslyn's interpretation of complex 
image generation. One explanation, a la Kosslyn, for the 
finding9 of experiments 4 and 7 would be that most 
autobiographical memories, but not all, are representend in a 
literal format whereas most semantic memories, but not all, are 
represented in a propositional format. Thus images of semantic 
memories are constructed from a propositiona~ list of attributes 
read individually into the imagery mediun whereas 
autobiographical memories are read whole into the imagery 
medium. If this is the case other priviliged properties of 
imagery might be observed to be specific to semantic memories. 
For example images drawn from autobiographical memories may not 
be amenable to mental rotation or, if they are, they may not 
exhibit a one to one isomorphism with the imaged object as do 
images drawn from semantic memories [Shepard and Metzler, 1974]. 
Also autobiographical memories, 
'fade' in the manner described 
if 
by 
they are literal, may not 
Kosslyn [1980] i.e. in 
discret~ parts. Possibly autobiographical memories fade 
completely over time and must be wholly regenerated. Note that 
all these hypothetical differences relate to differences in 
imagability between the two classes of memory. It is not 
proposed that that this type of research would question the 
priviliged properties of the imagery medium. '~e central point 
is that a model of memory that incorporates distinctions between 
classes of memory may give rise to an expanded model of imagery. 
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I~ conclusion the research reported in this thesis 
suggests that future studies of imagery might examine the 
generalizabi1ity of imagery effects to memories other than the 
semantic. This would constitute a strong test of current 
theories of imagery. 
12.10 Summary of Conclusions 
It was concluded that autobiographical and semantic 
memories of the same items differed in terms of the information 
that they contained. It was also concluded that semantic 
memories were organized in semantic categories whereas 
autobiographical memories were organized, at least in part, by 
recency of encoding. Finally it was concluded that 
autobiographical and semantic memories of the same items did not 
connect directly to one and other but, rather, connected via 
scene-, or script-, like semantic representations. 
These findings supported a revised semantic/episodic 
distinction which emphasised content and organizational 
differences between the two classes of memory. 
Chapter 12 
I~plications of the research were discussed and it was 
concluded that: a] future studies of autohiographical memory 
should investigate the content of a wider range of 
autobiographical memories and should address the issue of the 
organization 
studies of 
of autobiographical memories; b] that future 
semantic memories should be extended to semantic 
structures other than semantic categories; c] that future 
studies might more closely examine the development of semantic 
memories and the role of autobiographical memories in that 
develo~entj d) that theories of imagery may be tested in 
research that attempts to extend imagery effects to images drawn 
from autobiographical memories. 
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APPENDIX A 
Appendix A Page A.l 
Table A.l 
This table contains the goodness-of-example category norms 
reported in experiment 1, chapter 7. On each page appear the 
ratings from one category. The categories are presented in 
alaphabetical order: Bird, Clothing, Fruit, Furniture, Sport, 
Toy, Vegetable, Vehicle, Weapon. Next to each exemplar are 
the mean rating, ranking, and ranking found by Rosch [1975(b)], 
in that order. 
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Goodness-Of-Example Norm For The Category BIRD 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K. ) (U.S.A.) 
robin 1.11 1. 1. 
blackbird 1.14 2. 6. 
sparrow 1.16 3. 2. 
thrush 1.43 4. 23. 
swallow 1.44 5. 9. 
starling 1.48 6. 16. 
eagle 1.54 7. 17.5 
wren 1.57 8. 13.5 
pigeon 1.60 9. 22. 
o;eagull 1.63 10. 20. 
crow 1.67 11. 25. 
dove 1.70 12. 7. 
lark 1.81 13. 8. 
finch 1.85 14. 15. 
raven 1.87 15. 27. 
owl 1.92 16. 37. 
woodpecker 2.02 17. 21. 
goldfinch 2.04 18. 28. 
hawk 2.07 19. 26. 
fE.lcon 2.21 20. 24. 
canary 2.27 21. 5. 
Gwan 2.65 22. 43. 
stork 2.78 23. 41. 
pheasant 2.84 24. 31. 
albatros 2.86 25. 34. 
'Peacock 2.90 26. 46. 
hummingbird 2.92 27. 19. 
bluebird 2.98 28.5 4. 
parrot 2.98 28.5 29. 
duck 3.02 30. 45. 
sandpiper 3.25 31. 30. 
vulture 3.32 32. 40. 
buzzard 3.34 33. 42. 
bluejay 3.39 34. 3. 
mockingbird 3.45 35.5 12. 
parakeet 3.45 35.5 10. 
flamingo 3.50 37. 44. 
geese 3.65 38. 39. 
chicken 3.73 39. 48. 
crane 3.75 40. 33. 
pelican 3.87 41.5 38. 
turkey 3.87 41.5 49. 
toucan 4.03 43. 36. 
condor 4.10 44. 35. 
ostrich .4.11 45. 50 • 
penguin 4.17 46. 53. 
titmouse 4.55 48. 51. 
redbird 4.83 49. 13.5 
egret 4.99 SO. 47. 
oriole 5.27 51. 11. 
cardinal 6.14 52. 11.5 
catbird 6.21 53. 32. 
bat 6.45 54. 54. 
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Goodness-Of-Example Norm For The Category CLOTHING. 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K.) (U.S.A.) 
jacket 1.24 1. 8. 
shirt 1.25 2. 2.5 
sweater 1.27 3. 10. 
skirt 1.29 4. 4. 
BUit 1.34 5. 6. 
jumper 1.35 6. 14.5 
coat 1.42 7.5 9. 
dress 1.42 7.5 2.5 
blouse 1.58 9. 5. 
pants 1.77 10. 1. 
sweatshirt 1.85 11. ll. 
overcoat 1.88 12. 20. 
panties 1.92 13.5 14.5 
sports jacket 1.92 13.5 13. 
raincoat 1.95 15. 22.5 
bra 2.03 16. 26. 
underpants 2.09 17. 12. 
socks 2.11 18. 16. 
slacks 2.16 19. 7. 
vest 2.48 20. 30. 
stockings 2.55 21. 29. 
nightgown 2.75 22. 21. 
shoes 2.71 23. 27. 
slip 2.77 24. 25. 
parka 2.82 25. 17. 
pyjamas 2.87 26. 18. 
cape 3.22 27. 32. 
nylons 3.25 28.5 31. 
undershirt 3.25 28.5 19. 
bathrobe 3.30 30. 24. 
tie 3.39 31. 35. 
sandals 3.41 32. 34. 
bathing suit 3.43 33. 22.5 
boots 3.47 34. 33. 
gloves 3.52 35. 43. 
slippers 3.58 36. 40. 
hat 3.65 37. 41. 
scarf 3.69 38. 38. 
apron 3.96 39. 44. 
mittens 3.98 40. 39. 
girdle 4.21 41. 36. 
tuxedo 4.27 42. 28. 
belt 4.45 43. 37. 
overshoes 4.72 44. 42. 
earmuffs 5.67 45. 45. 
handkerchief 5.83 46. 46. 
watch 5.98 47. 50.5 
hairband 6.06 48. 48. 
ring 6.20 49. 49. 
earrings 6.25 50. 50.5 
necklace 6.30 51. 53. 
cufflinks 6.31 52. 52. 
bracelet 6.40 53. 54. 
purse 6.47 54. 47. 
cane 6.65 55. 55. 
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Goodness-Of-Example Norm For The Category FRUIT. 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K.) (U.S.A.) 
apple 1.15 1. 2. 
orange 1.24 2. 1. 
strawberry 1.26 3. 11. 
peach 1.30 4.5 4. 
pear 1.30 4.5 5. 
plum 1.38 6. 8. 
banana 1.39 7. 3. 
tangerine 1.42 8. 6.5 
grapes 1.44 9. 9. 
apricot 1.63 10. 6.5 
raspberry 1.64 ll. 19. 
blackberry 1.67 12.5 16. 
cherry 1.67 12.5 14. 
pineapple 1.76 14. 15. 
lemon 1.77 15. 20. 
grapefruit 1.82 16. 12. 
gooseberry 2.01 17. 36. 
melon 2.23 18. 17. 
lime 2.46 19. 25. 
watermelon 2.66 20. 23. 
pomegranate 2.72 21. 32. 
passion fruit 2.93 22. 33.5 
nectarine 3.30 23. 10. 
cranberry 3.35 24. 33.5 
berry 3.41 25. 13. 
honeydew 3.57 26. 28. 
avacado 3.79 27. 44. 
date 3.82 28. 37. 
blueberry 3.84 29.5 18. 
prunes 3.84 29.5 35. 
pa''''Paw 4.10 31. 42. 
fig 4.13 32.5 29. 
raisin 4.13 32.5 39. 
black raspberry 4.14 34. 21. 
mango 4.18 35. 30. 
tomato 4.30 36. 46. 
coconut 4.56 37. 43. 
pumpkin 5.05 38. 45. 
guava 5.08 39.5 31. 
muskmelon 5.08 39.5 40. 
papaya 5.25 41. 27. 
cantaloupe 5.37 42. 24. 
olive 5.57 43. 49. 
nut 5.70 44. 47. 
gourd 5.72 45. 48. 
boysenberry 5.85 46. 22. 
squash 5.87 47. 51. 
tangelo 5.90 48. 26. 
kumquat 5.96 49. 38. 
persimon 6.10 50. 41. 
pickle 6.64 51. 50. 
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Goodness~Of~Example Norm For The Category FURNITURE. 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K.) (U.S.A.) 
table 1.23 1. 3.5 
chest of drawers 1.27 2. 11. 
chair 1.28 3. 1.5 
bee! 1.29 4.5 13. 
sofa 1.29 4.5 1.5 
easy chair 1.33 6. 5. 
couch 1.52 7. 3.5 
desk 1.77 8. 12. 
dresser 1.90 9.5 6.5 
rocking chair 1.90 9.5 6.5 
coffee table 1.98 11. 8. 
cupboard 2.01 12. 39. 
bookcase 2.05 13.5 22. 
stool 2.05 13.5 32. 
cabinet 2.09 15. 27. 
bureau 2.34 16.5 14. 
chest 2.34 16.5 19. 
divan '2.36 18. 17. 
drawers 2.48 19. 34. 
cedar chest 2.78 20. 20. 
bench 2.82 21. 29. 
footstool 2.91 22. 26. 
('.halse lounge 3.01 23. 24. 
end table 3.04 24. 15.5 
rocker 3.17 25. 9. 
night table 3.27 26. 18. 
shelf 3.74 27. 44. 
china closet 3.75 28. 28. 
pttoman 3.76 29. 25. 
piano 3.85 30. 35. 
closet 3.86 31. 56. 
lamp 4.30 32. :31. 
magazine rack 4.33 33. 37. 
love seat 4.36 34. 10. 
mirror 4.48 35. 41. 
rug 4.49 36. 45. 
stove 4.56 37. 50. 
stereo 4.70 38. 40. 
refrigerator 4.73 39. 54. 
waste basket 4.75 40. 47. 
drapes 4.82 41. 53. 
picture 4.87 42. 55. 
television 4.87 43. 42. 
clock 4.92 44. 52. 
hi-fi 4.93 45. 38. 
counter 4.96 46. 51. 
davenport 5.04 47. 15.5 
cushion 5.07 48. 36. 
buffet 5.12 49. 30. 
bar 5.23 50. 43. 
radio 5.33 51. 48. 
sewing machine 5.43 52. 49. 
Cont/ ••• 
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••• /Cont ., 
Goodness-Of-Example Nonn For The Category FURNITURE 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U.K.) (U .S .A. ) 
vanity 5.68 53. 21-
telephone 5.69 54. 60. 
vase 5.70 55. 57. 
lounge 5.98 56. 23. 
ashtray 6.01 57.5 58. 
1?illow 6.01 57.5 46. 
fan 6.19 59. 59. 
hassock 6.25 60. 33. 
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Goodnesss-Of-Example Norm For The Category SPORT. 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U. K.) (U.S.A.) 
football 1.29 1.5 1. 
tennis 1.29 1.5 4. 
rugby 1.35 3. 8. 
squash 1.55 4. 22.5 
badminton 1.67 5. 24.5 
cricket 1.70 6. 22.5 
hockey 1.75 7. 9. 
basketball 1.76 8. 3. 
swimming 1.81 9. 11. 
running 1.95 10. 42. 
baseball 2.01 11. 2. 
pole vault 2.11 12. 26. 
v.:> lleyba 11 2.13 13. 14. 
ir.e hockey 2.21 14. 10. 
gymnastics 2.23 15.5 21. 
skiing 2.23 15.5 16. 
golf 2.29 17. 17. 
racing 2.37 18. 24.5 
boxing 2.39 19. 13. 
car racing 2.91 20. 37. 
bowling 2.92 21. 28. 
\later skiing 2.97 22. 29. 
canoeing 3.01 23.5 6. 
weight lifting 3.01 23.5 45. 
judo 3.03 25. 36. 
horse racing 3.08 26. 43. 
archery 3.13 27. 35. 
rowing 3.1S 28.5 39. 
sailing 3.18 28.5 33. 
fencing 3.21 30. 27. 
ice skating 3.23 31. 30. 
polo 3.27 32. 18. 
ping pong 3.29 33. 3S. 
skating 3.32 34. 31. 
softball 3.34 35. 5. 
diving 3.36 36. 34. 
lacrosse 3.40 37.5 15. 
wrestling 3.40 37.5 20. 
track 3.53 39. 12. 
surfing 3.59 40. 19. 
handball 3.74 41. 7. 
fishing 3.83 42. 40. 
horseback riding 3.89 43. 41. 
skindiving 3.91 44. 32. 
hiking 4.25 45. 44. 
billiards 4.31 46. 50. 
croquet 4.37 47. 46. 
boating 4.39 4S. 48. 
pool 4.78 49. 49. 
hUllting 4.88 50. 51. 
checkers 5.48 51. 56. 
ches'3 5.52 52. 54. 
Cont/ ••• 
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••• /Cont., 
C,oodnesss-Of-Example Norm For The Category SPORT 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K.) (U .S.A.) 
jump rope 5.63 53. 52. 
camping 5.81 54. 53. 
cards 5.84 55. 57. 
dancing 5.92 56. 55. 
horseshoes 6.16 57. 47. 
sunbathing 6.92 58. 58. 
Appendix A Page A.9 
Goodness~Of-Example Norm For The Category TOY. 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K.) (U.S.A.) 
teddy bear 1.27 1. 11. 
doll 1.44 2. 1. 
toy soldier 1.56 3. 3.5 
doll house 1.64 4. 13. 
ball 1.70 5. 14. 
rocking horse 1.75 6. 12. 
yo-yo 1.79 7. 5. 
kite 1.91 8. 23. 
jack-in-the-box 1.93 9. 3.5 
water pistol 2.01 10. 10. 
marbles 2.14 11. 7. 
top 2.25 12. 2. 
rattle 2.27 13. 8. 
tricycle 2.40 14. 25. 
football 2.51 15. 35. 
stuffed animal 2.56 16. 9. 
colouring book 2.58 17. 26. 
paper dolls 2.69 18. 16. 
puzzle 2.71 19. 29. 
game 2.73 20. 36. 
crayons 2.74 21. 27. 
swing 2.75 22. 37. 
train 2.75 23. 24. 
hula hoop 2.81 24. 17.5 
seesaw 2.83 25. 41.5 
pogo stick 2.86 26. 20. 
fire engine 2.96 27. 30. 
drum 2.99 28. 34. 
balloon 3.03 29. 31. 
skates 3.12 30. 32. 
bike 3.26 31. 50. 
bicycle 3.27 32. 47.5 
bat 3.34 33. 44. 
truck 3.39 34. 28. 
monopoly 3.44 35.5 39. 
sandbox 3.44 35.5 49. 
car 3.45 37. 45. 
blo{',k 3.53 38. 6. 
jacks 3.56 39. 1~. 
jump rope 3.58 40. 19. 
sled 3.65 41. 40. 
clay 3.67 42. 21.5 
bow and arrow 3.68 43. 51.5 
stilts 3.69 44.5 41.5 
boat 3.69 44.5 38. 
airplane 3.71 46. 46. 
tractor 3.76 47. 47.5 
baseball 3.78 48. 33. 
wagon 3.88 49. 21.5 
erector set 3.95 50. 17.5 
gun 3.96 51. 57. 
Cont/ ••• 
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••• /Cont., 
Goodne88-0f~Example Norm For The Categor.y TOY 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K.) (U.S.A.) 
rope 4.23 52. 51.5 
checkers 4.51 53. 43. 
tennis racket 4.63 54. 59. 
animals 4.66 55. 58. 
cards 4.68 56. 54. 
books 5.34 57. 60. 
dishes 5.63 58. 53. 
horse 5.69 59. 56. 
mitt 6.12 60. 55. 
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Goodness-Of-Example Norm For The Category VEGETABLE. 
potato 
cauliflower 
carrot 
brussels sprouts 
pea 
leek 
onions 
green beans 
spring greens 
turnip 
greens 
bean 
broccoli 
string beans 
parsnip 
spinach 
lettuce 
mushroom 
greeen peppers 
celery 
asparagus 
peppers 
cucumber 
radishes 
corn 
artichokes 
watercress 
sweet potato 
beets 
green onion 
parsely 
blackeyed peas 
tomato 
kale 
garlic 
pumpkin 
yams 
ba.ked beans 
lima beans 
eggplant 
sauerkraut 
rice 
avacado 
rhubarb 
okra 
pickles 
end:l.ve 
seaweed 
peanut 
ContI ••• 
Mean 
Rating 
1.21 
1.24 
1.28 
1.32 
1.36 
1.52 
1.63 
1.64 
1.72 
1.72 
1.79 
1.80 
1.86 
1.86 
2.04 
2.08 
2.22 
2.30 
2.58 
2.60 
2.67 
2.73 
2.83 
2.93 
2.99 
3.01 
3.08 
3.10 
3.13 
3.40 
3.80 
3.84 
3.87 
4.26 
4.29 
4.31 
4.40 
4.58 
4.78 
4.85 
4.89 
4.98 
5.20 
5.25 
5.34 
5.35 
5.58 
5.59 
5.73 
Rank 
(U .K.) 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9.5 
9.5 
11. 
12. 
13.5 
13.5 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
20. 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
25. 
26. 
27. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
33. 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
41. 
42. 
43. 
44. 
45. 
46. 
47. 
48. 
49. 
Rank 
(U.S.A.) 
29. 
9. 
2. 
10. 
1. 
36. 
:7.6. 
3. 
31. 
20. 
16. 
27. 
6. 
4. 
30. 
5. 
12. 
43. 
2'3.5 
13. 
7. 
37. 
14. 
25. 
8. 
19. 
34. 
38. 
15. 
28. 
40. 
35. 
17. 
46. 
53. 
51. 
39. 
50. 
18. 
21. 
48. 
56. 
41, • 
45. 
23.5 
49. 
41. 
52. 
55. 
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Goodness-Of-Example Norm For The Category VEGETABLE 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K.) (U.S.A.) 
squash 5.78 50. 11. 
wax beans 5.86 51. 33. 
escarole 5.98 52. 47. 
collard 6.15 53. 32. 
dandelion 6.19 54. 54. 
rutabaga 6.43 55. 42. 
romaine 6.45 56. 22. 
Appendix A Page A.13 
Goodness-Of-Example Norm For The Category VEHICLE. 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K.) (U.S.A.) 
car 1.11 1. 4. 
bue 1.26 2. 5.5 
automobile 1.29 3. 1. 
van 1.46 4. 11. 
motorcycle 1.50 s. 9. 
taxi 1.67 6. 5.5 
jeep 1.73 7. 7. 
truck 1.80 8. 3. 
bike 2.09 9. 19. 
a.mbulance 2.11 10. 8. 
bicycle 2.17 ll. 16. 
train 2.20 12. 14. 
station wagon 2.52 13. 2. 
honda 2.57 14. 12. 
scooter 2.69 15. 23. 
streetcar 2.73 16. 10. 
a~rplane 2.75 17. 18. 
tube 3.06 18. 26. 
carriage 3.11 19. 17. 
trolley (car) 3.23 20. 15. 
jet 3.29 21. 21. 
tricycle 3.36 22. 35. 
tractor 3.41 23. 24. 
wagon 3.47 24. 25. 
cable car 3.59 25. 13. 
ship 3.68 26. 22. 
cart 3.72 27. 28. 
go-cart 3.92 28. 32. 
tank 3.93 29. 31. 
boat 3.96 30. 20. 
trailer 4.33 31. 27. 
rowboat 4.85 32. 33. 
yacht 4.61 33. 30. 
rocket 4.83 34. 41. 
canoe 4.89 35.5 36. 
submarine 4.89 35.5 38. 
wheelchair 4.97 37. 29. 
raft 5.04 38. 37. 
sled 5.09 39. 39. 
dogsled 5.10 40. 34. 
feet 5.18 41. 45. 
horse 5.33 42. 40. 
skates 5.39 43. 43. 
elevator 5.42 44. 50. 
skis 5.47 45. 46. 
wlleelbarrow 5.59 46. 48. 
camel 5.71 47. 44. 
skateboard 5.82 48. 47. 
surfboard 5.92 49. 49. 
blimp 6.21 50. 42. 
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Coodness-Of-example Norm For The Category WEAPON. 
Mean Rank Rank 
.Rating (U .K.) (U.S.A.) 
gun 1.26 1. 1. 
revolver 1.29 2. 3. 
pistol 1.33 3. 2. 
shotgun 1.37 4. 9. 
machine gun 1.38 5. 4. 
dagger 1.52 6. 8. 
knife 1.53 7. 7. 
rifle 1.55 8. 5. 
sword 1.56 9. 10. 
bomb 1.60 10. 11.5 
hand grenade 1.69 11. 11.5 
A-bomb 1.80 12. 13.5 
bayonet 1.82 13. 13.5 
spear 1.89 14. 15. 
missile 2.15 15. 29. 
axe 2.17 16. 35. 
cannon 2.37 17. 17. 
arrow 2.42 18. 25. 
tomahawk 2.59 19. 23. 
bow and arrow 2.61 20.5 18. 
switchblade 2.61 20.5 6. 
tank 2.65 22. 27. 
lance 2.69 23. 20. 
brass knuckles 2.71 24. 21. 
t.atchet 2.73 25. 32. 
bullet 2.75 26. 22. 
club 2.76 27.5 19. 
razor 2.76 27.5 37. 
bazooka 2.93 29. lEo 
whip 2.95 30. 30. 
teargas 3.16 31. 28. 
bow 3.30 32. 36. 
fists 3.43 33. 34. 
mortar 3.56 34.5 25. 
razor blade 3.56 34.5 38. 
poison 3.74 36. 42. 
gas 3.96 37. 45. 
hammer 4.01 38. 50. 
rocket 4.09 39. 39. 
slingshot 4.10 40. 33. 
chain 4.14 41. 46. 
scissors 4.28 42. 47. 
stone 4.29 43. 44. 
pitchfork 4.31 44. 49. 
stick 4.34 45. 41. 
ice pick 4.36 46. 31. 
rock 4.80 47. 43. 
rope 4.88 48. 54. 
words 4.93 49. 51. 
truncheon 4.86 SO. 26. 
bricks 5.05 51. 48. 
j\\do 5.07 52. 40. 
Cont/ ••• 
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Goodness-Of-example Norm For The Category WEAPON 
Mean Rank Rank 
Rating (U .K.) (U .S.A.) 
glass 5.11 53. 59. 
hand 5.17 54. 52. 
car 5.36 55. 57. 
screwdriver 5.40 56. 58. 
pipe 5.48 57. 53. 
airplane 5.56 58. 55. 
foot 5.73 59. 56. 
shoes 6.35 60. 60. 
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Table A.2 
This table contains the imagery ratings gathered in 
experiment 2, chapter 7. Exemplars are listed under their 
category headings and next to each exemplar is the following 
information: Typicality rating; mean ratings for ease and 
detail of imagibility for typical instance imagers; mean 
ratingc for ease and detail of imagibility for personal 
instance imagers; overall means for rated imagibility 
[collapsed across ease and detail] of typical and personal 
images. 
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Table A.2 Personal and Typical Instance Imagery Ratings. 
[E-Ease, D-Detail, TI-Typical Instance, PI-Personal Instance] 
Typic-
-ality Category E-TI D-TI E-PI D-PI TI PI 
RaUng MEAN MEAN 
WEAPON 
1.26 gun 1.389 2.870 2.218 3.691 2.129 2.955 
1.38 dagger 1.648 2.648 3.545 4.073 2.480 3.309 
1.52 machinegun 1.976 2.389 2.928 3.401 2.433 2.988 
2.76 razor 1.301 2.013 2.143 2.528 1.962 2.340 
2.95 whip 1.944 2.944 3.073 3.318 2.444 2.964 
3.30 bow 1.370 2.296 1.273 3.127 1.833 2.200 
3.80 rocket 2.133 3.486 3.343 4.429 2.809 3.885 
3.86 slingshot 3.963 4.981 5.127 5.927 4.472 5.527 
4.86 truncheon 4.944 5.426 5.000 5.727 5.185 5.363 
Typic-
-allty Category E-TI D-TI E-PI D-PI TI PI 
Rating MEAN MEAN 
BIRD 
1.11 robin 1.185 1.648 1.836 2.236 1.416 2.036 
1.14 blackbird 1.296 1.926 2.136 2.645 1.611 2.390 
1.16 sparrow 1.426 2.463 2.636 4.145 1.944 3.390 
2.90 peacock 1.611 2.315 2.345 3.400 1.963 2.872 
2.98 parrot 1.759 2.815 3.018 4.109 2.287 3.563 
3.02 d1lck 1.481 2.333 2.018 3.364 1.907 2.691 
3.87 turkey 1.312 2.125 1.825 2.891 2.116 2.408 
4.11 ostrich 2.574 3.574 2.837 3.727 3.074 3.282 
4.17 penguin 1.636 2.722 2.655 3.89i 2.179 3.273 
Typic-
-al1ty Category E-TI D-TI E-PI D-PI TI PI 
Rating MEAN MEAN 
VEGETABLE 
1.21 potato 1.148 1.593 2.127 3.164 1.371 2.645 
1.24 cauliflower 1.296 1.648 2.891 4.200 1.472 3.455 
1.28 carrot 1.111 1.315 1.989 3.127 1.213 2.558 
2.83 cucumber 1.423 1.898 1.524 1.481 1.960 3.059 
2.99 corn 1.741 2.333 2.800 3.691 2.037 3.246 
3.08 watercress 1.815 2.407 2.491 4.582 2.111 3.536 
4.98 rice 1.519 2.000 2.345 3.127 1.759 2.736 
5.59 seaweed 1.833 2.759 2.200 3.270 2.296 2.735 
5.73 peanut 1.204 1.796 1.982 3.036 1.500 2.509 
Typic-
-al1ty Category E-TI D-TI E-PI D-PI TI PI 
RaUng MEAN MEAN 
CLOTHING 
1.24 jacket 1.481 2.000 1.818 2.745 1.740 2.281 
1.25 shirt 1.259 1.722 2.182 2.127 1.490 2.154 
1.27 sweater 1.426 2.093 2.600 3.091 1.759 2.845 
2.87 payjamas 1.500 2.222 2.064 2.926 1.861 2.500 
3.25 nylons 1.463 2.000 2.436 3.436 1.731 2.964 
3.30 bathrobe 1.667 2.204 2.600 3.340 1.935 2.970 
6.06 hairband 1.759 2.519 2.600 3.473 2.139 3.036 
6.47 purse 1.519 2.074 2.327 3.055 1.796 2.691 
6.65 cane 2.019 2.611 2.964 4.309 2.315 3.636 
ContI ••• 
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Typic-
-al1ty Category E-TI D-TI E-PI D-PI TI PI 
Rating MEAN MEAN 
FRUIT 
1.15 apple 1.148 1.481 1.818 3.073 1.314 2.445 
1.26 strawberry 1.315 1.667 1.982 2.855 1.491 2.418 
1.30 pear 1.148 1.852 2.282 3.536 1.500 2.909 
3.41 berry 1.907 2.667 7·746 3.891 2.287 3.318 
3.79 avacado 1.796 2.556 2.800 3.400 2.176 3.100 
3.84 prunes 1.685 2.278 3.036 4.145 1. 981 3.590 
5.57 olive 2.778 3.500 3.055 4.000 3.139 3.527 
5.70 nut 1.667 2.407 2.782 3.782 2.037 3.282 
6.64 pickle 2.000 2.901 2.418 3.491 2.450 2.954 
Typic-
-ality Category E-TI D-TI E-PI D-PI TI PI 
Rating MEAN MEAN 
TOY 
1.27 teddybear 1.222 1.648 1.982 2.636 1.435 2.309 
1.44 doll 1.333 1.870 2.400 3.345 1.601 2.872 
1.56 toysoldier 1.759 2.630 3.127 4.309 2.194 3.718 
2.83 s~esaw 1.871 2.130 2.213 2.425 2.000 2.719 
3.03 balloon 1.222 1.741 2.327 3.218 1.481 2.772 
3.12 skates 1.574 2.537 2.400 3.091 2.055 2.745 
3.69 stilts 1.630 2.611 2.700 3.355 2.120 3.027 
4.51 checkers 3.142 4.569 4.684 5.314 3.855 4.999 
4.68 cards 1.407 2.296 2.036 2.691 1.851 2.363 
Typic-
-ality Category E-TI D-TI E-PI D-PI TI PI 
Rating MEAN MEAN 
VEHICLE 
1.11 car 1.259 1.926 1.273 1.909 1.592 1.591 
1.26 bus 1.185 1.889 1.782 3.145 1.537 2.463 
1.46 van 1.537 2.352 2.418 3.127 1.944 2.772 
3.29 jet 1.883 3.093 2.091 3.091 2.488 2.591 
3.47 wagon 2.352 3.407 3.237 4.618 2.879 3.927 
3.68 ship 1.463 2.630 2.145 3.164 2.046 2.654 
5.42 elevator 2.000 2.889 2.400 3.236 2.443 2.818 
5.47 skiis 1.889 3.093 3.164 4.455 2.491 3.809 
5.92 surfboard 1.685 2.852 2.600 3.613 2.268 3.106 
Typic-
-ality Category E-TI D-TI E-PI D-PI TI PI 
Rating MEAN MEAN 
SPORT 
1.29 tennis 1.944 2.704 2.036 2.891 2.324 2.463 
1.35 rugby 2.204 3.352 2.582 3.891 2.778 3.236 
1.70 cricket 1.759 2.630 2.200 3.345 2.194 2.772 
3.03 judo 2.353 3.648 3.091 4.382 3.000 3.736 
3.13 archery 2.389 2.944 2.673 3.927 2.666 3.300 
3.18 sailing 1.926 2.907 2.236 3.200 2.416 2.718 
5.52 chess 1.852 2.778 2.309 3.509 2.315 2.909 
5.81 camping 2.093 2.926 2.000 2.618 2.509 2.309 
6.92 sunbathing 1.796 2.556 1.764 2.400 2.176 2.082 
/Cont ••• 
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TYPic-
-ality Category E-TI O-TI E-PI O-PI TI PI Rating MEAN MEAN 
1.23 FURNITURE table 1.781 1.932 1.981 2.853 1.856 2.417 1.28 chair 1.244 1.583 1.161 2.791 1.413 1.976 1.29 bed 1.916 2.001 1.636 1.964 1.958 1.800 4.30 lamp 2.093 2.187 2.532 3.000 2.140 2.766 4.48 mirror 2.168 2.982 2.745 3.635 2.575 3.190 4.49 rug 2.837 3.103 2.936 3.375 2.970 3.155 5.33 radio 2.000 2.610 2.819 3.402 2.305 3.110 5.70 telephone 1.872 2.106 1.914 3.600 1.989 2.757 6.01 ashtray 2.301 2.982 3.855 4.328 2.641 4.141 
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This appendix contains the stimuli employed in experiment 
3 an~ 12 examples of Ss PI and TI image descritpions, 6 from 
the PI condition followed by the corresponding 6 from TI. 
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Stimuli employed in experiment 3: 
Category Category Category 
Furniture Fruit Clothing 
-----------------Most Typical Exemplars----------------
Table Apple Jacket 
Chair Orange Shirt 
Bed Strawberry Sweater 
Couch Peach Skirt 
Desk Pear Suit 
_________________ Least Typical Exemplars---------------
Vase Tomato Handkerchief 
Radio Coconut Watch 
Telephone Olive Hairband 
Ashtray Nut Ring 
Pillow Pickle Purse 
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Examples of Ss PI and TI image descriptions: 
Personal Instance Imagers 
82: Desk: "Old metal desk we used to keep in garage at my 
parent's house. It was a bit rusty". 
Sl1: Furniture: "8tewkly Manor--full of second-hand furniture 
chairs, tables, sofas, all piled on top of each 
~ther in main room". 
86: Apple: "Very red apple sitting on top of other frui t in 
bowl on kitchen table at home". 
S8: Watch: "Watch I bought on plane comming back from Italy, 
it's got a blue face and I'm wearing it now". 
Sl: Sweater: "Chunky grey sweater that I bought from shop in 
London on Kensington High Street. It's very warm. 
89: Fruit: "I have an image of this really gaudy ornament 
that a neibour of mine has in her hallway. Its a 
very brighlty painted bowl full of china fruit on 
I a wooden pedistal. Ugh I". 
Typical Instance Imagers 
S12: Desk: "A wooden pine desk with flat top, draws down 
one Side, four legs, handles on draws". 
S6: Furniture: "I've an image of all sorts of furntiture 
Soft, Leather, wooden, metal, glass, fabrics, 
large, small, chairs, tables, beds~ couches, 
wardrobes ••• " 
S7: Apple: "Red and round with a brown coloured stalk" 
Sl: Watch: "Metal, leather strap, hands, dial, numbers round 
,dial, glass covering the face". 
S9: Sweater: "Ribbed, cream coloured, arms, roll neck, long, 
made of wool." 
S4: Fruit: "Apples, oranges, peaches, banannas, smell very 
sweet, multicoloured, reds, yellows, and greens, 
different shapes, round, spherical, long". 
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This appendix contains the stimuli employed in experiment 
4 and an example of the picture prime stimuli. 
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Category Category Category Category 
Furniture Vehicle Toy Fruit 
-----------------Highly Typical Exemplars---------________ _ 
Table 
Bed 
Car 
Bus 
Teddy bear 
0011 
Apple 
Pear 
-----------------Mediumly Typical Exemplars----------------
Mirror 
Rug 
Wagon 
Ship 
Balloon 
Skates 
Berry 
Prunes 
-------------------ATypical Exemplars-----------___________ _ 
Telephone 
Ashtrny 
Category 
Skiis 
Surboard 
Category 
Stilts 
Cards 
Category 
Olive 
Pickle 
Category 
Clothing Vegetable Bird Sport 
-----------------Highly Typical Exemplars------------------
Jacket 
Shirt 
Potato 
Carrot 
Robin 
Blackbird 
Tennis 
Rugby 
-----------------Mediumly Typical Exemplars----------------
Pyjamas 
Nylons 
Corn 
[water] Cress 
Parrot 
Duck 
Archery 
Sailing 
-------------------ATypical Exemplars---------··--------------
Hairband 
Purse 
Category 
Weapon 
Gun 
Dagger 
Whip 
Bow 
Slingshot 
Truncheon 
Rice 
Peanut 
Penguin 
Ostrich 
Chess 
Sunbathing 
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Example of Picture Prime: BIRD 
APPENDIX C c.4 
Example of Picture Prime: SPORT 
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This appendix contains the locative attribute and perceptual 
attribute norms [in that order] reported in experiment 6, 
chapter 10. The norms for each category are distributed over 3 
pages, the first page contains the the norm for the ~ategory 
superordinate, the second and third pages contain the norms for 
the exemplars ordered from most typical to least typical. The 
category norms are grouped in the order Weapon, Bird, Vegetable, 
Clothing, Fruit, Toy, Vehicle, Sport, Furniture. Each page contains 
the followi~g information on successive lines: The word responded 
to; the rated typicality of the word, Typ; the mean number of 
responses per subject, X; internal reliability correlations for the 
frequency of response measure, r; followed by the actual attribute 
responses listed in order of decreasing production frequency; each 
response is accompanied by the absolute frequency measure A, 
eXpressed 8S a percentage. Responses generated by only one subject 
are not presented. 
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Locational Attribute Norms For Items Of Varying Typicality 
From Nine Semantic Categories 
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WEAPON 
[N-40]* 
X-S.1 r-.82 
army 52.5 
museum 30 
armoury 27.5 
T.V. 20 
war 20 
battle 15 
soldier 15 
riots 15 
fight 12.5 
gunsmiths 12.5 
hand 7.5 
holster 7.5 
gunroom 7.5 
belt 7.5 
films 7.5 
castle S 
police 5 
thugs 5 
terrorists 5 
history books S 
torturers 5 
., 
ti"4Q for all norms. 
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GUN A% DAGGER A% WHIP A% 
Typ-1.26 Typ-1.52 Typ-2.95 
X-6.3 r-.71 X-6.4 r-.71 X-6.6 r-.68 
holster 55 sheath 57.5 circus 57.5 
armoury 37.5 belt 30 huntsman 32.5 
gunsmith 35 museum 27.5 horses 27.5 
hunting 25 hand 22.5 lion tamers 22.5 
shop 25 play 20 SeX shop 20.5 
army 22.5 film 17 .5 riding 17.5 
sports shop 20 shop 17 .5 jockeys 17 .5 
war 17.5 scabbard 15 animal trainer 15 
U.s. policeman 17.5 crimes 15 ringmaster 15 
U.S.A. 15 back 12.5 riding school 15 
soldier 15 'whodunnit' 12.5 horse trainers 12.5 
gamekeeper 12.5 hanging on wall 10 horse trials 12.5 
arsenal 12.5 soldier 10 horse races 12.5 
range 10 fight 10 horse shows 10 
pigeon shooting 10 knight 7.5 stables 10 
museum 10 thug 7.5 torture chamber 10 
policeman 10 corpse 5 slave ship 10 
western 7.5 indian 5 carriage 10 
cowboy 7.5 desk paperknife 5 farm 7.5 
cowboy film 7.5 macbeth 5 saddlers 7.5 
T.V. 7.5 Scotsman's sock 5 show jumping 7.5 
film 7.5 chariot race 7.5 
battle 7.5 stage coach 5 
gangster 5 bordello 5 
dealer 5 brothel 5 
poacher 5 on pub wall 5 
farmer 5 Houses of-
field 5 -Parliament 5 
court exhibit 5 
hand 5 
at a shootirlg 5 
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BOW A% SLINGSHOT A% TRUNCHEON A% 
Typ-3.30 Typ-4.20 Typ-4.86 
X-4.3 r-.51 X-4.1 r-.75 X=6.3 r-.58 
archer 47.5 battles 32.5 policeman 87.5 
Robin Hood 35 Bible 32.5 riots 52.5 
with arrows 27.5 David & Goliath 25 police station 47.5 
archery club 22.5 castles 25 policeman's hand 22.5 
Sports shop 17.5 in a boy's pocket demonstrations 20 
Agincourt 15 a catapult 25 football grounds 17.5 
battlefield 15 museums 17.5 T.V. 15 
fUm 15 sports shop 17.5 in a museum 12.5 
Sherwood Forest 10 knights 12.5 rubber 12.5 
country 10 war 12.5 violence 10 
hunt 5 fight 12.5 burglaries 10 
target 5 army 10 a bouncer in-
toy shop 5 primitive tribesl0 -a club 7.5 
war 5 historical timesl0 up a person's-
medieval times 5 excavations 7.5 -sleeve 7.5 
William Tell 5 encyclopedia 5 mugger's hand 5 
hunting 5 hand 5 
film 5 in police film 5 
leather 5 Panda car 5 
stones 5 straps 5 
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BIRO 
Xa 7.4 r-.83 
sky 77.5 
tree 70 
garden 67.5 
zoo 50 
cage 47.5 
bushes 30 
field 27.5 
nest 22.5 
T.V. 22.5 
aviary 20 
hedges 15 
fence 15 
museum 12.5 
park 12.5 
roof 10 
telephone wire 7.5 
water 7.5 
butcher's 5 
fence 5 
pigeon loft 5 
bird bath 5 
Appendix 0 Page 0.7 
ROBIN A% BLACKBIRD A% PARROT A% 
TYP-l.l1 Typ-l.14 Typ-2.98 
X-S.2 r-.84 X-5.4 r-.53 X-8.2 r-.73 
garden 87.5 garden 60 cage 100 
tree 82.5 pie 40 zoo 72.5 
Chris tmas card 52.5 trees 27.5 pet shop 50 bushes 30 nest 27.5 perch 30 
nest 30 fence 25 jungle 27.5 fence 22.5 hedge 25 aviary 25 hedge 22.5 field 25 Long John Silver's-lawn 17.5 bush 20 -shoulder 25 fields 17 .5 lawn 17.5 Monty Python-book 15 countryside 17.~ -sketch 20 
T.V. docUlllentary12.5 in the air 15 South America 20 
Village green 10 nursery rhymes 15 Africa 17 .5 
bird table 10 T.V. docUlllentaryl0 sholder 15 
woods 5 park 7.5 in a museum 15 
roof 5 table 7.5 pantomime 12.5 
balcony 5 yard 7.5 forest 10 
birdbath 5 roof 5 trees 10 
teapot 5 post 5 tropics 7.5 
starch packet 5 birdbath 5 circus 7.5 
on the ground 5 house 7.5 
bird book 5 bird book 5 
T.V. 5 
Simpson 5 
film 5 
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DUCK A% PENGUIN A% OSTRICH A% 
Typ-3.02 Typ-4.17 Typa 4.11 
X-S.9 r-.76 X-5.4 r-.56 X-6.1 r-.73 
pond S5 antartic/artic 92.5 zoo 72.5 
lake 65 zoo 77 .5 Africa 50 
river 52.5 T.V. 25 T.V. 32.5 
zoo 47.5 on a biscuit- wildlife park 25 
restaurant 32.5 -wrapper 22.5 desert 20 
on a plate 30 icy cold water 17 .5 museum 17 .5 
farmyards 27.5 book cover 17.5 hot & dry-
park 27.5 in a museum-
-countries 15 
supermarket 22.5 -stuffed 15 Australia 12.5 
butcher's 20 wildlife park 15 plains 12.5 
stream 17.5 frozen wastes 12.5 on the ground 10 
marshes 17.5 icebergs 12.5 bird book 7.5 
water 17.5 North Pole 12.5 sand 7.5 
fairground 12.5 glaciers 10 wilderness 7.5 
Aylesbury 10 snow 7.5 scrubland 5 
meal 10 game park 7.5 Kenya 5 
oven 7.5 pool 5 encyclopedia 5 
estuary 7.5 sea 5 pictures 5 
Thames 7.5 bird book 5 display case 5 
pool 5 tundra 5 with Rod Hull 5 
cannal 5 circus 5 
fen 5 waddling 5 
flying 5 encyclopedia 5 
sky 5 dress suit 5 
wall 5 
nest 5 
museum 5 
in a cartoon 5 
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VEGETABLE 
X-7.6 r-.87 
garden 62.5 
greengrocers 52.5 
kitchen 50 
shops 50 
restaurant 30 
field 25 
supermarket 22.5 
plate 20 
market 17.5 
meals 15 
farm 15 
soil 12.5 
ground 12.5 
allotments 7.5 
freezer 7.5 
fridge 7.5 
stews 7.5 
pan 5 
tin 5 
plastic bags 5 
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POTATO A% CARROT A% CORN A% 
Typ-1.21 Typ-1.28 Typ"'2.99 
X-9.l r-.49 X-6.4 r-.48 X-5.9 r-.47 
greengrocers 77 .5 greengrocer 55 fields 95 
field 50 garden 52.5 tin 42.5 
garden 30 tins 32.5 on the cob 35 
kitchen 27.5 restaurant 30 shop 30 
in ground/earth 25 field 30 kitchen 22.5 
chip shop 25 plate 27.5 America 20 
in a sack 17.5 supermarket 20 joke 17 .5 
shop 15 shop 17.5 countryside 12.5 
supermarket 15 ground 15 farm 12.5 
chips 15 kitchen 15 cereals 12.5 
meal 12.5 meal 12.5 harvest 10 
plate 12.5 salad 12.5 on a toe 10 
dinner 12.5 allotment 12.5 granary 7.5 
allotment 10 horses 10 barn 7.5 
pan 10 pan 10 windmill 7.5 
oven 10 fruitiers 7.5 mill 5 
jacket 10 market 7.5 flour 5 
Ireland 7.5 stews 7.5 supermarket 5 
tin 7.5 casseroles 5 bakers 5 
farm 5 fork 5 bread 5 
cottage pie 5 mouth 5 packet 5 
fruitiers 5 stew 5 resaurant 5 
market 5 bag 5 greengrocers 5 
garden centre 5 pub 5 pantry 5 
in packets 5 fridge 5 fridge 5 
vegetable rack 5 rabbits 5 Canada 5 
fork 5 vegetable rack 5 T.V. commercial 5 
mouth 5 
crisps 5 
bowl 5 
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WATERCRESS A% RICE PEANUT A% 
Typ-3.08 Typ-s.20 Typ-s.73 
X-6.4 r-.67 X-S.9 r-.62 X-6.4 r-.67 
greengrocers 77 .5 paddy fields 80 packets 55 
salad SO Chinese- shop 52.5 
water 47.5 -restauraunt 37.5 pub 50 
1n sandwiches 32.S curry 35 tins 25 
plate 25 shops 35 dish 22.5 
boxes/cartons 22.5 Indian- shell 20 
k1tchen 20 -restaurant 32.5 cinema 20 
pond 17 .5 plate 30 zoo 20 
mustard 17.5 packet 22.5 in butter 15 
soup 17.5 China 20 tree 12.5 
pots IS restaurant 20 plant 12.5 
shop 10 kitchen 17 .5 Africa 10 
supermarket 10 pudding 17 .S greengrocer's 10 
salad bowl 10 supermarket IS supermarket 10 
restaurant 10 India 15 America 7.S 
mustard 7.5 meal 12.5 T.V. 7.5 
garden 7.5 wedding 12.5 party 7.5 
fridge 7.5 jar 10 underground 7.5 
farm 5 third world- jar 7.5 
field 5 -counties 10 cartons 7.5 
R1ckmansworth 5 bowl 10 bowl 7.5 
blotting paper 5 dish 7.5 hot climates 7.5 
fork 5 fork 7.S Cyprus 5 
mouth 5 cooking 7.5 Near East 5 
garnish 5 mouth 5 South America 5 
ditches 5 in a wok 5 children 5 
bag 5 Orient 5 cupboard 5 
windowsills 5 Asia 5 fields 5 
Japan 5 bushes 5 
Ceylon 5 
Appendix D 
CLOTHING 
X-S.9 r-.85 
[clothes] shop 77.5 
wardrobe 62.5 
person 57.5 
clothes/washing-
-line 30 
chest-of-
-drawers 27.5 
drawers 25 
bedroom 25 
home/house 20 
laundry 20 
suitcase 17.5 
cupboards 15 
drawer 15 
hooks in hall 7.5 
clothes hanger 7.5 
on chair 5 
on floor 5 
dressing room S 
trunk 5 
clothes rack 5 
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JACKET A% SHIRT A% PYJAMAS A% 
Typ-l.24 Typ-l.25 Typ-2.87 
X-6.4 r-.58 X-5.9 r-.91 X-7.2 r-.38 
person 52.5 shop 75 
wardrobe 50 on a person 50 bed 72.5 
shop 47.5 clothes/washing- person 47.5 
hanger 22.5 -line 30 shop 42.5 
tailor's 20 on men 22.5 bedroom 30 
potatoes 17.5 chest-of- clothing shop 27.5 
hot water-
-drawers 22.5 clothes/washing-
-cylinder 17.5 wardrobe 17.5 -line 27.5 
clothes shop 15 laundry 17 .5 chest of drawersl7.5 
Coat hook 15 hanger 17.5 drawer 17.5 
back of a chair 15 washing machine 15 under pillow 15 
bedroom 15 boy 15 pyjama case 15 
window display 12.5 clothes shop 12.5 wardrobe 15 
part of a suit 12.5 Oxfam shop 12.5 airing cupboard 12.5 
men 12.5 store 12.5 cupboard 10 
dry cleaners 10 man's shop 10 man 10 
cloakroom 10 market 10 laundry 7.5 
market 7.5 tailor 7.5 washing machine 5 
sale 7.5 window display 7.5 Marks & Spencers5 
changing room 7.5 on a dummy 7.5 clothes horse 5 
dressing room 7.5 dressing room 7.5 ironing board 5 
.man's shop 5 cupboard 5 lounging 5 
on rail 5 clothes horse 5 parent's house 5 
hall stand 5 irioning board 5 hospital 5 
laundry 5 women 5 party 5 
book 5 house 5 silk 5 
house 5 bedroom 5 stripes 5 
back 5 children 5 
Slippers 5 
fireside 5 
schools 5 
camping 5 
dreesing up 5 
Sherlock Holmes 5 
whitehall farce 5 
theatre 5 
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NYLONS A% HAIRBAND A% PURSE A% 
Typ-3.25 Typ-6.06 Typ-6.47 
X-6.4 r-.89 X-5.8 r-.62 X-6.7 r-.83 
legs 82.5 head 50 handbag 97.5 
shops 75 hair 47.5 pocket 72.5 
washing line 32.5 shop 32.5 shop 47.5 
in a bag/packet 30 hairdressers 30 hand 25 
hosiery shop 20 dressing table 27.5 shoppingbag 20 
women 17.5 bedroom 25 shopping 20 
chest of drawersl7.5 school 17 .5 bank 20 
cupboard 12.5 tennis players 15 drawer 17 .s 
supermarket 12.5 woman 15 basket 15 
laundry 12.5 girl 15 holdall 15 
on suspenders 10 Alice 12.5 coat 12.5 
T.V. commercial 10 children 12.5 shop window 12.5 
in a photograph 10 kindergarden 12.5 shopping trolley10 
models 7.5 sports shop 12.5 supermarket 10 
striptease show 7.5 sportswomen 10 resaurant 10 
wife 5 Borg 10 till 10 
clothes horse 5 wife 7.5 leather shop 7.5 
magazine 5 girl's school 7.5 dressing table 7.5 
bank robbers 5 rock singer 5 table 5 
sex shop 5 pony taU 5 shelf 5 
bathroom 5 belt 5 
photograph 5 women 5 
old films 5 house 5 
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FRUIT 
X-6.6 r-.91 
tree 75 
bowl 52.5 
greengrocers 50 
supermarket 42.5 
bush/hedge 35 
orchard 30 
shops 27.5 
garden 22.5 
kitchen 20 
market 17.5 
pie 15 
tins 15 
baskets 7.5 
fruitier 7.5 
restaurant 7.5 
dessert 5 
yogurt 5 
paper bag 5 
box 5 
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APPLE A% PEAR A% BERRY A% 
Typ-1.15 Typ-l.30 Typ,.3.41 
X-8.4 r-.59 X-6.7 r-.74 X=6.1 r-.63 
tree 90 tree 82.5 bush 80 
greengrocers 52.5 greengrocers 75 hedgerow/hedge 47.5 
pies 47.5 tins 50 garden 32.5 
orchard 37.5 orchard 32.5 pie 25 
in a bowl 35 supermarket 30 greengrocer's 22.5 
shop 30 in a bowl 27.5 tree 17 .5 
supermarket 30 fruitiers 25 shrubs 17 .5 
cider 22.5 house 17.5 holly 15 
house 17 .5 12 days of- country 15 
kitchen 17.5 -christmas 17 .5 Christmas-
dish 17.5 christmas carol 17.5 -decorations 15 
tin 17.5 restaurant 17.5 fruitiers 12.5 
fruitiers 15 market 15 shop 10 
William Tell 12.5 in syrup 15 cans 10 
dinning room 12.5 Babycham 12.5 jam 7.5 
plate 12.5 in a basket 12.5 jelly 7.5 
basket 10 garden 12.5 kitchen 7.5 
box 10 dessert 10 jungle 7.5 
pantry 10 in fruit salad 10 branch 5 
vegetable rack 10 sunny country 5 woods 5 
lunch-box 7.5 Kent 5 field 5 
shop 7.5 kitchen 5 puciding 5 
market 7.5 wasps 5 wreath 5 
restaurant 5 tin branch 5 frozen in-
tarts 5 -a packet 5 
sauces 5 tin 5 
fruit coc kta1l 5 
Sommerset 5 
cupboard 5 
tray 5 
fridge 5 
turnover 5 
in sandwic.h'IJox 5 
garden 5 
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PR.UNES A% OLIVE A% PICKLE A% 
Typ-3.84 Typ-5.57 Typ-6.64 
X-5.6 r".83 X-7.4 r-.46 X-5.5 r-.43 
tins 67.5 tree 50 jars 77 .5 
supermarkets 47.5 jar 47.5 supermarket 30 
school dinners 32.5 Italy 45 shops 27.5 
grocer's 25 Greece 45 pub 27.5 
kitchen 22.5 restaurant 32.5 on a table 22.5 
Custard 22.5 parties 30 on a plate 20 
tree 17.5 011 30 pantries 17.5 
PUdding 17.5 cocktails 27.5 grocer's 17.5 
dishes 17.5 bar 25 christmas 15 
dessert 17.5 groves 22.5 Indian-
canteen food 15 supermarket 20 -restaurant 15 
packet 15 Spain 20 kitchen 12.5 
bOwl 15 pizza 17.5 Illeal 12.5 
dish 15 on top of meal 15 in a sandwich 12.5 
shop 12.5 warm countries 12.5 fish & chip shop10 
pie 10 Mediterranean 12.5 dish 10 
can 10 Greek restaurant10 restaurant 7.5 
Cupboard 7.5 Corfu 7.5 cupboard 7.5 
sPoon 5 Middle East 7.5 curries 7.5 
breakfast 5 Turkey 7.5 sideboard 5 
fruitiers 5 Israel 7.5 salad 5 
. mouth 5 France 7.5 fork 5 
rice 5 shop 7.5 spoon 5 
market 5 cheese 5 
grocer 5 bar 5 
delicattessence 5 
shop 5 
gnarled trees 5 
kitchen 5 
dish 5 
in a bowl 5 
fridge 5 
nets 5 
packets 5 
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TOY 
X-5.7 r-.52 
shops 60 
playroom 47.5 
child's room 40 
toy shop 27.5 
bedroom 22.5 
houses 22.5 
toy box 17.5 
children 15 
school 15 
nursery 15 
cupboard 12.5 
fairground 10 
playgroup 10 
pram 5 
garden 5 
park 5 
seaside 5 
street 5 
attic 5 
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TEDDy BEAR A% DOLL A% BALLOON A% 
Typ-1.27 Typ-l.44 Typ-3.03 
X-6.9 r-.71 X-5.7 r-.73 X"6.4 r-.84 
bed 60 pram 60 party 72.5 
toy shop 47.5 shop 45 sky 52.5 
bedroom 35 doll's house 37.5 fairground 30 
playroom 27.5 toy shop 32.5 shop 22.5 
toy box 22.5 playroom 27.5 children 22.5 
nursery 20 bedroom 25 in cartoons 17.5 
storybook 20 child's room 20 christmas 
shop 17.5 toy box 20 -decorations 17 .5 
with a child 15 children 15 basket 15 
toy cupboard 15 toy cupboard 15 flying 15 
sChool 12.5 doll's hospital 12.5 circus 15 
fairground 12.5 nursery 12.5 in the air 10 
Brideshead- car window 12.5 string 10 
-Revisited 12.5 playpen 10 as a weather-
pram 10 playground 7.5 -station 10 
Picnic 10 bed 7.5 toy shop 7.5 
T.V. 7.5 pushchair 7.5 dance 5 
playpen 7.5 supermarket 5 war 5 
playground 7.5 girls 5 air show 5 
pUsh chair 5 highchair 5 France 5 
doll's house 5 T.V. S market S 
carrycot's 5 magazines 5 
kindergarden 5 
story 5 
Winnie-the-Pooh 5 
in an ad'Ter t 5 
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SKATES A% STILTS A% CARDS A% 
Typ-3.12 Typ .. 3.69 Typ-4.68 
X-7.1 r-.43 X-5.4 r-.49 X"'6.3 r-.67 
ice rink 70 circus 82.5 shops 50 
roller skating- playground 32.5 casino's 47.5 
-rink 42.5 houses in- home 35 
lakes 40 -wet countries 30 club 30 
sports shop 35 clowns 25 pub 25 
pond 30 toy shop 22.5 packs 25 
skating rink 27.5 legs 17 .5 bridge club 22.5 
fish shop 22.5 fair 17.5 whlst drive 20 
ice 17.5 theatre 15 games shop 17 .5 
toy shop 17.5 pantomime 15 office 17 .5 
Wolverton 15 Jeux Sauns- lounge 15 
toy cupboard 15 -Frontiers 15 fortune telling 15 
lake 15 children 12.5 decks 12.5 
Richmond 12.5 toy cupboard 10 drawer 12.5 
Olympics 12.5 playroom 7.5 sleeve 12.5 
dancing 10 garage 5 supermarkets 7.5 
river 7.5 school 5 newsagents 7.5 
canal 7.5 streets 5 common room 5 
on the road 5 water 5 toy box 5 
children 5 Holland 5 cupboard 5 
feet 5 jungle 5 table 5 
boots 5 swamps 5 sale rep. 5 
T.V. 5 index cabinet 5 
liesure centre 5 
empty car park 5 
open spaces 5 
pavements 5 
pictures 5 
Appendix D 
VEHICLE 
X-7.1 r-.89 
garage 75 
road 75 
carpark 62.5 
motorway 25 
street 22.5 
town 17.5 
railway 15 
driveway 15 
show/sales room 15 
petrol station 12.5 
runway 12.5 
aiport 12.5 
station 10 
terminus 10 
shop 5 
shed 5 
countryside 5 
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CAR A% BUS A% WAGON A% 
Typ-l.11 Typ .. l.26 Typ-3.47 
X-8.6 r-.8f) X-6.1 r-.72 X=-5.6 r-.54 
garage 85 road 75 cowboy f1lms-
road 82.5 station 62.5 -western 52.5 
car park 75 streets 52.5 railway 50 
street 47.5 town 50 farm 27.5 
drive[way] 35 stop 47.5 road 25 
petrol station 22.5 city 22.5 wild west 20 
show room 20 depot 20 trains 17 .5 
motorway 17.5 terminus [al] 20 goods yard 15 
traffic jam 15 campus 20 cowboys &-
railway 15 villages 17.5 -indians 15 
T.V./fim 12.5 London 17.5 lanes 12.5 
car port 12.5 in a bus lane 15 toy 12.5 
town 12.5 traffic jam 15 prairie 10 
city 10 coach park 10 fair 10 
sales room 10 garage 7.5 trails 7.5 
lay-by 10 route 7.5 train set 7.5 
side of road 7.5 motorway 5 shunting yards 7.5 
lanes 7.5 sea-front 5 transport depot 7.5 
car ferry 7.5 country 5 sidings 7.5 
motorshow 7.5 airport 5 n;arket 5 
forecourt 5 museum 5 gypsies 5 
roundabout 5 brewery 5 
Le Mans 5 fairgrounds 5 
Watkins Glen 5 T.V. 5 
factory 5 car park 5 
museum 5 
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SHIP A% SKIIS AX SURFBOARD A% 
Typ-3.68 Typ-5.47 Typ-5.92 
X-7.5 r-.54 X-5.2 r-.51 X-5.9 r-.67 
sea 97.5 snow 52.5 beach 77 .5 
dock 75 Switzerland 50 sea 52.5 
harbour 47.5 mountains 37.5 California 50 
ocean 22.5 snowy slopes 35 Australlia 47.5 
lake 22.5 sports shop 30 sea-side 25 
river 20 Alps 30 sports shop 22.5 
port 20 Austria 30 on top of car 20 
cannal 17.5 on roof racks 22.5 Hawaii 17.5 
Channel 17.5 ski-slopes 20 Cornwall 17.5 
estuary 15 T.V. 17.5 water 15 
dry dock 15 adverts 17.5 T.V. 12.5 
pictures 15 ice 15 shop 12.5 
marina 10 cold climates 15 America/U.S.A. 12.5 
Pacific 7.5 hills 12.5 South American-
Atlantic 7.5 Europe 12.5 -beaches 10 
India 7.5 St. Moritz 12.5 Bondi Beach 10 
berth 5 Scotland 12.5 Devon 10 
jetty 5 Tyrol 10 ocean 7.5 
wreck 5 France 10 sea shores 7.5 
films 5 Spain 7.5 holiday 5 
T.V. 5 Italy 7.5 lake 5 
advertisments 5 Sweden 7.5 waves 5 
ferry brochure 5 Norway 5 surf 5 
model in museum 5 Finland 5 films 5 
war 5 Scandinavia 5 
Islands 5 shop 5 
on water 5 
Olympics 5 
sea planes 5 
Appendix D 
SPORT 
X-5.5 r-.74 
playing field 72.5 
T.V. 50 
stadium 27.5 
liesure centre 25 
football ground 17.5 
pitch 17.5 
swimming-pool 15 
sports hall 15 
o.u. 12.5 
gymnasium 12.5 
tennis courts 10 
racing tracks 7.5 
club 7.5 
hall 5 
sea 5 
board 5 
snooker table 5 
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TENNIS A% RUGBY A% ARCHERY A% 
Typ-l. 29 Typ-l.35 Typ-3.13 
X-6.1 r-.87 X-7.2 r-.63 X-4.9 r-.56 
COurts 85 field 52.5 field/meadow 77 .5 
Wimbeldon 75 Twickenham 50 Sherwood Forest 37.5 
television 47.5 pitch 32.5 sports centre 32.5 
grass 22.5 town 30 Olympic Games 17.5 
school 22.5 Murrayfield 25 T.V. 17.5 
indoor 20 rugby ground 25 woods 17.5 
Sports club 17.5 T.V. 17.5 outdoors 15 
leisure centre 15 school 17.5 sports club 15 
parks 10 Cardif Arms- Robin Hood 12.5 
tennis club 10 -Park 15 club 12.5 
tournament 10 Wales 15 range 7.5 
Forest Hills 7.5 France 12.5 country 5 
Sweden 7.5 rugby club 10 lawn 5 
U.S.A. 7.5 in mud 10 archery club 5 
outdoor 5 Landsdowne Road 7.5 gym 5 
O.U. 5 Cardiff 7.5 Medieval films 5 
table 5 Warickshire 7.5 fair 5 
at the seaside 5 England 7.5 
Roehampton 5 The Oval 5 
Huddersfield 5 
stadium 5 
park 5 
on grass 5 
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SAILING A% CHESS A% SUNBATHING A% 
Typ-3.18 Typ-5.52 Typ-6.92 
X-6.2 r-.58 X-3.8 r-.47 X-6.9 r=-.59 
lake 87.5 board 45 beach 97.5 
sea 85 T.V. 42.5 garden 60 
river 75 tournament 40 swinnning pool 32.5 
ocean 22.5 Russia 35 seaside 30 
loch 20 games shop 27.5 holidays 27.5 
canal 17.5 club 20 solarium 25 
reservoir 15 home 15 abroad 17.5 
broads 15 World- field 15 
Mediterranean 15 -Championship 15 terrace 12.5 
pond 12.5 sitting room 10 lawn 12.5 
Greece 10 newspaper 10 garden chair 12.5 
estuary 10 games room 7.5 roof 12.5 
bath 7.5 U.S.A. 7.5 sun bed 10 
water 5 computer 7.5 sun lounge 10 
harbour 5 competitions 5 outdoors 7.5 
seaside 5 contest 5 sauna 7.5 
Atlantic 5 toy shop 5 boat 5 
Cowes 5 toy box 5 patio 5 
yatch club 5 cupboard 5 South of France 5 
boatshow 5 school 5 Riviera 5 
films 5 lounge 5 Italy 5 
T.V. 5 hotel lounge 5 Marjorca 5 
Spain 5 
California 5 
West Indies 5 
hot climates 5 
dUI.es 5 
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FURNITURE A% 
X-5.9 r-.85 
house 77.5 
office 72.5 
shop 70 
rooms 27.5 
department store 20 
furniture shop 17.5 
warehouse 15 
removal van 15 
work place 12.5 
restaurant 10 
factory 10 
home 10 
auction 7.5 
Habitat 5 
cafe 5 
John Lewis 5 
kitchen 5 
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TABLE A% BED A% MIRROR A% 
Typ-l.23 Typ-l.29 Typ-4.48 
X-6.2 r-.87 X-s.9 r-.73 X-6.7 r-.69 
office 60 bedroom 70 bathroom 77 .5 
dinning room 57.5 hospital 52.5 hall 50 
room 50 shop 52.5 bedroom 47.5 
house/home 57.5 house/home 47.5 wall 30 
kitchen 42.5 garden 30 toilets/loos 30 
shop 25 hotel 22.5 dressing table 27 .5 
pub 20 bed sit 20 dress/clothes-
restaurant 17.5 airbed on beach 15 
-shop 27.5 
hotel 15 furniture shop 15 handbag 20 
lounge 15 dormitory 15 hall of mirrors 17 .5 
classroom 12.5 flat 12.5 car 15 
meeting rooms 12.5 warehouse 10 make-up bag 12.5 
garden 10 store 10 hairdressers 12.5 
on a picnic 10 room 7.5 kitchen 12.5 
furniture shop 10 hostel 7.5 dreessing room 10 
warehouse 7.5 old people' s- cabinet 10 
here 7.5 -hom 7.5 tailors 7.5 
sit ting room 7.5 caravan 5 shop 7.5 
board room 5 children's home 5 restaurant 7.5 
cafe 5 sunbed 5 opticians 5 
bar 5 camping 5 microscope 5 
entrance hlo.ll 5 park 5 telescope 5 
shed 5 sickroom 5 house 5 
newspaper 5 
Alice Through The-
-Looking-Glass 5 
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RUG A% TELEPHONE A% ASHTRAY A% 
Typ-4.49 Typ-5.69 Typ .. 6.01 
X-6.3 r-.67 X-7.4 r-.79 X=-5.8 r-.62 
fireside/hearth 60 office 80 pubs 55 
floor 57.5 box 52.5 table 52.5 
living room- house/home 50 office 50 
-lounge 50 table 45 house/home 47.5 
house/home 32.5 kiosk 45 restraunant 35 
shops 30 wall 42.5 cinema 22.5 
bedroom 22.5 desk 30 car 22.5 
carpet shop 20 booth 27.5 bus 20 
room 17 .5 exchange 20 desk 20 
walls 17 .5 hotel 17.5 train 17 .5 
entrances 15 restaurant 17.5 public place 17.5 
corridor 15 hall 15 chair 17.5 
car 15 pub 15 window sill 15 
kit 10 station 15 lounge 12.5 
bedside 10 street 12.5 smoking room 12.5 
bathroom 10 work 12.5 aeroplane 12.5 
rug shop 7.5 study 10 coach 10 
handicraft shop 7.5 Rolls Royce 5 common room 10 
doorways 7.5 car 5 hall 7.5 
lobby 5 police station 5 cafe 7.5 
room 5 films 5 club 7.S 
house 5 airport 5 hotel 7.5 
office 5 bank 5 bar 5 
Persia 5 meeting rooms 5 sink 5 
beach 5 floor 5 house 5 
mantlepiece 5 
souvenir shop 5 
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Perceptual Attribute Norms for Items Of Varying Typicality 
From Nine Semantic Categories 
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WEAPON A% 
*N-40 
X-S.4 r-.S9 
metal 42.S 
sharp 32.5 
hard 27.S 
wooden 22.S 
bullets 22.5 
missile 17.5 
gun 17.5 
blade IS 
knife 15 
pain(ful) 15 
cuts 12.5 
point 12.5 
radioactive 10 
war 7.5 
death 5 
dangerous 5 
~[~ 
-40 for all norms] 
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GUN A% DAGGER A% WHIP A% 
Typ-l.26 Typ-l.52 Typ-2.95 
X-7.S r-.83 X-6.3 r-.92 X-5.2 r-. 71 
bullet(s) 70 sharp 95 leather 60 
trigger 45 point(ed) 52.5 long 55 
barrel 45 handle/hilt 50 lash 32.5 
metal 42.5 blade 42.5 thong 30 
wood 40 metal 37.5 arrows 47.5 
loud bang 25 steel 32.5 handle 25 
chambers 22.5 short 27.5 thin 17.5 
dangerous 22.5 shiny 20 crack 15 
handle 22.5 long 17.5 cat'o' 9 tails 12.5 
small 20 small 17.5 bullwhip 10 
shoots 20 sheath 15 curlin 10 
long 17.5 kills 12.5 coil 7.5 
steel 10 weapon 7.5 hide 7.5 
kills 10 dangerous 7.5 birch 5.0 
shiny 10 knife 5 cane 5.0 
stock 7.5 wood 5 black 5.0 
silencer 7.5 silver 5 hurt(fu1) S.O 
weapon 5 bloody 5 iJain(ful) S.O 
black 5 horses S.O 
machine gun 5 circus S.O 
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BOW (a weapon) A% SLINGSHOT A% TRUNCHEON A% 
Typ-3.30 Typ-4.20 Typ-4.86 
X-4.1 r-.91 X-3.8 r-.78 X.-5.8 r-.85 
string 62.5 stone 52.5 long 75 
Wood(en) 50 elastic(bands) 45 wooden 72.5 
long 47.5 leather thong 27.5 hard 70 
arrows 47.5 David & Goliath 20 heavy 47.5 
arc 32.5 cloth 17.5 black 32.5 
curved 25 weapon 12.5 leather 27.5 
target 17.5 ball 7.5 rubber 22.5 
flexible 12.5 hard 7.5 policeman 20 
taut 10 catapult 7.5 blunt 15 
bendy 5 leather 5 phallic 15 
tWine 5 wooden 5 rounded 10 
gut 5 £lys 5 short 10 
string 5 solid 10 
aim 5 dark 10 
fishing 5 smooth 7.5 
handle 7.5 
slender 5 
thin 5 
dangerous 5 
hit 5 
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BIRD A% 
X-6.l r-.93 
feathers 82.5 
wings 67.5 
beak/bill 55 
£lys 52.5 
legs 45 
tail 32.5 
webbed feet 30 
sma11 25 
large 20 
colourful 17 .5 
black 15 
eyes(beady) 15 
song/ sings 10 
talons 7.5 
feet 5 
chirps 5 
claws 5 
head 5 
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ROBIN A% BLACKBIRD A% PARROT A% 
typ-l.ll Typ-l.14 Typ-2.98 
X-6.7 r-.91 X-5.8 r-.62 X-S.l r-.81 
redbreast 97.5 black 82.5 talks/ talkative 80 
feathers 62.5 feathers 55 feathers 55 
small 60 yellow bill 47.5 green 52.5 
brown 57.5 Sings/song 45 beak 50 
wings 52.5 beak 35 colourful 40 
bird 47.5 wings 32.5 bird 40 
christmas 37.5 large 27.5 red 35 
beak 32.5 orange beak 22.5 multicoloured 30 (thin) lags 27.5 legs 20 yellow 27.5 
flys 22.5 £lys 20 blue 20 
snow 10 brown IS wings 15 
winter 5 bird 10 squwaks 15 
sings 5 small 7.5 long beak 10 
feet 5 tail 7.5 noisy 7.5 
plump 5 feet 5 caged 7.5 
boys name 5 claws 5 voice 7.5 
sleek 5 flies 7.5 
long tail 5 
exotic 5 
plumage 5 
large 5 
tropical 5 
curved beak 5 
acreeches 5 
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DUCK A% PENGUIN A% OSTRICH A% 
Typ-3.02 Typ-4.17 Typ ... 4.43 
X-5.7 r-.69 X-5.5 r-.7 X .. 4.6 r-.67 
bill/beak 77 .5 black & white 92.5 long neck 55 
webbed feet 62.5 bill/beak 50 feathers(ed) 52.5 
feathers 52.5 webbed feet 47.5 long legs 50 
quacks 52.5 artic/antartic 45 tall 40 
brown 35 flightless 37.5 large 35 
swims 3S waddles 32.5 black & white 27.5 
white 27.5 feathers 27.5 flightless 22.5 
water 27 .5 wings 25 grey 17 .5 
wings 25 tubby 17.5 beak 15 
swims 25 yellow beak 17.5 legs 15 
small 17.5 swims 15 large eggs 12.5 
bread 15 flippers 15 buries head 12.8 
bird 10 large 12.5 scrraggy 12.5 
wet 10 fat 10 large eyes 7.5 
dives 10 stout 10 big feet 7.5 
eats 7.5 bird 7.5 small wings 5 
flys 7.5 short 7.5 tiny head 5 
found on ponds 5 fluffy 5 ugly 5 
smooth 5 upright 5 large 5 
soft 5 sqwauks 5 fast 5 
noisy 5 bleets 5 bird 5 
greasy 5 slides 5 
meat 5 
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VEGETABLE A% 
X .. 4.3 r-.51 
green 42.5 
hard 30 
dirty 25 
grows 22.5 
round 17.5 
long 15 
colour 15 
tasty 12.5 
edible 12.5 
brown 12.5 
ground 10 
food 10 
seeds 10 
skin/peel 7.5 
cookable 7.5 
leaves 7.5 
roots 7.5 
peas 5 
colour 5 
carrots 5 
bitter raw 5 
potato 5 
crisp 5 
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POTATO A% CARROT A% CORN A% 
Typ-l.21 Typ-l.28 TYP"2.99 
X-s.7 r-.s9 X-6.1 r-.73 X-s.9 r-.67 
brown 52.5 orange 95 yellow 81 
round 47.5 long 62.5 cob 47.5 
dirty 45 pointed 50 tall 42.5 
white 45 green leaves 42.5 sweet 35 
eyes 40 tasty 37.5 green 35 
peel 40 sweet 32.5 long 30 
muddy 32.5 tapered 27.5 flakes 27.5 
roast 27.5 muddy 20 stem 25 
chips 25 hard 17 .5 stalk 25 
mashed 17.5 knobbly 15 leaves 20 
large 15 crisp 15 ears 17.5 
hard 15 roots 12.5 fields 17.5 
small 12.5 grows 12.5 buttered 12.5 
mis-shapen 10 elongated 10 round 12.5 
knobly 10 fat 7.5 3waying 10 
thick skinned 7.5 rigid 7.5 vegetable 10 
grow in ground 5 narrow 5 foot 7.5 
vegetable 5 crunchy 5 bolled 7.5 
lumpy 5 peel 5 edible 7.5 
roots 5 juice 5 jokes 5 
skin 5 small 5 
edible 5 flour 5 
dirty 5 golden 5 
cereal 5 
old films 5 
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CRESS A% RICE AX PEANUT A% 
Typ.3.08 Typ-4.98 Typ-5.73 
X-4.3 r-.S8 X-4.8 r=.73 X-S.2 r-.74 
green 82.5 white 87.5 salty(ed) 87.5 
thin whitestems 47.5 small 50 small 52.5 
Small 45 puddings 42.5 brown SO 
green leaves 37.5 with curry 40 roasted 45 
leaves 32.5 paddyUelds 37.5 hard 42.5 
mustard 27.5 grains 35 shell 35 
seeds 25 long grain 27.5 greasey 32.5 
salad 20 brown 25 wi.th alchohol 27.5 
muddy roots 17.5 hard 25 oval 17.5 
blotting paper 15 fluffy 20 crunchy/chewy 17.5 
grown in water 12.5 sticky 17.5 yellow 12.5 
tasteless 12.5 oval 17.5 packets 12 .5 
tasty 10 fried 12.5 rich in protein 10 
black seeds 10 edible 12.5 brittle 7.5 
stalks 10 small grain 10 breaks in two 7.5 
tendrils 10 foreign 7.5 edible 5 
spindly 7.5 boiled 7.5 dry roasted 5 
wet 7.5 chinese food 7.5 kernel 5 
edible 5 food 7.5 oily 5 
garnish 5 yellow 5 tasty 5 
bitter 5 swells 5 K.P 5 
sharp 5 curvy 5 
.peppery 5 tatsy 5 
crisp 5 bland 5 
limp 5 starchy 5 
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CLOTHING A% 
X-4.1 r-4.5 
warm 47.5 
soft 35 
sleeves 30 
woollen 27.5 
material 20 
legs 20 
bright colours 17.5 
comfortable 15 
buttons 15 
pockets 12.5 
lapels 12.5 
collar 10 
shirt 7.5 
arms 7.5 
cotton 7.5 
nylon 5 
coat 5 
zips 5 
acrylic 5 
jeans 5 
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JACKET A% SHIRT A% PYJAMAS A% 
Typ-1.24 Typ-1.25 Typ-2.87 
X-3.9 r-4.2 X-5.6 r-.83 X-3.0 r-.49 
sleeves 55 collar 75 stripes(d) 67.5 
wartn 45 sleeves 60 two piece 37.5 
pockets 37.5 buttons 57.5 buttons 20 
velvet 27.5 white 50 cord 20 
button(s) 25 cotton 47.5 nightwear 17.5 
clothing 20 cuffs 20 baggy 17.5 
black 17.5 stripes 17.5 soft 15 
dark blue 15 tail 12.5 warm 15 
vented bdck 15 nylon 7.5 collar 10 
checked 12.5 tie 7.5 cotton 10 
collar 12.5 various colours 7.5 legs 10 
leather 12.5 button holes 7.5 clothes 7.5 
wool 10 checked 5 sleeves 7.5 
double breasted 7.5 ironing 5 blue & white 7.5 
belted 5 light 5 flannel 5 
twill 5 plain 5 men's apparell 5 
Soft 5 patterened 5 hot 5 
smart 5 pockets 5 bed 5 
large 5 silk 5 arms 5 
two arms 5 silk 5 
anorak 5 paisely 5 
blazer 5 partywear 5 
tweed 5 fleecy 5 
potato skin 5 frilly 5 
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NYLONS A% HAIRBAND A% PURSE A% 
Typ 3.25 Typ-6.06 Typ-6.47 
X-4.8 r-.40 X-3.6 r-.62 X=-5.4 r=.81 
stockings 47.5 coloured 42.5 leather 85 
silky 40 elastic 42.5 clip 40 
sheer 37.5 velevet 27.5 clasp 37.5 
seam 32.5 stretchy 25 zip 37.5 
brown 32.5 tidy 17.5 compartments 30 
suspenders 27.5 long hair 15 brown 15 
legs 17.5 ribbon 12.5 black 15 
long 15 nylon 12.5 small 12.5 
coloured 10 plastic 7.5 wallet 12.5 
dark 10 wide 7.5 metal catch 10 
smooth 7.5 cloth 7.5 round 7.5 
sexy 7.5 red 5 square 7.5 
tops 7.5 old fashioned 5 divided 5 
feet 7.5 holds hair 5 change 5 
laddered 5 thick 5 cheque 5 
tights 5 circular 5 tickets 5 
black 5 white 5 bills 5 
tan 5 black 5 receipits 5 
net 5 ballet 5 
sleek 5 
clinging 5 
soft 5 
fine 5 
heel 5 
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FURNITURE A% 
X-4.1 r-.38 
wooden 52.5 
large 30 
hard 27.5 
legs 20 
soft 17.5 
corners 15 
small 12.5 
plastic 12.5 
comfortable 10 
expensive 10 
metal 7.5 
arms 7.5 
back 7.5 
covered 7.5 
flat surface 5 
work on 5 
sit 5 
cushion 5 
seat 5 
bed 5 
chair 5 
eat off 5 
large 5 
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TABLE A% BED A% MIRROR A% 
Typ-l.23 Typ-l.29 Typ=4.48 
X-7.6 r-.56 X-7.3 r-.62 X=5.9 r-.72 
wood(en) 95 soft 47.5 reflects 75 
square 60 sheets 47.5 glass 60 
four legs 50 mattress 45 shiny/shine 30 
legs 47.5 sleep(on) 42.5 silver(ed) 27.5 
polished 30 warm 27.5 wood frame 27.5 
round 30 pillow 25 large 20 
flat 20 rectangle(ular) 25 square 17 .5 
brown 20 blankets 22.5 round 15 
eat off 20 comfortable 20 hangs on wall 15 
leaf 15 long 15 ornate 12.5 
grain(ed) 10 wooden 15 flat 12.5 
oak 10 springs 15 small 12.5 
shiny 7.5 duvet 12.5 smooth 10 
oblong 7.5 wide 12.5 clear 10 
work on 7.5 cosey 12.5 clean 5 
tablecloth 7.5 large 10 sharp corners 5 
metal 5 head 10 rectangle 5 
plastic 5 double 10 oval 5 
glas8 5 single 7.5 cracked 5 
shiny 5 pillow 7.5 smoked 5 
smooth 5 flat 7.5 
oval 5 oblong 7.5 
long 5 square 7.5 
black 5 big 5 
top 5 springy 5 
nested 5 hard 5 
foot 5 
covered 5 
quilt 5 
canopied 5 
bolster 5 
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RUG A% TELEPHONE A% ASHTRAY A% 
Typ-4.49 Typ-5.69 Typ-6.01 
X-5.8 r-.55 X-7.4 r-.87 X-6.3 r-.69 
wool(ly) 47.5 dial 62.5 dirty 77 .5 
square 32.5 ring 57.5 glass 55 
small 30 receiver 47.5 smelly 50 
fringed 30 plastic 45 round 47.5 
round 27.5 black 25 contains ash & 
soft 22.5 talk 25 used cigarettes 47.5 
warm 20 speakthrough 22.5 square 22.5 
rectangular 20 buttons 20 metal 20 
shaggy 17.5 bell 20 heavy 17.5 
piece of carpe 17 .5 numbers 20 ash 17.5 
fire 15 wires 20 wood (en) 12.5 
Pile 15 red 17.5 plastic 12.5 
woven 12.5 white 15 smoke 10 
sheep's skin 12.5 coloured 15 small 10 
cosy 10 box . 15 filthy 7.5 
patterned 10 cream 12.5 corners 7.5 
hearth rug 7.5 communicate 12.5 dish 7.5 
flat 7.5 engaged 10 pottery 5 
goat's skin 7.5 handle 10 indents 5 
oval 5 mouthpiece 7.5 lipstick 5 
large 5 speaker 7.5 writing 5 
nylon 5 earpiece 7.5 pipe 5 
tuft 5 lead 5 
many colours 5 dialing tone 5 
fluffy 5 directory 5 
mat 5 
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FRUIT A% 
X"'4.3 1'".54 
soft 45 
juicy 37.5 
sweet 30 
yellow 25 
green 25 
red 22.5 
pips 17.5 
skin 15 
edible 15 
stalks 10 
hard 7.5 
small 7.5 
round 7.5 
orange 5 
peel 5 
tastey 5 
apple 5 
stem 5 
leaves 5 
bananna 5 
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APPLE A% PEAR A% BERRY A% 
TYP"1.15 typa 1.30 Typ-3.41 
X-7.1 r-.82 X-6.1 r-.78 X-5.9 r-.67 
green 95 green 87.5 red 75 
red 92.5 juicy 52.5 black 67.5 
round 52.5 stalk 47.5 round 50 
pips 50 soft 30 small 47.5 
sweet 50 tree 30 juicy 30 juicy 47.5 fruit 30 poison(ous) 25 
core 25 sweet 22.5 (grows on)bush 25 
tree 17 .5 brown 17.5 wine 15 
peel/skin 15 hard 12.5 birds eat them 15 
crisp 12.5 yellow 10 fruit 12.5 
yellow 12.5 skin/peel 10 wild 7.5 
Shiny 10 tasty 7.5 sweet 7.5 
sour 5 pips/seeds 7.5 logan 5 
stalk 5 tear-shaped 7.5 pies 5 
hard 5 bulbous 5 winter 5 
fruit 5 orchard 5 autumn 5 
edible 5 rounded 5 bunches 5 
white flesh 5 small 5 edible 5 
crunchy 5 rough skin 5 elder 5 
computer 5 spots 5 smooth 5 
firm 5 hard 5 
oval 5 <Joft 5 
mull- S 
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PRUNES A% OLIVE A% . PICKLE Ai. 
'l'yp-3.84 Typ-5.57 Typ-6.64 
X-5.1 r-.83 X-6.5 r-.79 x-L1 r-.59 
black 77 .5 green 92.5 brown 50 
wrinkled 62.5 black 75 onion 47.5 
soft 32.5 oil(y) 47.5 spicy 45 
juicy 32.5 bitter 40 vinegar 35 
stones 37.5 small 37.5 sweet 30 
custard 25 stuffed 35. tasty 25 
sweet 20 Greece 27.5 sour 22.5 
school 15 oval 22.5 sharp 17.5 
dried 15 round 20 gerkin 17.5 
fruit 7.5 trees 15 tangy 15 
dark 7.5 red dot 12.5 yellow 12.5 
shrivelled 7.5 fruit 10 lumpy 12.5 
crinkley 5 cocktail 10 chunky 10 
dried plums 5 sour 7.5 sticky 10 
syrup 5 branch 5 ploughman's 7.5 
laxitive 5 leaves 5 chutney 7.5 
groves 5 fruity 7.5 
smooth 5 hot 7.5 
savoury 7.5 
green 5 
Pan Yan 5 
piccallili 5 
runny 5 
sauce 5 
mango 5 
lime 5 
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VEHICLE 
X-6.6 r-.78 
wheels 52.5 
transport 45 
metal 37.5 
large 30 
motorised 30 
engine 27.5 
windows 20 
movement 20 
seat 17.5 
car 15 
brakes 15 
tires 12.5 
carries 10 
bike 10 
door 7.5 
bus 7.5 
carriages 7.5 
power 5 
big 5 
train 5 
speed 5 
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CAR A% BUS A% WAGON A% 
Typ-1.11 Typ .. 1.26 Typ-3.47 
X-7.4 r-.72 X-7.7 r-.81 X-5.3 r-.71 
wheels 52.5 red 75 wheels 72.5 
seats 47.5 green 67.5 wooden 60 
metal 45 double decker 55 horse(s) 50 
windows 37.5 conducter 27.5 covered 42.5 
lights 37.5 fare 27.5 canvas cover 22.5 
brakes 22.5 tickets 25 indians 17.5 
large 22.5 late 25 large 17.5 
fast 20 seats 20 brown 15 
steering wheel 17.5 stairs 20 reins 15 
engine 15 windows 17.5 western 15 
tyres 15 Bingle decker 17 .5 old fashioned 12.5 
body 15 bell 15 transport 12.5 
boot 15 passengers 10 canopy 10 
rubber 12.5 wheels 10 cowboys 10 
horn 12.5 big 10 circle 7.5 
transport 10 large 7.5 four wheeled 7.5 
dashboard 10 long 7.5 metal 5 
shiny 7.5 stops 7.5 spokes 5 
clean 7.5 covered in- heavy 5 
expensive 7.5 -adverts 7.5 back flaps 5 
carry 5 noisy 7.5 painted 5 
four wheels 5 tall 5 pull along 5 
seat belts 5 heavy 5 freight 5 
bonnet 5 smokey 5 gypsy caravan 5 
'L' plate 5 driver 5 
big 5 travel on 5 
fast 5 mirror 5 
rust 5 timetable 5 
mirrors 5 engine 5 
motor 5 
door 5 
upholstery 5 
clutch 5 
gears 5 
blue 5 
red 5 
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snIP A% SKIIS A% SURFBOARD A% 
Typ-3.68 Typ-5.47 TYP"5.92 
X-5.5 r-.41 X-6.1 r-.52 X-5.3 r-.71 
large 52.5 long 92.5 long 67.5 
funnels 47.5 snow 47.5 wood (en) 52.5 
sails 42.5 pointed 30 flat 27.5 
metal 40 curves up 27.5 thin 22.5 
sea 37.5 wooden 27.5 pointed 22.5 
floats 25 smooth 20 curves up 17.5 
long 25 thin 17.5 smooth 15 
passengers 22.5 flat 12.5 waves 15 
wood 20 pairs/two 12.5 hard 12.5 
deck(s) 17.5 coloured 12.5 fiberglass 12.5 
mast 17.5 narrow 12.5 plastic 10 
big 15 fast 10 oval 10 
engines 12.5 speed 7.5 sleek 10 
steam 10 slopes 7.5 fast 10 
captain 10 winter sports. 7.5 sea 7.5 
crew 10 waxed 7.5 Malibu 7.5 
cabins 7.5 plastic 5 glides 7.5 
grey 7.5 fibre glass 5 coloured 7.5 
cargo 7.5 sharp 5 floats 5 
enormous 5 flat 5 rounded end 5 
-hull 5 straight 5 narrow 5 
ballrooms 5 sticks 5 stand on 5 
anchor 5 boots 5 lie on 5 
bow 5 sail 5 
fast 5 fin 5 
stern 5 
life boats 5 
iron 5 
cabins 5 
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SPORT 
X=s.1 r-.49 
teams 40 
competition 37.5 
ball 22.5 
run(ing) 22.5 
sweat 20 
energentic 20 
active 17.5 
games 17.5 
players 15 
strip 15 
rackets 15 
referees 15 
spectators 12.5 
stadium 10 
television 10 
horses 7.5 
track 7.5 
shorts 5 
boots 5 
shirt 5 
trainers 5 
winners 5 
crowds 5 
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TENNIS A% RUGBY A% ARCHERY A% 
Typ-l.29 Typ-l.35 Typ-3.13 
X-7.6 r-.78 X-3.8 r-.39 X-5.7 r-.74 
ball(s) 90 ball 47.5 arrows 92.5 
rackets 77 .5 oval ball 32.5 bow 67.5 
net 57.5 rough 30 target 62.5 
court 50 scrum 25 bullseye 45 
Wimbledon 47.5 tall goalposts 22.5 Robin Hood 40 
game 35 striped/hooped-
umpire 35 -shirts 17.5 sport 30 
lines 27.5 players 15 quiver 27.5 
shorts 25 pitch 15 points 22.5 
summer 20 'H' shape posts 12.5 green 17.5 
linesmen 20 game 12.5 crossbow 12.5 
grass 17.5 field 10 red 10 
white clothes 17.5 running 10 blue 10 
white 12.5 muddy 10 gold 7.5 
fast 10 men 10 straw 7.5 
making strokes 10 town 7.5 aim 5 
sport 10 leather ball 7.5 pull 5 
shirts 10 power 7.5 string S 
gravel 7.5 15-a-side 7.5 wood 5 
plimsoles 7.5 teams 5 medieval wars 5 
white skirt 7.5 line out 5 
high chair 5 ruck 5 
players 5 maul 5 
crowd 5 shorts 5 
catgut 5 violence 5 
serve 5 headbands 5 
volley 5 
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SAILING A% CHESS A% SUNBATHING A% 
Typ"'3.18 Typ-5.52 Typ=6.92 
X .. 5.6 r=.52 X-6.5 r=.82 X=6.9 r-.61 
boat(s) 60 board 72.5 tan 52. 5 
water 52.5 black & white 60 brown 52.5 
wind(y) 52.5 game 52.5 hot/heat 50 
sea 47.5 pawns 50 sun 45 
dingy 25 squares 30 swimsuit 42.5 
wet 20 queen 30 beach 40 
lifebelt 17 .5 king 27.5 sand 37.5 
yatch 15 pieces 27.5 oil 22.5 
racing 12.5 chessmen 20 burn(ing) 20 
yatch 10 bishops 17.5 lazy 17 .5 
blue 10 knights 17.5 lying in sun 17 .5 
white 10 rooks 17.5 warm 17 .5 
sou'westers 7.5 wooden 12.5 relaxing 12. 5 
tacking 7.5 checkmate 10 suntan lotions 12. 5 
rigging 7.5 pieces of wood 7.5 holiday 10 
sea gulls 5 carved 7.5 sunglasses 10 
lakes 5 ivory 7.5 bikini 7.5 
rivers 5 check 5 books 7.5 
waves 5 Championships 5 cream 7.5 
mast 5 long thought 5 peaceful 7.5 
galley 5 skill 5 boring 5 
oilskins 5 castles 5 ambre solaire 5 
oars 5 warfare 5 topless 5 
nakedness 5 
towel 5 
airbed 5 
sea 5 
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TOY 
X-3.7 r-.41 
soft 40 
play 37.5 
cuddly 30 
wooden 27.5 
plastic 22.5 
legs 17.5 
arms 17.5 
children 15 
shoots 15 
bows & arrows 12.5 
video games 12.5 
tough 10 
board games 10 
bucket & spade 10 
~yg~ 5 
wheels 5 
swings 5 
bike 5 
cowboy clothes 5 
nurse ~iform 5 
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TEDDY BEAR A% DOLL A% BALLOON A% 
Typ.,.I.27 Typ-l.44 Typ-3.03 
X-5.8 r-.83 X-4.9 r-.61 X-7.3 r-.54 
cuddly 70 dressed(s) 45 round 77 .5 
soft 55 plastic 42.5 light 52.5 
yellow 50 small 30 coloured 50 
brown 27.5 soft 22.5 floats 47.5 
legs 25 pretty 22.5 rubber 45 
arms 20 large 17.5 red 40 
glass eyes 20 pink 17.5 inflatable 35 
furry 17.5 eyes 15 blue 25 
nose 17.5 arms 12.5 plastic 22.5 
golden 15 legs 10 pops 20 
orange 12.5 rag 10 hanging basket 17 .5 
warm 10 girl's toy 10 very large 15 
fluffy 10 fixed stare 7.5 full of air 15 
eyes 7.5 hair 7.5 lonp, 12.5 
small 7.5 blonde 7.5 gas 12.5 
black nose 7.5 humanoid 5 yellow 12.5 
squeaky 5 cuddly 5 green 10 
fat 5 china 5 small 10 
ears 5 porcelain 5 squeeks 10 
black & orange- clothes 5 string 7.5 
-eyes 5 nylon hair 5 decoration 7.5 
friend 5 fun 7.5 
b~ng 5 
£lys 5 
RI01 5 
sandbags 5 
funny shapes 5 
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SKATES A% STILTS A% CARDS A% 
Typ-3.12 Typ-3.69 Typ-5.34 
X-4.7 r-.63 X-4.4 r-.78 X-S.2 r-.39 
wheels 72.5 wooden 87.5 playing 37.5 
ice 52.5 tall [er] 60 small 25 
roller 47.5 long 30 numbered 25 
blades 25 clowns 27.5 pack 20 
boots 22.5 two 25 rectangular 20 
laces 20 thin 25 greetings 20 
white 20 pillars 17.5 red 17.5 
straps 15 handles 15 black 17 .5 
fast 12.5 high 12.5 cardboard 15 
metal 12.5 circus 12.5 hearts 15 
ball bearings 10 narrow 10 games 15 
sharp 7.5 walk on 7.5 pictures 12.5 
buckles 7.5 straight 5 patterned 12.5 
speed 5 bits for feet 5 trumps 10 
rink 5 wobble 5 birthday 7.5 
frozen lakes 5 striped trouser 5 tricks 7.5 
cold 5 diamonds 7.5 
shoes 5 clubs 5 
steel 5 whist 5 
christmas 5 
post 5 
'get-well-soon' 5 
employment 5 
plastic 5 
coloured 5 
fifty two 5 
suits 5 
jokers 5 
ace 5 
king 5 
jack 5 
poker 5 
bridge 5 
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Stimuli employed in experiment 7 
The exemplars and attribute statements used in experiment 7 
are listed in two sets. Each set contains 36 true followed 
36 false attribute statements and corresponding exemplars. 
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Set 1 
Exemplar Attribute Statement 
[True] 
BED: FOUND IN A BEDROOM 
MIRROR: FOUND IN A BATHROOM 
TELEPHONE: FOUND IN THE OFFICE 
APPLE: KEPT IN A FRUIT BOWL 
PRUNES: ARE SOLD IN TINS 
PICKLE: IS SOLD IN JARS 
SHIRT: OFTEN WORN BY MEN 
NYLONS: WORN ON THE LEGS 
HAIRBAND: WORN ON THE HEAD 
TABLE: CAN BE MADE OF WOOD 
RUG: MAY HAVE A FRINDGE 
ASHTRAY: CAN BE VERY DIRTY 
PEAR: ARE GREEN IN COLOUR 
BERRY: ARE USUALLY SMALL 
OLIVE: CAN BE VERY OILY 
JACKET: USUALLY HAS SLEEVES 
PYJAMAS: CAN HAVE STRIPES 
PURSE: IS MADE OF LEATHER 
TABLE: KEPT IN DINNING ROOM 
RUG: FOUND BY THE FIRESIDE 
ASHTRAY: OFTEN FOUND IN PUBS 
PEAR: IS FOUND ON A TREE 
BERRY: IS FOUND ON A BUSH 
OLIVE: IS GROWN IN ITALY 
JACKET: KEPT IN A WARDROBE 
PYJAMAS: OFTEN WORN IN BED 
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Exemplar Attribute Statement 
[True] 
PURSE: KEPT IN A HANDBAG 
BED: CAN HAVE A MATTRESS 
MIRROR: SHOWS A REFLECTION 
TELEPHONE: USUALLY HAS A DIAL 
APPLE: ARE RED IN COLOUR 
PRUNES: ARE VERY WRINKLED 
PICKLE: CAN CONTAIN ONION 
SHIRT: USUALLY HAS A COLLAR 
NYLONS: USUALLY ARE SILKY 
HAIRBAND: IS MADE OF ELASTIC 
Exemplar Attribute Statement 
[False] 
POTATO: SOLD IN A CHEMISTS 
CORN: GROWS ON TREES 
PEANUTS: GROWN IN ICELAND 
BLACKBIRD: FOUND IN A SALAD 
PARROT: KEPT IN A TIN 
OSTRICH: FOUND IN A DESK 
TENNIS : PLAYED AT SEA 
ARCHERY: PRACTISED IN A BATH 
SUNBATHING: DONE IN A CUPBOARD 
CARROT: IS BLUE IN COLOUR 
CRESS: CAN BE VERY TALL 
RICE: IS RED IN COLOUR 
ROBIN: CAN BE VERY TALL 
DUCK: HAS VERY SHARP CLAW S 
PENGUIN: HAS FOUR LEGS 
Appendix D Page D.61 
Exemplar Attribute Statement 
[False] 
RUGBY: USES CLAY PIGEONS 
SAILING: IS DONE ON STILTS 
CHESS: PLAYED WITH RACKETS 
CARROT: IS KEPT IN A CAGE 
CRESS: FOUND IN ICECREAM 
RICE: GROWN IN SCOTLAND 
ROBIN: LIVES IN A BOTTLE 
DUCK: FOUND IN A BEDROOM 
PENGUIN: LIVES IN DESERTS 
RUGBY: PLAYED ON A TABLE 
SAILING: IS DONE ON GRASS 
CHESS: PLAYED ON AN COURT 
POTATO: IS SQUARE IN SHAPE 
CORN: IS GREY IN COLOUR 
PEANUTS: ARE EXTREEMLY BIG 
BLACKBIRD: IS COVERED IN FUR 
PARROT: IS COVERED IN SCALES 
OSTRICH: HAS TWO LONG FANGS 
TENNIS: PLAYED WITH A LANCE 
ARCHERY: IS DONE USING STONES 
SUNBATHING: IS DONE USING JAM 
Set 2 
Exemplar 
POTATO 
CRESS 
RICE 
Attribute Statement 
[True] 
SOLD IN A GROCERS' 
SERVED IN SALAD 
SERVED WITH CURRY 
Appendix D Page D.62 
Exemplar Attribute Statement 
[True] 
ROBIN PERCHES IN A TREE 
PARROT KEPT IN A CAGE 
OSTRICH FOUND AT THE ZOO 
RUGBY PLAYED ON A PITCH 
SAILING IS DONE ON WATER 
CHESS PLAYED ON A BOARD 
CARROT IS OFTEN POINTED 
CORN IS BRIGHT YELLOW 
PEANUTS ARE OFTEN SALTED 
BLACKBIRD HAS BLACK FEATHERS 
DUCK HAS WEBBED FEET 
PENGUIN IS BLACK AND WHITE 
TENNIS PLAYED WITH A BALL 
ARCHERY DONE USING A BOW 
SUNBATHING IS GETTING TANNED 
CARROT ARE OFTEN TINNED 
CORN IS GROWN IN FIELDS 
PEANUTS SOLD IN PACKETS 
BLACKBIRD SEEN IN THE GARDEN 
DUCK IS FOUND ON A POND 
PENGUIN LIVES AT SOUTH POLE 
TENNIS DONE AT WIMBLEDON 
ARCHERY PRACTICED IN A FIELD 
SUNBATHING IS DONE ON A BEACH 
POTATO IS BROWN IN COLOUR 
CRESS HAS GREEN LEAVES 
RICE IS WHITE IN COLOUR 
Appendix D 
Exemplar 
ROBIN 
PARROT 
OSTRICH 
RUGBY 
SAILING 
CHESS 
Exemplar 
TABLE 
MIRROR 
ASHTRAY 
APPLE 
BERRY 
OLIVE 
SHIRT 
PYJAMAS 
HAIRBAND 
BED 
RUG 
TELEPHONE 
PEAR 
PRUNES 
PICKLE 
JACKET 
NYLONS 
PURSE 
Attribute Statement 
[True] 
HAS A REDBREAST 
IS USUALLY GREEN 
HAS A LONG NECK 
USES TALL GOAL POSTS 
NEEDS A BRISK WIND 
PLAYED WITH PAWNS 
Attribute Statement 
[False] 
KEPT IN A TOILET 
STORED IN A TIN 
SOLD IN A GROCERS' 
KEPT IN A TOOL BOX 
IS GROWN IN WATER 
IS GROWN IN SUGAR 
KEPT IN A BARREL 
WORN AT THE OFFICE 
WORN ON THE KNEECAP 
IS MADE OF ROCK 
IS MADE OF CLAY 
IS MADE OF WOOL 
IS PINK IN COLOUR 
ARE MADE OF METAL 
IS MADE OF EGGS 
IS WORN ON SHINS 
ARE MADE OF SACK 
IS MADE OF GLASS 
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Appendix 0 
Exemplar 
BED 
RUG 
TELEPHONE 
PEAR 
PRUNES 
PICKLE 
JACKET 
NYLONS 
PURSE 
TABLE 
MIRROR 
ASHTRAY 
APPLE 
BERRY 
OLIVE 
SHIRT 
PYJAMAS 
HAIRBAND 
Attribute Statement 
[False] 
STORED IN A FIELD 
KEPT IN A POCKET 
FOUND IN A BOTTLE 
SOLD IN A TOYSHOP 
ARE SOLD IN TUBES 
IS SOLD IN BINS 
WORN ON THE NOSE 
WORN ON THE EARS 
KEPT IN THE OVEN 
IS MADE OF COTTON 
IS MADE OF STRING 
IS MADE OF CREAM 
TAPERS TO A POINT 
IS MADE OF METAL 
IS A BRIGHT RED 
IS MADE OF IRON 
ARE MADE OF BRICK 
IS MADE OF PASTRY 
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Stimuli employed in experiment 8 
The 96 dual cues employed in experiment 8 are listed on the 
following pages in the format in which they were presented. 
The exemplars for which they were cues are they same as those 
employed in experiment 4 [with the exception of the category 
Weapon] see appendix c. 
Appendix D Page D.66 
1 PERSON / WARDROBE: ? 
--
2 LEGS / SHOPS: _________________ ? 
3 HANDBAG / POCKET: ? 
4 TREE / TINS: ? 
5 BUSH / TREE: ? 
6 GREECE / ITALY: _________________ ? 
7 BED / TOYSHOP: ? 
8 PARTY / FAIRGROUND: ? 
-------------------
9 CIRCUS / PLAYGROUND: ? 
10 GARDEN / TREE: ________________ ? 
11 CAGE / ZOO: ? 
12 ANTARTIC / ZOO: _________________ ? 
13 GARDEN / GREENGROCERS': ? 
14 FIELDS / TIN: ? 
15 PACKET / PUB: ? 
16 ROAD / STATION: _________________ ? 
17 WESTERNS / RAILWAYS: _______________ ? 
18 SEA / CALIFORNIA: ? 
19 COURTS / WIMBLEDON: ? 
20 MEADOW / SHERWOOD FOREST: 1 
21 CLUB / RUSSIA: ? 
22 BEDROOM / HOSPITAL: ? 
23 FLOOR / FIRESIDE: ? 
24 OFFICE / BOX: ? 
25 RED / DOUBLE DECKER: ? 
26 WOODEN / WHEELS : ________ . - ______ 1 
27 LONG / WOODEN:_________ ? 
28 BALLS / RACQUETS : ________________ ? 
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~9 ARROWS / TARGET: ? 
30 BOARD / BLACK & WHITE: ? 
31 SOFT / SHEETS: ? 
32 WOOLLY / FRINGED: ? 
33 RING / DIAL: ? 
34 REDBREAST / FEATHERS: ? 
35 TALKS / GREEN: ? 
36 BLACK & WHITE / BEAK: ? 
37 ORANGE / LONG: ? 
30 YELLOW / COB: ? 
39 SALTY / BROWN: ? 
40 SLEEVES / PACKETS: ? 
41 SILKY / SHEER: ? 
42 CLIP / ZIP: ? 
43 JUICY / TREE: ? 
44 BLACK / RED: ? 
45 GREEN / BLACK: ? 
46 CUDDLY / SOFT: ? 
47 ROUND / INFLATED: ? 
48 WOODEN / SUPPORT: ? 
49 GARAGE / ROAD: ? 
50 SEA / DOCK: ? 
51 SNOW / SWITZERLAND: ? 
52 FIELD / rwrCKENHAM: ? 
53 LAKE / SEA: ? 
54 BEACH / GARDEN: ? 
55 DINNINGROOM / OFFICE: ? 
56 BATHROOM / HALL: ? 
57 TABLE / PUB: ? 
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58 TREES / GARDEN: ? 
---------------
59 POND / LAKE: ___________________ ? 
60 ZOO / AFRICA: _________________ ? 
61 GREENGROCERS' / FIELD: ? 
62 SALAD / GREENGROCERS': ? 
-------------------
63 PADDYFIELDS / CURRY: ? 
--------------------------
64 SHOP / WASHING LINE : ___________________ ? 
65 BED / BEDROOM: ? 
66 HEAD / HAIR: ? 
67 PIE / TREE: ____________________ ? 
68 TINS / SUPERMARKET: ? 
-------------------------
69 JAR / SANDWICH: ? 
-------------------------
70 PRAM / SHOP : _____________________ ? 
71 ICE RINK / SPORTS SHOP: ? 
72 CASINO / GAMES SHOP: ? 
--------------------
73 WHEELS / SEAT: _____________________ ? 
74 LARGE / FUNNELS: ___________________ ? 
75 LONG / POINTED: ? 
-------------------------
76 GAME / BALL: _____________________ ? 
77 BOAT / WATER: ? 
78 TAN / BROWN: ? 
79 WOODEN / SQUARE: ____________________ ? 
80 REFLECTION / GLASS: ________________ ? 
81 DIRTY / GLASS: ________________ ? 
82 BLACK / FEATHERS : _______________ ? 
83 BILL / WEBBED FEET: ? 
84 LONG NECK / FEATHI':RS: 
--------
-----? 
85 BROWN / ROUND: ? 
--------------------------
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86 GREEN / SMALL: ? 
. . . . . . . 
87 WHITE / SMALL: ? 
88 COLLAR / BUTTONS: ? 
89 STRIPED / STRING (CORD): ? 
90 ELASTIC / COLOURED: ? 
91 RED / GREEN: ? 
92 BLACK / WRINKLED: ? 
93 SPICY / BROWN: ? 
94 PLASTIC / DRESSED: ? 
95 BLADE / WHEELS: ? 
96 PLAYING / PACK: ? 
